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Shri Daulat Ram & Anr. v. Keshav Smarak Samithi & Anr. S
Judgment Summary — Valmiki J. Mehta, J. (Oral)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal is a Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the trial Court's judgment dated 17.2.2009 which decreed the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs for recovery of possession and mesne profits in respect of a portion of property No. 10196, Jhandewala Estate, Desh Bhandhu Gupta Marg, New Delhi (site plan Ex.PW1/4).
The respondents/plaintiffs asserted that plaintiff No. 2 was the owner of the entire property No. 10196 and that plaintiff No. 2 had leased a portion to plaintiff No. 1 by a registered lease deed dated 5.10.1970 (Ex.PW1/3). Both plaintiffs are societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The respondents relied on an earlier judgment of this Court in Civil Suit No. 1679 of 1982 (High Court judgment dated 22.1.1990, Ex.PW1/5) which recognized the ownership of plaintiff No. 2 in respect of the complete property and granted reliefs (including injunction) in that prior litigation involving the plaintiffs and the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).
The trial Court relied upon Ex.PW1/5 and a subsequent order Ex.PW1/6 dated 2.5.2003 (dismissing a DDA application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC) to hold plaintiff No. 2 to be the owner. The trial Court's decree for recovery of possession and mesne profits dated 17.2.2009 is the subject of the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court was justified in relying on the earlier High Court judgment (Ex.PW1/5) and the subsequent order (Ex.PW1/6) to decide the issue of ownership in favour of plaintiff No. 2.
- Whether a prior judgment not inter partes is admissible in evidence to establish title/ownership under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (as discussed in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah and earlier authorities).
- Whether the appellants/defendants' assertion of ownership/adverse possession (without documentary proof or specific pleading as to who was the owner against whom adverse possession was claimed) was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs' claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents / Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs relied on the registered lease deed dated 5.10.1970 (Ex.PW1/3) and on the prior High Court judgment dated 22.1.1990 (Ex.PW1/5) recognizing plaintiff No. 2's ownership of property No. 10196.
- The plaintiffs and the trial Court relied on the principle, as applied in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah (AIR 1998 SC 1132), that a prior judgment not inter partes may be admissible under Section 13 of the Evidence Act to prove assertion of a right to property.
Appellants / Defendants' Arguments
- The appellants' counsel relied on State of Bihar v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684), particularly paragraph 121 of that judgment, to contend that a judgment inter partes is not admissible to show title under Section 13 of the Evidence Act.
- At trial, the appellants/defendants asserted ownership and adverse possession but, as noted by the Court, did not plead specifically who was the owner against whom adverse possession was claimed and produced no documents to establish the alleged ownership.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132 | The admissibility of a previous judgment not inter partes under Section 13 of the Evidence Act to prove assertion of a right to property. | The trial Court's reliance on Ex.PW1/5 and Ex.PW1/6 to decide ownership in favour of plaintiff No. 2 was held to be permissible in view of the principle in Tirumala Tirupati (supra). |
| Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango, AIR 1954 SC 379 | Held that a judgment not inter partes is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property. | Used to support the proposition that a prior judgment (even if not inter partes) is admissible under Section 13 to establish title/ownership. |
| Sital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR 1954 SC 606 | Held that a previous judgment not inter partes is admissible under Section 13 as a 'transaction' in which a right to property was 'asserted' and 'recognised'. | Relied upon alongside Srinivas Krishna Rao to validate the admissibility and evidentiary value of Ex.PW1/5 for proving ownership. |
| Dinamoni v. Brajmohini, (1992) ILR 29 Cal 190 (PC) (as cited) | Privy Council view that a previous judgment not inter partes was admissible under Section 13 to show identification of parties, lands and who was declared entitled. | Cited as an earlier authority supporting admissibility of non-inter-partes judgments; used to bolster the Tirumala/Tango line of authorities. |
| Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Singh, (1895) ILR 22 Cal 533 (PC) | Cited in the context of historical discussion (noted as criticized in commentary). | Referenced in the Court's exposition of authorities concerning admissibility under Section 13; the criticism of this case was noted but contrasted with later Privy Council decisions. |
| Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157 | Privy Council decision accepting earlier reasoning on admissibility under Section 13, rejecting earlier criticism. | Referred to support the line of authorities holding non-inter-partes judgments admissible under Section 13. |
| State of Bihar v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 | Relied upon by appellants to contend that judgment inter partes is not admissible to show title under Section 13 (reference to para 121). | The Court examined this reliance and held that State of Bihar did not refer to the earlier three- and four-judge Division Bench decisions; thus it would not prevail over those earlier decisions of larger or equal Benches. |
| Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933 | Principle that a decision of a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges prevails over that of a smaller Bench. | Applied to hold that the earlier Division Bench decisions (Srinivas Krishna Rao and Sital Das) prevail over State of Bihar and therefore bind the Court. |
| Union of India v. S.K. Kapoor, (2011) 4 SCC 589 | Reaffirmation that earlier decisions (of a larger Bench) hold the field even if later decisions do not refer to them. | Relied upon to reinforce the binding character of the earlier Division Bench decisions that supported admissibility under Section 13 and to reject the appellants' reliance on State of Bihar. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis focusing primarily on (a) whether the earlier High Court judgment (Ex.PW1/5) and subsequent order (Ex.PW1/6) were admissible and could be relied upon to establish ownership, and (b) whether the appellants had satisfactorily pleaded and proved any competing title or adverse possession.
