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Har Narain Devi & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors.

Delhi High Court
Sep 11, 2009
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners, the widow (Petitioner No. 1) and daughter (Petitioner No. 2) of Late Shri Ishwar Singh (who died in 1985 and was the son of Late Shri Mukhtiar Singh, who died on 6.6.1997), filed a writ petition seeking a declaration that clause (a) of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 ("the said Act") is unconstitutional as being ultravires Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Late Shri Mukhtiar Singh was the bhumidhar of certain lands governed by the said Act. By operation of Section 50, on his death the bhumidhari interest devolved upon his grandsons (Respondent Nos. 3 and 4). Petitioners challenged the order of succession in Section 50(a) as discriminatory because it gives priority to male lineal descendants in the male line and excludes female descendants (the widow is placed elsewhere and the granddaughter is not provided for).

Respondents raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability: the said Act had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 (effective 20.06.1964), and Article 31B was relied upon to contend that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule cannot be challenged. After hearing arguments invoking Supreme Court precedents, the High Court adjudicated on whether Section 50(a) could be challenged despite its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule in 1964, and ultimately dismissed the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether clause (a) of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (providing a general order of succession in the male line) is unconstitutional as being ultravires Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether Section 50(a) (or the said Act) can be the subject-matter of a constitutional challenge once it had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 (i.e., whether Article 31B immunizes that provision from judicial review given that it was included in the Ninth Schedule prior to 24.04.1973).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Clause (a) of Section 50 provides for succession exclusively through the male line, thereby excluding female descendants (including Petitioner No. 2, the granddaughter) and discriminating on the basis of sex; hence it violates Articles 14, 15 and 21.
  • The Supreme Court decision in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) watered down the earlier holding in Waman Rao and affirmed the role of judicial review; petitioners contended that Coelho's principles permit challenge to Ninth Schedule inclusions that damage the basic structure, and that this reasoning should apply irrespective of whether the Ninth Schedule inclusion occurred before or after 24.04.1973.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Maintainability objection: the Delhi Land Reforms Act had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment (1964), before 24.04.1973; therefore Article 31B provides immunity and the Act (including Section 50(a)) cannot be challenged as being inconsistent with Part III rights.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench decision in Waman Rao v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 271), which, as interpreted by respondents, holds that enactments placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to 24.04.1973 are valid and not subject to challenge under Part III.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waman Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271 Held that amendments to include Acts in the Ninth Schedule made before 24.04.1973 are valid and not open to challenge; amendments made on or after 24.04.1973 are open to challenge on basic structure grounds. The respondents relied on Waman Rao to contend that the Delhi Land Reforms Act (placed in the Ninth Schedule in 1964) is immune from challenge. The High Court treated Waman Rao as supporting the proposition that Ninth Schedule inclusions before 24.04.1973 cannot be challenged.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 Established the "basic structure" doctrine: Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a manner that destroys or damages its basic or essential features. Referred to as the foundational decision that fixed 24.04.1973 as the date on which the basic structure doctrine was propounded; used to demarcate the pre- and post-24.04.1973 treatment of Ninth Schedule inclusions.
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1 Clarified limits of Article 31B and Ninth Schedule protection: laws added to the Ninth Schedule after 24.04.1973 must be tested against the basic structure doctrine and may be invalidated if they destroy or damage basic features (emphasising Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19; application of the "rights test" and the "essence of the right" test). Petitioners relied on Coelho to argue that Ninth Schedule immunity cannot shelter laws that damage the basic structure and that Waman Rao's protection should be read more narrowly. The High Court examined Coelho and concluded that its holding applies to amendments made on or after 24.04.1973, not to acts placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to that date.
Minerva Mills (referred to) Struck down clauses of the 42nd Amendment that improperly enhanced Parliament's power; illustrates judicial enforcement of basic structure limits on constitutional amendments. Referred to in the opinion (via summary of Coelho) as part of the jurisprudential context showing limits on Parliament's power; used to explain the doctrinal background but not as a basis to invalidate the 1964 Ninth Schedule inclusion here.
Indira Gandhi (referred to) Earlier precedent forming part of the basic structure jurisprudence (used in textual discussion in Coelho regarding the expansion of basic structure review and judicial review). Mentioned in the appellate line of authorities discussed in Coelho; used as context by the Court in analysing the scope of judicial review vis-à-vis Ninth Schedule laws, but not applied to change the result in this matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the principal legal question as whether Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act could be challenged after that Act had been included in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment in 1964.

