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Paradise Credit P. Ltd. & Ors. Petitioners v. State Of Nct Of Delhi
Factual and Procedural Background
The revisionist filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C) before the Court of ACMM, Saket, New Delhi, seeking registration of an FIR based on a complaint dated 26.05.2012. The complaint alleged that the applicant had pledged certain shares to accused no. 1 as security for a loan of Rs. 5.00 crores obtained by Spicejet Ltd. Accused no. 1 was alleged to have sold those pledged shares without the applicant's right to do so, in conspiracy with accused no. 2 and 3. The applicant requested directions to the police to register a case under Sections 406, 409, 415, 420, 464, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), investigate the matter, and submit a final report to the court. The trial court dismissed the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C, and this dismissal was upheld by the impugned order dated 13th August 2012, which is now under challenge in this petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court and the revisional court erred in dismissing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C without awaiting a complete status report from the police.
- Whether the police were obligated to register an FIR immediately upon receipt of a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence or whether a preliminary inquiry/status report could be sought first.
- The applicability of Supreme Court decisions on mandatory FIR registration and preliminary inquiries, particularly the directions in Lalita Kumari v. State, to the exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The trial court had sought a status report from the police but erred in not directing registration of an FIR despite the complaint clearly disclosing cognizable offences of misappropriation and forgery.
- The impugned order failed to consider the police status report wherein time was sought to verify allegations, rendering the dismissal unsustainable.
- Reliance was placed on several precedents, including Dr. Rajni Palri Wala v. Dr. D. Mohan & Anr., H.N Rishbud v. NCT of Delhi, Rabindra Rai v. State of Bihar, Shanti Devi v. State, and Ramesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), to support the contention that the FIR should have been registered.
Respondent No. 2's Arguments
- The matter essentially constitutes a civil dispute regarding loan repayment, with ongoing civil litigation, and thus does not require police investigation.
- The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C was rightly declined by the courts below.
- The decision in Subhkaran Luharuka v. State and the Supreme Court ruling in Lalita Kumari v. State, which allows preliminary inquiry in commercial offences, support the dismissal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2006) 2 SCC 677 | Mandate for police to register FIR when cognizable offence is disclosed in complaint. | Noted by impugned order; court balanced this with concerns about misuse of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C process. |
| Subhkaran Luharuka v. State, 170 (2010) DLT 516 | Permits magistrate to call for police status report before ordering FIR registration to prevent misuse of process. | Relied upon by revisional court to justify seeking status report before FIR registration. |
| Lalita Kumari v. State, W.P.(C) No. 68/2008 (2013) | Registration of FIR is mandatory if cognizable offence is disclosed; preliminary inquiry only allowed in specific cases including commercial offences. | Guidelines from this case informed the court's reasoning on proper procedure under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. |
| Dr. Rajni Palri Wala v. Dr. D. Mohan & Anr., Crl. M.C 6525/2006 dated 22.4.2009 | This precedent was cited in support of petitioners' contention for mandatory FIR registration. | Referenced by petitioners' counsel to bolster argument for registration of FIR. |
| H.N Rishbud v. NCT of Delhi (1955) 1 SCR 1150 | Cited as authority supporting petitioners' position. | Used by petitioners' counsel in submissions. |
| Rabindra Rai v. State of Bihar (1984) 32 BLJR 464 | Cited by petitioners' counsel to support their case. | Referenced in arguments but not specifically analyzed by court. |
| Shanti Devi v. State (2002) DLT 410 | Cited in support of petitioners' submissions. | Used by petitioners' counsel during arguments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the impugned and trial court orders alongside the police status report. It acknowledged the Supreme Court's directives in Lalita Kumari v. State which mandate FIR registration upon disclosure of a cognizable offence, while allowing preliminary inquiry in certain categories such as commercial offences. The court noted that the trial court had prematurely dismissed the petitioners' application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C without awaiting the complete status report from the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Crime Branch. The court emphasized that the preliminary inquiry should be time-bound and that the trial court ought to have waited for the police to complete their verification before deciding whether a cognizable offence was made out. Therefore, the dismissal was considered unwarranted as the status report was incomplete at the time of decision.
Holding and Implications
The impugned order dated 13 August 2012 and the trial court's order are quashed. The petitioners' application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is restored for hearing on merits by the trial court. The trial court is directed to await the complete status report from the concerned EOW, Crime Branch and thereafter decide the application expeditiously and afresh on merits. This decision does not express any opinion on the substantive merits of the case, thereby avoiding prejudice to either party. The direct effect is to ensure procedural correctness in handling applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C, emphasizing the necessity of complete police verification before dismissal. No new precedent is established beyond enforcing adherence to existing Supreme Court guidelines.
JUDGMENT
1. Impugned order of 13th August, 2012 upholds trial court's order dismissing petitioners' application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, which is under challenge in this petition.
