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Delhi Development Authority v. Balraj Virmany
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 29.08.1982, which affirmed the trial court's decree dated 07.03.1981 granting the plaintiff, Balraj Virmani, a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, Delhi Development Authority (DDA), from taking possession of the disputed plot (Plot No. 2, Jhandewalan E Block, Delhi).
Key undisputed facts in the record:
- The Delhi Improvement Trust granted a lease to the plaintiff by Ex.D-1 dated 06.01.1951 for a 20-year term, with an option (per Clause III(b)) to renew for a further 20 years provided the lessee had observed, performed and complied with the lease terms; Clause (vi) limited use to a cold storage purpose and made the lease void if used for other purposes not approved by the lessor.
- The original lease was to expire on 10.08.1968.
- The plaintiff gave his option to renew on 23.02.1967.
- The DDA served a notice dated 09.02.1968 (Ex.D-2) alleging four breaches and directing rectification, and reiterated those contents on 16.02.1968 (Ex.DW-4/1).
- On 01.03.1968 the plaintiff filed a reply (ExDW-5/2) admitting the breaches.
- On 03.10.1969 (Ex.PW-3/5) the DDA communicated that Rs. 666.87 was payable by the plaintiff as ground rent; subsequent payment receipts dated after 10.08.1968 (Ex.PW-3/3, Ex.PW-3/4, Ex.PW-3/6) show rent payments were made after expiry of the first term.
- Vide Ex.D-3 dated 01.09.1972 the DDA communicated that the lease was not to be renewed because the plaintiff had failed to comply with terms; however, the record shows the DDA had not formally determined the lease prior to that communication.
- Two courts below concurrently found in favour of the plaintiff; this is a second appeal in which a substantial question of law was admitted concerning the interpretation of the lease, particularly regarding renewal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lease (Ex.D-1) conferred on the plaintiff a unilateral option to renew for a further 20-year term, or whether renewal was conditional upon the lessee having observed and complied with the lease terms.
- Whether the defendant's demand for and acceptance of rent after expiry of the primary lease period amounted to a renewal of the lease in the factual matrix of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The trial and High Court judgments that treated the lease as giving a unilateral option to the plaintiff to renew were perverse; the lease must be read as a whole and the proviso in Clause III(b) conditions renewal on performance of covenant obligations.
- The DDA had pointed out breaches and the plaintiff admitted those breaches in his reply dated 01.03.1968 (ExDW-5/2); a party in breach should not be entitled to renewal.
- Mere acceptance of rent after the expiry of the lease term does not amount to renewal of a lease; reliance was placed on decisions including (2005) 5 SCC 543 Shanti Prasad Devi v. Shankar Mahto, 2006 (4) SCALE 14 Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh, and 1717 (2010) DLT 78 Ravi Chadha & Ors. v. Bank of Maharashtra.
Respondent's Arguments
- The DDA had issued a communication dated 03.10.1969 (Ex.PW-3/5) demanding rent, and the rent payments by the plaintiff followed that demand; these payments were not tendered without demand and the acceptance of rent pursuant to a demand indicates the lessor's intention to continue the lease.
- Inter-departmental communication (DW-5/1 dated 17.06.1968) shows the original four alleged breaches were reduced to two; one of the breaches (running a printing press) was noted as a condonable breach and the other (sub-letting) had been rectified.
- Although breaches were pointed out before expiry, the DDA did not formally determine the lease; the communications prior to expiry asked for rectification, and the purported non-renewal communicated later (Ex.D-3) was different from formal determination/demotion of the lease.
