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Hari Mohan And Anr. v. Smt. Maya Devi And Anr. S

Delhi High Court
Jul 26, 2011
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Structured Summary of the Opinion by VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. (ORAL)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two suits concerning the same immovable property (250 sq. yards at house No. G-24, Plot No. 9, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi) were instituted by opposing parties. Smt. Maya Devi (respondent No. 1) filed a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the appellants from interfering with her possession and enjoyment of the property. The present appellants filed a suit seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the respondents to hand over possession of the same property. At trial, the appellants' suit for mandatory injunction was decreed and the respondents' suit was dismissed. On appeal, by the impugned judgment dated 19.12.2009, the Appellate Court accepted the respondents' appeal, dismissed the appellants' suit and decreed the respondents' suit. The present proceedings are Regular Second Appeals challenging that Appellate Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appellate Court correctly applied Section 60 of the Easement Act, 1882 (holding that a licence coupled with interest and followed by permanent construction cannot be terminated) to the facts of this case.
  2. Whether a substantial question of law arises to entertain a Regular Second Appeal, in light of factual findings (construction, payments and utilities in respondent's name) and the principles restricting interference with concurrent findings of fact by appellate courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants argued that the Appellate Court wrongly invoked Section 60 of the Easement Act suo motu, because respondent No. 1 herself denied applicability of Section 60.
  • They contended that the Appellate Court erred in granting relief to the respondents and dismissing the appellants' suit.

Respondents' Case (as presented in the opinion)

  • Respondent No. 1, Smt. Maya Devi, asserted that she purchased the suit property from appellant No. 2 (Smt. Koyal Devi) in 1972 for Rs. 8,000.
  • After purchase she carried out construction on the property, obtained electricity and water connections in her name, and paid all relevant charges to local authorities.
  • Respondent No. 1 filed the suit for injunction on 12.01.1989; the appellants filed a counter suit in April 1990. The Appellate Court ultimately gave the respondents the benefit of Section 60 of the Easement Act in its judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the matter in two primary strands: (1) the threshold requirement for entertaining a Regular Second Appeal; and (2) the application of statutory principles to the factual findings.

On the threshold for a Regular Second Appeal, the Court reiterated that such appeals are to be entertained only where a substantial question of law arises. The mere existence of two possible views, one of which the Appellate Court adopted, does not automatically create a substantial question of law. Appreciation of evidence and concurrent findings of fact by the trial and appellate courts are not to be lightly interfered with in a second appeal.

On the facts and statutory law, the Court upheld the Appellate Court's application of Section 60 of the Easement Act, 1882. The opinion records that respondent No. 1 incurred the complete costs of construction, obtained electricity and water connections in her name, and paid charges to local authorities. Given these factual findings, the Court accepted the Appellate Court's conclusion that Section 60 applied — a licence coupled with an interest, followed by permanent construction, cannot be terminated.

The Court rejected the appellants' contention that the Appellate Court acted improperly in invoking Section 60 when the respondent had denied its applicability. The judge noted the legal proposition that one cannot be estopped against law, and consequently respondents are entitled to contend that Section 60 applies notwithstanding any previous denial. The Court also relied on Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (as cited in the opinion) to explain the estoppel principle: where a person under a belief of entitlement constructs on a plot and the real owner stands by, the real owner is estopped from later claiming title because his conduct constituted a representation of entitlement to the constructor.

Applying these principles to the admitted fact that respondent No. 1 had effected the entire construction on the plot and taken utilities in her name, the Court concluded that she is the owner of the building constructed on the plot (even if formal title papers in respect of the plot might be absent). Because the factual findings support the Appellate Court's reasoning and because no substantial question of law arises from the record, interference by way of a Regular Second Appeal was not warranted.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Regular Second Appeals are DISMISSED. The Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration.

Immediate implications for the parties:

  • The impugned Appellate Court judgment dated 19.12.2009 (which accepted the respondents' appeal and dismissed the appellants' suit) stands unaltered by these Second Appeals.
  • Respondent No. 1's entitlement to the benefit of Section 60 of the Easement Act, as applied by the Appellate Court (and the recognition of her ownership of the constructed building), remains effective according to the opinion.

