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M/S. Rite Approach Group Ltd. v. M/S. Rosoboronexport.
Factual and Procedural Background
M/s. Rite Approach Group Ltd. (the appellant) filed an appeal against the order dated 25th May, 2004 passed by a learned single Judge, which rejected its application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appellant claimed entitlement to a commission of Rs. 28.8 crores from M/s. Rosoboronexport (the respondent) relating to the sale of six helicopters by M/s. Kazan Helicopters Ltd. to the Border Security Force. The appellant relied on an agency agreement with M/s. Russian Technologies, asserting that the respondent had taken over that company. The appellant sought a Mareva injunction to restrain the Government of India from making payments to the respondent and to prevent the respondent from dealing with the helicopters.
The learned single Judge rejected the application on several grounds, including that the Government of India was not a party to the arbitration clause between the appellant and respondent, the agency agreement was not binding on the respondent, and the supplies did not correspond with the agreement terms. The Judge also noted that the respondent was a state-owned Russian company with sufficient assets to satisfy any decree, and that the strict preconditions for an injunction under Order XXXVII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were not met. The appellant did not invoke the arbitration clause during the three years following the application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an injunction (specifically a Mareva or freezing injunction) can be granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to restrain payment and dealings with assets in the context of an alleged commission dispute.
- Whether the agency agreement between the appellant and M/s. Russian Technologies binds the respondent, M/s. Rosoboronexport.
- Whether the conditions for granting a Mareva injunction, including risk of asset dissipation by the respondent, are satisfied.
- Whether non-invocation of the arbitration clause for an extended period affects the appellant’s entitlement to relief under Section 9.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The respondent is liable to pay commission amounting to Rs. 28.8 crores on the sale of six helicopters.
- Reliance on an agency agreement with M/s. Russian Technologies, which the respondent allegedly took over.
- Invocation of the Mareva injunction to restrain the Government of India from making payments to the respondent and to prevent the respondent from dealing with the helicopters.
- Affidavit filed stating, to appellant’s knowledge, that the respondent had not received payment from the Government of India under the relevant agreements.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended it was not the agent of the appellant and that dealings with M/s. Russian Technologies were separate and independent.
- The agency agreement was not binding on the respondent.
- Submitted an affidavit with a letter stating the respondent had already received full payment from the Government of India for the two helicopters.
- Asserted that as a state-owned company, it possessed sufficient assets and was not attempting to dissipate assets.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mareva v. International Bulkcarriers (1980) 1 All ER 213 | Principles governing Mareva (freezing) injunctions requiring a legal/equitable right, existence of debt, and risk of asset dissipation to frustrate judgment. | The Court explained the stringent conditions for granting a Mareva injunction and found no evidence that the respondent was dissipating assets, agreeing with the single Judge's reasoning. |
| Global Company v. National Fertilizers Ltd., AIR 1988 Delhi 397 | Interpretation of Order XXXVII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its applicability to Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. | The single Judge relied on this precedent to highlight that strict preconditions for injunctions under the Code were not met in the present case. |
| National Shipping Company v. Sentrans Industries Limited, AIR 2004 Bom 136 | Further authority on injunctions in arbitration contexts. | Relied upon by the single Judge to support the rejection of the appellant’s application for injunction. |
| Sukhwinder Pal Bipa Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 31 | Requirements for affidavits under Order 19, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing disclosure of knowledge and source. | The Court held that the appellant’s affidavit was insufficient as it lacked proper disclosure and was not a reliable statement under oath. |
| Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Chauhan & Ors., (1998) 76 DLT 817 | Application of Mareva injunction principles in Indian jurisdiction. | Referenced to explain the nature and conditions for freezing injunctions under Indian law. |
| Uppal Eng. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Cimmco Birla Ltd., (2005) 121 DLT 539 | Further elucidation on freezing injunctions and their prerequisites. | Used to affirm the principles guiding the Court’s assessment of the appellant’s application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court affirmed the learned single Judge’s observations that the Government of India was not a party to the arbitration clause between the appellant and respondent, and that the agency agreement was not binding on the respondent. It noted discrepancies in the helicopter models and quantities supplied relative to the agreement terms. The Court emphasized that the respondent, being a state-owned entity with sufficient assets, was not shown to be dissipating assets or acting fraudulently to frustrate any decree. The appellant’s affidavit lacked the necessary specificity and credibility as required under Order 19, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and was thus unreliable.
The Court explained the legal principles behind Mareva injunctions, reiterating that such injunctions are extraordinary remedies granted only when there is a clear risk that the debtor will dispose of assets to defeat a judgment. Since the respondent was not shown to be acting in such a manner, and given the absence of a legal or equitable right proven by the appellant and the failure to invoke arbitration for three years, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the impugned order.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the appeal.
The direct consequence is that the appellant’s application for an injunction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, including the Mareva injunction, was refused. The respondent is not restrained from receiving payments or dealing with the helicopters. No new precedent was established; the decision affirms the strict criteria for granting freezing injunctions and the necessity of credible evidence when seeking interim relief under the Arbitration Act.
