Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Somari Devi And Others v. Ragwar Singh And Others

Delhi High Court
May 22, 2009
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.R. Midha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an award of the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal which had dismissed the claim petition filed by the appellants.

On 4.1.1998 an accident occurred in which Jokhu Ram (the deceased) was struck by a truck bearing No. HR 38-BG 6052 while he was crossing the road near Lok Nayak Apartments, Sector 7, Rohini, Delhi. Jokhu Ram, a contractor, was accompanied by two labourers. He sustained fatal head and other injuries, was initially taken to Hindu Rao Hospital and referred to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital where he died on 5.1.1998.

The deceased was survived by his widow, two minor sons (about 12 and 7 years), a minor daughter (about 3 years) and his father. The father filed the claim petition before the Tribunal on their behalf.

At the Tribunal: the widow gave evidence as PW 1 and produced various documents (charge-sheet Exh. P1; mechanical inspection Exh. P2; post-mortem Exh. P3; registration cover Exh. P4; seizure memo Exh. P5; F.I.R. Exh. P6; seizure memo of driving licence Exh. P7; driving licence Exh. P8; site plan Exh. P9; death certificate Exh. P10). An eyewitness PW 2 also gave evidence. The driver filed a written statement denying involvement; the vehicle owner did not appear and was proceeded against ex parte; the insurance company admitted insurance of the offending vehicle.

The Tribunal dismissed the claim petition for multiple reasons (see below). The appellants appealed against that dismissal. The High Court examined the record, set aside the Tribunal's findings, computed compensation based on the record, and allowed the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim petition on the stated grounds (identity of deceased not proved, eyewitness credibility questioned, alleged lack of medical/legal documents and procedural irregularities) despite the evidence produced by the appellants (PW1, PW2 and documents Exh. P1–P10).
  2. Whether the Tribunal failed to discharge its statutory duty under section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the summary procedure envisaged by the Act and Rules (including Rule 118 of the Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993).
  3. Whether, on the material placed on record, the appellants were entitled to compensation and if so, the appropriate quantum and apportionment of that award.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Position (as presented in the record)

  • The deceased was struck by the truck No. HR 38-BG 6052 driven rashly and negligently while crossing the road; the incident caused fatal injuries and death on 5.1.1998.
  • PW 1 (the widow) testified about the deceased's occupation (contractor doing flooring work) and income (stated at Rs. 6,000–7,000 per month) and produced documentary evidence: charge-sheet (Exh. P1), mechanical inspection (Exh. P2), post-mortem (Exh. P3), registration cover (Exh. P4), seizure memo (Exh. P5), F.I.R. (Exh. P6), seizure memo of driving licence (Exh. P7), driving licence (Exh. P8), site plan (Exh. P9), and death certificate (Exh. P10).
  • PW 2, an eyewitness produced by the appellants, deposed that he accompanied the deceased and saw the truck hit the deceased coming from Rithala side at very high speed driven rashly and negligently.

Respondent(s)' Position (as presented in the record)

