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Madan Lal Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar & Ors
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Vipin Sanghi, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Criminal Revision Petition under Section 397 CrPC challenges the order dated 07.08.1999 of the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ), Delhi in Sessions Case No. 75/1999 (Madan Lal Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar etc.), by which the ASJ discharged the accused in the complaint filed by the petitioner under Sections 304B, 498A, 406, 109 and 120B IPC.
Key facts (as set out in the opinion): Monica (the complainant's daughter), a medical doctor, married respondent No.1 on 30.11.1991. She died on 26.09.1992 while living with her husband in Surat. The dead body was brought to Delhi on 27.09.1992 and an inquest under Section 176 CrPC and a post-mortem were conducted. The petitioner alleged dowry demands and complaints were made to authorities in Surat and Delhi.
Procedural history (as set out): On 26.07.1993 the petitioner filed a complaint under Section 200 CrPC in the Metropolitan Magistrate's Court; statements of the petitioner and his son were recorded (C-1 and C-2). On 24.08.1995 the Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons. The respondents applied to recall the summoning order on 15.04.1997; that application was rejected by the Magistrate on 23.05.1998. The Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions under Section 208 CrPC. Before framing of charges, the Sessions Court summoned two post-mortem doctors and recorded one statement. On 07.08.1999 the ASJ discharged the respondents (impugned order).
The revision petition was previously dismissed by this Court by summary order on 19.10.2000; the Supreme Court granted leave on 22.02.2002 directing this Court to apply its mind independently. The petition was again dismissed in default on 11.08.2005 but the Supreme Court again directed a decision on merits, bringing the matter back for hearing before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge erred in relying upon and considering documents and materials produced by the accused at the stage of consideration of charge/discharge (section 227/227-equivalent stage), relying on the principles in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration.
- Whether the decision in Satish Mehra (permitting the trial court to consider materials produced by the accused at the stage of section 227) remains good law in view of the subsequent larger Bench decision in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi that held the accused has no right to produce material at the time of taking cognizance or framing charge.
- Whether documents produced by the accused along with an application to recall the summoning order constitute "the record of the case" for the purposes of Section 227 CrPC (and related provisions) and therefore may be considered at the stage of framing of charge.
- Whether the High Court can exercise its powers under Section 482 CrPC (and Article 226) by looking into documents produced by the accused to quash proceedings where the accused can produce material of unimpeachable character, as argued with reference to Debendra Nath Padhi and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Complainant / Petitioner)
- Submitted that the ASJ relied on Satish Mehra (1996) to consider materials produced by the accused at the stage of framing of charge and thereby improperly relied on documents produced by the accused to discharge them.
- Contended that Satish Mehra has been overruled by the larger Bench decision in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005), which holds that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material; therefore the impugned decision is inconsistent with Debendra Nath Padhi and unsustainable.
- Argued that at the stage of framing of charge the trial court cannot go into probative value of material; material produced by the prosecution (complaint and statements C-1 and C-2) must be accepted as true for that limited purpose. Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, State of M.P. v. Mohan Lal Soni, State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Sway, and Suresh Kumar Tekriwal to support this proposition.
- Thus, maintained that the ASJ improperly examined evidence and assessed its probative worth at the charge stage instead of determining whether a prima facie case was made out.
Respondents (Accused)
- Contended that at the stage of charge/discharge the Court is entitled to consider the record of the case and documents submitted therewith; in this instance the post mortem report, inquest proceedings, CFSL report and letters of complainant were part of the record when the ASJ considered framing or discharge because they had been filed by the Magistrate along with the respondents' application seeking recall of the summoning order.
- Argued that the complainant suppressed relevant materials (did not furnish post-mortem to the Magistrate although he referred to it in the complaint and in C-1) and that suppression should not prejudice the accused by forcing them to face a trial which, according to them, has no basis.
- Submitted that the inquest and post mortem were obligations under Section 176 (death of a woman within seven years of marriage on request by a relative) and that the Magistrate ought to have considered the inquest report before issuing process.
- Urged that the High Court could quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC by looking into the accused-produced documents to prevent abuse of process where accused can produce material of unimpeachable character, citing para 29 of Debendra Nath Padhi as invoking the Bhajan Lal parameters for such exercise of power.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration (1996) 9 SCC 766 | Held that a Sessions Judge could consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated under Section 227 CrPC; recommended truncation of proceedings if trial would be futile. | The learned ASJ expressly relied upon Satish Mehra in the impugned order and examined documents produced by the accused at the charge stage in accordance with that authority. The Court noted this reliance in reviewing the impugned order. |
| State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 | Held that at the time of taking cognizance or framing charge the accused has no right to produce any material; Satish Mehra's contrary view was held to be incorrectly decided and overruled. | The Court applied and discussed the holding in Debendra Nath Padhi to interpret "record of the case" (linked to Section 209) and to conclude that documents produced by the accused with a recall application do not form part of the record for Section 227 purposes. The Court relied on Padhi to reject the respondents' contention that accused-produced documents could be considered at framing. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa & Ors (1996) 4 SCC 659 | Authority for the proposition that at the stage of framing of charge the probative value of material should not be gone into; prosecution material is to be accepted as true and if commission of offence is probable, charge may be framed. | Referred to by the petitioner to support the argument that the learned ASJ could not examine the probative worth of material at the framing stage. The Court recorded this reliance when setting out the petitioner's submissions. |
| State of M.P v. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 | Supports the proposition that at framing the Court must examine whether a prima facie case is made out; should not assess sufficiency of evidence to convict. | Referred to by the petitioner; the Court recorded this authority as part of the petitioner's submissions about the proper scope of inquiry at the framing stage. |
| State of A.P v. Golconda Linga Sway & Anr (2004) 6 SCC 522 | Affirms that charge may be framed where materials show probability of the commission of the crime (probability, not certainty). | Relied upon by the petitioner and recorded by this Court as part of submissions opposing the ASJ's in-depth evidentiary examination at the charge stage. |
| Suresh Kumar Tekriwal v. State of Jharkhand & Anr (2005) 12 SCC 278 | Characterised as being on the same lines as Debendra Nath Padhi (i.e., restrictive view on admissibility of accused-produced materials at framing stage). | Mentioned by the petitioner in support of the contention that materials produced by the accused cannot be considered at the framing stage; recorded as part of the petitioner's authorities. |
| State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 | Sets out parameters for the High Court's power under Section 482 CrPC / Article 226 to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice. | Referred to in the context of para 29 of Debendra Nath Padhi; respondents relied on the Bhajan Lal parameters to argue for wide exercise of Section 482 powers. The Court considered and rejected the submission that s482 should be invoked at this stage because the accused-produced documents had not been led in evidence and proved. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court began by identifying that the impugned ASJ order expressly relied on Satish Mehra to justify examining materials produced by the accused when considering framing of charge (the ASJ had reviewed post-mortem, inquest proceedings, CFSL report and other documents, and consulted medical texts, ultimately concluding no ground to charge under Section 304B IPC).
2. The petitioner argued that Satish Mehra had been overruled by the larger Bench in Debendra Nath Padhi, which holds that the accused has no right to produce material at the time of taking cognizance or framing of charge. The Court recited the Padhi holding and its reasoning that the phrase "record of the case" (as used in Section 227) must be read in light of Section 209 (which defines what is sent on committal) and that no provision grants the accused a right to file material at framing stage.
3. The Court analysed the statutory scheme for complaint cases committed under Section 208 CrPC and noted the documents that the Magistrate is obliged to furnish free of cost at committal (statements recorded under Sections 200/202, statements/confessions under Sections 161/164, and any document produced before the Magistrate on which the prosecution proposes to rely). On that basis the Court concluded that documents produced by the accused with an application to recall the summoning order are not required to be supplied at committal and therefore cannot be classed as "the record of the case" for Section 227 purposes.
4. The Court rejected the respondents' submissions that (a) the Magistrate issued process without applying his mind or calling for the inquest/post-mortem and (b) the documents were public records or documents of statutory authorities so they should be treated differently. The Court noted the respondents had earlier challenged the summoning order under Section 482 but withdrew that petition with liberty to approach the trial court, and that the trial court's detailed order of 23.05.1998 rejecting the recall application attained finality because it was not further challenged.