The court examined the competing Supreme Court authorities relied upon by the parties. It first noted that Waman Rao had held that enactments placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to 24.04.1973 were valid and not subject to challenge: the immunity of Article 31B protected such laws. Respondents invoked this principle to contend that the 1964 inclusion insulated Section 50(a) from judicial review.

The court then considered I.R. Coelho (2007), which elaborated that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule on or after 24.04.1973 would be subject to basic-structure scrutiny and could be invalidated if they damaged the basic structure (with special emphasis on Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19, and by application of the "rights test" and "essence of the right" test). The petitioners argued that Coelho effectively weakened Waman Rao and allowed challenges even to pre-1973 Ninth Schedule inclusions that damaged the basic structure.

After analyzing the language and concluding parts of Coelho (including paragraph 151), the court concluded that both Waman Rao and Coelho must be read as distinguishing between Ninth Schedule inclusions before and after 24.04.1973. The court emphasized that 24.04.1973 is the critical date because Kesavananda Bharati was decided on that date and propounded the basic structure doctrine.

On this basis, the court held that Section 50(a), having been inserted into the Ninth Schedule in 1964 (well before 24.04.1973), is protected by Article 31B and therefore not open to challenge under Part III on the grounds advanced by the petitioners. The court acknowledged the petitioners' grievance about the gender-discriminatory effect of Section 50(a) but observed that, given the constitutional provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it was constrained from striking down the provision.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition challenging clause (a) of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is dismissed as not maintainable because the Act was placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment in 1964 (i.e., prior to 24.04.1973) and is therefore protected by Article 31B.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The court refused to strike down Section 50(a); the petitioners' claim that the provision violates Articles 14, 15 and 21 was not granted relief in this forum because the Act's Ninth Schedule inclusion predates 24.04.1973 and is therefore immune from challenge under the governing Supreme Court precedents as interpreted by this Court.
  • No costs were awarded ("No order as to costs").
  • The court noted the apparent unfairness to female descendants created by Section 50(a) but observed that the remedy for that inequality lies with the legislature; the court stated that its hands are tied by the constitutional position as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
  • Broader jurisprudential consequence: The decision does not seek to depart from or create a new precedent; it applies the existing Supreme Court line of authority distinguishing Ninth Schedule inclusions before and after 24.04.1973.

Final court order: "The writ petition is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs."

Show all summary ...

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.:—Through this writ petition, the petitioners seek that clause (a) of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act.), be declared unconstitutional, allegedly being ultravires Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

2. The petitioners herein are the widow and daughter of Late Shri Ishwar Singh (died in 1985) s/o Late Shri Mukhtiar Singh (died on 6.6.97). Late Shri Ishwar Singh also had two sons, who are Respondent Nos. 3 and 4.

3. Late Shri Mukhtiar Singh was the bhumidhar in respect of certain lands which were governed by the said Act. As per the provisions of Section 50 of the said Act, on his death, his bhumidhari interest in the said holdings devolved upon his grandsons, Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Section 50 of the said Act is reproduced hereunder:

“50. General order of succession from males. - Subject to the provisions of section 48 and 52, when a Bhumidhar or Asami being a male dies, his interest in his holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of the succession given below:

(a) Male lineal descendants in the male line of the descent:

Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if any male descendant between him and the deceased is alive:

Provided further that the son or sons of a predeceased son howsoever low shall inherit the share which would have devolved upon the deceased if he had been then alive:

(b) Widow;

(c) Father;

(d) Mother, being a widow;

(e) Step mother, being a widow;

(f) Father's father;

(g) Father's mother, being a widow;

(h) Widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent;

(i) Brother, being the son of same father as the deceased;

(k) Unmarried sister;

(1) Brother's son, the brother having been a son of the same father as the deceased;

(m) Father's father's son;

(n) Brother's son's son;

(o) Father's father's son's son;

(p) Daughter's son.”

(Underlining added)

4. The main grievance of the petitioners is with respect to the line of succession provided in Section 50. Clause (a) thereof requires that whenever a male bhumidhar or asami dies, the interest shall first devolve upon the male lineal descendants in the male line of descent, howsoever low, thus, excluding the female descendants. Given the fact that the chances of there being no male lineal descendants at all are extremely low, the interest in all likelihood will not devolve upon the female descendants in any case. The widow of the deceased (Petitioner No. 1) is mentioned in Clause (h) and the granddaughter (Petitioner No. 2) is ignored completely. It is on the ground of discrimination on the basis of sex, that the petitioners are challenging the said provision.