  • The driver of the offending vehicle filed a written statement denying that the truck was involved in the accident.
  • The owner of the offending truck did not appear before the Tribunal and was proceeded ex parte.
  • The insurance company admitted that the offending vehicle was insured.
  • Respondent No. 4 (later in proceedings) produced witnesses from the District Transport Office and proved that a photocopy of the driving licence placed on record from the criminal case was fake; respondent No. 4 thus succeeded in proving the driving licence photocopy was not genuine.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saramma Scaria v. Mathai, 2003 ACJ 213 (Kerala) Tribunals must not dispose of claims lightly; Claims Tribunals exist to provide speedy remedy and should not allow victims to suffer due to technicalities. The court relied on this authority to criticize the Tribunal's cavalier approach and to reinforce that tribunals must safeguard claimants' rights and avoid succumbing to technicalities or doubts that would defeat legitimate claims.
N.K.V Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC) Principle that in appropriate cases courts may draw initial presumption (res ipsa loquitur) and should not let technicalities allow drivers/owners to escape liability. Referred to (via the Saramma Scaria quotation) to support the proposition that culpability may be inferred from circumstances and that tribunals should not let niceties defeat justice for accident victims.
Ramdev Singh v. Chudasma v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala, 1999 ACJ 1129 (Gujarat) Observations on judicial values, subconscious influences and the role of fidelity to rules and principles in judicial decision-making. Quoted to underline judicial duties and to emphasize that judges must apply rules and doctrines faithfully and not be swayed by extraneous influences when deciding matters.
Bartly v. State, 75 NW 832 Authority supporting that a presiding judge should acquire full knowledge of facts and is allowed under circumstances to interrogate witnesses. Used to support the proposition that a judge should actively elicit facts and, where necessary, question witnesses to arrive at truth and justice.
Kanwar Devi v. Bansal Roadways, 2008 ACJ 2182 (Delhi) Authority applied in determining appropriate basis for assessing deceased's income for compensation computation. Followed as precedent in computing the deceased's notional income (combined approach based on minimum wages and accepted multipliers/adjustments) for compensation purposes.
Lekh Raj & Anr. v. Suram Singh & Ors., 2007 ACJ 2165 Authority applied in the methodology for computing compensation (income assessment and multiplier application). Relied upon as part of the line of authorities to determine the deceased's income for loss of dependency calculation.
National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Renu Devi & Ors., 2009 ACJ 1921 (Delhi) Authority cited for computation practices in assessing compensation (income and multiplier usage). Followed along with other Delhi precedents to arrive at the notional income figure and computation of compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along the following lines, based solely on the materials and reasoning contained in the opinion:

  1. Duty of Inquiry under the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules:
    • The court held that the Tribunal failed to discharge its statutory duty under section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which requires the Tribunal to hold an inquiry into claims. The Tribunal should follow a summary procedure subject to rules (section 169 and Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993, particularly Rule 118 and Rule 118(7) allowing site visits and examination of relevant persons).
    • The court emphasized that the Act and Rules envisage an inquiry (summary) and do not use the word "trial", thereby authorising an active, inquisitorial approach by the Tribunal to uncover the truth.
  2. Powers of the Court to Elicit Evidence:
    • The court quoted and discussed section 165 of the Evidence Act, explaining the plenary power of a judge to ask any question and order production of documents to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts. The court reiterated that the judge must actively investigate and elicit evidence that parties may not have produced themselves.
    • On this basis the High Court observed that the Tribunal could and should have used its powers to summon the Investigating Officer and other witnesses recorded in the criminal case if there were doubts about the factum of the accident.
  3. Evaluation of Tribunal's Findings:
    • The Tribunal had dismissed the claim petition on multiple grounds: post-mortem not mentioning eyewitness identification; MLC not proved; charge-sheet/FIR recorded no witness at the spot; PW 2's account had gaps (not in FIR, did not state TSR number, seizure memo prepared one day later and not witnessed by PW 2); accused refused to submit to TIP; and identity of deceased and driver not established.
    • The High Court found that the Tribunal did not conduct the inquiry in the manner required by section 168 and related rules. The court concluded that the statement of PW 2 together with documents Exh. P1–P10 clearly proved that the deceased died in a road accident arising out of rash and negligent driving by the driver of truck No. HR 38-BG 6052.
    • The court held that if the Tribunal had any doubt, it should have summoned the Investigating Officer or other witnesses recorded in the criminal case to ascertain the truth; instead the Tribunal relied on surmises and conjectures. Therefore the Tribunal's findings were set aside.
  4. Quantum of Compensation:
    • The Tribunal had not computed compensation. The High Court assessed compensation by: (a) noting deceased's age as 35 years (Exh. P10), (b) acknowledging that appellants alleged income of Rs. 6,000 p.m. but there was no documentary proof, and (c) therefore taking the deceased's income as the minimum wage for a skilled worker at the time of the accident (Rs. 2,208).
    • Taking account of increases over 10 years and following earlier decisions of the Court (Kanwar Devi; Lekh Raj; National Insurance), the court adjusted the income to Rs. 3,312 [(Rs. 2,208 + Rs. 2,208 × 2) ÷ 2].
    • After deducting one-fourth for personal expenses and applying the multiplier of 16, the loss of dependency was calculated as Rs. 4,76,928. Additional heads awarded: Rs. 10,000 (loss of love and affection), Rs. 10,000 (loss to estate), Rs. 10,000 (loss of consortium), Rs. 5,000 (funeral expenses). Total compensation computed as Rs. 5,11,928.
  5. Interest and Recovery Rights:
    • The court awarded interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition (17.3.98) till realization.
    • Respondent No. 4 produced evidence (R4 W1 and R4 W2) proving that a photocopy of the driving licence placed on record in the criminal case was fake. Consequently, respondent No. 4 was given recovery rights to recover the award amount from respondent No. 2 after making payment to the claimants.
  6. Apportionment among Claimants and Incidental Directions:
    • The court recorded the appellants' agreed distribution of the award: Appellant No.1 — 60%; Appellant No.2 — 10%; Appellant No.3 — 10%; Appellant No.4 — 20%.
    • The court deferred the order regarding the mode of investment and directed a subsequent hearing, noting that it had directed LIC, SBI and other banks to formulate a special scheme for road accident victims; the matter was to be re-notified on 3.7.2009.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED

The High Court set aside the Tribunal's dismissal of the claim petition and awarded compensation of Rs. 5,11,928 in favour of the appellants and against respondent No. 4, with interest at 7.5% p.a. from 17.3.1998 until realization.

Implications (direct effects):

  • The Tribunal's findings that had dismissed the claim petition were set aside by the High Court as being based on surmise and conjecture rather than a proper inquiry.
  • The appellants were granted the computed compensation with interest (total Rs. 5,11,928), and the award is to be paid by respondent No. 4, who has a right of recovery against respondent No. 2 after payment to the claimants.
  • The compensation shares among appellants were fixed (Appellant No.1: 60%; Appellant No.2: 10%; Appellant No.3: 10%; Appellant No.4: 20%).
  • An order on the mode of investment of award moneys was deferred to a subsequent date with a direction that a special scheme for road accident victims be considered by LIC, SBI and other banks.

Broader legal implications: The opinion emphasizes the Tribunal's duty to conduct an active, summary inquiry under section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the judge's powers under section 165 of the Evidence Act. The opinion cites prior authorities to support these propositions. The judgment, as recorded in the opinion, effects the direct outcome for the parties and applies established precedents and statutory provisions in assessing liability and computing compensation; it does not state that it is laying down a novel legal principle beyond application of these established rules.

Show all summary ...

J.R Midha, J.:— The appellant has challenged the award of the learned Tribunal whereby learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition filed by the appellants.

2. The accident dated 4.1.1998 resulted in the death of Jokhu Ram. The deceased was a contractor and was going from Sector 11, Rohini to his house on foot. Two labourers were accompanying the deceased. The deceased was crossing the road near Lok Nayak Apartments, Sector 7, Rohini, Delhi, when he was hit by truck bearing No. HR 38-BG 6052 coming from Rithala side at a very high speed and being driven in a rash and negligent manner and without blowing the horn. The deceased sustained fatal injuries on his head and other parts of the body and was initially taken to Hindu Rao Hospital which referred him to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital where he expired on 5.1.1998 The deceased was survived by his widow, two minor sons aged about 12 and 7 years, a minor daughter aged about 3 years and father who filed the claim petition before the learned Tribunal.

3. The widow of the deceased appeared as PW 1 and deposed that the deceased was a contractor doing flooring work earning Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 7,000 per month and at the time of the accident, he had a work contract at Sector 7, Rohini. The deceased was 35 years of age at the time of his death. PW 1 tendered in evidence the charge-sheet, Exh. P1; mechanical inspection report, Exh. P2; post-mortem report, Exh. P3; registration cover, Exh. P4; seizure memo of truck, Exh. P5; F.I.R, Exh. P6; seizure memo of driving licence, Exh. P7; driving licence, Exh. P8; site plan, Exh. P9 and death certificate, Exh. P10.

