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National Textile Corporation Limited v. Kunj Behari Lal .

Delhi High Court
Aug 16, 2010
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — V.B. Gupta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a Government Undertaking described as a sick company that, after receiving adverse concurrent findings from the courts below, filed the present petition before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The respondent had filed a suit for possession, rent/arrears and mesne profits and permanent injunction in respect of premises that had been let to the petitioner in 1990. In March 2010 the petitioner filed an application seeking suspension of the eviction/legal proceedings on the ground that, being a sick company, proceedings should not continue without prior consent of the BIFR under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), specifically invoking section 22(1) of SICA.

The petitioner's written statement did not take the SICA-related plea; the SICA plea was raised later in the application for suspension. The trial court passed an order dated 18 March 2010 holding that section 22(1) of SICA did not cover eviction proceedings. The first appellate court, by order dated 25 May 2010, upheld the trial court's order, noting inter alia that the petitioner had not pleaded the SICA plea in earlier pleadings and that it was not shown that the disputed property was included in any BIFR scheme. The petitioner then filed the present petition under Article 227 challenging the impugned orders. The High Court dismissed the petition as frivolous and imposed costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope and limit of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and whether intervention is warranted in this case?
  2. Whether section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 automatically suspends proceedings instituted by a landlord for eviction and related claims (such as recovery of rent and mesne profits) against a sick industrial company.
  3. Whether the petition under Article 227 is maintainable to challenge concurrent findings of the courts below in the circumstances of this case (including the lateness of the SICA plea and absence of specific averments that the disputed property was part of any BIFR scheme).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that section 22 of SICA is intended to protect a sick company from legal proceedings that would impose additional financial liability and imperil rehabilitation; therefore the entire prayer clause of the suit (which seeks rent, arrears and mesne profits in addition to eviction) should have been examined and cannot be treated as limited to eviction alone.
  • The petitioner relied on judgments, including Stichting Doen-Postcode Loterij… v. Vin Poly Recyclers Pvt. Ltd. (2010 (115) DRJ 708 [DB]) and Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association (AIR 1992 SC 1439), in support of its position.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position as Reflected in the Opinion

  • The plaintiff/respondent's suit sought possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction on the ground that the lease period had expired; the plaintiff relied on the Supreme Court authority (cited as AIR 1992 S.C. 1445 in the trial court) to the effect that proceedings of the type instituted by the plaintiff are not covered by section 22(1) of SICA.
  • The trial court and the appellate court noted that the petitioner had not earlier pleaded the SICA defence in its written statement or in prior applications and had not shown that the particular unit or the disputed property was ever included in any BIFR scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 Article 227 jurisdiction is a power of superintendence to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases, not for correcting mere errors. The Court invoked this principle to emphasize the limited scope of Article 227 and to frame the standard for intervening in concurrent findings of lower courts.
Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) Support for the proposition that Article 227 should be exercised sparingly to keep subordinate courts within their authority but not to correct mere errors. Quoted (via Waryam Singh) as a source for the sparing exercise principle; used to reinforce the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
Narain Singh through LRS. v. Shanti Devi though LRS., 2010 (115) DRJ 601 Where two courts below have given concurrent findings of fact, the High Court under Article 227 should not disturb those findings except in exceptional cases (e.g., absence of jurisdiction or disregard of settled law). The Court relied on this authority to decline to disturb the concurrent findings of the trial and first appellate courts in the present matter.
Stichting Doen-Postcode Loterij… v. Vin Poly Recyclers Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (115) DRJ 708 [DB] Authority cited by the petitioner (a case under Order 37 CPC concerning recovery of money). The Court (and trial court) held that this decision was not applicable to the present facts because it dealt with recovery of money under Order 37 CPC, whereas the present suit is for possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction.
Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 1992 SC 1439 The Supreme Court observed that section 22(1) of SICA does not cover proceedings instituted by a landlord for eviction of company premises let out to it. The Court treated this Supreme Court pronouncement as determinative: section 22(1) does not cover eviction proceedings and, accordingly, the lower courts' decisions were upheld.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by restating the limited scope of Article 227, citing Waryam Singh (and the Dalmia Jain Airways passage) to stress that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and not to correct mere errors. The Court also cited Narain Singh to explain that concurrent findings of fact by two courts below should not be disturbed except in exceptional circumstances such as lack or excess of jurisdiction or disregard of well-settled legal propositions.