5. The respondents, through their learned counsel, have raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the present petition, on the ground that the said Act had been placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India (in Entry 61), by virtue of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, with effect from 20.06.1964 Article 31B of the Constitution provides that no Act that has been placed in the Ninth Schedule can be the subject matter of challenge. Article 31B reads as under:—

“Art. 31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.- Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.”

6. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Waman Rao v. Union of India: AIR 1981 SC 271, wherein, considering their earlier decision in Keshavananda Bharti v. Stat of Kerala: AIR 1973 SC 1461, the court held:—

“2. In Keshvananda Bharati, decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage and destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of the various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24,1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24. 1973 is saved by Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.”

(Underlining added)

7. It was accordingly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, that since the said Act was placed in the Ninth Schedule prior to 24.4.1973 (i.e, in 1964), it is covered by the immunity provided in Article 31B, and is, thus, beyond the pale of challenge. Consequently, they submitted, the present petition is not maintainable.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners, placed reliance on another recent nine-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in I. R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu: (2007) 2 SCC 1, wherein the court observed:

“136. The role of the judiciary is to protect fundamental rights. A modern democracy is based on the twin principles of majority rule and the need to protect fundamental rights. According to Lord Styen, it is job of the Judiciary to balance the principles ensuring that the Government on the basis of number does not override fundamental rights.

Application of doctrine of basic structure

137. In Kesavananda Bharati's case, the discussion was on the amending power conferred by unamended Article 368. which did not use the words ‘constituent power’. We have already noted difference between original power of framing the Constitution known as constituent power and the nature of constituent power vested in Parliament under Article 368. By addition of the words ‘constituent power’ in Article 368, the amending body, namely, Parliament does not become the original Constituent Assembly. It remains a Parliament under a controlled Constitution. Even after the words ‘constituent power’ are inserted in Article 368, the limitations of doctrine of basic structure would continue to apply to the Parliament. It is on this premise that Clauses 4 and 5 inserted in Article 368 by 42nd Amendment were struck down in Minerva Mills case.

138. The relevance of Indira Gandhi's case, Minerva Mills case and Waman Rao's case lies in the fact that every improper enhancement of its own power by Parliament, be it Clause 4 of Article 329A or Clause 4 and 5 of Article 368 or Section 4 of 42nd Amendment have been held to be incompatible with the doctrine of basic structure as they introduced new elements which altered the identity of the Constitution or deleted the existing elements from the Constitution by which the very core of the Constitution is discarded. They obliterated important elements like judicial review. They made Directive Principles en bloc a touchstone for obliteration of all the fundamental rights and provided for insertion of laws in the Ninth Schedule which had no nexus with agrarian reforms. It is in this context that we have to examine the power of immunity bearing in mind that after Kesavananda Bharati's case, Article 368 is subject to implied limitation of basic structure.

139. The question examined in Woman Rao's case was whether the device of Article 31B could be used to immunize Ninth Schedule laws from judicial review by making the entire Part III inapplicable to such laws and whether such a power was incompatible with basic structure doctrine. The answer was in affirmative. It has been said that it is likely to make the controlled Constitution uncontrolled. It would render doctrine of basic structure redundant. It would remove the golden triangle of Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19 in its entirety for examining the validity of Ninth Schedule laws as it makes the entire Part HI inapplicable at the will of the Parliament. This results in the change of the identity of the Constitution which brings about incompatibility not only with the doctrine of basic structure but also with the very existence of limited power of amending the Constitution. The extent of judicial review is to be examined having regard to these factors.

140. The object behind Article 31B is to remove difficulties and not to obliterate Part III in its entirety or judicial review. The doctrine of basic structure is propounded to save the basic features. Article 21 is the heart of the Constitution. It confers right to life as well as right to choose. When this triangle of Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19 is sought to be eliminated not only the ‘essence of right’ test but also the ‘rights test’ has to apply, particularly when Keshavananda Bharti and Indira Gandhi cases have expanded the scope of basic structure to cover even some of the Fundamental Rights.