- Subsequent events are relevant: DDA's policy for conversion of leasehold to freehold was under consideration; the plaintiff paid Rs. 1 crore as conversion charges and his representation was under consideration; adjacent property E-1 had been regularized on payment of conversion charges (supporting the factual context).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (2005) 5 SCC 543 — Shanti Prasad Devi v. Shankar Mahto | Relied on by the appellant to support the proposition that mere acceptance of rent after expiry does not amount to renewal. | The court recorded the appellant's reliance but did not accept the appellant's contention as a blanket rule in the facts of this case; the court distinguished the situation because the acceptance followed a demand by the lessor. |
| 2006 (4) SCALE 14 — Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh | Relied on by the appellant for the proposition that acceptance of rent post-expiry is not necessarily a renewal. | The court noted the reliance but treated the present facts as different because the rent was accepted pursuant to a departmental demand (Ex.PW-3/5), which the court regarded as indicating the lessor's intention to continue the lease. |
| 1717 (2010) DLT 78 — Ravi Chadha & Ors. v. Bank of Maharashtra | Relied on by the appellant for the same broad submission concerning the legal effect of acceptance of rent after expiry. | The court acknowledged the citation but concluded that the factual matrix here (demand followed by acceptance) led to a different outcome on renewal. |
| AIR 1985 SC 111 — Laxmi Narain Guin v. Nirayan Modak | Cited by the court for the proposition that subsequent events, when admitted, can be taken into account by a High Court in a second appeal. | The court applied this authority to justify taking into account admitted subsequent events (e.g., the conversion-representation and the payment of conversion charges) in the adjudication of the second appeal. |
| Judgment dated 05.05.2009 — D.L.F. Universal Limited v. Union of India | Placed on record by the respondent as a subsequent event evidencing the DDA's approach to conversion/regularization of leasehold properties. | The court noted this judgment as a document placed on record to show subsequent developments (regularization/conversion policy and practice) and considered that such events could be relevant to the resolution of the dispute. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a focused factual and contractual analysis and applied principles governing second appeals and the legal effect of acceptance of rent after expiry:
- Contractual construction: The court read the lease (Ex.D-1) and held that Clause III(b) cannot properly be interpreted as granting an absolute unilateral option to the lessee; the explicit proviso conditions renewal on the lessee having "observed, performed and complied with the terms and covenants conditions of this lease."
- Chronology and notices: Notices of breaches dated 09.02.1968 (Ex.D-2) and 16.02.1968 (Ex.DW-4/1) were served before the lease expired (10.08.1968); the plaintiff had already exercised the option to renew on 23.02.1967.
- Departmental assessment of breaches: Inter-departmental noting dated 17.06.1968 (Ex.DW-5/1) reduced four alleged breaches to two; one of the breaches (running of a printing press) was classified as condonable and the sub-letting issue had been rectified according to the record.
- Demand and acceptance of rent: Crucially, the court emphasized Ex.PW-3/5 dated 03.10.1969, a communication by the DDA demanding ground rent after the expiry of the first term, and subsequent rent payments (Ex.PW-3/3, Ex.PW-3/4, Ex.PW-3/6). The court found that these payments were made pursuant to a demand by the DDA (i.e., they were not unsolicited tenders) and that the DDA's acceptance of those payments indicated an intention on the part of the lessor to continue the lease.
- Distinction between determination and non-renewal: The court observed that the department had not formally determined the lease prior to the rent demand and that communications before expiry had asked for rectification rather than effecting forfeiture or termination; a later communication (Ex.D-3) stated the department's intention not to renew but did not equate to formal determination earlier in time.
- Second appeal standard: The court reiterated that concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below favoring the plaintiff could be interfered with only on the ground of perversity. It found the lower courts' conclusion that the lessee had an absolute unilateral right to renew to be unsustainable (perverse), but it did not disturb the factual conclusion that the lessor's conduct (demand and acceptance of rent) amounted to renewal.
- Subsequent events: Invoking the principle in Laxmi Narain Guin v. Nirayan Modak, the court considered admitted subsequent events (the conversion policy and the plaintiff's payment of conversion charges) as relevant background that the High Court in second appeal may take into account.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding:
The court answered the substantial question of law by holding that although the plaintiff did not possess a unilateral right to renew the lease under Clause III(b), the specific facts of this case — namely the defendant's demand for ground rent after expiry and the defendant's acceptance of rent payments pursuant to that demand — amounted to a renewal of the lease.
Final Disposition: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The substantial question of law was answered in favour of the respondent (plaintiff below) and against the appellant (DDA).
- On the facts before the court, the defendant's conduct (demand and acceptance of rent after expiry) operated effectively as a renewal of the lease; the court therefore upheld the relief granted below to the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal.
- The court rejected the notion that Clause III(b) conferred a unilateral renewal option on the lessee; that contractual point was resolved against the plaintiff's claimed unilateral right, but the factual circumstances produced a renewal in operation.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel, general legal principle beyond its factual conclusion; its effect is to resolve the parties' rights in this dispute by applying established principles of contractual interpretation, the law concerning acceptance of rent and renewal, and the second appeal standard on interference with findings of fact.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1. This appeal has impugned the judgment and decree dated 29.08.1982 which had endorsed the finding of the trial Judge dated 07.03.1981 whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff Balraj Virmani seeking a perpetual injunction to the effect that the defendant/Delhi Development Authority (DDA) be restrained from taking action for taking possession of the disputed plot i.e plot No. 2, Jhandewalan E Block, Delhi had been decreed.