Applying these principles, the Court examined the factual matrix: the respondent's suit for possession, mesne profits and injunction; the petitioner's belated invocation of section 22(1) of SICA in an application filed in March 2010 despite not pleading it in its written statement; and the absence of clear averments that the disputed property or the petitioner's unit was included in any BIFR scheme.

The Court analyzed the statutory text of section 22(1) of SICA (quoted in the opinion) and observed that the provision nowhere states that no suit for possession can be filed against a sick company. The trial court had followed the Supreme Court decision in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd., which held that eviction proceedings by a landlord against a sick industrial company do not fall within the categories of proceedings automatically suspended under section 22(1). The first appellate court's reasoning — that the petitioner had not timely raised the SICA plea, had not shown the disputed property formed part of any BIFR scheme, and that prima facie the petitioner was not covered by section 22(1) — was recited and treated as cogent.

The Court further observed that the Stichting Doen decision relied upon by the petitioner was distinguishable and inapplicable because it concerned recovery proceedings under Order 37 CPC rather than eviction/possession claims. Considering the statutory language, the Supreme Court authority, the lower courts' factual findings and the absence of any jurisdictional error or disregard of settled law, the Court concluded there was no illegality, infirmity or irrationality in the impugned orders.

Finally, characterizing the petition as frivolous and an attempt to squander public time and money, the Court exercised its discretion to dismiss the petition and to impose costs on the petitioner, including directions for recovery of costs from officials responsible for pursuing the litigation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Article 227 was dismissed as meritless and frivolous. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- (Fifty Thousand Only) on the petitioner (CM No. 14150/2010). The petitioner was directed to deposit the costs by way of cross cheque with the Registrar General within four weeks. The petitioner was also directed to recover the cost amount from the salaries of the delinquent officials who pursued the litigation and to file an affidavit giving details of the officials from whose salaries the costs have been recovered within four weeks. The matter was listed for compliance on 20th September, 2010. The order concluding the motion reads: "Dismissed."

Implications: The direct effect is that the impugned orders of the trial court (dated 18 March 2010) and the first appellate court (dated 25 May 2010) stand upheld and the High Court declined to interfere under Article 227. The Court relied on existing Supreme Court and High Court authority to confirm that section 22(1) of SICA does not automatically stay eviction proceedings instituted by a landlord. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying and following the cited authorities; its immediate consequence is dismissal of the petition and imposition of costs against the petitioner.

Show all summary ...

V.B Gupta, J.:— Petitioner which is a Government Undertaking and a sick company after getting concurrent adverse findings from the courts below, is bent upon wasting public time and money. Now, it has chosen to file present petition before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. Before dealing with this petition, it would be necessary to state as to what is the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled that jurisdiction of this Court, under this Article is limited.

3. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954, SC 215, the court observed;

“This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J, in — ‘Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee’, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) (B), to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.”

4. In light of principles laid down in the above decision, it is to be seen as to whether present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against impugned orders is maintainable or not.

5. In Narain Singh through LRS. v. Shanti Devi though LRS., 2010 (115) DRJ 601, this court observed;

“It is settled law that where two courts below have given a concurrent finding of facts, this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India shall not disturb the finding even if there is some mistake committed in appreciation of some part of evidence. Under Article 227, the court does not correct the mistakes of law or mistakes of facts. The intervention of this court under Article 227 has to be only in those exceptional cases where the courts below had either not exercised their jurisdiction or had acted beyond jurisdiction or had ignored the well-settled legal proposition and acted contrary to law.”

6. Coming to the facts of this case, respondent filed a suit for possession, rent/mesne profits etc. against petitioner to whom property in question was let out more than twenty years ago (i.e in 1990).

7. In March, 2010, petitioner filed an application for suspension of legal proceedings for eviction pending against it on the ground that it is a sick company and as per provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short as ‘SICA’) respondent be asked to obtain prior consent of BIFR before proceedings in the matter.