4. The appellant had produced the eyewitness, PW 2, who deposed that he was accompanying the deceased on 4.1.1998 at about 10.55 p.m and while crossing the road near Lok Nayak Apartment, Sector 7, Rohini, the deceased was hit by truck bearing No. HR 38-BG 6052 coming from Rithala side at a very high speed and driven in a rash and negligent manner.

5. The driver of the offending vehicle filed the written statement before the learned Tribunal and denied the involvement of the truck in the accident. The owner of the offending truck did not appear before the learned Tribunal and was proceeded ex parte. The insurance company admitted the factum of insurance of the offending vehicle before the learned Tribunal.

6. The learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the postmortem report does not mention that the eyewitness, PW 2, had identified the dead body of the deceased. The learned Tribunal further held that the MLC has not been proved by the appellants. It is further recorded that as per the F.I.R and charge-sheet, no witness was found on the spot. The learned Tribunal observed that PW 2 has not stated the number of TSR in which he followed the PCR jeep to the hospital. The name of PW 2 has not been recorded in the F.I.R The seizure memo of the truck was prepared one day after the accident by the I.O As per the charge-sheet, P1 surrendered before the criminal court on 19.1.1998 but refused to submit himself to Test Identification Parade. The seizure memo of the truck was not witnessed by PW 2. The learned Tribunal, therefore, gave a Finding that PW 2 was not the actual eyewitness of the accident and was brought in as the witness subsequently. The learned Tribunal further observed that neither the identity of the deceased was established nor the identity of the person who was driving the truck has been established and there is no material on record to prove that Jokhu Ram sustained fatal injuries as a result of the accident caused by rash and negligent driving of the truck bearing No. HR 38-BG 6052. The learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition for all these reasons.

7. The learned Tribunal has utterly failed to discharge the duty cast by section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 168 provides that the Tribunal shall hold an inquiry into the claim. Section 169 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit subject to the Rules made in that behalf. Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993 provides the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal. Rule 118 of Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993 provides the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal. Rule 118(7) provides that the Claims Tribunal may during the course of inquiry visit the site of accident or examine any person likely to be able to give information relevant to the proceedings.

8. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules is that the Tribunal has to conduct an inquiry into the claim and a summary procedure has to be evolved. The Act as well as Rules nowhere use the word ‘trial’.

9. In the case of Saramma Scaria v. Mathai, 2003 ACJ 213 (Kerala), Kerala High Court observed as under:

“(4) We may at the outset point out that the Tribunal cannot claim any credit in the manner in which the claim petition was disposed of. We find in very many cases Tribunals are dealing with the compensation claims lightly forgetting the purpose for which they have been constituted. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals are constituted under the Act so as to advance speedy remedy to the injured as well as the legal heirs of the deceased. Claimants are not seeking any charity but their legitimate right to get justice and adequate compensation for the tragedy befallen them not due to their fault but due to the negligence of the other side. The Claims Tribunal is bound to mitigate the hardship of the person injured and to save the family from penury. In N.K.V Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC), Supreme Court has reminded the Claims Tribunals stating as follows:

‘Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Claims Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here and some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes’.”

10. In Ramdev singh V. Chudasma v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala, 1999 ACJ 1129 (Gujarat), the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court observed as under:

“(22)…The thrust of the attack on judicial values is not so much that Judges are consciously prejudiced, but that they are subconsciously influenced by the fact that they come from a narrow social stratum and reflect the values of a minority class. There can be no question but that subconscious influences of this kind do exist, but the submission made here is that the charge is prone to exaggeration.

