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Surendra M. Mittal & Anr. v. National Consumer Disputes Redressal, Commission & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the order dated 2 December 2005 of the learned Single Judge, which dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The writ petition attacked three orders of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dated 9 May 2002, 29 September 2003 and 16 August 2004 (the latter two arising from review/recall applications).
Substantively, the dispute arose from an agreement between the appellant and respondent No. 2, Ravinder Kumar, for purchase of the second floor of property No. D-44/6, East of Kailash, New Delhi, for Rs. 7,00,000. The respondent was to construct the second floor, work to start November 1991 and complete by end April 1992. Possession was delivered in August 1992 after final payment in July 1992. The appellant complained of poor construction quality and delay and claimed Rs. 1,00,000 as devaluation with interest and damages.
The appellant succeeded before the State Commission. Respondent No. 2 appealed to the National Commission. By order dated 9 May 2002 the National Commission allowed respondent No. 2's appeal, giving reasons. The appellant contended before the writ court (and in this Letters Patent Appeal) that the National Commission had reserved the appeal, allowed time for written synopses which were filed after 9 May 2002, but nonetheless disposed of the appeal on 9 May 2002 by dictation in chamber without hearing oral arguments—an alleged violation of principles of natural justice. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, and that dismissal is impugned in this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the National Commission violated principles of natural justice by not hearing oral arguments on 9 May 2002 before passing its order in First Appeal No. 49/1995.
- Whether the appellant successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that official/judicial acts are regularly done.
- Whether a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable to challenge the National Commission's order in the circumstances, and whether prejudice to the appellant was shown to warrant exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- On 9 May 2002 the National Commission had reserved its order and allowed parties time to file written synopses; those synopses were filed later, but the National Commission nonetheless disposed of the appeal on 9 May 2002 by dictation in chamber.
- No oral arguments were heard or addressed by the parties on 9 May 2002; this amounted to a violation of principles of natural justice.
- The appellant sought review/recall of the National Commission's decisions (orders dated 29 September 2003 and 16 August 2004) on this basis.
Respondent No. 2's Arguments
- Respondent No. 2 disputed the appellant's account and submitted that both parties were given full opportunity to present and urge their cases on 9 May 2002 and that proper oral hearing took place before the National Commission passed the order dated 9 May 2002.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Devinder Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (2002) 5 SCC 234 : AIR 2002 SC 1661 | Support for the statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that official or judicial acts, once proved to have been done, will be presumed to have been regularly performed. | The court relied on this authority to explain the presumption of regularity and held that the appellant bore the onus to rebut it, which the appellant failed to discharge. |
| State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narender Kumar reported in (2004) 4 SCC 567 : AIR 2004 SC 2711 | Authority cited in support of the presumption under Section 114 regarding regularity of official/judicial acts. | Used to reinforce the principle that the presumption is rebuttable but the onus lies on the person who seeks to rebut it; the court found no satisfactory rebuttal by the appellant. |
| Hari Singh v. State of U.P reported in (1984) 2 SCC 624 : (AIR 1984 SC 1020) | Authority cited in the context of the presumption under Section 114 of regularity of official acts. | Relied upon as part of the authorities establishing the presumption which the appellant failed to rebut. |
| Tata Cellular v. Union Of India. reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 : AIR 1996 SC 11 | Principles delineating the limited scope of judicial review and the circumstances in which interference is warranted. | Applied to state that judicial review is limited and interference is appropriate only in cases of grave miscarriage, palpably wrong orders contrary to law/principles of natural justice, or lack of jurisdiction. |
| New Horizons Limited v. Union of India reported in (1995) 1 SCC 478 : 1995 AIR SCW 275 | Authority on the limited nature of judicial review and when courts should interfere with administrative/quasi-judicial decisions. | Referred to by the court to support the proposition that writ jurisdiction should not normally be exercised except in clearly demonstrable cases of prejudice or illegality. |
| Govt. of A.P v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan reported in (2006) 2 SCC 373 : AIR 2006 SC 1214 | Authority cited for the established principles limiting judicial review and the circumstances warranting interference. | Used to reinforce the court's conclusion about the restricted role of writ courts in reappraising findings of quasi-judicial bodies absent jurisdictional error or manifest injustice. |
| Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic) reported in (2006) 7 SC 558 : AIR 2006 SC 3096 | Authority cited to emphasize that relief under Article 226 is discretionary and prejudice must normally be shown to justify exercise of writ jurisdiction. | Applied to conclude that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused by the National Commission's procedure or orders. |
| P.D Agrawal v. State Bank of India reported in (2006) 8 SCC 776 : AIR 2006 SC 2064 | Authority supporting the need to show prejudice for discretionary relief under Article 226. | Relied upon to support the court's view that no prejudice was shown and therefore discretionary writ relief was not justified. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps anchored in statutory presumptions and principles governing writ jurisdiction:
- The court noted that it could not independently verify whether oral arguments were addressed on 9 May 2002, and therefore invoked the statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that official acts are presumed to have been regularly performed. The court cited authorities (Devinder Pal Singh; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narender Kumar; Hari Singh v. State of U.P) to explain the presumption and that it is rebuttable but the onus lies on the person seeking to rebut it.
