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Trehan Promoters & Builders Pvt. Ltd. Petitioner v. Welldone Technology Parks Development Pvt. Ltd.

Delhi High Court
Sep 4, 2009
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a company with its registered office in Delhi, entered into a collaboration agreement with the respondent, whose registered office is in Lucknow, for developing an IT Park on land owned by the petitioner in Village Tikri, Tehsil, District Gurgaon, Haryana. The agreement provided that the respondent would develop the project at its own cost, with the petitioner receiving 50% of the total sanctioned Floor Space Index (FSI) and the respondent receiving the remaining 50% as per the sanctioned building plan. The sanctioned plan specified a common entry and exit to Pockets A and D of the project from Gurgaon-Sohna Road.

The dispute arose when the respondent began constructing an entry and exit road only for Pocket D, deviating from the sanctioned plan and effectively blocking access to Pocket A from the main Gurgaon-Sohna Road. The petitioner contended that this action breached the collaboration agreement and sought interim injunction relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, restraining the respondent from acting contrary to the agreement and specifically from constructing the road that obstructed Pocket A's access.

The petitioner approached the Court in Delhi, asserting jurisdiction despite the property being situated in Haryana, relying on the proviso to Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) which allows jurisdiction where compliance is sought by personal obedience. The Court raised the issue of jurisdiction and invited submissions on the matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court in Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding a dispute over immovable property situated in Gurgaon, Haryana.
  2. The scope and applicability of Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly whether it permits the Court to grant interim relief that amounts to specific performance of a contract or directs compliance with contract terms.
  3. The applicability of the proviso to Section 16 of the CPC concerning personal obedience and its effect on jurisdiction in matters involving immovable property.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhawna Seth v. DLF Universal Limited & Anr (1998) Consideration of jurisdiction in suits for specific performance without possession claims; distinction between suits claiming possession and those that do not. Used to illustrate the distinction between suits claiming possession and those not, but noted that the case was under the Specific Relief Act and not directly applicable to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulat & Anr, JT 2001 (7) SC 580 Interpretation of Clause 12 of Letter Patent of High Court of Bombay and Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act regarding suits for land and specific performance. Distinguished by the Court as not applicable to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, emphasizing that the judgment did not address jurisdiction under Section 9.
Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr (2005) 7 SCC 791 Consideration of jurisdictional issues related to suits involving immovable property and specific relief. Referenced alongside other cases to discuss jurisdictional principles but not applied directly to the arbitration context.
P. Subbarao and Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh Association FAO (OS) 25 2007 Delhi DB Principle that interim relief under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC cannot dispose of the suit or grant relief identical to the final relief sought. Applied to emphasize that Section 9 of the Arbitration Act does not authorize interim relief that effectively disposes of the dispute or directs specific performance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the scope of Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, emphasizing that it is intended to provide interim measures to preserve property or evidence pending arbitration, not to grant interim relief tantamount to specific performance of contracts or to decide substantive disputes. The Court noted that Section 9 requires the existence or invocation of an arbitration clause and is not analogous to the Specific Relief Act, under which one may seek injunctions or specific performance directly from the Court.

The Court further reasoned that the dispute involved immovable property situated in Gurgaon, Haryana, and under Clause 16(d) of the CPC, jurisdiction lies with the Court within whose territorial limits the property is situated. The petitioner’s reliance on the proviso to Section 16 CPC, which allows jurisdiction based on personal obedience for compliance, was rejected as the Court found that personal obedience cannot be extended to circumvent territorial jurisdiction in immovable property matters.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the Delhi Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act concerning the Gurgaon property. The Court emphasized that Section 9 interim relief cannot be used to place parties back in their pre-dispute positions or to compel specific performance, as such relief would effectively preclude arbitration and dispose of the dispute prematurely.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, concerning the immovable property situated in Gurgaon, Haryana.

The petition was dismissed in limine without costs. The decision directly affects the parties by denying interim relief in Delhi and reinforces the principle that disputes involving immovable property must be adjudicated by courts within the territorial jurisdiction where the property is located. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the limits of Section 9 and territorial jurisdiction under the CPC.