8. Interestingly, in the written statement no such plea was taken. Now without amending the written statement petitioner cannot take a new and all together different plea in the application in question.

9. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioner that purport of section 22 of sica is to protect a sick company from legal proceedings which would foist any additional financial liability upon the sick company and imperil the rehabilitation process. The suit filed by respondent is for recovery of rent, arrears as well as mesne profits and not limited to eviction alone. Therefore, lower courts were required to examine the entire prayer clause of the original suit and not limit the question to eviction alone.

10. In support learned counsel has cited following judgments;

(i) Stichting Doen-Postcode Loterij… v. Vin Poly Recyclers Pvt.… clers Pvt. Ltd., 167 (2010) Delhi Law Times 333 : 2010 (115) DRJ 708 [DB], and

(ii) Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madra, (1992) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1439.

11. Section 22(1) of SICA which is relevant in this case read as under; “S. 22. Suspension of Legal proceedings, contracts, etc.

(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof [and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company] shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.”

12. Above Section nowhere states that no suit for possession can be filed against the sick company.

13. Trial court in its impugned order dated 18th March, 2010 observed;

“Plaintiff has filed the present suit for possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction. By way of this suit, plaintiff is praying a decree of possession of the tenanted premises B-33/2, Ground Floor, Laxmi Nagar, Vikas Marg, Delhi-110092. Plaintiff also prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from sub-letting/transferring the possession of suit premises to any other person. Counsel for the defendant had placed reliance on judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court passed in case titled as ‘Stichting Doen-Postcode Loterij… v. Vin Poly Recyclers Pvt.….’ This judgment is not helpful o the defendant as the facts of the case law cited by the defendant are distinguished from the fact of the present case. The case law cited is a suit under the provisions of 37 CPC but the present suit is for possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction. Plaintiff has placed reliance on ‘AIR 1992 S.C 1445’ to the effect that the proceedings are not covered under section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. I am bound to follow the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court. In this judgment, their Lordships have clearly observed that the following proceedings only are automatically suspended U/S 22(1) of the Act:—

(i) Proceedings for winding up of the industrial company.

(ii) Proceedings for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company; and

(iii) Proceedings for the appointment of receiver.

In para 12 of this judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly observed that;

“eviction proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant company would not fall in categories (i) and (iii) referred to above. It is also of served that it has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant company that such proceedings fall in category (ii) since they are proceedings against the property of the sick industrial company. The submission is that the lease-hold right of the appellant company in the premises leased out to its property and since the eviction proceedings would result in the appellant company being deprived of the said property, the said proceedings would be covered by category (ii). We are unable to agree. The second category contemplates proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any other properties of the industrial company. We are therefore of the view that section 22(1) does not cover a proceeding instituted by a landlord of a sick industrial company for the eviction of the company premises let out to it.”