- Applying that presumption to the facts, the court observed that the National Commission's order of 9 May 2002 was a detailed order which specifically recorded that learned counsel for the appellants had raised three arguments and that the appellant (an advocate) had argued about delay and poor quality. The National Commission expressly recorded that it had heard arguments and perused the material on record and then gave detailed reasons.
- The court found that the appellant had not produced cogent material to rebut the presumption of regularity. Accordingly, the court accepted the respondent's contention that oral arguments were addressed before the National Commission on 9 May 2002.
- The court addressed the fact that written synopses were filed after 9 May 2002 and explained its view—based on the material before it—that written synopses simply record the orally presented arguments and cannot go beyond what was argued orally. The National Commission later examined the written synopses and found no ground to change its earlier view.
- On the scope of judicial review, the court reiterated established principles (citing Tata Cellular, New Horizons, Govt. of A.P v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan) that interference by writ courts is limited and justified only in cases of grave miscarriage of justice, palpably wrong orders contrary to law or natural justice, or lack of jurisdiction.
- The court observed that relief under Article 226 is discretionary and that prejudice must normally be shown (citing Om Prakash Mann and P.D. Agrawal). The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the National Commission's procedure or orders.
- On this basis the court upheld the Single Judge's conclusion that there was no case for exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present facts.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petition is dismissed; the order of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2005 is upheld.
Implications:
- The direct consequence is that the appellant's writ petition challenging the National Commission's orders (9 May 2002, 29 September 2003 and 16 August 2004) fails and the National Commission's decisions stand.
- No costs were awarded.
- The court applied established principles concerning the presumption of regularity under Section 114, the limited scope of judicial review, and the discretionary nature of Article 226 relief, but the opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond applying those established principles to the facts.
Order: Petition dismissed.
Sanjiv Khanna, J.:— The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against order dated 2nd December, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. In the said writ petition, the appellant No. 1 had challenged orders dated 9th May, 2002, 29th September,; 2003 and 16th August, 2004 passed by the National Commission constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for short).
2. The appellant, who appeared in person, argued that on 9th May, 2002, the National Commission had while reserving its order in First Appeal No. 49/1995 titled Ravinder Kumar v. Surender Kumar Mittal granted time to the parties to file their written synopsis and these were subsequently filed but the National Commission proceeded to dispose of the appeal itself on 9th May, 2002 by dictating an order in chamber. It was also stated by the appellant that no arguments were heard and addressed by parties on 9th May, 2002. Thus there has been violation of principles of natural justice. The subsequent orders also made subject matter of the writ petition, being orders dated 29th September, 2003 and 16th August, 2004, are passed by the National Commission on the review/recall applications filed by the appellant.
3. The appellant had entered into an agreement with the respondent No. 2, Mr. Ravinder Kumar for purchase of the second floor of property No. D-44/6, East of Kailash, New Delhi for a total cost of Rs. 7,00,000/-. The second floor was to be constructed by the respondent No. 2. The construction was to start in November, 1991 and was to be completed by end of April, 1992. The possession was however delivered to the appellant-claimant in August, 1992 after the respondent No. 2 contractor had received the final payment in July, 1992. The appellant was not satisfied with the quality of construction and claimed Rs. 1,00,000/- as devaluation of the work done with interest as well as damages for the delay in construction.
