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Lords Chloro Alkali Limited v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited & Anr.

Delhi High Court
May 27, 2011
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No.1 Company supplied one unit of a converter system to the petitioner company pursuant to a purchase order dated 10.4.1996 for a plant at Alwar. Only partial payments were made. Subsequently the petitioner company's net worth was wiped out and the petitioner initiated proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) to be declared a sick company. The Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) approved a revival scheme by its order dated 30.11.2006 which envisaged settlement of dues at 26.50% for secured creditors and 10% for unsecured creditors.

Respondent No.1 claims it was unaware of the SICA proceedings and only became aware after an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR). Respondent No.1 contended that, being a Central Public Sector Undertaking (PSU), it must be treated as "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore falls within the expression "other authority" in Section 19(1) of the SICA, entitling it to circulation of the rehabilitation scheme and the right to be treated as a person required to give consent under Section 19(2).

The AAIFR accepted respondent No.1's contention by its order dated 12.10.2010. A subsequent BIFR order dated 26.3.2010 discharged the petitioner from the purview of SICA/BIFR as its net worth had become positive as on 31.3.2009; that order, however, directed that unimplemented provisions of the sanctioned scheme, if any, should be implemented and monitored.

The petitioner challenged the AAIFR order in writ jurisdiction. The present opinion addresses that challenge and interprets whether respondent No.1 is covered by the expression "other authority" in Section 19(1) of the SICA and whether unpaid price for supplied goods amounts to "financial assistance" within the meaning of Section 19(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Public Sector Enterprise/Undertaking (PSU) having outstanding dues in respect of a commercial transaction from a sick company falls within the definition of "other authority" for purposes of Section 19(1) of the SICA and is therefore entitled to the circulation of the rehabilitation scheme and to obtain its consent under Section 19(2) of the SICA.
  2. Whether the unpaid balance price for goods supplied (i.e., the unpaid commercial debt) falls within the definition of "financial assistance" by way of loans, advances, guarantees, reliefs, concessions or sacrifices as contemplated by Section 19(1) of the SICA.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • Respondent No.1 asserted it is a Central PSU and should be treated as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and thus falls within the expression "other authority" used in Section 19(1) of the SICA.
  • Consequently, it argued it was entitled to prior notice under Section 19(2) of the SICA and to be treated as a person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance.
  • Counsel for respondent No.1 relied on principles in cases such as Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Sukhdev Singh to show that public corporations/instrumentalities may be regarded as "State" for certain purposes.
  • It was submitted that the phrase "other authority" should be read in conjunction with the other entities listed in Section 19(1) and that, because respondent No.1 had a large public claim, it should be regarded as an "other authority" regardless of whether its transaction was commercial.
  • Counsel accepted Article 12's scope is limited and Article 226's scope is wider but maintained that the question to be decided was interpretation of Section 19(1) and not application of Article 12 tests per se.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that respondent No.1's dealings were a pure commercial supply transaction pursuant to a purchase order and did not involve any public function or duty.
  • According to the petitioner, respondent No.1 is correctly characterized as an unsecured creditor and is therefore entitled only to the treatment provided for unsecured creditors under the sanctioned scheme (10% of principal).
  • The petitioner relied on a Division Bench decision (National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Singer India Limited) to show that a PSU's investment in share capital was not "financial assistance" under Section 19(1); by analogy, commercial dealings should not attract Section 19(1) protection.
  • The petitioner referred to Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts Limited to highlight the distinction between public/state action and private commercial action by a state instrumentality; when a state body acts as a contracting party in commerce it assumes private-law character and should not be treated as "State" for purposes of invoking public-law remedies or entitlements in this context.
  • It was also pointed out that Section 18(3)(b) addresses circulation of the draft rehabilitation scheme for knowledge of creditors; Section 19(1) does not mention creditors generally and instead specifies particular categories of entities for the special rule under Section 19(2).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 Illustration of the expansion of governmental functions and the creation of public corporations/instrumentalities; used to explain when corporations may be treated as 'State' for constitutional accountability. The court acknowledged the decision as emphasizing that certain bodies may be treated as 'State' in appropriate circumstances, but used it to show that those tests concern Article 12 analysis and do not compel extending Section 19(1) of SICA beyond its plain words. The court treated this precedent as part of the material showing the difference between State-character activities and commercial transactions.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 Principle that neither the form of a corporation nor its ostensible autonomy necessarily takes away its character as 'State' where governmental control and accountability under Part III exist. The court noted the case for the proposition that public corporations can, in some circumstances, be 'State' under Article 12. However, it distinguished that principle from the statutory interpretation of Section 19(1), holding that such constitutional characterisation cannot be imported into the phrase "other authority" in Section 19(1) to widen its scope beyond entities engaged in providing financial assistance as specified in the statute.
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 Tests (financial, functional and administrative control) for determining whether a body is 'State' under Article 12; tests are not to be applied rigidly but cumulatively. The court referred to Ajay Hasia's tests as part of the Article 12 analysis referenced by parties, but held that Article 12 analysis (and Ajay Hasia tests) were not the appropriate means to expand the meaning of "other authority" in Section 19(1). The court preferred a literal construction of Section 19(1).
National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Singer India Limited, WP(C) No. 7341/2009 (Division Bench, Delhi) Held that a PSU's investment in share capital of a sick company is not "financial assistance" by way of loan, advance, guarantee, sacrifice, relief or concession under Section 19(1) of SICA. The court observed this decision and accepted that it was factually different but supportive of the proposition that not all transactions involving PSUs fall within Section 19(1). The precedent was relied upon by the petitioner and the court treated it as indicating that commercial investments/transactions by PSUs need not attract Section 19(1) reliefs.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited, (1986) 1 SCC 264 Principle that courts distinguish public-law/state actions from private-law/commercial actions of state instrumentalities; when state/instrumentality acts in corporate/shareholder role it assumes private-law character. The court cited and applied this principle to conclude that respondent No.1's supply transaction was a purely commercial transaction without public function, and therefore its commercial claim (unpaid price) could not be treated as the sort of "financial assistance" contemplated by Section 19(1).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carried out a textual and contextual interpretation of Section 19(1) and (2) of the SICA, applying the following analytical steps and conclusions (as expressed in the opinion):