First, the Court accepted the trial Court's reliance on Ex.PW1/5 and Ex.PW1/6 because the Supreme Court's decision in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah establishes that a judgment not inter partes is admissible under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property. The court reproduced and relied upon the line of authority in Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango (three-Judge Division Bench) and Sital Das (four-Judge Division Bench) which hold that prior non-inter-partes judgments can be admitted under Section 13 to show asserted rights in property.
Second, the Court addressed the appellants' reliance on State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 684). The Court observed that State of Bihar did not refer to the earlier Division Bench decisions of Srinivas Krishna Rao and Sital Das. On the binding force of precedent, the Court explained (by reference to Union of India v. Raghubir Singh and Union of India v. S.K. Kapoor) that decisions of a larger Bench prevail over those of smaller Benches, and that earlier decisions remain binding even if later decisions do not refer to them. Therefore, the State of Bihar authority, as relied on by the appellants, did not displace the earlier binding Division Bench authorities supporting admissibility under Section 13.
Third, and factually, the Court noted that the appellants/defendants had not pleaded with specificity as to who they asserted was the owner against whom adverse possession was claimed. The Court emphasized that where a party claims possession on the basis of ownership, that party must identify the asserted owner and the adverse possession should be specifically pleaded and, where necessary, proved by documents. The Court found that the appellants produced no document to establish their alleged ownership; mere assertions were insufficient.
On these bases — (i) the admissibility and evidentiary value of the prior High Court judgment in Ex.PW1/5 supported by Supreme Court precedents, and (ii) the appellants' failure to plead or prove an asserted competing title or adverse possession — the Court concluded that there was no error in the trial Court's finding of ownership in favour of plaintiff No. 2 and in the decree for possession.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The trial Court's judgment dated 17.2.2009, decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits in respect of the suit property, is upheld. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the trial Court's decree for possession and mesne profits in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs (based on ownership of plaintiff No. 2 as established by Ex.PW1/5 and Ex.PW1/6) stands affirmed.
- The Court applied established Supreme Court authorities to permit reliance on a prior judgment not inter partes as evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act; this decision applies those authorities to the facts of the case but does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond their application.
- No broader or novel precedent was stated by this Court; the Court relied on existing Supreme Court precedent regarding admissibility under Section 13 and on well-established principles concerning the binding nature of larger Bench decisions.
No additional orders or modifications to the trial Court's decree were made by the Court in this oral judgment beyond dismissal of the appeal and costs as recorded.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. The challenge by means of this Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is to the impugned judgment of the trial Court dated 17.2.2009 By the impugned judgment dated 17.2.2009, the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs for recovery of possession and mesne profits was decreed. The suit for possession was decreed with respect to the suit property which is part of the property No. 10196, Jhandewala Estate, Desh Bhandhu Gupta Marg, New Delhi as shown in the site plan Ex.PW1/4.
2. The subject suit was filed by the respondents/plaintiffs on the assertion that the entire property bearing No. 10196 Jhandewala Estate was owned by plaintiff No. 2 and a portion of which the plaintiff No. 2 leased out to the plaintiff No. 1 vide lease deed dated 5.10.1970 registered with the sub-Registrar, Delhi. The lease deed executed by the plaintiff No. 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 is not disputed inter se the plaintiffs/respondents and this lease deed has been proved before the trial Court as Ex.PW1/3. Both the plaintiffs are societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. In support of the ownership of the plaintiff No. 2, reliance was placed upon judgment passed by this Court in Civil Suit No. 1679 of 1982 between the plaintiffs and Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The judgment of the High Court dated 22.1.1990 was exhibited as Ex.PW1/5. This judgment was passed in a litigation between the plaintiffs and the DDA pertaining to ownership of the complete property No. 10196, Jhandewala Estate. The ownership of the plaintiff No. 2 has been recognized as per the said judgment. The disputes decided in the suit were as to whether the DDA was the owner of the property or was the plaintiff No. 2 in the present suit the owner of the property. After holding the plaintiff No. 2 as the owner of the property, the relief of injunction as prayed for in the suit was granted. Some of the relevant observations in the judgment of this Court dated 22.1.1990 read as under:-
“In the field map (nakha Kishatwar) of 1908, certified copy of which is Ext.P.4, the entire are is shown as Jhandewala Temple. Thus, I am of the view that Jhandewala temple has been in existence, much prior to the year 1903, and plaintiffs have been able to prove that same was setup by Shri Badri Dass.
It is established that after the year 1880, Shri Badri Dass came in possession of the entire suit property, which was earlier owned by Shri Jiya Ram and Shri Chhajju Ram. Defendant has failed to explain as to how, the Government became the owner of the land when admittedly, the aforesaid 2 brothers were the owners, and thereafter, Shri Badri Dass was in exclusive possession of the entire land.
No doubt, lateron, in the revenue record, Crown was shown as the Owner of the property. But, there is no mutation of the purchase of any part of the land, in favour of the Government. It is worth-while to mention, that the entry, thereby showing the ownership of the Crown, was itself commented upon, as wrong (in para 64) in the report of Shri R.B White, Head Assistant Commissioner on the Administration of Delhi Crown Land, dated November 1, 1909, which had been accepted as correct, even by publishing it in 1933. True copy of the extract of para 64 has been proved as Ext.P.8
In 1913, certain lands were to be acquired for capital of India. However, the land in question, was exempted from the notification, by the then Collector, stating that it being a Jhandewala Temple and estate, as such, could not be acquired. The certified true copy of the award dated July 2, 1913 is Ext.P.9
Plaintiffs have also proved that Shri Badri Dass and his successors, namely, Shri Ramji Dass and Shri Sham Sunder, have been dealing with the land, as owners. From 1944, when the society was set up by Shri Sham Sunder, plaintiff No. 1 has been dealing with the land as its owner, and has been in complete control and management of the same.
Out of the suit property, land measuring 14,300 sq yds. was given on perpetual lease, for a period of 99 years, by plaintiff No. 1 to Shri M.S Gowalkar, Chief of R.S.S, vide registered lease deed dated 19th August, 1947. Shri M.S Gowalkar, subsequently vested the lease property, in favour of plaintiff No. 3. Plaintiff No. 3 has raised construction, over the land, from time to time, after obtaining necessary sanctions from the appropriate authorities, including the defendant and, has been enjoying the portion, as the lessee under plaintiff No. 1. Copy of the lease-deed is Ext.P.7
To further show, that plaintiff No. 1 has been dealing with the land as owner, another lease-deed was executed by it, in favour of M/s Baij Nath Brothers, for an area of 1700 sq. yds., for a period of 50 years. This document was also registered on January 19, 1948. Plaintiff No. 1 also leased the other portion of the suit property, in favour of plaintiff No. 2, vide lease deeds dated October 5, 1970 measuring 733 sq. metres and 4620 sq. metres.
For raising construction, lessees have been obtaining the sanction of the building plans, from appropriate authorities. The various letters, thereby granting such sanctions, are Exts. P.12, P.13, P.14, P.17, P.18 and P.28 Certificate of occupancy, issued by Municipal Corporation of Delhi, is Ext. P.29 and P.36
After coming into force the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, proceedings were taken against plaintiff No. 3, under this Act, and plaintiff No. 3 was granted exemption by the appropriate authorities and such exemption has been duly proved. Copy of the order is Ext.P.43
Apart from the aforesaid lease-deeds, executed by plaintiff No. 1, plaintiff No. 1 society has also been letting out various portions of the suit property to various tenants and has been collecting rent from them.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
For the reasons stated above, there is no material to hold that defendant is the licensor in respect of property in suit. This notice is contrary to the facts and revenue records. Moreover, plaintiff No. 1 society and its predecessors, right from Shri Badri Dass, raised structures of permanent nature, on the suit land, and have further granted perpetual leases to various persons, who, after obtaining the necessary sanctions, have raised buildings. Thus, in my view, the notice is invalid.” (underlining added)
3. The trial Court relied upon this judgment of the High Court Ex.PW1/5, and a subsequent order Ex.PW1/6 dated 2.5.2003 passed dismissing the application of the DDA under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, to hold that the plaintiff No. 2 was the owner of the suit property in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M Krishnaiah AIR 1998 SC 1132. In the decision in the case of Tirumala Tirupati (supra), the Supreme Court relied upon two earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, one of three Judges and one of four Judges, to hold that a judgment which may not be inter parties would still be relevant to determine the controversy as to ownership of the property by virtue of Section 13 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court, in this regard, read as under:-
“7. In view of the above contentions, the following three points arise for consideration:
Whether the judgment in OS 51 of 1937, Sub-Court, Chittoor dated 15-6-1942 declaring the title of the TTD, was admissible and could be relied upon by the TTD as evidence in the present case, even though present plaintiff was not a party to OS 51 of 1937?”
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
9. In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy Council. In Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango, AIR 1954 SC 379, speaking on behalf of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. held that a judgment not inter parties is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. A contention that judgments other than those falling under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act were not admissible in evidence was expressly rejected. Again B.K Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of four learned Judges in Sital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR 1954 SC 606 held that a previous judgment not inter parties, was admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a ‘transaction’ in which a right to property was ‘asserted’ and ‘recognised’. In fact, much earlier, Lord Lindley held in the Privy Council in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini, (1992) ILR 29 Cal 190 (198) (PC) that a previous judgment, not inter partes was admissible in evidence under Section 13 to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who was declared entitled to retain them. The criticism of the judgment in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini and Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Singh, (1895) ILR 22 Cal 533 (PC) by Sir John Woodroffe in his commentary on the Evidence Act (1931, p.181) was not accepted by Lord Blanesburgh in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157 : 61 IA 286.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff and hold that the TTD could rely on the judgment in OS 51/37 as evidence to prove its title in regard to the suit property, even though the present plaintiff was not a party to that suit. Point No. 1 is held accordingly against the respondent.” (underlining added)
4. In my opinion, therefore, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment when it relies upon the judgment of the High Court Ex.PW1/5, and the subsequent order Ex.PW1/6, to decide the issue of ownership in favour of plaintiff No. 2. I may further add that if a person claims possession on the basis of ownership and which is claimed by the appellants/defendants in these proceedings, then, such person will have to first allege as to who was the owner of the property and against whom adverse possession is claimed for a period of around 50 years. This assertion of a particular owner is necessary because the claim of title of such an owner can be established from a judgment in a litigation which may have arisen between the said owner and any other person. In this case, the owner was plaintiff No. 2 and “any other person” was the DDA. In the case pleaded by the appellants/defendants in the trial Court there is conspicuous silence of any assertion as to who was actually the owner of the property and against whom adverse possession was claimed. I may only add that though there was an assertion of ownership, in addition to the owner by adverse possession, but admittedly no document was filed at all to establish the so called alleged ownership of the appellants/defendants. Obviously, by a simple assertion of ownership, no one can become an owner of a property.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has sought to place reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Sri Radha Krishna Singh AIR 1983 SC 684 to contend that a judgment inter parties is not admissible to show title under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Reliance is placed upon para 121 of this judgment. A reference to this judgment in the case of State of Bihar (supra) relied upon by the appellants show that in the said judgment no reference is made to the earlier Division Bench judgment of the Supreme Court of three Judges and four Judges in the cases of Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango, AIR 1954 SC 379 (division bench of three Judges) and Sital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR 1954 SC 606 (division bench of four Judges). It is settled law that a decision of a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges prevails over the decision of a Division Bench of smaller number of Judges vide Union of India v. Raghubir Singh AIR 1989 SC 1933. In fact, a Division Bench of equal number of Judges cannot disagree with an earlier decision of an equal number of Division Bench. If a Division Bench of the same number of Judges disagrees with a decision of a Division Bench of same number of Judges, then, the matter has to be referred to for decision to a larger Bench of Supreme Court. Recently, the Supreme Court has re-affirmed this position in the judgment reported as Union of India v. S.K Kapoor(2011) 4 SCC 589 wherein the Supreme Court observed that even if a later decision is given without referring to the earlier decision, yet it is the earlier decision which will hold the field. I therefore hold that the judgment relied upon on behalf of the appellants in the case of State of Bihar (supra) will not bind this Court in view of the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court of bench of equal and larger number of Judges in the judgments of Srinivas Krishna Rao (supra) and Sital Das (supra).
6. No further issue is urged or pressed before this Court.
7. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the appeal which is therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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