4. The appellant succeeded before the State Commission, pursuant to which the appeal was filed before the National Commission by the respondent No. 2.
5. By the impugned order dated 9th May, 2002, learned National Commission allowed the appeal of the respondent setting out reasons in detail.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has disputed and contested the submissions of the appellant that oral argumerits were not addressed before the National Commission on 9th May, 2002. It was stated that both the parties were given full opportunity to present and urge their cases on the said date. Thus, it is a case of the respondent No. 2 that proper hearing was held before the order dated 9th May, 2002 was passed.
7. There is no method by which this Court can verify whether arguments were addressed by both the parties on 9th May, 2002. Under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, there is a statutory presumption that official acts have been validly done and performed as per law. Ills, (e) to Section 114 elucidates that when an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed that the official or judicial act has been regularly done. The presumption about validity and regularity is rebutable and not conclusive, but onus to prove to the contrary is on the person who seeks to rebut the presumption. The presumption can be rebuted by cogent and relevant material. (See Devinder Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (2002) 5 SCC 234 : (AIR 2002 SC 1661); State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narender Kumar reported in (2004) 4 SCC 567 : AIR 2004 SC 2711 and Hari Singh v. State of U.P reported in (1984) 2 SCC 624 : (AIR 1984 SC 1020).
8. We do not think that appellant has been able to dispel and rebut the said presumption. Order dated 9th May, 2002 is a detailed order dealing with various aspects and contentions raised by the parties. It specifically records that the learned counsel for the appellants had raised three arguments on the basis of which it was contended that the State Commission had gone wrong. It further records that the appellant, who is also an advocate, had argued to the contrary and had stated that the respondent was guilty of delay in giving possession and the material used in the construction of the house was of poor quality. Learned Members of the National Commission have specifically observed that they had heard the arguments and perused the material on record. Thereafter, the Members had given their reasons which elaborately deal with various contentions of the parties. In these circumstances, we do not see any reason not to agree and accept the contention of the respondent No. 2 that arguments were addressed by the parties before the National Commission on 9th May, 2002.
9. It is a fact that the parties had filed their written synopsis after 9th May, 2002. However, it has not been pointed out and shown to us that the order dated 9th May, 2002 does not deal with the contentions and arguments raised and mentioned in the written synopsis. Written synopsis can only record in writing, the arguments raised orally and the contentions made at the time of hearing. Written synopsis/arguments cannot go beyond what is argued orally. It may be relevant to state here that the National Commission in it's subsequent orders had taken care to examine the contentions on merits raised by the appellant in the written submission and found that no ground was made out to take a different view that what had been taken earlier.
10. An order passed by the National Commission in a first appeal can be made subject matter of Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court but not in an appeal before the Supreme Court. Even if it is conceded and accepted that an order passed by the National Commission in a first appeal can be made subject matter of challenge in a writ Court, power of Judicial review by its very nature is limited. Interference is required and desirable when there is grave miscarriage of justice, a palpably wrong order contrary to law and principles of natural justice has been passed, or there is lack of jurisdiction. These principles are well established and need no further elaboration. It would suffice to refer to the observations made by Supreme Court in the cases of Tata Cellular v. Union Of India. reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 : (AIR 1996 SC 11), New Horizons Limited v. Union of India reported in (1995) 1 SCC 478 : (1995 AIR SCW 275) and Govt. of A.P v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan reported in (2006) 2 SCC 373 : (AIR 2006 SC 1214). Further a relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is always discretionary and it has to be normally shown and established that prejudice has been caused. In the present case contentions raised by the parties have been considered and dealt with by the National Commission in the order dated 9th May, 2002, even though the written synopsis were filed later on. Non-availability of written synopsis before the National Commission has not made any difference as contentions raised and argued were considered and decided by the National Commission. The appellant has not been able to prove and show that any prejudice has been caused to him. (See Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic) reported in (2006) 7 SC 558 : (AIR 2006 SC 3096) and P.D Agrawal v. State Bank of India reported in (2006) 8 SCC 776 : (AIR 2006 SC 2064). National Commission has also examined the written synopsis and taken the same into consideration while dismissing the review applications.
11. In this view of the matter, we uphold the order of the learned single Judge holding, inter alia, that no case has been made out for exercising of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No costs.
Petition dismissed.
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