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Singer Company Limited v. Chetan Machine Tools

Delhi High Court
Feb 26, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Singer Company Limited and Singer India Limited (plaintiffs) filed a suit against defendants who manufacture and sell milling machines. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants have adopted the trademark "Singer," which is deceptively similar in color scheme and font to the plaintiffs' registered trademark "Singer," thereby infringing on their trademark rights and passing off their goods. The plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the trademark "Singer" or any deceptively similar mark.

The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule XI of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. They argued that there was no averment that the defendants reside, carry on business, or that the cause of action arose within the Court's territorial jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs relied on a document filed along with the plaint, specifically the defendants' reply to a notice dated August 6, 2008, admitting that their milling machines were sold throughout India, to contend that the Court has territorial jurisdiction.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule XVII CPC to include averments that the defendants market their products over the internet accessible within the Court’s jurisdiction and have admitted selling the products throughout the country, including the jurisdiction of the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint discloses a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, thereby justifying dismissal under Order VII Rule XI CPC.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend the plaint to incorporate averments regarding territorial jurisdiction after the defendants filed the application for rejection.
  3. Whether a suit for trademark infringement is maintainable by one registered proprietor of a trademark against another registered proprietor of the same trademark, especially in light of Section 30(2)(e) and Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The defendants’ reply dated August 6, 2008, admitting that their products are sold throughout India, including the Court’s jurisdiction, supports territorial jurisdiction.
  • The failure to aver territorial jurisdiction in the plaint was a mere omission that can be corrected by amendment under Order VI Rule XVII CPC.
  • Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, permits a suit for infringement even when the defendant raises a defence under Section 30(2)(e), and such suit may be stayed pending rectification proceedings but not rejected outright.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The plaint does not disclose any cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court as there is no averment that defendants reside or carry on business within the Court’s jurisdiction.
  • The reply dated August 6, 2008, is a general statement and cannot be treated as an admission conferring jurisdiction.
  • The plaintiffs cannot fill the jurisdictional lacuna in the plaint by amendment or by relying on documents filed along with the plaint.
  • Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act bars a suit for infringement between two registered proprietors of the same trademark; the remedy is a cancellation petition before the Registrar of Trade Marks.
  • An application for amendment of the plaint should not be entertained after a defendant has filed an application for rejection under Order VII Rule XI CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Liverpool and London S.P and I Asson. Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I and Anr., 2004 (9) SCC 512 Order VII Rule XIV CPC - Documents filed along with the plaint are to be considered along with the plaint for disposal of an application under Order VII Rule XI CPC. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the defendants' reply filed along with the plaint could be considered to determine territorial jurisdiction and cause of action.
M/S Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 484 Curability of defective pleadings and the principle that defective pleadings can be amended if the cause of action is not completely absent. The Court applied this principle to allow the plaintiffs’ amendment application despite the defendants’ objection.
Wasudhir Foundation v. C. Lal & Sons, 45 (1991) Delhi Law Times 556 Order VI Rule XVII and Order VII Rule XI CPC - Power of the Court to allow amendment of plaint to disclose cause of action and prevent rejection of plaint. The Court followed this judgment to hold that allowing amendment to the plaint to cure defects is consistent with procedural law facilitating justice.
Gaganmal v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., AIR 1950 Bombay 345 Order VII Rule XI CPC - Power of the Court to allow amendment of plaint to disclose cause of action and avoid rejection. The Court cited this case to reinforce the principle that a plaint can be amended to disclose a cause of action before rejection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the defendants' application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule XI CPC on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction and cause of action. It noted that though the plaint itself did not aver that the defendants reside or carry on business within the Court’s jurisdiction, the documents filed along with the plaint, particularly the defendants' reply dated August 6, 2008, admitted that the defendants' products were sold throughout India, which prima facie included the Court’s jurisdiction.

Relying on the Apex Court precedent in Liverpool’s case, the Court held that documents filed with the plaint must be considered in deciding such applications and that the defendants’ admission could not be ignored. The Court further held that failure to aver jurisdiction in the plaint was not fatal and could be remedied by amendment.

