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Ramesh Advani v. Hiro Advani

Delhi High Court
Jul 16, 2013
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for a declaration that he is a co-owner (1/3rd share) of property No. BA-238, Tagore Garden, New Delhi, for partition and for a permanent injunction restraining defendant no. 1 from dealing with the property. The plaint pleads that the plot was purchased in 1964 and a building constructed thereafter by the parties' father, Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani, from his self-acquired funds but in the name of his eldest son (defendant no. 1). The family allegedly lived jointly; after the father's death (1976) and the mother's death (1990) the plaintiff and the two defendants became joint owners. The plaintiff alleges that on 1 June 2012 defendant no. 1 denied him entry to the first floor where the plaintiff's belongings remain.

Summons and notice for interim relief were issued; ex parte interim relief (6 June 2012) restrained defendant from dealing with the first floor and a Court Commissioner was appointed to inventory articles. The Commissioner could not initially enter and the court ordered breaking open the door. Both defendants filed written statements: defendant no. 1 contested the claim; defendant no. 2 supported the plaintiff. The Commissioner later reported the premises appeared locked for a long time and contained belongings identified by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought interim relief restraining defendant no. 1 from interfering with use/ enjoyment of the first floor and barsati floor, delivery of keys deposited in court, comparison of signatures on an affidavit dated 23 December 1974 and reference of documents to a forensic laboratory. The court directed arguments on maintainability under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (the Benami Act) and reserved order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's claim (that the property was acquired and constructed by the father from his self-acquired funds but allotted in defendant no. 1's name) is barred by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's case falls within the exception(s) in Section 4(3) of the Benami Act — specifically (a) the coparcenary/Hindu undivided family exception and/or (b) the trustee/fiduciary exception — such that the bar in Section 4 would not apply.
  3. Whether interim relief (including restraint on dealing with the first floor and delivery of keys) should be granted in light of the Benami Act and the Commissioner’s report.
  4. Whether the court should compare or refer for expert examination the signatures on the affidavit dated 23 December 1974 relied on by defendant no. 1.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plot and construction were paid for and carried out by the father from his self-acquired funds though the allotment and record are in the name of defendant no. 1.
  • The family was a Joint Hindu Family at the time of acquisition; after the deaths of the parents the three children became joint owners with 1/3rd shares each.
  • The first floor was in the plaintiff’s occupation and his belongings remain there; he sought protection against dispossession and interim relief.
  • Contended that the case is covered by the exception in Section 4(3) of the Benami Act (allegedly invoking coparcenary/trustee exceptions) and relied on Marcel Martins v. M. Printer (2012) 5 SCC 342.
  • In replication, disputed valuation and service of earlier legal notice; alleged that allotment records in defendant no. 1's name were because the father applied and paid, and some receipts are in the father’s handwriting; relied on an affidavit (dated 23.12.1974) said to support the family ownership case.

Defendant no. 1's Arguments (Written Statement)

  • Challenged proper valuation and court fees for declaration relief.
  • Asserted that a legal notice dated 16 September 2003 asking the plaintiff to vacate the first floor was served and so the suit is time-barred.
  • Denied existence of a Joint Hindu Family in the sense of a coparcenary; pleaded he was the allottee under the DDA LIG scheme and that allotment, deposits and lease deeds/records are in his name.
  • Claimed he funded construction from his savings and loans from LIC (mortgaging the plot) and informed LIC that the property was his self-acquired property; completion certificate and MCD records in his name; leasehold converted to freehold in his name.
  • Asserted plaintiff was a licensee residing out of love and affection; ground floor and eviction proceedings were undertaken by him; property tax was paid by him by cheque and he never took payment from plaintiff for tax.
  • Stated plaintiff shifted to another house in 2006–07 and telephone and electoral roll addresses correspond; alleged plaintiff and his wife suddenly sought possession on 31 May 2012.