(Underlining added)

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Supreme Court, in this case, highlighted the importance of judicial review and pointed out the drawbacks in the decision in the Waman Rao case, which they sought to rectify by watering down the implication of that decision. Accordingly, the court held:

“151. In conclusion, we hold that:

(i) A law that abrogates or abridges rights guaranteed by Part HI of the Constitution may violate the basic structure doctrine or it may not. If former is the consequence of law, whether by amendment of any Article of Part III or by an insertion in the Ninth Schedule, such law will have to be invalidated in exercise of judicial review power of the Court. The validity or invalidity would be tested on the principles laid down in this judgment.

(ii) The majority judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's case read with Indira Gandhi's case requires the validity of each new constitutional amendment to be judged on its own merits. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account for determining whether or not it destroys basic structure. The impact test would determine the validity of the challenge.

(iii) All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles underlying them. To put it differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure.

(iv) Justification for conferring protection, not blanket protection, on the laws included in the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional Amendments shall be a matter of Constitutional adjudication by examining the nature and extent of infraction of a Fundamental Right by a statute, sought to be Constitutionally protected, and on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19 by application of the “rights test” and the “essence of the right” test taking the synoptic view of the Articles in Part III as held in Indira Gandhi's case. Applying the above tests to the Ninth Schedule laws, if the infraction affects the basic structure then such a law(s) will not get the protection of the Ninth Schedule.”

(Underlining added)

10. The contention of the petitioners was that, the decision of the Supreme Court in Waman Rao's case (supra), had been watered down by the decision in I. R. Coelho's case (supra), in the sense that the conclusion that any act or regulation and its provisions thereof, that destroy or damage the basic structure of the Constitution, by taking away or abrogating the fundamental rights of the citizens as per Articles 14, 19 and 21, are open to challenge, would apply to all amendments, whether made prior to or after 24.4.1973 It was submitted that since Section 50 (a) is in clear violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21, it accordingly deserves to be struck down.

11. Thus, the fundamental question to be decided by this court is ‘ whether the provisions of Section 50 (a) of the said Act can be the subject matter of challenge, once it had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by virtue of the Constitution 17th Amendment Act in 1964?

12. Considering the decision in Waman Rao's case (supra), it is apparent that the enactments that were placed in the Ninth Schedule by virtue of the amendments prior to 1973 cannot be the subject matter of challenge on any grounds whatsoever. In other words, they remain undisturbed. A more detailed reading of the judgment in I. R. Coelho's case also reveals the same. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are reproduced hereunder:

“1. In these matters we are confronted with a very important yet not very easy task of determining the nature and character of protection provided by Article 31-B of the Constitution of India, 1950 (for short, the ‘Constitution’) to the laws added to the Ninth Schedule by amendments made after 24th April, 1973. The relevance of this date is for the reason that on this date judgment in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala was pronounced propounding the doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution to test the validity of constitutional amendments.

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

Broad Question

5. The fundamental question is whether on and after 24th April, 1973 when the basic structure doctrine was propounded, it is permissible for the Parliament under Article 31B to immunize legislations from fundamental rights by inserting them into the Ninth Schedule and, if so, what is its effect on the power of judicial review of the Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, a reading of the concluding part of the judgment clarifies the intention of the Bench. The same, inter alia, reads as under:—

“151. (iii) All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles underlying them. To put it differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure.

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

(v) If the validity of any Ninth Schedule law has already been upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on the principles declared by this judgment. However, if a law held to be violative of any rights in Part III is subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April, 1973, such a violation/infraction shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 and the principles underlying thereunder. “

(Underlining added)

13. It is clear from the above that both the decisions of the Supreme Court apply to constitutional amendments after 24.04.1973, i.e, after the decision in Keshavananda Bharti's case (supra). The importance of 24.04.1973 has been spelt out in I.R Coelho (supra) itself to be because on this date the judgment in Kesavananda Bharti (supra) was pronounced which propounded the “basic structure” doctrine. Accordingly, we find that the Section 50(a) of the said Act cannot be challenged because of article 31b of the constitution and because it had been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution in 1964, that is, prior to 24.04.1973

14. While there may be apparent justification for the petitioners to be aggrieved by the provisions of Section 50 of the said Act inasmuch as it is heavily loaded in favour of male descendants of a bhumidhar and this may appear to unfairly prejudice the rights of women and may be construed as discrimination against them solely on the ground of sex but, in the wake of the Constitutional provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court, this court's hands are tied. Perhaps the legislature ought to take note of the incongruous position of female descendants of bhumidhars and asamis and remedy the inequality.,

15. For now, we have to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents, that this writ petition challenging Section 50 of the said Act is not maintainable.

16. The writ petition is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs.