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Akhil Bhartiya Mahajan Shiromani Sabha & Others v. Dharamveer Mahajan & Ors

Delhi High Court
Aug 19, 2008
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J. (Oral)

Factual and Procedural Background

These petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenge an instrument described as an "Award" dated 28 April 2008 by Justice R.C. Chopra (retd.). Justice R.C. Chopra had been appointed by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 29 August 2007 in R.F.A. No. 48/2007 as "Arbitrator/Court Commissioner" to determine membership cut-off issues and to conduct elections for the President of the Akhil Bhartiya Mahajan Shiromani Sabha.

As Sole Arbitrator Justice R.C. Chopra's April 2008 instrument found that of 413 claimed members, 399 were enrolled after the cut-off date of 15.9.1997, their enrolment appeared to have been for undue electoral advantage, and those persons were held not entitled to participate in the election; further directions for holding elections were issued.

Multiple applications (OMP No. 293/2008 and OMP No. 403/2008) were filed challenging the process and the Award: one party complained that due to pendency of these petitions the arbitrator/commissioner was not proceeding with elections; some persons who were declared not entitled asserted they were not given notice by the arbitrator and sought relief to set aside the Award on that ground.

At a hearing on 1 August 2008 the Court questioned whether the April 2008 instrument was an "Award" within the meaning of the Arbitration Act because (a) there was no arbitration agreement shown, and (b) many of the persons whose rights were decided were not parties to the original appeal or before the Division Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the instrument dated 28 April 2008 by Justice R.C. Chopra (retd.) constitutes an "Arbitral Award" within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  2. Whether petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are maintainable against that instrument.
  3. Whether the Division Bench's appointment of Justice R.C. Chopra was intended as an appointment of an arbitrator, a court commissioner, or a referee (within the meaning of Section 20 of the Indian Evidence Act), and the legal consequences of that characterization.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced in OMP No. 293/2008 (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Counsel for petitioners argued that if Justice R.C. Chopra was intended only as a Court Commissioner under Order 26 CPC, the appeal (R.F.A. No. 48/2007) would not have been disposed of and would have been kept pending with the commissioner ordered to file a report.
  • Attention was drawn to a petition under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act having been moved before Justice R.C. Chopra and to C.M. Nos. 13848-13849/2007 and an order dated 9 October 2007 (in which an application pressing that the appointment be as Court Commissioner only was withdrawn), to contend the appointee was intended to be an arbitrator.

Arguments advanced in OMP No. 403/2008 (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Some persons held not entitled to vote contended they were not given notice by the Arbitrator and that the Award should be set aside on that ground.
  • The senior counsel for these petitioners expressed willingness to treat the April 2008 instrument as an Arbitral Award and to submit to arbitration, but asserted they were not heard and sought that the Award be set aside and the matter remitted under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration Act to the Arbitrator.
  • Reliance was placed on Section 89 CPC and on the fact that members of the Sabha had consented to arbitration in R.F.A. No. 48/2007, so those members should be bound by that agreement.

Respondents' position (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The senior counsel for the respondents complained that, because of the pendency of the Section 34 petitions, Justice R.C. Chopra (retd.) was not proceeding with holding the elections.
  • When asked if they were agreeable to the disputes now raised being resolved by Justice R.C. Chopra, the respondents indicated they were not agreeable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hormusji v. Local Board, Karachi, AIR 1934 Sind 200 (passage of Lord Esher in 56 LJQB 530) Distinction between an arbitrator (who hears parties and decides on evidence) and an appointment whose object is to preclude disputes from arising (not an arbitrator); existence of intermediate cases decided by intention of parties and circumstances. The Court relied on this passage to support the proposition that nomenclature alone ('Arbitrator') does not determine the nature of the appointment; intention and circumstances determine whether the appointee is an arbitrator or not.
Garg Builders and Engineers v. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd., AIR 1995 Delhi 111 Even where a clause refers disputes to a person, the clause may be a "finality clause" or provision to prevent disputes by making a decision binding without constituting arbitration; mere agreement to be bound by a person's decision does not make that person an arbitrator. The Court cited this case to affirm that an agreement to be bound by a decision is not dispositive of an arbitration agreement; the reference could be to an expert/finality mechanism rather than arbitration.
K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573 Recognition that some persons entrusted by consent may affect legal rights by procedures of ministerial (non-judicial) nature rather than by arbitral/judicial procedures. The Court invoked this authority to underscore that not all consensual decision-makers are arbitral tribunals; some may operate by ministerial/administrative procedure and therefore fall outside arbitration.
Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, 1985 (Supp) 1 SCC 17 Discussion of appointment of a referee within the meaning of Section 20 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court relied on this Supreme Court discussion to support its conclusion that the appointment could be characterized as that of a referee under Section 20 Evidence Act rather than an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act.
Ram Narain and Others v. Santosh Kumar and Others, AIR 1952 Punjab 344 Instance where the expression "Arbitration Agreement" was used but held to be a reference to a referee, not arbitration; parties were bound by the referee's finding. The Court cited this case to support the position that labels are not determinative and that a reference may be to a referee whose findings bind the parties as admissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining whether the Division Bench's order of 29 August 2007 evinced an agreement to arbitrate within the meaning of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The following analytical steps are recorded:

  1. The Court observed that for an appointment to be of an arbitrator intended to make an arbitral award, there must be an Arbitration Agreement between the parties. The Court examined the statements and affidavits recorded before the Division Bench and concluded they do not disclose any agreement to arbitrate.
  2. The Court noted that under Section 89 CPC, an out-of-court reference to arbitration made by the Court in settlement proceedings would apply the Arbitration Act only if there was an arbitration agreement; thus, section 89 contemplates the Arbitration Act applying where parties agree to arbitration.
  3. The Court emphasized that mere use of the nomenclature "Arbitrator" in the Division Bench order is not determinative; the intention of the parties and the substance of the reference must be examined (drawing on Hormusji and other authorities).
  4. Considering the scope and purpose of the Division Bench's reference — to determine membership questions and to facilitate elections and to bring the controversy to an end so that elections could be held without further challenge — the Court concluded that the Division Bench intended Justice R.C. Chopra to act as a "referee" (or court commissioner/referee) whose findings would be binding as admissions, rather than as an arbitrator producing an arbitral award subject to Section 34 challenges.
  5. The Court relied on precedent (Hormusji; Garg Builders; K.K. Modi; Hirachand Kothari; Ram Narain) to distinguish arbitration from appointments intended to be ministerial, finality-creating, or refereeing in nature, and to justify treating Justice Chopra's appointment as that of a referee under Section 20 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  6. On that basis — absence of an arbitration agreement and the characterization of the appointment as a referee/court commissioner rather than an arbitrator — the April 2008 instrument was held not to be an "Arbitral Award" within the Arbitration Act.

Holding and Implications

Primary Holding: The Court held that the instrument dated 28 April 2008 by Justice R.C. Chopra (retd.) is not an Arbitral Award within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Disposition: The petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging that instrument were held to be not maintainable and were dismissed.

Implications:

  • The April 2008 instrument cannot be the subject of a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act because it is not an arbitral award (as found by the Court).
  • The Court's decision rests on the characterization of the Division Bench's intention and the absence of an arbitration agreement; the Court treated the appointment as that of a referee (Section 20 Evidence Act) whose finding binds the parties as an admission.
  • The opinion does not state that any new legal precedent is being laid down beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; the decision is confined to the parties and the facts before the Court and the direct effect described above.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J. (Oral):— These petitions have been preferred under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the se Award E dated 28th April, 2008 of Justice R.C Chopra (retd.). Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) was appointed as “Arbitrator/Court Commissioner” vide order dated 29th August, 2007 of the Division Bench of this court in R.F.A No. 48/2007. For expediency, the order dated 29th August, 2007 aforesaid is set out as hereinbelow.

“Appellant has placed on record an affidavit of Mr. T.R Gupta, President of the Akhil Bhartiya Mahajan Sheromani Sabha whereby he has given his consent to the Court referring all the disputes to a Court Commissioner/Arbitrator of its choice as also for holding the election to the post of the President of Akhil Bhartiya Mahajan Sheromani Sabha and issue necessary directions in this regard. Mr. Razdan submits that though the affidavit, which has been filed, is of Mr. T.R Gupta on behalf of the Sabha, he is also authorized to make the statement on behalf of Mr. Rajinder Motiyal also. Mr. Jagdish Raj Mahajan, who was a party before the learned Single Judge, has not raised any objection with regard to the reference to these disputes. Let the statements of both the counsel be recorded.

Statement of Mr. T.N Razdan, counsel for the appellants and Mr. Rakesh Mahajan, counsel for the respondents has been separately recorded. The affidavit filed by Mr. T.R Gupta and Mr. Dharamvir Singh are taken on record.

In view of the statements and the affidavits filed, we appoint Justice R.C Chopra, N-113, Greater Kailash Part-I, New Delhi, a retired Judge of this court to act as the arbitrator/Court Commissioner to do the following:

1. To determine whether life members/working committee members enrolled after the cutoff date i.e 15.9.1997 are validly enrolled and if so, are they entitled to participate in the elections going to be held.

2. To conduct the elections of the President of the Akhil Bhartiya Mahajan Shiromani Sabha in accordance with the provisions of the bye laws of the Sabha.

The Arbitrator/Court Commissioner is also empowered to decide any other matter incidental to the above and to take such further steps as are necessary to accomplish the aforesaid object. The fee of the Arbitrator/Court Commissioner shall be fixed by him and shall be shared by both the parties equally. The status quo as of now shall be maintained subject to such further directions as may be given by the Arbitrator/Court Commissioner. The Arbitrator/Court Commissioner is requested to see that the elections are held at its earliest and goodwill and harmony is restored within the community. If possible, the entire exercise be completed within three months.

The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.”

2. Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) pronounced an ‘Award’ on 28th April, 2008 as ‘Sole Arbitrator’ and found that out of 413 persons who were claimed to be members of Akhil Bhartiya Mahajan Shiromani Sabha, 399 were enrolled after the ‘cut off’ date and their enrolment appeared to have been done only to gain undue advantage in election of President which had not been held after 1997 and held their enrolment contrary to rules and further held the said persons not entitled to participate in the election to be held by him. He issued further directions for holding of elections.

3. The grievance of the senior counsel for the Respondents is that owing to pendency of these petitions, Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) is not proceeding with the holding of elections.

4. OMP No. 293/2008 has been preferred by a party to RFA No. 48/2007 vide order in which appointment of Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) was made. OMP No. 403/2008 has been preferred by some of the persons who were held not entitled to participate in the ensuing election. The said persons contend that they were not issued notice by the Arbitrator Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) and the Award dated 28th April, 2008 is liable to be set aside on this ground.

5. On 1st August, 2008 when OMP No. 293/2008 had come up before this court, the counsel for the Petitioners therein was asked to satisfy as to how the order dated 28th April, 2008 is an ‘Award’ within the meaning of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and as to how petitions under Section 34 of the Act are maintainable with respect thereto in as much as neither was there any arbitration agreement nor were the persons whose rights to be decided, parties to R.F.A No. 48/2007 or before the Division Bench or before Justice R.C Chopra (retd.).

6. The counsel for the Petitioners in OMP No. 293/2008 has submitted that if Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) was intended to be a Court Commissioner only within the meaning of Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the lis in which he was appointed, that is, R.F.A No. 48/2007 would not have been disposed of and would have been kept pending and the Court Commissioner would have been ordered to file his report in the said proceedings. He has drawn attention to the fact that petition under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was moved before Justice R.C Chopra (retd.). He has also relied upon C.M Nos. 13848-13849/2007 in disposed of R.F.A No. 48/2007 and the order dated 9th October, 2007 made therein, copies whereof have been handed over in the court, to contend that while relief was pressed in the application that the appointment should be as a Court Commissioner only and not as an Arbitrator, the application was withdrawn.

7. The senior counsel for the Petitioner, in OMP No. 403/2008 has inter alia stated that the Petitioners are willing to treat the ‘Award’ dated 28th April, 2008 as an Arbitral Award and are willing to submit to Arbitration but their grievance is that they were not heard and not given notice and thus, the Award dated 28th April, 2008 be set aside and the matter be remitted under Section 34 (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the Arbitrator. On query as to how the same constituted an ‘Award’ within the meaning of Arbitration Act, the senior counsel for the Petitioners has drawn attention to section 89 of the cpc and urged that since the Petitioners in OMP No. 403/2008 are members of the Sabha which had consented to Arbitration, they are also bound by the Agreement of the Sabha in R.F.A No. 48/2007 of appointment of Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) as Arbitrator.

8. I have enquired from the counsel for the Respondents in both the petitions, if they are willing to the disputes now raised being resolved by Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) already appointed by the Division Bench but the Respondents are not agreeable.

9. R.F.A No. 48/2007 was preferred against order dated 2nd July, 2007 of dismissal of CS (OS) No. 1716/2006 filed by the Respondents herein inter alia for declaration that the enrolment of members was illegal and to restrain the executives of Sabha from acting. The Hon'ble Single Judge on 2nd July, 2007 dismissed the suit with directions to hold election in accordance with the constitution of the Sabha.