Defendant no. 2

  • Supported the plaintiff (the written statement record indicates defendant no. 2 sided with the plaintiff).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Marcel Martins v. M. Printer, (2012) 5 SCC 342 Relied on by plaintiff for proposition that benami bar may not apply where the person in whose name property is held stands in a fiduciary capacity (trustee) — factual context relevant to deduce fiduciary relationship. The court noted Marcel Martins but distinguished it: in Marcel Martins the legal heirs made contributions and the property title movement involved a common ancestor and contributions; the present facts differ and do not establish the requisite fiduciary relationship or the same factual matrix.
State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao, (1985) 2 SCC 321 Explains that coparcenary is narrower than a joint family; only male members who acquire by birth interests are coparceners. The court applied this to hold that the plaint's allegation of a joint Hindu family without alleging coparcenary is insufficient to invoke the Section 4(3)(a) exception; the exception must be read strictly and requires coparcenary-specific pleading.
Makhan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Kulwant Singh, (2007) 10 SCC 602 Held there is no presumption that a property is joint family property merely because a joint Hindu family exists; party asserting must show nucleus with which joint family property could be acquired. The court invoked this authority to emphasize that mere pleading of a joint Hindu family is inadequate; plaintiff did not plead the requisite nucleus or that the property was joint family/coparcenary property.
Mayor (H.K) v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100 Holds that a plaint must be read meaningfully to see whether a real cause of action is made out and courts should reject vexatious/illusory plaints. The court relied on this principle (and a subsequent Division Bench decision following it) to justify scrutinizing the plaint to determine whether the exceptions to the Benami Act were genuinely pleaded or merely pretended to get the suit to trial.
Santosh Malik v. Maharaj Krishan, MANU/DE/0448/2012 (Division Bench) Followed Mayor (H.K) principle regarding meaningful reading of plaint and rejection of illusory claims. The court cited this Division Bench decision as following Mayor (H.K) and applying the same approach on plaint scrutiny in benami-related challenges.
Manjeet Singh Anand v. Sarabit Singh Anand, MANU/DE/1205/2009 (Division Bench) Held that rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on benami ground was not appropriate where the plaint contained averments implying Hindu Undivided Family and trustee holding for benefit of family. The court noted it was not bound by that decision because in that case there were specific averments of coparcenary/holding for benefit; in the present case such averments are lacking.
Babita Pal v. Jagdish Bansal, 196 (2013) DLT 792 (Division Bench) Refused summary dismissal on benami ground observing that the true nature of transaction/relations may be determinable only after trial. The court stated it did not consider itself bound by that decision for reasons explained and referenced a separate recent pronouncement (Peeyush Aggarwal) to support its approach.
Peeyush Aggarwal v. Sanjeev Bhavnani, CS (OS) No. 1026/2010 (pronouncement dated 04.07.2013) Referenced by the court as a recent pronouncement of the judge addressing related issues (used to explain why the court did not consider itself bound by some Division Bench dicta). The court relied on its own recent reasoning in that pronouncement in declining to follow certain Division Bench decisions and to explain its approach to rejection of plaints on benami grounds.
Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1997 SC 3255 Specific paragraphs (36–39) were relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel in relation to examination/importance of affidavits/signature issues. The court noted the reliance but held that the affidavit relied upon (dated 23.12.1974) if admitted would amount to an admission of benami holding and would not take the suit out of the Benami Act's bar.
Keventer Agro Limited v. Kalyan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (opinion of the same Judge) Contains discussion on remedy available to dispossessed licensees and Section 65 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882. The court referenced its own earlier discussion to support the proposition that a dispossessed licensee's remedy under Section 65 is for compensation and not for repossession; applied this to the present facts where plaintiff was found to be a licensee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focussed first on the maintainability of the suit under the Benami Act because if the suit is barred, adjudication of interim relief applications would be unnecessary.

1. Statutory framework and issue framed:

  • The Benami Act prohibits suits to enforce rights in respect of property held benami (Section 4) and defines benami transaction as transfer to one person for consideration paid by another (Section 2(a)).
  • Section 4(3) contains two exceptions making the bar inapplicable where: (a) the person in whose name property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for benefit of coparceners; or (b) the person is a trustee or otherwise standing in a fiduciary capacity and the property is held for benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee.

2. Burden for invoking exceptions:

  • The court explained that to invoke Section 4(3)(a) the plaintiff must plead/establish existence of a Hindu undivided family, that defendant no. 1 is a coparcener, and that the property is held by defendant no. 1 for benefit of coparceners.
  • To invoke Section 4(3)(b) the plaintiff must plead/establish that defendant no. 1 stood in a fiduciary capacity (trustee) vis-à-vis the father and now vis-à-vis the plaintiff and defendant no. 2, and that the property was held for their benefit.

3. Scrutiny of pleadings:

  • The court reviewed the plaint and found it pleaded only a "joint Hindu family" and that the father acquired and constructed the property from his self-acquired funds, with records in defendant no. 1's name. The plaint asserted the parties became joint owners on intestate deaths but did not plead that the property was coparcenary property or that defendant no. 1 was a coparcener holding the property for the benefit of coparceners.
  • Relying on State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao and Makhan Singh, the court emphasised that coparcenary is narrower than joint family and that mere existence of a joint family or residence together does not create a presumption of coparcenary property; a nucleus for joint property must be shown.
  • The court concluded the plaint lacks the specific averments necessary to fall within Section 4(3)(a); viewing the exception strictly is appropriate since it is an exception to a legislative prohibition.