In the first place, if the subconscious influences are taken into account, as indeed they should be, then account should be taken of all such influences, including those that tend to counteract and minimize prejudice. One of these is fidelity to rules, principles and doctrines. Even if a judge were to have some prejudice and wants to give effect to it, he has to do so as plausibly as possible within the framework of rules, the leeways of doing so are not unlimited and this does operate as a brake on personal prejudice. It has to be remembered that cases are argued, often with great ingenuity, by counsel, and if one side puts forward an interpretation of a statutory provision or a precedent, which cannot be countered plausibly, the Judge has to decide accordingly, however much his own wishes are to the contrary.”

11. The learned Tribunal could have invoked section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act which is reproduced hereunder:

“Section 165. Judge's power to put questions or order production.—The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question:

Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved:

Provided also that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the questions were asked or the documents were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.”

12. This section invests the Judge with plenary powers to put any question to any witness or party, in any form, at any time, about any fact relevant or irrelevant. Section 165 is intended to arm the Judge with the most extensive power possible for the purpose of getting at the truth. The effect of this section is that in order to get to the bottom of the matter before it, the court will be able to look at and inquire into every fact whatever and thus possibly acquire valuable indicative evidence which may lead to other evidence strictly relevant and admissible. The court is not, however, permitted to found its judgment on any but relevant statements.

13. A Judge, who at the trial merely sits and records evidence without caring so to conduct the examination of the witnesses that every point is brought out, is not fulfilling his duty.

14. Mr. Edmund Burke arguing in Warren Hastings Trial said that it is the duty of the Judge to receive every offer of evidence, apparently material, suggested to him, though the parties themselves through negligence, ignorance, or corrupt collusion, could not bring it forward. He has a duty of his own, independent of them, and that duty is to investigate the truth. If no prosecutor appears, the court is obliged through its officer, the clerk of the arraigns, to examine and cross-examine every witness who presents himself; and the Judge is to see it done effectively, and to act his own part in it.

15. In Bartly v. State, 75 NW 832, Harrison, C.J, said:

“It is undoubtedly necessary that the Judge who presided should acquire as full a knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case on trial as possible, in order that he may instruct the jury, and correctly, to the extent his duty demands, shape the determination of the litigated matters, that justice may not miscarry, but may prevail; and doubtless, it is allowable at times, and under some circumstances, for the presiding Judge to interrogate a witness.”

16. The object of a trial is, first, to ascertain truth by the light of reason, and then, do justice upon the basis of the truth and the Judge is not only justified but required to elicit a fact, wherever the interest of truth and justice would suffer, if he did not.

17. The framers of the Act, in the Report of the Select Committee published on 1.7.1871 along with the Bill settled by them, observed as follows:

“Passing over certain matters which are explained at length in the Bill and report, I come to two matters to which the Committee attach the greatest importance as having peculiar reference to the administration of justice in India. The first of these rules refers to the part taken by the Judge in the examination of witnesses; the second, to the effect of the improper admission or rejection of evidence upon the proceedings in case of appeal.

That part of the law of evidence which relates to the manner in which witnesses are to be examined assumes the existence of a well educated Bar, co-operating with the Judge and relieving him practically of every other duty than that of deciding questions which may arise between them. I need hardly say that this state of things does not exist in India, and that it would be a great mistake to legislate as if it did. In a great number of cases—probably the vast numerical majority—the Judge has to conduct the whole trial himself. In all cases, he has to represent the interests of the public much more distinctly than he does in England. In many cases, he has to get at the truth, or as near to it as he can by the aid of collateral inquiries, which may incidentally tend to something relevant; and it is most unlikely that he should ever wish to push an inquiry needlessly, or to go into matters not really connected with it. We have accordingly thought it right to arm Judges with a general power to ask any questions upon any facts, of any witnesses, at any stage of the proceedings, irrespective of the rules of evidence binding on the parties and their agents, and we have inserted in the Bill a distinct declaration that it is the duty of the Judge, especially in criminal cases, not merely to listen to the evidence put before him but to inquire to the utmost into the truth of the matter.”