5. The respondents also argued that the High Court could quash the complaint under Section 482 by looking into accused-produced documents of unimpeachable character (relying on Padhi's para 29 and Bhajan Lal). The Court declined this approach at the present stage because the documents (inquest, post-mortem, CFSL report) had not been led in evidence and proved and therefore could not be characterized as documents of "unimpeachable character and sterling quality" sufficient to justify exercise of s482.
6. Weighing these factors, the Court concluded (for the reasons stated) that the impugned order of discharge by the ASJ should be quashed and directed the parties (with specific exemptions for elderly respondents No.2 and 5) to appear before the Sessions Judge on a specified date.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): The petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 07.08.1999 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, is quashed.
Immediate consequences (as ordered by the Court): - All parties, except respondent Nos. 2 and 5 (who were exempted from personal appearance on the next date due to advanced age), were directed to appear before the concerned Sessions Judge on 21.07.2008. The elderly respondents may apply for further exemption if they wish.
Broader implications: - The opinion discusses and applies the authoritative position in Debendra Nath Padhi that the accused has no right to produce material at the stage of taking cognizance or framing of charge, and it clarifies that documents produced by an accused with an application to recall the summoning order are not part of "the record of the case" for Section 227 purposes. The Court also emphasised that the High Court's power under Section 482 CrPC should not be exercised by treating unproved accused-produced documents as of unimpeachable character.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down any new precedent; its direct effect is to quash the ASJ's discharge order and remit the matter to the Sessions Court for further proceedings consistent with the reasoning above.
Vipin Sanghi, J. (Oral):— This Criminal Revision Petition has been preferred under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) to impugn the order dated 07.08.1999 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in Sessions Case No. 75/1999 “Madan Lal Kapoor v. Rajiv Thapar etc.”, whereby the the learned ASJ has discharged the accused in the aforesaid complaint case filed by the petitioner under Sections 304B/498A/406/109/120B IPC.
2. The daughter of the complainant/petitioner herein, Monica, was married to respondent No. 1 on 30.11.1991 She was a medical doctor having MBBS degree. At the time of death and she was doing a diploma course in Gynecology and Obstetrics at New Civil Hospital, Surat. Respondent No. 1 Rajiv Thapar was then posted as Assistant Director in the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Surat. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are the father, brother, sister-in-law and mother, respectively, of the respondent No. 1. On 26.09.1992 Monica died while living with her husband at Urmil Heart Hospital, Surat. On 27.09.1992, the dead body of Monica was brought by her in-laws to Delhi. The complainant came to Delhi from Chandigarh, where he resides. He called the police and the police informed the SDM. On 28.09.1992 the SDM started inquest proceedings under section 176 of the code. A team of four experts was appointed to conduct the post mortem of the deceased. The petitioner claims that he repeatedly made complaints to various authorities in Surat and Delhi to the effect that there were dowry demands from the respondents and that his daughter had been done to death by the respondents on account of the said demands not being met. Eventually, on 26.07.1993 the petitioner made a complaint under section 200 of the code in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate recorded the statement of the petitioner and his son as C-1 and C-2. On 24.08.1995 the learned Magistrate took cognizance and summons were issued to the respondents. On 15.04.1997 the respondents moved an application before the learned Magistrate for recalling the summoning order. This application was rejected by the learned MM on 23.05.1998 The learned Magistrate supplied copies of the complaint and the statements to the respondents and committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial under Section 208 of the Code. Thereafter, before hearing arguments on the charge, the Sessions Court summoned two of the doctors, who had conducted the post mortem, and recorded the statement of one of the four doctors, namely, Dr. Banerjee. On 07.08.1999 the impugned order was passed, as aforesaid, discharging the respondents.
3. This Revision Petition came up for hearing before this Court on 19.10.2000 The same was dismissed by a summary order stating that there is no infirmity in the impugned order. Special Leave Petition preferred by the petitioner was allowed on 22.02.2002 by the Supreme Court with the direction that this Court should apply its mind independently and pass a reasoned order.
4. The Revision Petition was again dismissed in default for non-prosecution on 11.08.2005 Once again, the Special Leave Petition preferred by the petitioner was allowed with the direction to the Court to decide the case on merits. That is how the matter is now coming up for hearing.