4. Fiduciary/trust exception (Section 4(3)(b)) analysis:

  • The court noted the plaintiff relied on Marcel Martins but held that Marcel Martins is fact-specific (legal heirs had contributed to purchase and conversion of title) and therefore not analogous. The plaintiff did not plead facts showing a fiduciary/trust relationship between defendant no. 1 and the father or other heirs.
  • The court observed that without pleaded special circumstances, a grown-up son ordinarily cannot be presumed to be trustee of his father; no such relationship was pleaded.

5. Document relied upon by defendant no. 1 (affidavit dated 23.12.1974):

  • The affidavit purportedly admits the father purchased the plot and constructed in defendant no. 1's name and that the father bore expenses and received income as head of the joint family. The plaintiff sought comparison/expert examination of signatures.
  • The court held that if admitted, that affidavit would be an unequivocal admission of benami holding; allowing the suit to proceed on the basis of such an affidavit would allow the Benami Act to be defeated by documents executed by benamidar. Thus the affidavit does not take the suit out of the Benami Act's prohibition.

6. Possession argument and Commissioner’s report:

  • The plaintiff argued long possession (1967–2006/07) should raise a presumption of jointness or prevent dispossession without due process. The court found the Commissioner’s report and photographs indicated the first floor had been locked and not in use for a long time; the belongings found appeared old and unused.
  • The court held that even if plaintiff had belongings there, if he was a licensee with no legal right, Section 65 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 provides only compensation for a dispossessed licensee, not repossession. The court referred to its prior decision (Keventer Agro) for detailed discussion.

7. Conclusion of analysis:

  • On the pleadings and documents before it, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to plead facts bringing the case within either exception of Section 4(3) of the Benami Act.
  • Consequently, the claim in the suit is barred by the Benami Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The suit is dismissed as barred by the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The suit is dismissed and all pending applications connected with the suit are also dismissed.
  • No costs were awarded by the court ("however in the circumstances no costs").
  • The dismissal is on the ground of statutory bar under the Benami Act; the court found no basis in the pleadings to invoke Section 4(3) exceptions.
  • The court indicated that a document constituting an admission of benami holding (the 1974 affidavit) cannot be used to circumvent the Benami Act; it would, in the court's view, confirm the bar rather than negate it.
  • The court noted that it was not setting any broader precedent beyond applying existing principles strictly to the pleadings before it; the decision results in the direct effect of depriving the plaintiff of the relief claimed and leaving the recorded owner (defendant no. 1) free of the iterated claim under the pleadings as they stood.
Show all summary ...

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

1. The plaintiff has sued for declaration that he is a co-owner of property bearing No. BA-238, Tagore Garden, New Delhi and for partition thereof and permanent injunction restraining the defendant no. 1 from dealing with the said property, pleading:-

(i). that the plaintiff Shri Ramesh Advani and the defendants Shri Hiro Advani and Mrs. Manju Keswani are the only children of Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani who after his retirement from the post of Supdt. CPWD purchased plot No. BA-238, Tagore Garden, New Delhi ad measuring 80 sq. yds. from Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in the year 1964 from his “self acquired funds” but in the name of his eldest son i.e defendant no. 1 Shri Hiro Advani;

(b). it was at that time a Joint Hindu Family comprising of the said Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani as head of the family, his wife Smt. Lachmi Advani, their two sons i.e the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 and their daughter i.e defendant no. 2;

(c). that a two and a half storeyed building was constructed by Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani thereon immediately after purchasing the plot “out of his self acquired own funds”;

(d). that since construction aforesaid the family has been living therein jointly; the marriage of defendant no. 2 was performed by Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani in 1966 “out of his own funds”; thereafter the defendant no. 2 and subsequently the plaintiff were also married;

(e). the ground floor was let out by Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani to a tenant;

(f). that after the intestate death of Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani in 1976 the defendant no. 1 started living on the ground floor and the plaintiff on the first floor of the house along with the mother, with the barsati floor let out to a tenant by the mother of the parties;

(g). barsati floor was also got vacated by the mother and was used by the children of the family for studying purpose;

(h). that the mother also died intestate in the year 1990;

(i). since the demise of the mother, the plaintiff and the two defendants are the joint owners having 1/3rd share each in the said property ‘which is their parental property’ with common use of the barsati floor;

(j). that the defendant no. 1 has been taking Rs. 1,750/- per year from the plaintiff in cash to pay Property Tax with the last such payment being made in March, 2011;

(k). that the elder son of the plaintiff shifted to another house in the neighbourhood after his marriage in the year 2006; the younger son of the plaintiff is living abroad; in the circumstances the plaintiff from time to time went and resided in his elder son's house in the neighbourhood while continuing to live on the first floor of the said property;

(l). that on 31st May, 2012 the plaintiff and his wife had gone to their elder son's house in the neighbourhood in the evening and stayed for the night there but when returned in the morning of 1 June, 2012, their entry was denied by the defendant no. 1 and his family; the complaint to the Police and other authorities did not help; and

(m). that all the belongings of the plaintiff are still lying on the first floor.

Hence this suit.

2. Summons of the suit and notice of the application for interim relief were issued to the defendants and vide ex parte ad interim order dated 6 June, 2012 which continues to be in force the defendant was restrained from dealing with or parting with the first floor of the property; a Court Commissioner was appointed to make an inventory of articles lying on the first floor which could throw light on the person who has been in occupation thereof in the recent past with authority to take photographs and make enquiries from the neighbours; however the Court Commissioner could not enter the premises since the same were locked and the defendant no. 1 stated that he had misplaced the key; accordingly vide subsequent order dated 8 June, 2012 order for breaking up of the door to the first floor was issued.

3. Both the defendants have filed written statement, with the defendant no. 1 contesting the claim of the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 supporting the plaintiff.

4. The defendant no. 1 in his written statement has contested the claim in suit pleading:-

(i). that the suit has neither been valued properly for the relief of declaration claimed nor has the appropriate Court fees been paid thereon;

(ii). that the defendant no. 1 had sent a legal notice dated 16 September, 2003 asking the plaintiff to vacate the first floor, which was duly delivered and the suit claim is barred by time;

(iii). that there was no Joint Hindu Family though the family was living jointly;

(iv). the defendant no. 1 was gainfully employed in Federation of Associations of Small Industries of India in the year 1960 as a Stenographer and was in the year 1964 when the plot was acquired, drawing a salary of about Rs. 400/- per month;

(v). the plot aforesaid was allotted to the defendant no. 1 by the DDA under the LIG Scheme;

(vi). that the defendant no. 1 deposited Rs. 300/- in cash with the DDA on 7 October, 1963 and upon allotment vide letter dated 13 January, 1964 DDA asked the defendant no. 1 to deposit further amount of Rs. 2,590/- for execution of the Lease Deed; the defendant no. 1 deposited the said amount on 30 March, 1964 and on 3 July, 1964 deposited Rs. 149/- towards charges for Stamp Duty and receipts for all the said amounts are in the name of defendant no. 1 and on the basis thereof perpetual Lease Deed dated 29 September, 1964 was executed by the DDA in favour of the defendant no. 1;

(vii). that the construction on the aforesaid plot was started in the year 1965 by the defendant no. 1 with his own savings and loan was applied for from the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) against the three policies held by the defendant no. 1 and by mortgaging the said plot on 29 August, 1966;

(viii). that in reply to query of the LIC the defendant no. 1 vide his letter dated 15 June, 1966 informed LIC that the property to be mortgaged was his self acquired property and he was the exclusive owner thereof and that his father and brother had no share therein;

(ix). that Completion Certificate was issued in the name of the defendant no. 1; property recorded in the MCD in the name of the defendant no. 1 and leasehold rights in the land underneath the property converted into freehold on 11 October, 1993 again in the name of defendant no. 1;

(x). that the residence of the plaintiff in the said property of the defendant no. 1 was out of love and affection and as a licensee;

(xi). that the ground floor was let out by the defendant no. 1 only and proceedings for eviction of the tenant on the ground floor were filed and pursued by the defendant no. 1 only;

(xii). that the barsati floor was never given on rent and has always been in possession of the defendant no. 1;

(xiii). that the Property Tax was always paid by the defendant no. 1 by cheque and the defendant no. 1 never took even a single rupee from the plaintiff for Property Tax;

(xiv). that the plaintiff with his family shifted to a house in the neighbourhood in the year 2006-2007 soon after the marriage of the elder son of the plaintiff on 3 October, 2006 and their names in the Electoral Rolls of the year 2009 and 2012 are also at the address of the said other property; the telephone earlier installed in the name of the plaintiff was also in October, 2006 shifted to the other property; and,

(xv). that the plaintiff and his wife on 31 May, 2012 suddenly wanted to take possession of the first floor.

5. The plaintiff has filed a replication, (a) controverting that the suit is not properly valued and service of legal notice dated 16 September, 2003; (b) denying for want of knowledge that the defendant no. 1 was employed since the year 1960 and pleading that it was the father of the parties who had applied to the DDA in the name of the defendant no. 1 and had paid all the amounts therefor and the challans of deposit filed by the defendant no. 1 with his written statement are in the handwriting of the father; (c) pleading that all the records are in the name of the defendant no. 1 because the application for allotment and the allotment were in the name of the defendant no. 1; (d) pleading that the defendant no. 1 had himself executed an affidavit dated 23 December, 1974 affirming and declaring that he was a member of the Joint Hindu Family headed by father also resident of the suit property and that his father had purchased the said plot and raised construction thereon and which affidavit also bears the signature of the father of the parties and the defendant no. 1 in admission/denial has falsely denied his signature and signatures of the father thereon; (e) pleading that at the time of allotment and construction all the parties were unmarried and the decisions were taken and all the funds managed by the father only and the father may have taken loans against the LIC policies in the name of the defendant no. 1; (f) pleading that all the loans were repaid by the father and it was for this reason only that affidavit dated 23 December, 1974 was executed by the defendant no. 1; (g) pleading that prior to shifting into the said property the family was residing in the government accommodation allotted to the father; (h) pleading that the conversion of lease hold rights in the land underneath the property into freehold was not in the knowledge of the plaintiff; (i) that the defendant no. 1 never claimed to be the sole owner of the property; (j) pleading that though the father had let out the ground floor and was collecting the rent thereof but since the lease deed with the tenant was in the name of the defendant no. 1 the eviction proceedings were initiated against the tenant in the name of the defendant no. 1; (k) pleading that the plaintiff and his wife have throughout been living on the first floor;(l) pleading that the address in the Electoral Rolls was got changed since the plaintiff and his wife were then staying with the younger son at Bangalore and to ease receipt of correspondence.