2. The factual background of this case as noted in the impugned order is as under:-
“The revisionist filed an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C before the Court of ACMM, Saket, New Delhi, praying for registration of FIR pursuant to complaint dated 26.05.2012 against Malanpur Steel Limited, alleging that the applicant had pledged certain shares to accused no. 1 as security for loan of Rs. 5.00 crores, obtained by Spicejet Ltd. having its office at Cargo Complex, IGI Airport, New Delhi. Contending that said accused No. 1 has sold those pawned shares belonging to the applicant for which same had no right to sell. Said accused No. 1 has sold the same to accused No. 2 and 3, having entered into a conspiracy with the latters, the applicant requested for issuing direction to the SHO of police officer concerned to register a case against said accused for offence punishable under Section 406, 409, 415, 420, 464, 120-B IPC and to investigate the matter and again to submit final report to the court in this regard.”
3. Impugned order takes note of the Apex Court's decision in Ramesh Kumari v. State(2006) 2 SCC 677, requiring police to mandatorily register an FIR in a complaint where cognizable offence is disclosed. But the learned Revisionist Court has chosen to rely upon a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Subhkaran Luharuka v. State, 170 (2010) DLT 516 and has held as under:-
“At the same time, the apprehension that the procedure [Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C] may not be misused by some clever litigant by filing false complaint, against anyone merely to take revenge, cannot be ruled out, outrightly. To minimise any such misuse of process of court, it is not unjust to call ‘status report’ from the police. Calling status report does not amount investigation of the case threadbare, rather it becomes necessary for a Magistrate to know as to whether the complainant had approached the police or not or that similar complaint was made earlier or not found favour of police or the court.”
4. At the hearing, learned senior counsel for petitioners had contended that it is ex-facie apparent from the record that the Trial Court had sought “action taken report/status report” from the local police, but had misdirected itself in not directing registration of an FIR, although upon a bare perusal of the complaint in question (Annexure P-3) made to the local police, it becomes apparent that the offence of misappropriation and forgery committed by respondent/accused is cognizable offence. It was pointed out by learned senior counsel for the petitioners that neither trial court's order nor impugned order makes any reference to the status report (Annexure P-8) wherein time was sought to verify the allegations and submit the report. Thus, it was contended that the impugned order is unsustainable on the face of it and deserves to be quashed and the petitioners' application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C ought to be allowed. In support of above submissions, reliance was placed by learned senior counsel for petitioners upon decisions in Dr. Dr. Rajni Palri Wala…Petitioner v. Dr. D. Mohan & Anr.…S, Crl. M.C 6525/2006 dated 22.4.2009, H.N Rishbud v. NCT of Delhi(1955) 1 SCR 1150, Rabindra Rai v. State of Bihar(1984) 32 BLJR 464, Shanti Devi v. State97 (2002) DLT 410 and Ramesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)(2006) 2 SCC 677.
5. Learned senior counsel for respondent No. 2 had supported impugned order and the trial court's order and had submitted that the entire case of petitioners/complainants, at best, makes out a civil dispute regarding repayment of loan and various civil litigations in respect thereof are pending and the evidence to prove the averments made in the complaint in question is with petitioners and no police investigation is required and so petitioners' application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C has been rightly declined by the Courts below and there is no substance in this petition.
6. It was pointed out that the decision in Subhkaran Luharuka (Supra) holds the field and recent Apex Court decision in W.P(C) No. 68/2008 in Lalita Kumari v. State rendered on 12 November, 2013, deals with the powers of police to register an FIR and exception has been carved out leaving it open to the police to conduct an preliminary enquiry prior to registration of the FIR in the complaints relating to commercial offences. Thus, it was submitted that this petition deserves to be dismissed.
7. Upon hearing both the sides and on perusal of the impugned order, trial court's order, the material on record and the decisions cited, I find that the directions issued by Apex Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) relating to Section 154 of Cr.P.C provide valuable guidelines for the exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C as well. The directions issued by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) are as under:-
“111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under section 154 of the code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.
vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
b) Commercial offences
c) Medical negligence cases
d) Corruption cases
e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.”
8. Perusal of the complaint in question, impugned order, trial court's order and the status report (Annexure P-8), I find that once trial court's had called for the status report and the concerned officer of the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Crime Branch had sought time to verify the facts, then dismissal of petitioners/complainants application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C was unwarranted. Trial court ought to have waited for a complete status report from Crime Branch and then should have taken a decision as to whether upon considering the complaint in question and detailed status report, a cognizable offence is made out or not.
9. In view of the aforesaid, impugned order dated 13 August, 2012 (Annexure P-1) and trial court's order are quashed and petitioner's/complaint's application filed under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C is restored for hearing on merits by trial court and it is directed that after complete status report is obtained from the concerned EOW, Crime Branch, petitioner's application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C be expeditiously decided afresh on merits.
10. This petition is disposed of while not expressing any opinion on the merits, lest it may prejudice either side.
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