5. The submission of learned counsel for petitioner, firstly, is that a perusal of the impugned order would show that the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing the same has relied on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration (1996) 9 SCC 766 and keeping in view the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in that decision, has proceeded to rely on documents and materials produced by the accused/respondents herein at the stage of considering the framing of charge/discharge of the accused. This submission of the petitioner is clearly established on a reading of the impugned order and there can hardly be any argument about the same. I may only reproduce paragraph 9 of the impugned order for this purpose. The same reads as follows:—
“9. I am reminded of 1996 (3) Crimes 85 (SC) Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration where the apex court had stated guidelines as to how a court should proceed to determine whether a case for framing of charge is made out or not. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also stated that the Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated u/s 227 Cr.P.C It has also been pointed out that if the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or sheer waste of time. It is advisable to truncate or ship the proceedings at that very stage of the matter. In para 13, their lordship held as follows:—
“But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindul that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of work-load.”
This Court can thus look into the documents produced by the accused at this stage. The documents so produced by the accused are post-mortem report, inquest proceedings recovered by SDM and letters of complainants. Obviously, these documents are indisputable in nature. I may now refer to them.”
6. After relying upon the decision in Satish Mehra (supra) the learned ASJ has proceeded to carry out a meticulous and in depth examination of the post mortem report, inquest proceedings recorded by the SDM, the report of CFSL and other documents produced by the accused/respondents before the learned Magistrate along with application seeking recall of the summoning order. The learned ASJ has also referred to the medical texts from various authorities and eventually he has come to the conclusion that there is no ground to charge the accused persons under Section 304B IPC.
7. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the decision of the Supreme Court in Satish Mehra (supra) stands squarely overruled by the larger Bench decision of the same Court in State Of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568. In the said decision after discussing the various earlier decisions rendered by it, the Supreme Court in para 23 held that “clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra case holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of section 227 of the code has not been correctly decided.”
8. On this basis the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned decision is in the teeth of the decision of Supreme Court in Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) and that it cannot be sustained. He further submits that the learned ASJ has gone into the evidence to find its probative value which is not permitted in law at the stage of framing of charge. He submits that the material brought on record in the case, namely, the complaint and the evidence of C-1 and C-2 has to be accepted as true at that stage. He relies on State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 659 to support the contention that at the stage of framing of charge probative value of material and record cannot be gone into and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true, and if on the basis of materials brought on record the Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is probable, a case for framing of charge is made out. He further submits that at the stage of framing of charge the learned ASJ could not have examined the evidence to appreciate whether it is sufficient or not for convicting the accused. For this proposition, he relies State of M.P v. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338. The Court has only to examine and be satisfied that the prima facie case is made out for proceeding further at the stage of framing of charge. He further submits that the learned ASJ while passing the impugned order has gone into the evidence of the complainant meticulously, which could not be done at the stage of consideration of the matter on charge. He relies on State of A.P v. Golconda Linga Sway & Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 522 in support of this proposition. Charge can be framed if there are materials showing probability about the commission of the crime as against certainty. He has also placed on reliance in Suresh Kumar Tekriwal v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2005) 12 SCC 278, which is on the same lines as the decision of the Supreme Court in Debendra Nath Padhi (supra).
9. On the other hand, the submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that at the stage of consideration of the charge or discharge of the accused, the Court is entitled to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith. He submits that the post mortem report, inquest proceedings recorded by the SDM, report of CFSL and the letters of the complainant were part of the record of the case when the same was being considered by the learned ASJ, since these documents had been filed by the learned Magistrate along with the respondents' application to seek recalling of the summoning order. He further submits that the complainant/petitioner had resorted to suppression of relevant materials while filing the complaint. Though, in the body of the complaint, the complainant had made a reference to the conduct of post mortem at Delhi, the complainant had failed to file the same with his complaint. He submits that the learned Magistrate should have required the complainant to produce the said report, since reference had been made to it in the complaint itself and the same was also referred to in the statement of C-1.complainant. He submits that resort to suppression of vital documents and materials by the complainants, the disclosure of which may have persuaded the learned Magistrate not to issue process, cannot act to the prejudice of the respondents by requiring them to respond to the summons and to face trial in a case which, according to them, has no basis. He further submits that the post mortem report, the inquest report and the CFSL report are not the documents of the respondent/accused. These are documents prepared by the statutory authorities on the basis of the complaint made by the petitioner. His submission is that the case made out against the accused is of causing the unnatural death of deceased Monica by the accused on account of the alleged demands of dowry of the accused not being satisfied. section 176 of the code obliges the Magistrate, empowered in this behalf, to hold inquest when the case relates to the death of a woman within 7 years of her marriage and any relative of the woman has made request in this behalf. He, therefore, submits that the inquest report of the Magistrate ought to have been looked into by the concerned MM even before issuance of process.