6. The Court Commissioner in his report dated 6 July, 2012 has reported:-

(A). that the walls of all the rooms on the first floor were damp due to water seepage; the plaster on the walls was cracked and the paint peeling off;

(B). that the plaintiff identified his belongings lying in all the rooms which include a wooden bed, TV cabinet, diwan, cupboards, old clothes, utensils and old books; the defendant no. 1 did not deny the said articles to be belonging to the plaintiff but denied that the plaintiff and his family were residing on the first floor;

(C). that certain bank account statements and phone bills of the year 2005 in the name of the plaintiff's son were also found;

(D). the calendar on the wall was of the year 2007; and,

(E). that looking at the condition of the premises it appeared that the said portion of the house had been locked since a very long period of time and the condition thereof was such that no person could possibly be living therein in the recent past.

The keys of the lock on the door of the first floor have been deposited by the Court Commissioner in this Court.

7. Arguments on the applications of the plaintiff for interim relief restraining the defendant no. 1 from interfering in the use and enjoyment by the plaintiff of the first floor and common use of the barsati floor and of delivery of keys of the first floor lying deposited in this Court and for this Court to on its own compare the signatures purportedly of the defendant no. 1 on the affidavit dated 23 December, 1974 and the admitted signatures of the defendant no. 1 on the Court record and for sending of the said documents to a recognized Government Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison were heard on 21 May, 2013 when the counsel for the plaintiff was asked to address also on the aspect of maintainability of the suit in view of the bar of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Benami Act) (though no such plea was taken by the defendant no. 1) and arguments on the said aspect also heard and order reserved.

8. I will first take up the aspect of the maintainability of the suit in view of the bar of the Benami Act in as much as if the suit were to be found to be not maintainable, the question of adjudicating the applications aforesaid would not arise.

9. The claim of the plaintiff in the suit, in a nutshell, is that the property aforesaid was acquired and built by the father of the parties from his self acquired funds but in the name of the defendant no. 1 and the family then was a Joint Hindu Family.

10. The Benami Act was enacted to prohibit benami transactions and the right to recover property held benami and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(a) thereof defines benami transaction as a transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. Section 4 thereof bars any suit claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held and at the instance of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.

11. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, it was enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff whether not the claim of the plaintiff, of the subject property being transferred by the DDA to the name of the defendant no. 1 for consideration paid or provided by the father and of the plaintiff as such being the real owner of 1/3 share in the property by inheritance, against the defendant no. 1 in whose name the property is held, is hit by the bar of the Benami Act and if that were to be the case of the plaintiff whether not, even if there was to be any truth therein, the said property is liable to acquisition under Section 5 of the said Act.

12. The counsel for the plaintiff has contended (a) that the case of the plaintiff is covered by the exception provided in Section 4(3) of the Benami Act; and, (b) reliance is placed on Marcel Martins v. M. Printer(2012) 5 SCC 342.

13. Section 4(3) of the Benami Act makes the bar contained in Section 4

(1) & (2) inapplicable.

“(3)

(a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or

(b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity.

14. Though the counsel for the plaintiff has not elaborated but it is obvious that for the plaintiff to fall in the exception provided in clause (a) supra, the plaintiff has to plead/prove/establish:-

(I). the existence of a Hindu undivided family;

(II). that the defendant no. 1 and in whose name the property is held is a coparcener of the said Hindu undivided family; and,

(III). that the property is held by the defendant no. 1 for the benefit of the coparceners in the family.

15. Similarly, for the claim of the plaintiff to fall in the exception provided in clause (b) supra (and invoking which the plea of benami was held to be not applicable, in Marcel Martins supra) the plaintiff has to plead/prove/establish:-

(i). that the defendant no. 1 in whose name the property is held is a trustee of or was otherwise standing in a fiduciary capacity earlier of/towards the father and now of/towards the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2; and,

(ii). the property was held by the defendant no. 1 earlier for the benefit of the father and now for the benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 for whom he is the trustee or towards whom he stands in such fiduciary capacity.