10. The Division Bench, with a view to resolve all disputes as to who, as per the constitution of Sabha was a member entitled to vote and who was not, and further to ensure holding of elections, after recording consent of parties before it, referred for information to Justice R.C Chopra (retd.). The reference was of matter in dispute between the parties to the suit in appeal. The intent was to bring the controversy to an end and of the parties being bound by the finding/statement of Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) and to expedite holding of elections. The elections could be held only if there was to be no further challenge to finding of Justice R.C Chopra (retd.). Mere use of nomenclature ‘Arbitrator’ will not constitute reference to Arbitration.

11. For the Division Bench to have intended to appoint Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) as an Arbitrator, it was essential to have an Arbitration Agreement within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act, of the parties to agree to Arbitration. A copy of the statements recorded before the Division Bench on 29th August, 2007, has been handed over and which does not disclose any agreement of the parties to Arbitration. For the court, in exercise of the powers under section 89 of the cpc also, to refer the parties to Arbitration, an Arbitration Agreement is a must in as much as section 89 (2) (a) provides that the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply to such a reference. In the absence of an Arbitration Agreement, I find it difficult to hold that Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) was intended to act as an Arbitrator or could have made an Arbitral Award against which objections can be preferred under Section 34 of the Act. I, therefore, hold that the ‘Award’ dated 28th April, 2008 is not an Arbitral Award.

12. In Hormusji v. Local Board, Karachi, AIR 1934 Sind 200, the following passage by Lord Esher in 56 LJQB 530 was quoted with approval “If it appears from the terms of the agreement, by which a matter is submitted to any person, that that which he is to do is to be in the nature of a judicial inquiry, and that the object is that he should hear the parties and decide the matter upon evidence to be led before him, there the person is an Arbitrator. But if it appears that the object of appointing the person was not to settle differences after they had arisen, but to preclude differences from arising, there the person appointed is not an Arbitrator. There is an intermediate class of cases in which a person is appointed to determine disputes after they have arisen, but is not bound to hear evidence or argument. In those cases it may be more difficult to say whether the person is a valuer or an Arbitrator. They must be determined according to the circumstances in each particular instance by the intention of the parties.”

13. Similarly in Garg Builders and Engineers v. U.P Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Limited (AIR 1995 Delhi 111). This court was concerned with the interpretation of the following clauses:

“In the event of any dispute arising out of any of the conditions of this agreement, the matter shall be referred to the then unit incharge, whose decision shall be final and binding on both the parties”

Even though the clause used the expression of reference of dispute, the court held that the clause was only calculated to prevent disputes from arising and was akin to “finality clause” making provision for decision by an expert. No judicial determination of disputes was called for. The court held that mere agreement between the parties to be bound by the decision of a person does not constitute him as an arbitrator.

14. The discussion would be incomplete without reference to the dicta of the Apex Court in K.K Modi v. K.N Modi (1998) 3 SCC 573 where reference with approval was made to Commercial Arbitration 2nd Edition by Mustill and Boyd wherein the learned Author has observed that apart from arbitral tribunals, in the complex modern state, there exist persons entrusted by consent with the power to affect the legal rights of two parties inter se in the manner creating legally enforceable rights, but intended to do so by a procedure of ministerial and not a judicial nature.

15. In my opinion, the appointment of Justice R.C Chopra (retd.) vide order dated 29th August, 2007 by the Division Bench was as a “referee” within the meaning of Section 20 of the Indian Evidence Act and whose decision on the matters in disputes referred to him was binding on the parties to the dispute as an admission.

16. The apex court in Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan [1985 (Supp) (1) SCC 17] has discussed such appointment of Referee within the meaning of Section 20 of the Evidence Act.

17. In Ram Narain and Others v. Santosh Kumar and Others (AIR 1952 Punjab 344) also, the expression ‘Arbitration Agreement’ was used but it was held that the Agreement was made not in the nature of a reference to Arbitration but a reference to a referee and as such the parties were bound by the finding of the said referee.

18. In my view, the parties before the Division Bench did not intend to have the disputes arbitrated. If that was to be so, the Division Bench would not have used the expression “Arbitrator/Court Commissioner” for Justice R.C Chopra. Further if the finding of justice R.C Chopra on the dispute of membership was not intended to bind the parties, the Division Bench would not have authorized/empowered Justice R.C Chopra to hold the election also.

19. Since I have held that there was no arbitration, these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 are held to be not maintainable and dismissed.