- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ashok Malik v. Ramesh Malik
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance based on an alleged oral agreement to sell property located at C-10, Chirag Enclave, New Delhi. The plaintiff claimed to have occupied the property since May 1980 as an employee of Modi Rubber Limited, the tenant of the defendant. An oral agreement to sell 50% of the defendant’s share and terrace rights was allegedly made in October 1986 for Rs. 6 lakhs, with partial payments made. Subsequently, in February 1990, the defendant allegedly agreed to sell the entire property for Rs. 21 lakhs, with the plaintiff paying Rs. 11.33 lakhs by 1993. The defendant delayed executing the sale deed, citing the survival of his mother until 1992. The plaintiff requested execution of the sale deed in March 1993, which was not acted upon.
In 1996, the defendant filed an eviction suit against Modi Rubber Limited. The plaintiff sought to be impleaded as defendant No. 2 in that suit and was added in January 2001. The plaintiff also filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking to amend his written statement to include a counterclaim for specific performance of the same agreement, which was rejected on the ground of limitation by the Additional District Judge in July 2001. Instead of appealing that order, the plaintiff filed the present suit in September 2001.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit for specific performance is barred by limitation as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the suit appears from the statements in the plaint to be barred by limitation.
- Whether the prior rejection of the amendment application in the eviction suit on limitation grounds precludes the plaintiff from filing the present suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant/Defendant's Arguments
- The suit is barred by limitation as the claim for specific performance arose in March 1993, but the suit was filed only in September 2001, beyond the three-year limitation period under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
- The issue of limitation was already settled by the rejection of the plaintiff’s amendment application in the eviction suit in July 2001, which sought to raise the same claim.
- The plaintiff did not appeal the order rejecting the amendment application and instead filed the present suit, which ought to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaint was not filed beyond time, and the limitation issue is contentious and cannot be decided at the stage of Order 7 Rule 11 application.
- Reliance on Supreme Court decisions (Liverpool & London S.P. & I. Assoc. Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I and Popat & Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association) to submit that only the plaint should be examined under Order 7 Rule 11, and not the defence raised by the defendant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Liverpool & London S.P & I Associated Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 | Principle that in an Order 7 Rule 11 application, only the plaint is to be examined, not the defence. | Considered by the court in assessing whether limitation could be examined at the plaint stage. |
| Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 | Reinforces that limitation is to be considered on the face of the plaint in Order 7 Rule 11 applications. | Relied upon to clarify the scope of examination under Order 7 Rule 11. |
| Sanjay Kaushish v. U.C Kaushish, AIR 1992 Delhi 118 | Establishes that if the plaint and accompanying documents show the suit is barred by limitation, the plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11. | Applied to hold that the plaint here is barred by limitation on its face and liable to be rejected. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the plaint and the documents filed along with it, including the order rejecting the plaintiff’s amendment application in the eviction suit. The Court noted that the limitation period for a suit for specific performance under Article 54 of the Limitation Act is three years, starting from the date the plaintiff had notice of refusal to perform, which was March 1993 in this case. Since the suit was filed on September 5, 2001, it was clearly beyond the limitation period.
The Court also observed that the issue of limitation had already been decided against the plaintiff in the eviction suit by the Additional District Judge’s order dated July 27, 2001, which was not appealed. This prior adjudication barred the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same claim.
While recognizing the principle that only the plaint should be examined under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court found that the plaint itself and the documents annexed disclosed the suit was barred by limitation. Therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected without delving into the defendant’s defence.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED the plaint by allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation.
The Court’s decision results in the rejection of the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance. The ruling confirms that a plaint can be rejected at the threshold if limitation is apparent on the face of the plaint and accompanying documents. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the application of existing limitation principles and procedural rules under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.— This is an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’) filed on behalf of the defendant requesting this Court to reject the plaint on the ground that the suit appears from the statements in the plaint to be barred by limitation.
2. The suit has been filed for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to sell entered into between the defendant as the owner and the plaintiff as the intending purchaser of the property bearing No. C-10, Chirag Enclave, New Delhi-110 048. It is alleged by the plaintiff that the plaintiff came in occupation of the property being an employee of a company known as ‘Modi Rubber Limited’, the said company was the tenant of the defendant. The plaintiff claims to have occupied the premises some time in May, 1980. It is alleged that in October 1986, an oral agreement to sell was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant whereby the defendant agreed to sell 50% of his share in the land and the entire terrace rights of the building thereon to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs. It is alleged in the plaint that a sum of Rs. 3.6 lakh was paid to the defendant's brother and a further sum of Rs. 0.40 lakh was paid to the defendant in cash. The balance amount of Rs. 2 lakh was to be paid in instalments to the wife and daughter of the defendant.
3. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that in February 1990, the defendant agreed to sell the entire property for a total sum of Rs. 21 lakhs. The plaintiff alleges to have paid a sum of Rs. 11.33 lakh in cash in total by 1993. It was alleged that the defendant was not executing the sale deed because his mother was still alive and that the same became executable only in 1993 when his mother died (she actually died as stated in 1992 by the defendant). It is alleged that in March, 1993, the plaintiff requested the defendant to execute the sale deed but the same was not being executed.
4. It is an admitted fact that in 1996, the defendant filed an eviction suit against its tenant (Modi Rubber Limited). In February, 1997, the plaintiff moved an application in that suit seeking impleadment as a defendant. By an order passed in January, 2001, the plaintiff was added as defendant No. 2 in the said eviction suit without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. The rent in respect of the premises was paid by Modi Rubber upto May, 1999 and now the same was being paid by the plaintiff.
5. It is also an admitted position that an amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17 had been filed by the plaintiff herein (defendant No. 2 in the eviction suit) for amending his written statement to include a counterclaim. As stated in para 14 of the plaint, the plaintiff, had moved the said application under Order 6 Rule 17 on 20.4.2001 and the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge by his order dated 27.7.2001 It is, however, not mentioned in the plaint as to what was the nature of the counter-claim that the plaintiff herein was seeking in the said eviction suit. Though, along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed a list of documents and the documents: One of the documents was a copy of the order rejecting the application of the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC in the said eviction suit. A reading of the said order discloses that the counter-claim was in essence a plea for specific performance of the very same agreement which is the subject matter of the present suit. One of the grounds of rejection of the amendment application was that the amendment sought was in respect of a plea which was barred by limitation. The learned Additional District Judge held as under:
“11. First and foremost whether an amendment seeks to extend the limitation, where the claim is clearly barred by time.—In the instant case the introduction of specific performance of contract would require the amendment to be filed within specified period and for the purpose of specific performance Article 54 of Limitation Act would apply. Specially the latter part of the said Article where no period is specified, the refusal to perform would constitute the notice and the beginning of limitation for specific performance and in the instant case the defendant No. 2 required and demanded of the plaintiff to execute the sale deed in March 1993. And the amendment sought to be made through an application dated 20.4.2001 is clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed for suit for specific performance and accordingly the relief claimed through amendment would be barred by limitation.”
6. In the context of these circumstances, it was urged on behalf of the applicant/defendant that the issue of limitation with regard to the plea of specific performance already stands settled by the order dated 27.7.2001 whereby the amendment application of the plaintiff in the eviction suit was rejected. Instead of filing an appeal against that order, the plaintiff, shortly thereafter, filed the present suit on the same grounds. Apart from this, even on the facts as mentioned in the plaint, the plaint has been presented beyond time and the same is liable to be rejected as such.
7. The plaintiff resisted this application on the ground that the plaint has not been filed beyond time and that if there is a contentious issue with regard to limitation, then there is no question of rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11. For this purpose, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Liverpool & London S.P & I Associated Ltd. v. M.V Sea Success I, 2003 X AD (S.C) 53 : (2004) 9 SCC 512. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, 2005 VII AD (S.C) 558 : (2005) 7 SCC 510 to submit that in an application under Order 7 Rule 11, only the statements in the plaint ought to be seen and not the defence raised by the defendants.
8. It is true that while examining an application under Order 7 Rule 11, only the plaint and the material presented along with the plaint can be seen. If upon an examination of the plaint and the admitted documents filed along with the plaint it appears that the plaint is barred by any law (in this case law of limitation), then the plaint is liable to be rejected [see Sanjay Kaushish v. U.C Kaushish, AIR 1992 Delhi 118 (para 16)]. In the present case, it is quite clear that the issue with regard to the plea of specific performance being barred by limitation has already been decided by the order dated 27.7.2001 whereby the learned Additional District Judge rejected the plaintiff's application in the eviction suit for bringing out the amendments to his written statement so as to include a counter-claim based on the said plea of specific performance. In my view, once that had been done and no appeal had been preferred therefrom, no occasion arose to enable the plaintiff to file a suit shortly thereafter seeking a decree of specific performance.
9. In any event, the limitation prescribed for a suit for specific performance of a contract as per Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is three years. The time from which the period begins to run is the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused. As per the averments made in the plaint, there was no dated fixed for the performance. Therefore, the time from which the period begins to run would be when the plaintiff had notice that performance was refused. The averments contained in the plaint disclose that the plaintiff asked the defendant to execute the sale deed in March, 1993, but he did not. Therefore, the starting point of limitation would be March, 1993. The suit was filed on 5.9.2001 It was beyond the period of three years stipulated under the Limitation Act, 1963. Accordingly, the suit is time-barred and the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit appears from the statements made in the plaint to be barred by any law (in this case the law of limitation).
10. This application is allowed. The plaint is rejected with costs.
Application allowed.
Alert