2. Below noted facts are undisputed:-
(i) The Delhi Improvement Trust had granted lease to the plaintiff vide Ex.D-1 dated 06.01.1951 qua the suit land. It was initially for a period of 20 years to be extended for a further period of 20 years in terms of the conditions contained therein.
Clause (vi) is relevant and reads as under:-
“not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of Cold Storage plant without the consent in writing of the said lessor; provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the Lessor;”
Clause III (b) reads as under:-
“In case this lease with the lessee shall continue for the said period of 20 years and provided the lessee has observed performed and complied with the terms and covenants conditions of this lease, the Government shall grant to the lessee an option to renew the lease on such terms and conditions as the lessor deems fit for further period of 20 years; provided that the notice of the intention of the lessee to exercise this option of renewal is given to the lessor six months before the expiration of the lease; provided further that if the lease is extended for a further period of 20 years the lessor shall have the right to enhance the rental upto 50% at the original rent.”
(ii) Lease was to expire on 10.08.1968
(iii) On 23.02.1967, the plaintiff had given his option to renew the lease deed.
(iv) On 09.02.1968 (Ex.D-2) the defendant had notified him four breaches (as detailed therein) had been committed by the defendant; he was directed to rectify the said breaches failing which his lease was liable to be determined.
(v) On 16.02.1968 (Ex.DW-4/1) the contents of Ex.D-2 were reiterated.
(vi) On 01.03.1968, the defendant filed his reply (ExDW-5/2) admitting the breaches in the lease deed.
(vii) Vide Ex.PW-3/5 dated 03.10.1969 DDA gave information to the plaintiff informing him that a sum of Rs. 666.87 paise is payable by him as ground rent in terms of the lease.
(viii) Vide Ex. D-3 dated 01.09.1972 lease of the suit land was determined; DDA vide this communication had communicated to the plaintiff that since he has failed to observe, perform and comply with its terms and covenants; breaches being continued, the DDA had decided not to renew the lease deed.
(viii) Vide Ex.PW-3/3, Ex.PW-3/4, & Ex.PW-3/6, the plaintiff has paid rent for the aforenoted premises; these documents are all after 10.08.1968
3. There are two concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below in favour of the plaintiff.
4. This is a second appeal. It has been admitted and on 10.03.1983, the following substantial question of law had been formulated:-
“The RSA raises the question of interpretation of the lease, particularly with regard to the renewal which is likely to arise in a large number of cases.”
5. On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged that the judgment of the court below holding that the lease (Ex.-D-1) had given a unilateral option to the plaintiff to renew the lease deed is a perversity; document has to read in its entirety and aforenoted clauses (vi) a read with clause III (b) clearly postulate a situation that if there was any breach committed by the plaintiff, he is not entitled to a second renewal; it is submitted that the defendant has admitted the breaches and this is evident from his reply dated 01.03.1968 (Ex DW-5/2). The impugned judgment reading it in this manner is clearly a perversity. The finding in the impugned judgment calls for an interference. It is further submitted that mere acceptance of rent for the subsequent months after the lease period does not amount to renewal of a lease. To support this submission, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in (2005) 5 SCC 543Shanti Prasad Devi v. Shankar Mahto; 2006 (4) SCALE 14 Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh as also 1717 (2010) DLT 78 Ravi Chadha & Ors.…Plaintiffs; v. Bank Of Maharashtra…Defendant.. The finding returned on this score in favour of the plaintiff is also a perverse finding.