The Court then addressed the question of whether a suit for trademark infringement is maintainable between two registered proprietors of the same trademark, noting the defendants’ reliance on Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides that no infringement occurs where the defendant has a registered proprietary right. However, the Court observed that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act contemplates such suits and provides for stay of proceedings pending rectification petitions, indicating that such suits are not barred outright.

Finally, the Court considered the plaintiffs’ application to amend the plaint after the defendants filed their rejection application. It emphasized the principle that procedural laws should facilitate justice and cited precedents allowing amendments to cure defects in pleadings. The Court rejected the defendants’ contention that amendment should not be allowed post rejection application and allowed the amendment.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the defendants' application under Order VII Rule XI of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction and cause of action.

The Court allowed the plaintiffs’ application under Order VI Rule XVII CPC to amend the plaint to incorporate averments regarding territorial jurisdiction.

As a result, the amended plaint was taken on record, and the defendants were directed to file their written statement and replies within specified timeframes.

The decision implies that a plaint will not be rejected solely for lack of explicit averments of territorial jurisdiction if documents filed with the plaint indicate the presence of jurisdictional facts. It also affirms the Court's power to allow amendments to cure defects in pleadings even after an application for rejection has been filed. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles.

Show all summary ...

Rekha Sharma, J.— The Singer Company Limited and Singer India Limited are the plaintiffs before me. They claim that plaintiff No. 1 is the largest and most successful sewing machine company. It manufactures and sells sewing machines besides other variety of goods in around 150 countries including India under the trademark “Singer” which is registered in India since the year 1942 and that plaintiff No. 2 is an affiliate of plaintiff No. 1 and is a licensed user of its trademark. Based on these averments, plaintiffs have filed the present suit against the defendants who are manufacturing and selling Milling Machines, on the allegation that they have adopted the trademark “Singer” which is deceptively similar to their trademark in colour scheme and font and consequently, they are infringing their trademark and are also passing off their goods by riding on their piggy back. Hence, they have prayed for a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from using the trademark “Singer” or any other deceptively similar trademark.

2. The defendants in response to the suit have filed an application under Order VII Rule XI of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the Code) and thereby seek rejection of the plaint, on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is stated that there is not a whisper in the plaint that the defendants at the time of commencement of the suit actually and voluntarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain or that the cause of action has, wholly or in part, arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is alleged that the only averment that has been made to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is that the first plaintiff through the second plaintiff carries on its business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court which averment, it is contended, is not enough to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Hence, it is further contended that the plaint is liable to be rejected.

3. Before I proceed to deal with the issue raised, it needs to be noticed that the plaintiffs have along with the plaint filed number of documents and one such document is the reply of the defendants dated August 06, 2008 to a notice from the plaintiffs dated July 31, 2008 calling upon them to desist from using their trademark “Singer”. In their reply, the defendants had stated that they are established and reputed manufacturers and merchants of Milling Machines and machine tools since 1991 and that the said products are being sold throughout the country and have acquired a very vast and ever increasing reputation and goodwill. The reply so given was heavily relied upon by the plaintiffs to contend that this Court does have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

4. What also needs to be noticed, is that after the filing of the application under Order VII Rule XI of the Code by the defendants, the plaintiffs moved an application under order vi rule xvii of the code seeking amendment of the plaint so as to incorporate therein the following averments:—

“The cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court as the defendants are featuring its product namely Milling Machine over the internet on websites and thereby inviting people from all over India, to purchase its said product. The said websites are accessible within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court and targets and/or is likely to target the public/customers residing within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court to sell the same to them. Further, the defendants in their letter of August 11, 2008 at para No. 3 admitted that the Milling Machines, machine tools manufactured and/or marketed by them are being sold all over the country. The said admission in the defendants' said letter makes it clear/evident that the aforementioned product(s) of the defendants is available within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court and/or the defendants have the intention to sell the same and/or carry on business within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.”