  1. Plain-meaning approach: The court emphasized that Section 19's provisions are clear in their terms and reflect legislative intent, and therefore a literal, grammatical construction applies. The court declined to extend the section's meaning by importing concepts from Article 12 or Article 226 of the Constitution.
  2. Structure of the statutory list: The court examined the punctuation and coordination in Section 19(1). It parsed the entities from which financial assistance may be provided into discrete categories (Central Government; State Government; any scheduled bank or other bank; and a grouped category: a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority). The presence of commas and the use of "or" were read to indicate that the final phrase must be read in the light of the immediately preceding terms ("a public financial institution or State level institution").
  3. Ejusdem generis principle: Because the general words "any institution or other authority" follow specific types ("a public financial institution or State level institution"), the court held that the phrase "other authority" must be read ejusdem generis — i.e., limited to authorities of the same kind (those that provide financial assistance such as loans, advances or guarantees).
  4. Definition and role of "the person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance": The court accepted that the bracketed portion in Section 19(1) is a defining clause for the expression "the person" required by the scheme to provide financial assistance when that phrase is used elsewhere in Section 19.
  5. Meaning of "financial assistance": The court held that Section 19(1) contemplates financial assistance specifically by way of loans, advances, guarantees, or reliefs/concessions/sacrifices connected to such lending-type transactions. The court reasoned that reliefs/concessions/sacrifices are to be understood as applying to loans/advances/guarantees (i.e., reductions or sacrifices in respect of borrowings) and must therefore be read ejusdem generis with the first three terms.
  6. Application to unpaid price for goods: On that basis the court concluded that unpaid price for goods supplied pursuant to a commercial sale does not fall within loans, advances, guarantees, or within reliefs/concessions/sacrifices of those lending forms. A pure commercial transaction (supply of goods for price) is not the kind of "financial assistance" envisaged by Section 19(1).
  7. Distinction between state-character and commercial acts by PSUs: While acknowledging the jurisprudence that public corporations may be treated as 'State' under Article 12 in particular contexts, the court stressed the factual distinction — respondent No.1's transaction was purely commercial and lacked a public function. Therefore, being a PSU did not, by itself, convert a commercial creditor into an "other authority" entitled to Section 19(2) protections.
  8. Result on AAIFR's approach: The court held that AAIFR's application of Article 12 to enlarge the category of persons covered by Section 19(1) was incorrect; the correct approach was statutory interpretation of Section 19(1) which excludes a commercial unpaid price claim from the "financial assistance" category and, consequently, excludes respondent No.1 from qualifying as an "other authority" under Section 19(1) for the purposes of Section 19(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the AAIFR dated 12.10.2010 is set aside (the rule is made absolute).