16. The bar imposed by the Benami Act is invariably found to be got rid of by pleading a case to be under either of the aforesaid two exceptions. The question which arises for consideration is, whether such a plea has been made by the plaintiff and even if be so, whether a mere plea of the case falling in exceptions aforesaid is enough for the case to be set down for trial and which, experience of life shows generally drags on for several years, putting a clog on the property and thereby depriving the recorded owner thereof from exercising rights with respect thereto and often compelling him/her to settle with the claimants, negating the enactment of Benami Act and allowing litigation before the Courts to be used as a tool of coercion or oppression.

17. I am of the opinion that though undoubtedly where the pleadings make out a case for prohibition of the Benami Act to be inapplicable, the case ought to be set down to trial but not at the mere asking. The Court is required to study the pleadings carefully to judge whether the same constitute the case of exception or is merely a pretence to somehow get the suit listed for trial and to use litigation as a tool of oppression/coercion.

18. When we look at the pleadings in the present case, there is no plea even for invoking either of the exceptions aforesaid. The relevant pleas in the plaint are:

“That Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani was gainfully employed with C.P.W.D He retired from the post of Superintendent from C.P.W.D After his retirement, he purchased a plot No. BA-238, Tagore Garden, New Delhi-110027 measuring 80 sq. yds. from his own self acquired funds, but in the name of his eldest son-defendant no. 1. It was at that time a Joint Hindu Family. The family at that time comprised of Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani as the Head of the family, his wife Smt. Lachmi Advani, his two sons Hiro Advani, (defendant no. 1), Ramesh Advani (plaintiff) and his daughter Manju Keswani @ Hardevi Advani (defendant no. 2).”

“That a two and a half storey building was constructed by Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani immediately after purchasing the plot out of his self acquired own funds which is the suit property in the present suit.”

“That after construction of the building, the family has been living therein jointly.”

“But even after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant No. 1, the family has been living jointly in the same house. However, the ground floor was let out by Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani to a tenant.”

“That Shri Leelaram Jagatrai Advani died intestate in 1976 leaving behind him following legal heirs:-

(a) Smt. Lachmi Advani (Widow)

(b) Mr. Hiro Advani (Son)

(c) Mrs. Manju Keswani & Hardevi Advani (daughter). (Her name prior to marriage was Hardevi Advani which was changed by her husband and in-laws after marriage to Manju Keswani).

(d) Mr. Ramesh Advani (Son)”

“Unfortunately in 1990, Smt. Lachmi Advani also died intestate, leaving behind her the following legal heirs:-

(a) Mr. Hiro Advani (Son)

(b) Mrs. Manju Keswani & Hardevi Advani (daughter). (Her name prior to marriage was Hardevi Advani which was changed by her husband and in-laws after marriage to Manju Keswani).

(c) Mr. Ramesh Advani (Son)”

“All the parties are joint owners of the suit property, the same being their parental property, to the extent of 1/3 undivided share in the suit property.”

“That the suit property is a joint property of the parties wherein the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and 2 are joint owners having one-third undivided share each. Since the suit property is a joint property purchased and constructed by the father of the parties, but purchased in the name of defendant no. 1 being the eldest son, the father of the parties had even submitted an affidavit to the authorities in this regard and the said affidavit was duly signed and verified by the defendant no. 1.”

It would thus be seen that though it is pleaded that at the time of acquisition of the plot the family of the plaintiff was a joint Hindu family also comprising of the defendant no. 1 but there is no plea of the defendant no. 1 being a coparcener or of the property being held by the defendant no. 1 for the benefit of the coparceners in the family.

19. The exception in section 4(3)(a) to the applicability of the Benami Act uses the term ‘Hindu Undivided Family’ as well as ‘coparcener’. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao(1985) 2 SCC 321 has held that a joint family may consist of female members also but a Hindu coparcenary is however a narrower body than the joint family; only male members who acquire by birth interest in the joint or coparcenary property can be members of the coparcenary or coparceners. The exception contained in 4(3)(a) of the Act restricts its benefit only to property held by a “coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family” as opposed to any “Member’ of such family. It is so because such coparceners are recognized by law to jointly by birth inherit rights in the joint property of the family and in the event such property stands in one of their names for the benefit of others, the Benami Act is declared to not come in the way. Such a principle however cannot be extended to all/any members of such family who do not have any vested right in the property and to whom such property devolves in their independent/separate capacity by way of intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act. The pleading of the plaintiff is of a joint family of which the mother and sister of the parties were also members and not of coparcenary. section 4(3)(a) though uses the word Hindu Undivided Family, but being in the nature of an exception to the general rule of prohibition of the right to recover property held benami, has to be construed strictly so as not to make the prohibition redundant. From the use of the word coparcenary in conjunction with Hindu Undivided Family in section 4(3)(a), the reference to Hindu Undivided Family has to be read as a reference to a coparcenary and which as aforesaid as held by the Supreme Court is a narrower body than the joint family. Thus the plea in the plaint of the existence of a joint Hindu family and in the absence of any plea of coparcenary cannot be read as a plea of exception carved out in section 4(3)(a).