6. Arguments have been rebutted. It is pointed out that in terms of Ex.PW-3/5 dated 03.10.1969 a communication had been sent by the lessor to the lessee demanding rent for these premises pursuant to which rent payments had been made; this is not a case where the rent has been tendered without any demand from the lessor. It is pointed out that the lease deed Ex.D-1 envisages a permission to the defendant to construct the premises on the lease hold plot which had been granted to him; it is pointed out that vide Ex.D-2 (09.02.1968) and Ex.DW-4/1 (16.02.1968) four breaches had been pointed out by the DDA yet in the inter-se communication of the Department dated 17.06.1968 (DW-5/1) it is clear that these four breaches had been reduced to two; these related to the running of a printing press by the plaintiff which even as per Ex. DW-1/5 was a condonable breach and on the question of sub-letting by the plaintiff to another party, the same had also since been rectified. It is pointed out that admittedly the plaintiff had exercised his option to renew his lease vide his letter dated 23.02.1967; breaches had been pointed out by the Department but in the aforenoted communications Ex.D-2 (dated 09.02.1968), Ex.DW-4/1 (dated 16.02.1968) as also in the subsequent notice Ex.D-3 (dated 01.09.1972) the defendant had till date not determined the lease of the plaintiff; the first two communications merely asked the plaintiff to rectify the breaches and the last communication (Ex.D-3) stated that the Department has no intention to renew the lease; it is pointed that non-renewal of lease is distinct from the determination of lease which till date has not been done. Certain subsequent events have also been pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent. It is submitted that the policy of the DDA for conversion from lease hold to free hold is under consideration and this is clear from the communication dated 22.01.2008 sent by the DDA to the present appellant, copy of which has been placed on record and this is an admitted document. It is pointed out that case of the plaintiff is in fact under consideration and he has paid Rs. one crore as conversation charges. Another subsequent event which has been brought to the notice of the Court is that in case of the adjoining property i.e E-1 Jhandewalan, Delhi (suit property is E-2) has since been regularized which was also a lease granted by the DDA; on the payment of conversion charges, the lease hold rights had been converted into free hold. Copy of the judgment dated 05.05.2009 passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 173/1988 D.L.F Universal Limited v. Union of India has also been placed on record. It is pointed out that these subsequent events must kept in mind while deciding this issue.
7. Record has been perused. There is no dispute to the proposition that the subsequent events which are admitted can be taken into account. The High Court in a second appeal can take note of such subsequent events and grant relief in accordance with it. This has been held by Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 1985 SC 111 Laxmi Narain Guin v. Nirayan Modak. The aforenoted two subsequent events which have been pointed out and noted supra are even otherwise admitted. 8 Be that as it may, the merits of the controversy have to be detailed and discussed. The lease deed is Ex. D-1. The lease had been granted for a cold storage purpose stating therein that it is to be used for a cold storage and for no other purpose. Clause III (b) also cannot be interpreted to be read as a clause giving unilateral option to the plaintiff to renew the lease; it clearly contained a proviso which proviso states that the lessee will have the option to renew the lease provided that lessee has observed, performed and complied with the terms covenant and conditions of the lease. It is also not in dispute that notices dated 09.02.1968 (Ex.D-2) and 16.02.1968 (Ex.DW-4/1) had been served upon the defendant pointing out these breaches. These breaches had been pointed out before the period of lease had expired. The lease deed was dated 06.01.1951 and it was to expire on 10.08.1968 It is also not in dispute that prior to this date i.e 23.02.1967, the plaintiff had exercised his option to renew the lease. It is also not in dispute that vide the inter-se communications and noting of the Department, four breaches as pointed out had been reduced to two. This was in terms of the noting dated 17.06.1968 of the defendant (Ex. DW-5/1). Ex.PW-3/5 is a very relevant document. This document dated 03.10.1969 is a communication by the department informing the plaintiff that he has to pay ground rent pursuant to which rent has been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. This letter was sent by the Department admittedly after the period of the expiry of the lease i.e after 10.08.1968 This is thus not a case where the defendant was a passive party; it was on his demand and asking (Ex.PW-3/5) that the ground rent was paid in terms of this lease (Ex. PW-3/3 dated 03.04.1970, Ex. PW-3/4 dated 04.10.1969 and Ex. PW-3/6 dated 23.06.1969 evidence payments of rent); acceptance of rent in such a case does tantamount to an intention of the lessor to continue with the lease. The first lease had admittedly expired on 10.08.1968 This communication of 03.10.1969 (Ex.PW-3/5) asking the plaintiff to pay the arrears of rent for this lease is nothing but a clear indicator of the lessor to continue with the lease.
9. It is also not in dispute that the Department has formulated a policy for conversion of lease hold rights into free hold of properties at Jhandewalan and the adjoining property E-1 has since been converted from lease hold to free hold. It is also admitted that Rs. 1 crore has been paid by the plaintiff seeking a conversion from lease hold into free hold and his representation is under consideration.
10. This is a second appellate court. Findings of fact can be interfered with only if there is perversity. This finding in the impugned judgment that there was a unilateral option on the part of the plaintiff to renew the lease can on no count sustained. However the act of the defendant in demanding and accepting the rent clearly indicates the intention of the lessor to renew the lease.
11. Substantial question of law is accordingly answered as under:-
Although the plaintiff did not have a unilateral right to renew the lease yet in the factual scenario of the present case, acceptance of rent by the defendant pursuant to a demand made by the defendant, did amount to a renewal of lease.
12. Substantial question of law is accordingly answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Appeal has no merit. Dismissed.
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