SANJIV KHANNA, J.:— M/s. Rite Approach Group Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the appellant, for short) has filed the present appeal against the order dated 25th May, 2004 passed by the learned single Judge rejecting it's application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for short).
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Mareva v. International Bulkcarriers reported in (1980) 1 All ER 213 and submitted that M/s. Rosoboronexport (hereinafter referred to as the respondent, for short) is liable to pay to the appellant, commission of Rs. 28.8 crores on sale of six helicopters by M/s. Kazan Helicopters Ltd. to Border Security Force. Reliance is placed upon agency agreement between the appellant and M/s. Russian Technologies and it claimed that the respondent herein has taken over the said company. It is submitted that the Government of India should be injuncted by Mareva injunction from making full payment of the two helicopters to the respondent and the respondent should be restrained from dealing with the said helicopters.
3. Detailed facts have already been noted by the learned single Judge in the impugned Order and are therefore not reproduced. However, the learned single Judge in the impugned order has noted that the Government of India is not a party to the so-called arbitration clause existing between the appellant and the respondent. Contention of the respondent that the respondent was not an agent of the appellant, dealings between the appellant and M/s. Russian Technologies were separate and independent and agency agreement is not binding on the respondent and other pleas were raised.
4. Learned single Judge has noted that the number of helicopters and their models and that the supplies made to the Ministry of Home Affairs did not tally with the agreement between the appellant and M/s. Russian Technologies, which was in respect of 16 helicopters to be supplied to Ministry of Defence. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence had in the agreement specifically stipulated that there shall be no agent for the purpose of intercession, facilitation or for in any way recommendation to the Government of India or any of the functionaries of the Government. Learned single Judge further noticed that the respondent is a State owned undertaking of the Government of Russia and therefore has sufficient assets to satisfy any decree in favour of the appellant. Lastly, it was observed that provisions of Order XXXVII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code, for short) or conditions stipulated herein can be read into Section 9 of the Act but the strict preconditions specified in the said provisions were not satisfied in the present case. Learned single Judge relied upon the case of Global Company v. National Fertilizers Ltd. reported in AIR 1988 Delhi 397 and an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of National Shipping Company v. Sentrans Industries Limited, in Appeal No. 852/2003, reported in AIR 2004 Bom 136.
5. We need not enter into detailed controversy as the respondent has filed an affidavit enclosing therewith letter dated 19th August, 2005. In this letter, it has been specifically stated that the respondent has already received the entire money from the Government of India towards supply/sale of the two helicopters. The aforesaid letter was filed along with affidavit dated 7th November, 2005. Learned counsel for the appellant, in these circumstances, took repeated adjournments and at the time of hearing, filed in the Court, a copy of the affidavit dated 2nd March, 2007. In this affidavit it is stated that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the appellant, the respondent has not received money from the Government of India under the Agreement dated 14th April, 2000 and Letter of Credit of June, 2003 bearing No. 0096 103DC028270. This affidavit as filed shows that the appellant does not have full information and knowledge and has merely presumed that the sale consideration of the two helicopters has not been paid. The said affidavit is no statement and affirmation under oath that can be relied upon. In Sukhwinder Pal Bipa Kumar v. State of Punjab, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1982 SC 65, it was observed that an affidavit asserting or denying allegations as correct to the best of the deponent's knowledge is no affidavit and is contrary to requirement to Order 19, Rule 3 of the Code which requires the deponent to disclose nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient particularity. Moreover, the application under Section 9 of the Act was filed in 2004 and till today, during the last three years, the appellant has not invoked the arbitration clause.
6. The appellant is based in Singapore and Austria. The respondent is a company operating and having its registered office in Russia. Without examining and going into the question whether injunction can be issued on an application under Section 9 of the Act by the Courts in India, it may be noticed that the Court of Appeal in the case of Mareva v. International Bulkcarriers (supra) had held that freezing injunction should not be granted unless a person has a legal or equitable right, it appears that a debt is due is due and owner and there is danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets before the judgment is passed so as to defeat the decree which may be passed. Injunction order even as per the Court of Appeal can be issued in extraordinary circumstances. Mareva or freezing injunction is passed when there is evidence or material to show that the debtor is acting in a manner or is likely to act in a manner to frustrate subsequent order/decree of the Court or tribunal. The Court therefore freezes the assets of the debtor to prevent the assets from being dissipated, to prevent irreparable harm to the creditor. It prevents a foreign defendant from removing his assets from the jurisdiction of the Court. It is like and akin to “attachment before judgment” and conditions mentioned in the said provision should be satisfied before freezing injunction order is passed. (See Formosa Plastic Corporation Ltd.… v. Ashok Chauhan & Ors.…, reported in (1998) 76 DLT 817 and Uppal Eng. Co. (P) Ltd… v. Cimmco Birla Ltd…., reported in (2005) 121 DLT 539. The respondent Company is owned by Russian Government and there is no such allegation that the respondent company is trying to defeat and play a fraud by moving/transferring its assets. We agree with the reasoning given by the learned single Judge.
7. We do not find any merit in the present Appeal and the same is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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