14. Whereas, first appellate court in its impugned order dated 25th May, 2010 observed;

“Present suit was filed by the plaintiff in January 2009 and written statement was filed by the plaintiff/respondent in April, 2009. Thereafter an application u/o 12 R 6 CPC was also filed which was duly replied by the defendant/appellant. In all these pleadings, the defendant/appellant had not taken any such plea at any point of time that the present proceedings are governed by section 22 of sica and prior permission of the BIFR are required to prosecute the proceedings. It is matter of record that in the application on behalf of the defendant/appellant for suspension of the legal proceedings, it is informed that the said scheme was referred to the BIFR way back in the year 2002 and BIFR have even sanctioned the revival scheme of the eight subsidiaries of NTC Limited and these proceedings were being continued for long time and despite having all such information well within the knowledge of the defendant/appellant, no such plea was taken by the defendant/appellant either in the written statement or in application u/o 12R6 CPC. It is only then, when the matter was fixed for arguments on application u/o 12R6 CPC, the present application was filed. Despite all that it has nowhere been stated as to whether present unit of the defendant/appellant for which is being sought had ever been referred/included in the scheme so prepared by the BIFR. It is not even clearly and transparently stated by the defendant/appellant as to whether it is the defendant company or whether it is a subsidiary of the defendant company which has been included in the scheme, so prepared by BIFR. There is no specific averment at all in the entire application, in the written statement or in the reply to the application of plaintiff/respondent u/o 12R6 CPC that this property under dispute, for which eviction proceedings are going on was ever a part of properties which have been included by BIFR for preparing the scheme of revival ship of defendant/appellant herein. Further, this is a suit for possession as filed by the plaintiff/respondent against the defendant/appellant on the ground that lease period for which the premises was let out to the plaintiff/respondent has come to an end and, therefore, he be directed to vacate the premises. Plea of the defendant/appellant on the other hand initially was that although the lease period for which it was agreed to have been expired yet it was orally extended. Now the case before the court is that defendant/appellant would never inform the court with respect to the pendency of the proceedings before BIFR nor would take such plea nor would vacate the premises and would take the plea of oral extension of lease deed as against a person who just want to get his premises vacated. If the premises would have been vacated in view of the written lease deed just after the expiry of the lease period, there would not have been any dispute of such nature, and further the contention of the defendant/appellant would have been well found, if it would have been clearly stated that the immovable property under the lease deed of the defendant/appellant, is a part and parcel of the Scheme, so prepared by the BIFR. Prima facie, the defendant/appellant is not being covered u/s 22(1) of SICA and the averment is only with respect to subsidiary company of the defendant/appellant and not with regard to the defendant itself.

Therefore, keeping in view all the above facts, court is of the considered opinion that there is no irregularity/illegality in order passed by the Ld. Trial Court being order dt. 18.3.10”

15. In Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. (Supra) Supreme Court observed;

“We are, therefore, of the view that Section 22(1) does not cover a proceeding instituted by a landlord of a sick industrial company for the eviction of the company premises let out to it.”

16. Further, decision of Stichting Doen Postcode Loterji (supra) is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case, as that case was under order 37 of CPC for recovery of money.

17. Thus, in view of decision of Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. (Supra) there is no reason to disagree with the reasoning given ??? the courts below and there is no illegality, infirmity or irrationality in the impugned orders.

18. Present petition is most bogus and frivolous one and has been filed just to squander public money and to harass a common man who committed blunder by giving his property on rent to the mighty public undertaking. It is a well known fact that courts across the country are saddled with large number of cases. Public Sector undertakings indulgences further burden them. Time and again, courts have been expressing their displeasure at the Governments'/Public Sector undertakings compulsive litigation habit but a solution to this alarming trend is a distant dream. The judiciary is now imposing costs upon Government/Public Sector undertakings not only when it pursue cases which can be avoided but also when it forces the public to do so.

19. Public Sector undertakings spent more money on contesting cases than the amount they might have to pay with regard to the premises which have been taken on rent by them. In addition there to, precious time, effort and other resources go down the drain in vain. Public Sector undertakings are possibly an apt example of being penny wise, pound foolish. Rise in friviolous litigation is also due to the fact that Public Sector undertakings though having large number of legal personnel under their employment, do not examine the cases properly and force poor litigants to approach the court.

20. Frivolous litigation clogs the wheels of justice making it difficult for courts to provide easy and speedy justice to the genuine litigants. Public Sector undertakings should not indulge in mindless litigation and unnecessary waste the time and public exchequer's money. A strong message is required to be sent to those litigants (whether Government or Private) who are in the habit of challenging each and every order of the trial court even if the same is based on sound reasoning and also to those litigants who go on filling frivolous applications one after another.

21. Under these circumstances, present petition which is meritless, bogus and most frivolous one, is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- (Fifty Thousand Only).

22. Petitioner is directed to deposit the costs by way of cross cheque with Registrar General of this court, within four weeks from today.

23. Meanwhile, petitioner shall recover the cost amount from the salaries of delinquent officials who have been pursuing this meritless and frivolous litigation, with the sole aim of wasting the public exchequer. Affidavit giving details of the officials from whose salary the costs have been recovered be also filed in four weeks.

24. List for compliance on 20th September, 2010.

CM No. 14150/2010

25. Dismissed.