Consequences for the parties:

  • Respondent No.1 is not covered within the definition of "other authority" for the purposes of Section 19(1) of the SICA and therefore is not entitled to the circulation/consent procedure under Section 19(2) on that basis.
  • The unpaid price for goods supplied does not constitute "financial assistance" by way of loans, advances, guarantees, reliefs, concessions or sacrifices as contemplated by Section 19(1) of the SICA.
  • Respondent No.1 is to be treated as an unsecured creditor (as earlier categorized by the BIFR) and, under the sanctioned scheme, its entitlement is limited to the percentage applicable to unsecured creditors (10% of the principal amount as per the approved scheme). The court noted that the scheme’s implementation and payment schedule governed actual payment timings.
  • Parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Broader implications: The opinion rests on a textual, literal construction of Section 19(1) and confines the application of Section 19(2) to entities akin to public financial institutions or State level institutions that provide lending-type financial assistance. The court did not purport to lay down an expansive new constitutional principle beyond this statutory construction. (The opinion focuses on the direct effect on the parties in this litigation.)

Show all summary ...

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.:— The present writ petition raises the following question of law:

“Whether a Public Sector Enterprise/Undertaking (for short ‘PSU’) having dues outstanding in respect of a commercial transaction from a sick company within the meaning of The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SICA’) falls within the definition of “other authority” for purposes of Section 19(1) of the SICA and is entitled to the benefit of sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the SICA of circulation of the scheme and entitlement to obtain its consent?”

2. Respondent No. 1 Company supplied one unit of 12KA, 360V DC 6 Pulse Tyristor Converter System to the petitioner Company against a purchase order dated 10.4.1996 for a plant at Alwar. Only some part payments were made when the net worth of the petitioner Company was wiped out and, thus, proceedings were initiated by the petitioner Company under the SICA for being declared as a sick company. These proceedings resulted in examination of a scheme for revival of the petitioner Company and the final approved scheme in terms of the order dated 30.11.2006 of the BIFR envisaged settlement of dues of secured and unsecured creditors at 26.50 per cent and 10 per cent of the principal amount respectively.

3. It is the case of respondent No. 1 Company that it did not come to know of these proceedings, and it is only after about two (2) years when an appeal was filed before the AAIFR (aggrieved by the fact that respondent No. 1 Company was being treated under the head of ‘unsecured creditors’, which would entitle it only to 10 per cent of the principal amount) did it become aware of the said proceedings. It is the case of respondent No. 1 Company that the said Company is a Central PSU and has to be treated as “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and would, thus, be covered within the meaning of “other authority” under Section 19(1) of the SICA which would entitle it to a prior notice under Section 19(2) of the SICA.

4. In order to appreciate the controversy, the relevant provisions are reproduced as under:

“19. Rehabilitation By Giving Financial Assistance.—(1) Where the scheme relates to preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures with respect to any sick industrial company, the scheme may provide for financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices from the Central Government, a State Government, any scheduled bank or other bank, a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority (any Government bank, institution or other authority required by a scheme to provide for such financial assistance being hereafter in this section referred to as the person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance) to the sick industrial company.

(2) Every scheme referred to in sub-section (1) shall be circulated to every person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance for his consent within a period of sixty days from the date of such circulation or within such further period, not exceeding sixty days, as may be allowed by the Board, and if no consent is received within such period or further period, it shall be deemed that consent has been given.”

5. The plea of respondent No. 1 Company found favour with the AAIFR in terms of the impugned order dated 12.10.2010 on the premise that the term “other authority” used in Section 19(1) of the SICA will take its colour from Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Respondent No. 1 being a PSU was, thus, covered within the meaning of “other authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and consequently under section 19(1) of the sica.

6. Another fact taken note of by the AAIFR is that a subsequent order was passed by the BIFR on 26.3.2010 in terms whereof the petitioner Company was discharged from the purview of SICA/BIFR as its net worth had become positive as on 31.3.2009 but simultaneously directions were issued by the same order that the unimplemented provisions of the sanctioned scheme, if any, should be implemented by the concerned agencies and their implementation would be monitored by the petitioner. The final directions, as pointed out by learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1, are, however, limited in their scope as the scheme is not sought to be reopened, the provisions of which are to remain unchanged. The only change in the sanctioned scheme that may need to be effected would be on the basis of the decision of the BIFR taken after notice to respondent No. 1 and considering the response of respondent No. 1 in respect of its claims.