Broader implications:

  • The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent; it affirms the Appellate Court's factual findings and statutory application and emphasizes the limited scope for interference in a Regular Second Appeal where no substantial question of law exists.

Show all summary ...

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. These two appeals arise from a common judgment of the Appellate Court dated 19.12.2009 between the same parties raising common questions of law and fact and have therefore been heard and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The challenge by means of these Regular Second Appeals is to the impugned judgment dated 19.12.2009 by which the appeal of the respondents herein was accepted and consequently the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants which was decreed by the trial Court was dismissed.

3. The facts of the case are that two suits were filed, one by Smt. Maya Devi (respondent No. 1) for permanent injunction to restrain the appellants from interfering with her possession and enjoyment of the suit property comprising of 250 sq. yards situated at house No. G-24, Plot No. 9, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi. Another suit was also filed by the present appellants seeking mandatory injunction against the respondents to hand over the possession of the suit property. The suit of the present appellants was decreed by the trial Court and the suit of the present respondents was dismissed. In the appeal, however, by the impugned judgment dated 19.12.2009, the suit of the appellants for mandatory injunction came to be dismissed and the suit of the respondents came to be decreed.

4. The case of Smt. Maya Devi/respondent No. 1 was that she had purchased the suit property from the appellant No. 2 Smt. Koyal Devi, who was the wife of the appellant No. 1, in the year 1972 by payment of total sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/-. It was further the case of Smt. Maya Devi/Respondent No. 1 that after having purchased the property she constructed on the property, got electricity and water connections installed and paid all other charges as were necessary with respect to the property. Since the intentions of the appellants became dishonest, the subject suit was filed by Smt. Maya Devi on 12.1.1989 and subsequently to which in April, 1990 the appellant filed the counter suit. The Appellate Court has given the benefit of Section 60 of the Easement Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to the respondents herein by holding that once a licence is created in an immovable property and such licence is coupled with interest and there is permanent construction on the property such licence cannot be terminated. Trial Court invoked Section 60 of the Act inasmuch as there was no title document in favour of the present respondent No. 1.Smt. Maya Devi.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants sought to argue that Section 60 of the Act has been wrongly suo moto invoked by the Appellate Court since the respondent No. 1 herself denied the applicability of Section 60 of the Act. It has been argued that the Appellate Court has erred in granting relief to the respondents and dismissing the suit of the appellants.

6. A Regular Second Appeal has to be only entertained if there arises a substantial question of law. Merely because two views are possible and the Appellate Court has taken one possible view, cannot mean that a substantial question of law arises. Appreciation of evidence is within the jurisdiction of the original Court and the Appellate Court, and which appreciation of evidence ought not to be lightly interfered because for maintaining a second appeal there is required not only a question of law but a substantial question of law.

In my opinion, the arguments as raised by the counsel for the appellants are misconceived and no substantial question of law arises inasmuch if really the appellant No. 2.Smt. Koyal Devi, wife of appellant No. 1, was the owner of the property, then the appellants would not have stood by and allowed the respondents to raise construction on the suit property. It is established on record that the respondent No. 1 herein incurred the complete costs for construction on the plot, got electricity and water connections in her name and also has paid all the charges to the local authorities with respect to the subject property. Clearly therefore Section 60 of the Act applies. The argument of the appellants that the respondents herself denied applicability of Section 60, is without merit inasmuch as there cannot be an estoppel against law. The respondents are always entitled to argue that Section 60 of the Act applies. In my opinion, the Appellate Court is also otherwise correct because as per Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872, once a person having a belief that he is the owner of a plot, constructs on a plot and the real owner stands by then such real owner is estopped from claiming any title in the plot inasmuch as by standing by he has given a representation that the person who constructs on the plot had complete entitlement to construct. Further, since the respondent No. 1 has admittedly made entire construction on the plot in question, she is definitely the owner of the building which has been constructed on the plot though formally there may not be title papers in the name of the respondents with respect to the plot in question.

7. No substantial question of law therefore arises. Dismissed.