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Surinder Kumar Boveja v. Commissioner Of Welth Tax .

Delhi High Court
May 2, 2006
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee was assessed to wealth tax by the Wealth Tax Officer (WTO) on the valuation of a Delhi Stock Exchange ticket for the years 1991-1992 and 1992-1993. The WTO valued the tickets at Rs. 25 lakhs and Rs. 40 lakhs respectively. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT), who partly allowed the appeal and directed the WTO to adopt lower valuations of Rs. 15 lakhs and Rs. 20 lakhs. The assessee did not appeal this order, but the Revenue did, before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). The ITAT dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the ticket's value could not exceed its purchase price as it was initially non-transferable. Subsequently, the assessee filed delayed appeals against the CIT orders before the ITAT. These appeals were dismissed by the ITAT on the ground of limitation without considering the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delayed appeals filed by the assessee against the orders of the Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Appeals) could be condoned and admitted despite the significant delay.
  2. Whether the ITAT's observation that it does not lay down law but only decides disputes affects the finality of its orders and the possibility of condoning delay in filing appeals.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant argued that the delay in filing appeals should be condoned because the appellant was initially unaware of the correct legal position.
  • The appellant contended that after the ITAT's order dismissing the Revenue's appeal, which contained favorable observations, the appellant became aware of the legal position and thus sought condonation of delay.

Respondent's Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
266 (1992) STC Vol 87 Baroda Rayon Corp Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax The principle that a Tribunal's decision, while binding on subordinate authorities, does not settle law for the State and thus does not constitute laying down law. The court relied on this precedent to hold that the ITAT's decision does not amount to laying down law and therefore the assessee's delay in filing appeals could not be condoned on the basis that the Tribunal had laid down new law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the delay in filing appeals by the assessee and the principle of "sufficient cause" required for condonation of delay. It emphasized that sufficient cause must be beyond the party's control and involve due care and attention. The court noted that the assessee was satisfied with the relief granted by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Appeals) and did not appeal initially. The delay was substantial—four years and 245 days in one case and one year and 154 days in another. The court rejected the appellant’s claim that ignorance of the legal position justified the delay, reaffirming that ignorance or neglect is not sufficient cause. The court also relied on the Baroda Rayon Corp Ltd. precedent to underscore that the Tribunal’s role is to decide disputes, not to lay down law, and thus the Tribunal’s order could not be treated as a new legal position justifying delay. Consequently, the court upheld the ITAT’s dismissal of the appeals on the ground of limitation.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The court's decision results in the dismissal of the assessee's delayed appeals, affirming that delay caused by satisfaction with earlier relief or ignorance of law does not justify condonation. The ruling reinforces the finality of the Tribunal’s orders and clarifies that the Tribunal does not lay down law but merely decides disputes, limiting the scope for reopening cases on the basis of subsequent favorable observations. No new precedent beyond the immediate case implications was established.

Show all summary ...

Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.— The assessee in this case was assessed to wealth tax by the Wealth Tax Officer (herein after referred as the ‘WTO’). The assessee was holder of a ticket of Delhi Stock Exchange. The WTO valued the tickets at Rs. 25 lakhs for the year 1991-1992 and Rs. 40 lakhs for the year 1992-1993. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax and vide an order dated 28.3.2000, the appeal was partly allowed. WTO was directed to adopt valuation of Rs. 15 lakhs for the assessment year 1991-1992 and Rs. 20 lakhs for the assessment year 1992-1993. The assessee felt contended with the relief granted and did not prefer an appeal against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax. Revenue, however, preferred an appeal against the order before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the appeal was disposed of vide order dated 23.9.2004, The Appellate Tribunal while rejecting the appeal of the Revenue observed that the order of CIT regarding valuation of the ticket was not in accordance with law. The Tribunal was of the opinion that value of the ticket could not be more than the amount, for which ticket was purchased as the ticket was non-transferable initially. Since the assessee had not preferred an appeal against the order, the order of CWT (A) regarding valuation of ticket was upheld. The appeal of Revenue was dismissed.

2. After the order of Tribunal containing above observation, the assessee/appellant preferred appeals before the Appellate Tribunal against the orders of the CWT (A) dated 28.3.2000 and 8.05.2003 Out of the said two appeals, one was delayed by four years and 245 days and other was delayed by one year and 154 days. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals without going into merits of the case on ground of limitation holding that the decision of the CWT (A) has become final and it would be against the spirit of order of the Tribunal to grant relief to the assessee. It was observed that proceedings before the Tribunal were continuation of the assessment proceedings and the Tribunal merely decides dispute between the parties. Even if interpretation of law is involved, it cannot be said that the Tribunal lays down the law. So it would not be correct to say that the tax liability with which the assessee got burdened was not in accordance with law. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment reported as 266 (1992) STC Vol 87 Baroda Rayon Corp Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax.

In this judgment Gujarat High Court has held that:—

“In our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly pointed out that when a Tribunal decides any question and interprets a provision of law, while doing so, it cannot be said to be laying down any law for the State or settling the law for the State. It is no doubt true, as contended by the learned advocate for the applicant, that whatever Tribunal decides is binding on the subordinate authorities including the Commissioner, but that is because the Tribunal is a superior authority in the hierarchy of administration. Merely for that reason, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be said to have the effect of deciding or settling law for the State. In our opinion, the Tribunal, was therefore, right in holding that the assessee had failed to make out sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal to the Tribunal within the prescribed time.”

3. The counsel for appellant has argued that in view of the observation made by Tribunal while dismissing the appeal of Revenue, the delay in filing the appeal should have been condoned. It was submitted that appellant did not prefer appeal against the order initially as he was not aware of the legal position. After the orders of Tribunal he became aware of the legal position and therefore, the Tribunal should have condoned the delay.

4. In order to get condonation of delay in filing of an appeal, a party has to show sufficient cause. Sufficient cause means a cause beyond the control of the party e.g a mistake made in good faith in respect of exercise of due care and attention. But where there is want of due care and attention or want of due diligence or sufficient cause the delay cannot be condoned. The appellant was satisfied with the relief granted by CWT (A). After being satisfied with the relief granted by CWT (A), he did not prefer an appeal against the order. However, the Income Tax Department preferred the appeal against the order of CWT (A) before the Tribunal. Even during the arguments before the Tribunal, appellant supported the order of CWT (A) and stated that the order be not reversed. Appellant chose to prefer an appeal against the order of CWT (A) only after the order of the Tribunal making some observation in his favour came. We consider that a party who had been contended with the order and due to that reason has not preferred an appeal, cannot later on, on seeing some observation in a judgment or a finding about the law cannot plead that the delay be condoned of the entire period for which the party had felt contended and not preferred an appeal. The appellant did not prefer an appeal against the order of CWT (A) for about five year in one case for about one and half year in another case. Ignorance of law, appellants neglect or failure to seek legal advice is not sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Ignorance of law is no excuse and Court cannot consider ignorance of law or mistake of law as sufficient cause for condonation of delay. If condonation is allowed on such ground, then there would be no end to the litigation and a party can prefer an appeal against an order at any point of time after finding some observation in a judgment subsequently delivered by a higher forum.

5. We, therefore, consider that the Appellate Tribunal was right in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation. We find no force in the appeal and the same is dismissed.