7. We have had the benefit of submissions of both the learned counsels for the parties. The counsels have submitted before us that the exact proposition of law as framed above is an unexplored terrain as there is no direct pronouncement of the High Court or the Supreme Court in this behalf though some judgments were referred to which may have indirectly commented on the aspect in issue. It is also the common cause of the parties that the AAIFR actually did not appreciate the purport of the submissions and the correct question raised before it as the issue was not one of applying the principles of Article 12 of the Constitution of India to Section 19 of the SICA but the question to be examined is as framed by us aforesaid.

8. The aforesaid being the position, we considered it appropriate to first to hear the submissions of the learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 as to his plea that on a reading of Section 19 of the SICA, respondent No. 1 would be covered within the definition of “other authority”. Learned counsel fairly submitted before us that he was conscious of the fact that the scope within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India would be limited and the scope within Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be wider in this behalf. It was, thus, submitted that the question was not one as to whether the transaction in question was in furtherance of any public duty but on the interpretation of section 19(1) of the sica.

9. Learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that Section 19(1) of the SICA envisages a scheme for rehabilitation of the sick company to be provided with financial assistance or sacrifices from:

(a) Central Government, State Government,

(b) Any scheduled bank or other bank,

(c) A public financial institution or State level institution or any institution, or

(d) Other authority.

10. Learned counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 3(1)(p) of the SICA, which read as under:

“3. Definitions.

(1) In this Act, unless the context, otherwise requires,-

(p) “State level institution” means any of the following institutions, namely:—

(i) State Financial Corporations established under section 3 or section 3a and institutions notified under section 46 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (63 of 1951);

(ii) State Industrial Development Corporations registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);

(iii) such other institutions, being companies and not being public financial institutions, engaged in the development or financing of industrial undertakings, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify:

Provided that no institution shall be so specified unless not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital thereof is held by any State Government or Governments or by any institution or institutions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) or partly by one or more public financial institutions, or institutions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) and partly by one or more State Governments.”

11. It was, thus, submitted that while the expression ‘State level institution’ used in Section 19(1) of the SICA had been clearly defined, and the expression ‘or any institution’ must, thus, take colour from it, the expression ‘other authority’ has no similarity with the expression used in Section 3(1)(p) of the SICA.

12. All these entities aforesaid are collectively described as ‘the person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance’. (In order to indicate that the use of the phraseology ‘person’ in other parts of Section 19 of the SICA would include all these entities). Section 19(1) of the SICA makes no distinction between a secured and an unsecured creditor. It gives certain special rights to a category of institutions as set out therein irrespective of the fact that they have advanced any secured or unsecured loans or carried out any other transaction.

13. Learned counsel submits that this Section is required to be broken into four parts mentioned aforesaid. The expression “other authorities” would have to have a reference to an entity other than an entity mentioned in (a), (b) & (c) above and cannot stand alone. The expression “other authority”, it was submitted, will have to take colour (a), i.e, the Central Government or State Government, as it does not fit into the scheme of (b) or (c). It is in that context that the submission was advanced that the expression “other authority” under Section 19(1) will have the same meaning as in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The test whether a person or authority is discharging a public duty was stated to be relevant in the context of maintainability of a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but was not relevant in the context of the meaning to be given to the expression “other authority” and respondent No. 1 being a creditor of a large amount of public money was, thus, an “other authority” for purposes of Section 19(1) of the SICA and thus entitled to notice under Section 19(2) of the SICA.

14. Learned counsel referred to the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 to emphasise the expansion of the functions of the Government in a welfare State resulting in forging of a new instrumentality or administrative device for handling these new problems which resulted in creation of public corporations as observed in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421. Thus, it was held that neither the form of the corporation, nor its ostensible autonomy would take away from its character as ‘State’ and its constitutional accountability under Part III vis-vis the individual. In para 40 it was observed as under:

“40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”