20. Though it is pleaded that the family at the time of acquisition of the plot was a joint Hindu family but it is nowhere pleaded that the plot was acquired or construction raised thereon from the funds of the family. Rather the plea is of the plot having been acquired and the construction being raised from the self acquired funds of the father and the father exercising the rights over the property as owner and the plaintiff and the two defendants becoming the 1/3 owners each of the property on the intestate demise of their father and mother and being their only class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act.

21. Mulla's commentary on Hindu Law, 18 Edition under para 214 thereof explains the genesis of coparcenery as under:-

A coparcenary is created in the following manner: A Hindu male A, who has inherited no property at all from his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather, acquires property by his own exertions. A has a son B, B does not take any vested interest in the self-acquired property of A during A's lifetime, but on A's death, he inherits the self-acquired property of A. If B has a son C, C takes a vested interest in the property by reason of his birth, and the property inherited by B from his father A becomes ancestral property in his (B's) hands, and B and C are coparceners as regards the property. If B and C continue joint, and a son D is born to C, he enters the coparcenary by the mere fact of his birth. Moreover, if a son E is subsequently born to D, he too becomes a coparcener.

22. The Supreme Court in Makhan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Kulwant Singh(2007) 10 SCC 602 held that there is no presumption of a property, being joint family property, only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family and the person who asserts so has to prove that there was a nucleus with which joint family property could be acquired. Thus from the mere plea of existence of a joint Hindu family at the time of acquisition of the plot and construction thereon and from the absence of any plea of a nucleus and rather the assertion of the property having been acquired by the father from his self acquired funds, it has but to be held that there is no plea in the plaint of the property at the time of acquisition/construction being of a coparcenary or of the defendant no. 1 holding the same for the benefit of coparceners in the family.

23. Thought the Hindu Succession Act has been amended w.e.f 2005 making females also coparceners but the father of the parties is stated to have died much prior to the said amendment, in the year 1976 and as per the law then applicable the mother of the parties and the defendant no. 2 being the sister would not have inherited any rights in the property and the share of the father in the property would have devolved on the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 by survivorship. However the pleading is of the property on the demise of the father being inherited by all his class I heirs i.e including the mother and the sister and which also is a clear indication of absence of any coparcenery or the property being of any coparcenary.

24. The Supreme Court in Mayor (H.K) v. Vessel M.V Fortune Express(2006) 3 SCC 100 and recently followed by the Division Bench of this Court Santosh Malik v. Maharaj Krishan MANU/DE/0448/2012 while upholding the order of rejection of the plaint on the ground of the claim therein being barred by the Benami Act, held that the plaint has to be read meaningfully and not formally and it is the duty of the Court to see whether a real cause of action has been made out in the plaint or something illusory has been projected and that after so reading, vexatious plaints have to be thrown out. In fact during the course of hearing it was repeatedly asked from the counsel for the plaintiff whether there was anything else to show that there was a coparcenary in fact in existence at any time; whether any Income Tax returns thereof were filed; whether there was any other joint property of the parties earlier or now. The counsel candidly admitted that there is none.

25. Merely because a person at the time of acquisition of the property may be residing with his parents and siblings and merely because the sale consideration has flown from the parents or from some other siblings is not enough to bring a case within the exception aforesaid to the prohibition contained in Benami Act. It cannot be lost sight of that benami transactions prevalent earlier, generally were between family members and hardly ever in the name of absolute strangers, and if pleas as in the present case were to be held to be falling within the exception clause, would negate the legislative intent of prohibiting actions to enforce rights in respect of property held benami.

26. I have considered whether the long admitted possession at least from the year 1967 till 2006-2007 i.e of nearly 40 years of plaintiff of the premises can be said to raise any presumption of jointness or of the intent but I am unable to hold so. Such possession has to be seen in the context of Indian conditions where siblings especially brothers living together, even after their marriages, in a house belonging to one of them, is not uncommon.

27. As far exception (b) supra is concerned, it was imperative for the plaintiff to plead a relationship of trust between the defendant no. 1 and earlier the father and/or that of defendant no. 1 was standing in a fiduciary capacity and holding the property for the benefit of the father. There are no such pleas in the plaint. The plaintiff has merely relied on Sri Marcel Martins. The Supreme Court in the said judgment has held that in determining whether a relationship is based on trust or confidence, relevant to determining whether they stand in a fiduciary capacity, the Court shall have to take into consideration the factual context in which the question arises for it is only in the factual backdrop that the existence or otherwise of a fiduciary relationship can be deduced in a given case.