10. The Supreme Court in Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) has very clearly and in no uncertain terms held that at the time of taking cognizance or framing of charge, the accused has no right to produce any material. As aforesaid, Satish Mehra (supra) has expressly been overruled which held that the trial Court has the powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of section 227 of the code. While dealing with the meaning of the expression “the record of the case”, as appearing in section 227 of the code the Supreme Court in Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) has held that though the word ‘case’ is not defined in the Code, but Section 209 throws light on the interpretation to be placed on the said words. Section 209 deals with the commitment of the case to the Court of Sessions when offence is triable exclusively by it. The said Section provides that when it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall send to that Court, the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence and notify the public prosecutor of the commital of the case to the Court of Sessions. On this basis, the Supreme Court observed that the record of the case and documents submitted therewith as postulated in Section 227 relates to the case and the documents referred to in Section 209. The Court further observed that no provision in the Code grants to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial.
11. The present being a complaint case under Section 208 of the Code, the Magistrate was obliged to furnish to the accused free of cost copy of the following documents:—
(i) the statements recorded under Section 200 or Section 202, of all persons examined by the Magistrate;
(ii) the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under Section 161 or Section 164;
(iii) any document produced before the Magistrate on which the prosecution proposes to rely.
12. From the aforesaid, it is evident that documents which are produced by the accused before the Magistrate, as in the instant case, the documents produced along with an application seeks recall of the issuance of process, are not even required to be supplied to the accused at the stage of committal of the case to the Court of Sessions. These documents, therefore, cannot be classified as “the record of the case”. I, therefore, do not accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the documents produced by the accused before the learned Magistrate along with their application seeking recall of the issuance of process are a part of the record of the case, which can be looked in to under section 227 of the code. The law does not carve out any exception in respect of any document, whether it be a document originating from a public record or any document that may be produced by the accused. Therefore, the submission that the post mortem report, the inquest report, the report of CFSL etc. were part of a public record and not documents of the accused, also cannot be accepted.
13. The submission of the respondent that the learned Magistrate issued process without application of mind and without even calling for the inquest report and the post mortem report, even though the post mortem report had a reference in the complaint and the statement of C-1 also cannot be accepted at this stage. This is so because the respondents had initially challenged the summoning order before this Court by filing a petition under section 482 of the code. That petition was withdrawn with liberty to move the trial Court. Accordingly, the trial Court was approached by the respondents. By a detailed order dated 23.05.1998 that application of the accused was also rejected. That order has attained finality, as it was not challenged thereafter by the respondents. Instead, the respondents chose to participate in the proceedings before the Sessions Court and argued on the aspect of framing of charge/discharge.
14. Another submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that, in any event, this Court is empowered to quash the complaint by exercising its power under section 482 of the code by looking into the documents produced by the accused/respondents. He refers to para 29 of Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) where the Supreme Court has held that in cases where the accused are having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character and sterling quality, the width of the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited and in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
15. I am, however, not inclined to accept this submission of the respondents at this stage. This is for the reason that the materials and documents produced by the respondents, namely, the inquest report, the post mortem report and the report of CFSL have not yet been led in evidence and proved on record. They cannot be categorised as documents of unimpeachable character and sterling quality, at this stage.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 07.08.1999 passed by learned ASJ, Delhi is quashed. The parties except respondent Nos. 2 & 5, who are the father and mother, respectively, of the respondent No. 1 and are stated to be about 77 and 71 years of age, are directed to appear before the concerned Sessions Judge on 21.07.2008 Respondent Nos. 2 & 5 are exempted from personal appearance on the next date. However, if they wish to seek further exemption, it shall be open to them to apply to the concerned Court.
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