15. We may note at this stage itself that the emphasis is on an accountability of such a State authority to rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution of India.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, canvassed before us that respondent No. 1 Company despite being a Government Company was not covered within “other authority”, in Section 19(1) of the SICA as it had entered into a mere commercial transaction in pursuance to a purchase order. There were other companies sailing in the same boat. A transaction which is purely commercial in nature without any public function or duty attached to it does not entitle respondent No. 1 Company to interfere into the revival scheme of a sick industrial company merely on the ground that it is a Government Company and thus while entering into such a commercial transaction a Government Company cannot seek a better dispensation by virtue of being a PSU. Learned counsel sought to draw strength from the observations made in WP (C) No. 7341/2009 titled National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Singer India Mmited decided on 30.8.2010 (reported in 2010 (103) SEBI & Corporate Law 385 Delhi), which is a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. It could, however, not be disputed that the issue which was adjudicated upon in that case is slightly different. A PSU had invested money in the sick company in the form of share capital and it was held that such investment could not be said to be a financial assistance to a sick company by way of loan, advance, guarantee, sacrifice, relief or concession by a financial institution. Such a PSU which invests in the share capital would not come within the meaning of section 19(1) of the sica. The case being one of dilution of shareholding of the petitioner therein in the sick company was held not to come within the purview of section 19(1) of the sica.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited, (1986) 1 SCC 264 wherein it was observed in para 102 as under:

“102. For example, if the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the court will keep away from it. The court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the Company like any other shareholder.”

(emphasis supplied)

18. Learned counsel submitted that undisputedly respondent No. 1 is a creditor of the petitioner Company having a claim of Rs. 73.49 lakh. As to how such a creditor is to be treated has to take its colour from Section 18(3)(b) of the SICA which mandates circulation of the draft rehabilitation scheme for knowledge of the creditors. There is no mention of creditors in section 19(1) of the sica. Respondent No. 1 Company being an unsecured creditor would, thus, have to stand at the end even in the event of winding up of the petitioner Company under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. Out of the total dues which were outstanding from the petitioner Company, the extent of dues payable to respondent No. 1 were 11.47 per cent and thus the sanctioned scheme could not be interfered with on the pretext of a minority stake qua the dues.

19. We may, once again, at this stage point out that the aforesaid plea is really not of much relevance as the expressions used in Section 19(1) of the SICA are not in respect of unsecured or secured creditor but the benefit of Section 19(2) of the SICA being made available to the entities envisaged under section 19(1) of the sica.

20. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsels for the parties. We are also conscious of the fact that the impugned order does not reopen the chapter of the sanctioned scheme which stands partly implemented and the petitioner Company having come out of the woods. The rights in terms of the impugned order have been given to respondent No. 1 Company limited to a hearing before the BIFR to examine as to how its debts are to be treated keeping in mind that it is a PSU. However, the issue is not whether a limited right is given or not but as to whether respondent No. 1 could fall within the definition of “other authority” as used in Section 19(1) of the SICA for it to enjoy certain special rights under Section 19(2) of the SICA even though it is an unsecured creditor. Another connected question which would arise for consideration would be whether the unpaid balance price for goods supplied would fall within the definition of ‘Financial Assistance’ by way of loans, advances, or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices. For the said purpose construction would have to be given to Section 19 of the SICA.

21. In our view the provisions of section 19 of the SICA are clear in their terms reflecting the intent of the legislature and there is no need to give it an extended meaning by seeking resort to provisions of Article 12 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principles of literal construction would apply in such a case. The plain, literal and grammatical meaning have to be given effect to and if that is so done it is not inconsistent with any expressed intention or declared purpose of the SICA. The species specify in one category ‘a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority’. The expression ‘any institution or other authority’, thus, take their colour from a ‘public financial institution or State level institution’.

22. We may also clarify that learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 was right in his contention that the bracketed portion of Section 19(1) of the SICA is for purposes of defining the expression ‘the person’ required by the scheme to provide financial assistance when used in other parts of the Section so that repeatedly it is not necessary to use “any Government bank, institution or other authority required by a scheme to provide such financial assistance”. It is, thus, a defining clause for the expression ‘the person’.

23. Section 19(1) of the SICA envisages the issue of financial assistance by way of concession or sacrifices from certain entities and those entities are, thus, required to have the benefit of the scheme being circulated and the consent obtained under Section 19(2) of the SICA. Thus, Central Government and State Government are specifically mentioned in it. Similarly, there is a mention of scheduled bank or other bank. After ‘Central Government’ there is a comma (,) whereafter the expression ‘a State Government’ is used, again breaking the sentence by a comma (,) and thereafter ‘any scheduled bank or any other bank’, which again is followed by a comma (,). Thereafter the expression used in continuity is ‘a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority’. We are, thus, unable to accept the plea of learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the financial assistance by way of concessions or sacrifices is from four different nature of entities as canvassed. The different entities are broken up by inserting a comma (,) and wherever similar nature of entities are there the expression used is ‘or’. Thus, the concessions or sacrifices are sought from:

a. Central Government,

b. State Government,

c. any scheduled bank or other bank,

d. a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority.