Show all summary ...

1. By this petition under section 9 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 (for shot, “the Act”) the petitioner has made the following prayers:

“a. pass an ad interim measures direction of interim injunction against the Respondent restraining the Respondent from, in any manner, acting contrary to and/or inconsistent with the terms of the collaboration agreement dated 2-3-2005 and the supplementary collaboration agreement dated 10-7-2007 and in particular restraining the respondent from constructing and/or building any road providing entry and exit only to Pocket ‘D’ and blocking the entry and exit point to pocket ‘A’ from the main Gurgaon-Sohna Road in violation of the sanctioned plans.”

2. As per the facts disclosed in the petition, the petitioner company having registered office in Delhi entered into a collaboration agreement with respondent having registered office at Lucknow. The collaboration agreement was executed at New Delhi for developing an IT Park for commercial space on the land owned by petitioner at Village Tikri Tehsil, District Gurgaon, Haryana by the respondent at its own cost and the petitioner was to get 50% of the total sanctioned FSI and 50% was to go to respondent in terms of the sanctioned building plan. The parties allocated their shares on paper in the entire project. It is stated that as per sanctioned plan, a common entry and exit to Pocket A and D of the project was to be from Gurgoan-Sohna Road. Respondent, who was responsible for construction and development of the site, recently started working on main entry and exit by deviating from the sanctioned plan. While, as per the sanctioned plan, a common entry and exit to Pocket A and D of the project was to be provided, the respondent insisted on constructing an entry and exit road only for Pocket D falling in its share, thereby, preventing access to Pocket A from the main Gurgaon-Sohna Road. It is submitted that this action of respondent amounted to breach of collaboration agreement.

3. The cause of action for the petitioner to approach this Court arose when respondent started providing entry and exit for the different blocks of the project under collaboration agreement at Gurgaon-Sohna Road which falls within the jurisdiction of Court at Haryana. The relief which the petitioner has sought from this Court is that the respondent should be restrained from providing exit near Block D of Gurgaon-Sohna Road of the project instead of providing exit near block A. In view of these facts, the petitioner was asked to address the arguments on the issue of jurisdiction of this Court. It is submitted by petitioner that since the prayer made by the petitioner is for compliance of the terms of collaboration agreement and this compliance is to be obtained from personal obedience, this Court will have jurisdiction in terms of proviso to Section 16 of Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner relied on Bhawna Seth…Plaintiff; v. Dlf Universal Limited & Anr…Defendants.) 2110 of 1998 decided on 19th February 2007 and Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulat & Anr. JT 2001 (7) SC 580. In Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court had considered Clause 12 of Letter Patent of High Court of Bombay and Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act and observed that a suit for land is a suit in which relief claimed relates to title or delivery of possession of land or immovable property and a suit for specific performance of contract to execute and register a lease with alternative claim for damages is not a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent Act. In my considered view, this judgment is not applicable to the case of petitioner herein that approached this Court under section 9 of the arbitration & conciliation act since this judgment has not addressed and dealt with the issue of jurisdiction under Section 9. It is settled law that every judgment of the High Court or the Supreme Court decides lis before it and unless and until a general law is laid down, the judgment is not to be treated as a statute.

4. In Bhavna Seth's case (supra), this Court after considering the various judgments passed by this Court and Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr.(2005) 7 SCC 791, observed that a distinction has been carved out in respect of a suit where no possession has been claimed of the land (subject matter of suit) and a suit in which possession of the land has been claimed. The suit in Bhavna Seth's case (supra) was also for specific performance of the contract i.e for enforcement of the contract for sale and for execution of sale deed. The counsel for plaintiff in that case told the Court that plaintiff would not press for relief of possession and plaintiff reserved its right to file separate suit for possessions at a later stage. Since the plaintiff did not claim relief for possession, despite the fact that the property was not situated within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court considered on the basis of Adcom Electronics Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that this Court shall have territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The case of Bhavna Seth (supra) was also under Specific Relief Act.

5. section 9 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 gives powers to the Court to pass an interim order to the following effects:

“(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of die following matters, namely:-

(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is die subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorizing for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any part or authorizing any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;

(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.”

6. Section 9 is applicable only where a party has invoked the arbitration clause or has intention to invoke the arbitration clause. Section 9 is not in the nature of provisions of Specific Relief Act where a party can come to the Court and pray for a relief of performance of the contract and ask the Court to compel the other party to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract and seek an injunction from the Court that the party should be restrained from violating the terms and conditions of the contract. In fact, Section 9 of the Act envisages existence of an arbitration clause whereunder the disputes resolution mechanism is provided and the parties had chosen the arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism instead of choosing the Court to resolve their disputes. Resort to the Court under Section 9 of the Act is for limited purpose of preserving the property which is the subject matter of dispute so that by the time the arbitrator decides the dispute, the property itself is either sold away or disposed of by the opposite side, or being of perishable nature is likely to perish or where there is need to appoint a receiver, the Court passes an order for appointing a receiver. The extent and scope of relief under Section 9 of the Act cannot extend so as the Court directs a party to specifically perform the contract so that the party approaching the Court has not to go to the arbitrator for breach of contract. Section 9 does not envisage a situation where the order of the Court under Section 9 itself settles the disputes between the parties. Neither by the instrumentalities of Section 9, the Court can put the party back into pre-dispute situation and ask the party to comply with the contract. Even under order 39 rules 1 & 2 cpc, which is referred to as akin to Section 9 of the Act, an interim relief cannot be granted which is same as the relief sought in the suit, and which amounts to disposal of the suit itself. [P. Subbarao and Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh Association FAO (OS) 25 2007 Delhi DB]. If the Court could direct specific performance of the contract under section 9 of the arbitration & conciliation act, and could place the parties in the position prior to rising of dispute, no dispute would ever go to the arbitrator and by an interim relief itself, the Court would be finally disposing of all the disputes between the contracting parties by just directing specific performance of the contract, irrespective of the breach on the part of one or the other.

7. I also consider since the property is situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi this Court would have no jurisdiction. The parties entered into the collaboration agreement for developing the immovable property. The disputes regarding development of the property, construction, entry, exit are the disputes in respect of immovable property and the rights of the parties therein. Clause 16(d) of CPC provides that for determination of any right or interest for immovable property, the suit has to be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situated. Whether the petitioner should have a gate on the main Gurgaon-Sohna Road or on the side road as sought to be constructed by respondent is a dispute of rights of petitioner in respect of the property only. It is not a dispute qua a personal right against the respondent. The proviso cannot be explained in a manner that for every relief under Section 16 CPC personal obedience is pleaded. For example, in case of Clause 16(a) CPC, if respondent is in possession of the immovable property, he can be directed to handover possession of immovable property and the immovable property can be recovered by the respondent being compelled by personal obedience of such a direction of the Court. Similarly, respondent can be compelled by personal obedience to partition the immovable property by handing him over a site plan and drawings of lines on site plan where he has to construct the walls. Even the foreclosure of mortgage, sale or redemption can be got done through the personal obedience of the parties. The immovable property is incapable of performing any act in itself. It is only the owner/lessor/lessee/mortgagee/licensee who has to do the different acts in respect of the property. If the property has to be transferred from A to B, A has to personally execute a sale deed in favour of B. It is the person concerned with the property who has to do certain acts in respect of the property for all purposes concerning the property. I, therefore, consider that personal obedience cannot be stretched to such an extent that section 16 of cpc itself becomes redundant. I find no act in respect of the property which cannot be got done through personal obedience by directing the owner/person concerned with the property.

8. In my view, the proviso would not be applicable in order to invoke the jurisdiction under section 2(i)(e) read with section 9 of the arbitration & conciliation act, 1996 so as to claim relief qua the property situated in Gurgaon, Haryana from the Court in Delhi.

9. In view of my foregoing discussion, I find that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. The petition is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed in limine. No orders as to costs.

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J.