18. The Judge contemplated by section 165 is not a mere umpire at a wit-combat between the lawyers for the parties whose only duty is to enforce the rules of the game and declare at the end of the combat who has won and who has lost. He is expected, and indeed it is his duty, to explore all avenues open to him in order to discover the truth and to that end, question witnesses on points which the lawyers for the parties have either overlooked or left obscure or wilfully avoided.

19. Learned Tribunal did not conduct the inquiry as envisaged in section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Although the statement of PW 2 as well as the documents, Exh. PW1 to Exh. PW10, clearly proved that the deceased died in a road accident arising out of rash and negligent driving of motor vehicle bearing No. HR 38-BG 6052 by its driver, still if the Tribunal had any doubt about the factum of accident, the Tribunal could have summoned the Investigating Officer and other witnesses recorded in the criminal case. Nothing prevented the Tribunal to summon Investigating Officer or other witnesses to ascertain the truth but instead of conducting an inquiry, learned Tribunal passed the order which is based on surmises and conjectures. The findings of learned Tribunal are therefore set aside.

20. The learned Tribunal has not computed the compensation. The evidence led by the appellants has been perused and the compensation is computed on the basis of the material on record.

21. The deceased was aged 35 years at the time of accident as per the death certificate, Exh. P10. Deceased was survived by his widow, two minor sons, one daughter and father at the time of the accident. The deceased was working as a contractor for doing flooring work. It is alleged that the deceased was earning Rs. 6,000 per month. However, no document whatsoever has been placed on record to prove the income of the deceased. The income of the deceased is, therefore, taken according to the minimum wages for a skilled worker which was Rs. 2,208 at the time of the accident. Taking notice of the increase in the minimum wages over a period of 10 years due to inflation and price index and following the judgments of this court in the cases of Kanwar Devi v. Bansal Roadways, 2008 ACJ 2182 (Delhi); Lekh Raj & Anr.… v. Suram Singh & Ors.…, 2007 ACJ 2165 (National Insurance Company Ltd… v. Renu Devi & Ors…, 2009 ACJ 1921 (Delhi), the income of the deceased for computation of compensation is taken to be Rs. 3,312 [(Rs. 2,208 + Rs. 2,208 × 2) V 2]. ¼th is deducted for the personal expenses of the deceased and applying the multiplier of 16, the loss of dependency of the appellants is computed to be Rs. 4,76,928. Rs. 10,000 is awarded for loss of love and affection, Rs. 10,000 for loss to estate, Rs. 10,000 for loss of consortium and Rs. 5,000 towards funeral expenses. The total compensation is computed at Rs. 5,11,928.

22. The appeal is accordingly allowed and an award of Rs. 5,11,928 along with interest at the rate of 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition, i.e, 17.3.98 till realization is passed in favour of the appellants and against respondent No. 4.

23. R4 W1 is the witness from District Transport Office, Alwar, who produced the original register pertaining to the year 1993 containing the entries from 17835 to 18404 and there is no entry in the name of Ragwar Singh. Copy of the extract from the register and the entry of 18.11.1993 has been exhibited as Exh. R4 W1.AR. Respondent No. 4 produced another witness, R4 W2, who proved the notice under Order 12, rule 8 issued to the driver as well as the owner to produce the driving licence. Respondent No. 4 has succeeded in proving that the photocopy of the driving licence placed on record from the criminal case was fake.

24. Respondent No. 4 is, therefore, given the recovery rights to recover the award amount from respondent No. 2 after making the payment to the claimants.

25. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the father of the deceased expired during the pendency of the petition and his share has devolved upon the appellants. The share of the appellants in the award amount shall be as under:

Appellant No. 1 : 60 Per cent Appellant No. 2 : 10 Per cent Appellant No. 3 : 10 Per cent Appellant No. 4 : 20 Per cent

26. The order with respect to the mode of investment shall be passed on the next date of hearing as this court has directed LIC, SBI and other banks to formulate a special scheme for victims of road accident. Re-notify on 3.7.2009

27. Appeal allowed.