24. The petitioner cannot be permitted to break and create a separate category of “other institution” when the word used is ‘or’ prior to it. The expression “other authority”, thus, has to take a cue from the prior expressions ‘a public financial institution or State level institution’, which is followed up by ‘or any institution or other authority’ and must be read ejusdem generis. The particular words in respect of the class, category, or genus are followed by the general words and thus must be limited to things of the same kind as those specified. It is these nature of institutions which fall within one category. The objective is also very clear - these are institutions which may be providing financial assistance in more manner than one to a sick company and may be called upon to give concessions or sacrifices at the stage of rehabilitation scheme.

25. Section 19(1) of the SICA deals only with a provision made for financial assistance by way of “loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices” from the relevant entities. Thus, the words “financial assistance” are qualified by such financial assistance only by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices. The unpaid price for goods supplied certainly does not fall within the definition of a loan or an advance or a guarantee. The question arises as to whether it would fall within a relief or concession or sacrifice. In our view, the mode and manner of use of these words in the provision make it clear that the last three words take their colour from the nature of transactions reflected specifically in the first three words, i.e, they have to be read in ejusdem generis. A financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees is a positive act by which some more amount is given or guarantee is given for rehabilitation of the company. On the other hand, reliefs, concessions, sacrifices are acts where something is given up, i.e, in respect of loans, advances, or guarantees by way of relief, concession or sacrifice. The entity, thus, takes a lesser amount than due towards the loan, advance or a guarantee. A pure commercial transaction of supply of goods and the corresponding entitlement to recover the balance unpaid price would, thus, not fall within this category and thus even otherwise the benefit of the provisions, of Section 19(2) of the SICA are not available to respondent No. 1.

26. There is no doubt-that respondent No. 1 is a PSU. There is also no doubt that there is no character of a public function attached to the transaction in question which is a pure commercial transaction of sale of goods for a price where part payment has been made and the remaining payment undisputedly remains due. It is in that context that for the remaining unpaid price respondent No. 1 has been treated as an unsecured creditor as it was not an entity which had lent any money against security. This categorization of respondent No. 1 under the heading of ‘unsecured creditors’ can, thus, not be doubted. It will make no difference that in respondent No. 1, being a PSU, the funds, control and management are of the Central Government. The expression “other authority” cannot be construed by clubbing it with ‘Central Government’ or ‘State Government’ as it sought to be done by learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 and thus there cannot be any question of taking any colour from the meaning attached to “other authority” where that expression follows a different nature of expression used in Article 12 of the Constitution of India for purposes of adjudication of rights in Part III of the Constitution of India. In Article 12 of the Constitution of India the expression “the State” has been included to define ‘Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India’ and the same have been construed to include PSUs for that purpose. Similarly, the unpaid price will not also fall within the definition of a financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices.

27. The pronouncements of the Supreme Court cited by both the learned counsels for the parties in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology case (supra) and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited case (supra) have, in fact, a common thread running through it which distinguishes the nature of commercial transactions which may be carried out by PSUs merely as a contracting party which are distinguishable from actions which have a State character or where the rights under Part III of the Constitution of India are enshrined.

28. We are, thus, of the considered view that respondent No. 1 is not entitled to be covered within the definition of “other authority” within the meaning of Section 19(1) of the SICA nor can the unpaid price be categorized as financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices and thus is not entitled to the notice under Section 19(2) of the SICA. Respondent No. 1 is, thus, liable to be treated as an ‘unsecured creditor’, as has been done by the BIFR, and in view of the scheme which has been duly approved in accordance with law the entitlement is restricted to 10 per cent of the principal amount being in the category of an unsecured creditor. We may notice that it was pointed out to us that the petitioner has not paid even that amount but then learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the said amount had to be paid at certain stages and the installment of the same has been brought to the Court by learned counsel for the petitioner.

29. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order of the AAIFR dated 12.10.2010 is set aside making the rule absolute.

30. Parties are left to bear their own costs.