28. Having said that, it becomes important to see the factual context in which the said observations were made. In that case it was not in dispute that the title to the property even though as a tenant originally vested in the common ancestor of the parties who had died intestate and was transferred in the name of one of the heirs only at the instance of the Municipal Corporation to avoid procedural complications and all the legal heirs had made contributions towards the sale consideration for conversion of the tenancy rights into ownership rights and it was in these facts that the Supreme Court held the plea of benami to be not available and held the case to be falling in the exception. The present is however not a case of parties acquiring title to the property from a common ancestor; rather the case is that the common ancestor from his self acquired funds had acquired the subject property in the name of the defendant no. 1. The said plea, even if were to be ultimately proved, is squarely in the teeth of the prohibition in the Benami Act.

29. I would be failing in my duty if do not refer to the Division Bench dicta in Manjeet Singh Anand v. Sarabit Singh Anand MANU/DE/1205/2009 where rejection of the plaint on the ground of claim therein being barred by the Benami Act was denied on the existence in the plaint of the plea of existence of a joint family and which was held to imply Hindu Undivided Family, observing that though the case of the plaintiff therein was weak and not likely to succeed but holding the same to be no ground for ousting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. However in that case there were averments in the plaint of the property being held for the benefit of coparcerners in the family and the defendant holding the property as a trustee for the benefit of all the family members and which as aforesaid are lacking in the present case. I therefore do not consider myself bound by the said judgment. Mention in this regard may also be made of another Division Bench of this Court in Babita Pal v. Jagdish Bansal196 (2013) DLT 792 where also a plea for summary dismissal of the suit for reason of the claim therein being barred by the Benami Act was rejected for the reason that the real import of the transaction and the relation between the parties could be determined only after trial. However, I do not consider myself bound thereby also for the reason discussed in detail in my recent pronouncement dated 04.07.2013 in CS (OS) No. 1026/2010 titled Peeyush Aggarwal Plaintiff v. Sanjeev Bhavnani Defendant and for which reason it is not deemed necessary to burden this judgment therewith.

30. That brings me to the only document in this regard filed by the defendant no. 1 and qua which application aforesaid has also been filed by the plaintiff for examination of the signatures by this Court and/or for reference of the signatures to an expert. The counsel for the plaintiff in this regard has also relied on paras 36 to 39 of Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State Of Karnataka AIR 1997 SC 3255.

31. In the said affidavit purportedly of the defendant no. 1, the defendant no. 1 has deposed that he is a member of the Joint Hindu Family headed by the father; that the father had purchased the plot and constructed on the same in his name; that the expenses incurred on the house were being borne by and income therefrom being also received by the father as head of the joint family.

32. The question which arises is whether the said affidavit would take the suit away from the clutches/prohibition of the Benami Act.

33. I am unable to see how. If the same were to be permitted, it would amount to the Courts permitting the Benami Act to be defeated merely by the real owners obtaining execution of such documents from the benami owners; rather the said affidavit is an unequivocal admission of the property being benami and rights wherein cannot be enforced by the plaintiff claiming to be the true owner of a share in the property by inheritance from the father. The said affidavit nowhere advances the case of the existence of the coparcenary of which the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 can be said to be coparceners.

34. Even otherwise, without any special circumstances and which are not pleaded, there cannot be any question of a grown up son being a trustee of the father or standing in a fiduciary capacity qua the father.

35. Thus whichever way one looks at, the claim in the suit is barred by the Benami Act.

36. Faced therewith the counsel for the plaintiff had contended that the plaintiff has been in possession of the first floor and even if not having any rights in the property, cannot be dispossessed therefrom without due process of law.

37. However the report as aforesaid of the commission issued at the instance of the plaintiff is of the first floor though containing the belongings of the plaintiff being not in use for the last several years. The Commissioner, as directed, has also taken photographs and a perusal whereof also supports the said report. In any case no objections against the said report have been filed. Moreover, once it is held that the plaintiff has no right in the property and was living therein as a licencee of the defendant no. 1 and once it is found that the plaintiff on the date of institution of the suit was not living in the property, mere finding of the goods and articles belonging to the plaintiff in the said premises would not entitle the plaintiff to be put back into possession. Reference in this regard may be made to Section 65 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 which provides the remedy of dispossessed licensee as for compensation only and not for repossession. I have had an occasion to discuss this aspect in detail in a recent judgment in Keventer Agro Limited…Plaintiff; v. Kalyan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr…Defendants. and need is thus not felt to reiterate the same here.

38. The suit is accordingly dismissed as barred by the provisions of the Benami Act. Resultantly all pending applications are also dismissed; however in the circumstances no costs.

Decree sheet be drawn up.