5. Should the amendment, as proposed, be allowed? This is yet another issue which falls for determination.

6. The territorial jurisdiction to entertain a suit is governed by Section 20 of the Code except in relation to immovable properties or where the suit is for the compensation for wrongs to person or movables. Those are governed by sections 16 & 19 of the code. In so far as Section 20 of the Code is concerned, it provides that every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain or where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

7. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the plaint does not contain averments to the effect that the defendants actually and voluntarily reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain or that the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. This being so, should the plaint be rejected? The answer is in the negative and the reason is that while examining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action, it is not the plaint alone which is to be seen but also the documents filed along with the plaint and thereby forms part of the plaint. I say so on the strength of a judgment of the Apex Court in Liverpool and London S.P and I Asson. Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I and Anr., 2004 (9) SCC 512 which says that having regard to order vii rule xiv of the code not only the plaint but also the documents filed along with the plaint are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of disposal of the application under Order VII Rule XI of the Code.

8. The plaintiffs, as has been noticed above, have filed along with the plaint reply of the defendants to their notice dated July 31, 2008 calling upon them to desist from using the trademark “Singer”. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs on the basis of the said reply has argued that the defendants having themselves admitted that their products were being sold throughout India which obviously would be taken to include Delhi cannot be allowed to contend that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the plaint and that the failure of the plaintiffs in not making an averment that the defendants' products were being sold in Delhi was not of much consequence and that at the most, it Was a mere omission which the plaintiffs by virtue of application under order vi rule xvii of the code are seeking to make good.

9. The defendants, on the other hand, have contended that their reply dated August 06, 2008 is of a general nature and it cannot be taken to be an admission on their part so as to be conferring territorial jurisdiction on this Court. As regards the application of the plaintiffs for amendment, it is contended that where the plaint is completely silent on the question of jurisdiction, the lacuna cannot be permitted to be filled-up by allowing the application for amendment or by looking into the documents filed along with the plaint, for documents can only supplement the averments made in the plaint but cannot act as substitute to the missing averments.

10. Having considered the rival submissions, I feel that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Liverpool's case, it will not be right to hold that the documents filed along with the plaint can be looked into as supplementing the plaint only and not beyond that. It is on a conjoint reading of the plaint and the documents filed along with it that the Court should come to a conclusion, whether the suit filed by the plaintiff discloses a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Court. As noticed above, the defendants in their reply dated August 06, 2008 had clearly stated that their products were being sold throughout the country. Prima facie, the reply goes to show that they are being sold in Delhi too. Of-course, the plaintiffs during the course of trial shall have to prove that the products of the defendants are actually being sold in Delhi but that will be a matter of evidence. At the present stage of the proceedings, in view of the reply dated August 06, 2008, it cannot be said that this Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The mere failure under the circumstances to set out this assertion in the plaint cannot be treated as fatal.

11. There is yet another aspect which needs to be noticed. The plaintiffs have made two-fold grievances against the defendants; one, that they are infringing their trademark, and the other that they are passing off their goods as that of the plaintiffs. In so far as the suit against relief of infringement is concerned, it is stated that the suit can even be filed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Court where at the time of institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or proceeding actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. In support, reference is made to Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and to paragraph No. 31 of the plaint where it is stated that the first plaintiff through second plaintiff carries on its business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

12. It is not disputed by learned counsel for the defendants that a suit alleging infringement under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 can be instituted within the jurisdiction of a Court where the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. However, it is submitted that no suit for infringement is maintainable against the defendants in view of Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. This Section lays down that a registered trademark is not infringed where the use of a registered trade mark, being one of two or more trade marks registered under this Act which are identical or nearly resemble each other, in exercise of the right to the use of that trademark given by registration under this Act. Relying upon the said Section, it is argued that no suit can be instituted by a person claiming to be the proprietor of a registered trademark against another person who too has been granted proprietary right of the same trademark and that the only remedy in such a situation is to file a cancellation petition for removal of the registered trademark before the Registrar of Trade Marks which the plaintiffs, as per the averments made in the plaint, have already done.

13. Responding to the aforesaid submissions, counsel for the plaintiffs submits that there is no absolute bar to file a suit by the proprietor of a registered trademark against another registered proprietor of the same trademark and in support, he has relied upon Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which runs as under:—

“Where in any suit for infringement of a trade mark, the defendant raises a defence under clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 30 and the plaintiff pleads the invalidity of registration of the defendant's trademark, the Court trying the suit shall, -

(i) if any proceedings for rectification of the register in relation to the plaintiff's or defendant's trade mark are pending before the Registrar or the Appellate Board, stay the suit pending the final disposal of such proceedings.”

14. Having regard to the provisions of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, I am prima facie of the view that a suit by a registered proprietor of a trademark against another registered proprietor of the same trademark cannot be declined to be entertained at the threshold. Such a suit can lie but may have to be stayed depending upon the defence raised by the defendants. I am, however, expressing no final opinion on the issue raised except saying that the suit cannot be rejected at the inception itself.

15. In any case, as noticed above, the plaintiffs have moved an application under order vi rule xvii of the code for amendment of the plaint and thereby are seeking to make good the omissions. The defendants say that once an application under Order VII Rule XI of the Code for rejection of the plaint has been filed, an application for amendment cannot be entertained. Is it so?

16. It has been time and again held by the Courts that procedural laws are intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. The Supreme Court in M/S Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram , AIR 1978 Supreme Court 484 has held that the defective pleadings are generally curable if the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab-initio completely absent. It has been further held that:—

“Even very defective pleadings may be permitted to be cured, so as to constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions, such as payment of either any additional court fees, which may be payable, or of costs of the other side are complied with.”

It goes on to say that:—

“It is only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a newly constituted cause of action that the Courts should, ordinarily, refuse prayers for amendment of pleadings.”

17. As I have already said that in view of the reply of the defendants dated August 06, 2008 this Court does not lack inherent jurisdiction to deal with the suit, I see no reason why the amendment should not be allowed. I am fortified in my view by a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Wasudhir Foundation…Plaintiff; v. C. Lal & Sons…Defendant., 45 (1991) Delhi Law Times 556. What he wrote, I quote:—

“5. This is righteous path. And, if this be so, is it not necessary, in the ends of justice, to extend the beneficial legal principles ensconced in Order 6 rule 17? Moreso, when one hardly discerns anything in Order 7 rule 11 which may lead one to take the view that it takes away the power of the Court to allow amendments or places hurdles in performance of its duty. After all, what is the effect of Order 7 rule 11? It is, if I understand correctly, that the plaintiff would not be precluded from filing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, if he so desires (see Order 7, Rule 13). If such be the effect, why not permit the amendment of the plaint so as to remove the defect and prevent the operation of the Rule? Why make him first invite the rejection of the plaint, then allow him to file a fresh suit at the expense of delay and heavy costs? Why not straight-away allow him to amend the plaint, remove the defect and permit him, thereby, to proceed with the same suit? Why this rigmarole? After all, procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of justice. With respect, it has rightly been had in Gaganmal v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., AIR 1950 Bombay 345:

“It is perfectly true that it is incumbent upon the Court to reject a plaint that does not disclose a cause of action, but it does not follow that it is not open to the Court to allow a plaint to be amended so that it should disclose a cause of action. It is only when a plaint does not disclose a cause of action that the Court is called upon to exercise its power under 0.7 R. 11. But the Court may prevent the operation of 0.7 R. 11, and may save the plaint being rejected by exercising its power under 0.6 R. 17, and allowing the plaint to be amended.”

18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the application of the defendants under Order VII Rule XI of the Code is dismissed, and the application of the plaintiffs under order vi rule xvii of the code is allowed. The amended plaint is taken on record.

19. Learned counsel for the defendants is directed to file written statement to the suit as also reply to the application under order xxxlx rules 1 & 2 of the code within two weeks and rejoinder within two weeks thereafter.