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Union Of India v. Daisy Trading Corporation .

Delhi High Court
May 12, 2006
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was awarded a contract for the supply of tents. The petitioner carried out a risk-purchase at the cost of the respondent and recovered that amount by adjusting it against sums due to the respondent under other contracts. A dispute arose between the parties and, because the contract contained an arbitration clause, the matter was referred to a Sole Arbitrator, Shri Ram Bahadur, who rendered an ex parte award. That ex parte award was set aside by this Court by an order dated 18.10.2001 remitting the matter for reconsideration.

The Director General of Supplies & Disposals then appointed Shri Brijendra Singh Meena, Additional Legal Adviser of the Government of India, as Sole Arbitrator. Shri Meena made and published an award dated 28.12.2004 upholding the petitioner's right to recover the amount of the risk purchase and rejecting the respondent's counterclaim.

The respondent's counsel, conscious of the limited powers of the Court under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, confined submissions to alleged error apparent on the face of the record — specifically non-consideration of the respondent's plea, absence of reasons, and that the award was contrary to law.

The factual controversy before the arbitrator concerned whether the petitioner had varied the original terms of the contract (for example, by imposing additional inspection/capacity-assessment requirements and later conditioning bulk manufacture on approval of two advance samples) — conduct which the respondent said amounted to a variation or novation of the contract entitling them to treat the contract as closed — and, if not, whether the petitioner's risk-purchase was validly conducted.

The Court found defects in the award of 28.12.2004 (described below) and, after hearing the parties, concluded a fresh arbitrator should be appointed to adjudicate the dispute. The parties agreed to the appointment of justice R.C. Chopra (Retd.) as Sole Arbitrator. The Court fixed the arbitrator's fee at Rs. 50,000 to be shared equally, set aside the impugned award, remitted the matter for fresh adjudication, and disposed the suit. The Court issued ancillary directions regarding appearance on 3.6.2006 at 11:00 a.m., transfer of the arbitral record by the petitioner's counsel to the new arbitrator, registry communication to the arbitrator, and DASTI service to counsel.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the award dated 28.12.2004 is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record, specifically (a) non-consideration of the respondent's pleaded case, (b) absence of reasons in the award, and (c) being contrary to law.
  2. Whether, as a preliminary matter, the petitioner had varied or novated the original contract (by imposing additional testing/inspection/capacity-assessment requirements and conditioning bulk manufacture on approval of advance samples) so as to entitle the respondent to treat the contract as closed.
  3. If there was no such variation, whether the petitioner's risk-purchase was valid — in particular whether the terms and conditions of the original contract and the risk-purchase were sufficiently similar to permit recovery for risk-purchase.
  4. Whether the identified deficiencies in the arbitrator's approach and award justify setting the award aside and directing a fresh reference to a newly appointed arbitrator.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that the petitioner altered the contractual terms after contract formation — for example by requiring capacity assessment and later conditioning bulk manufacture on approval of advance samples — which were not envisaged by the original contract and should, therefore, be treated as a variation or novation permitting the respondent to treat the contract as closed (representation dated 2.8.1988).
  • The respondent argued that time was not treated as of the essence by the petitioner, because the petitioner communicated that delivery periods would be re-fixed after approval of advance samples, and thus any alleged breach by the respondent could not be treated as a straightforward failure to perform.
  • Before the Court, the respondent's counsel limited submissions to errors apparent on the face of the award: non-consideration of the respondent's pleaded case, absence of reasons in the award, and that the award was contrary to law.

Petitioner / Arbitrator's Position (as reflected in the award)

  • The arbitrator concluded that the respondent failed to participate in the risk-purchase advance tender and, relying on that fact, held it was unnecessary to compare the terms and conditions of the original purchase order and the risk-purchase.
  • After first addressing risk-purchase, the arbitrator stated (without recorded comparisons of material terms) that he found "no major difference" between the original contract and the risk-purchase.
  • The arbitrator ultimately held that since the respondent failed to supply the material, the petitioner was entitled to make the risk-purchase and recover the amount.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the award and identified both procedural and substantive shortcomings in the arbitrator's approach and reasoning. The principal points of the Court's analysis were:

  1. Order of issues: The arbitrator considered the issue of the validity of the risk-purchase before addressing the threshold question whether the petitioner had altered the contractual terms — a reversal of the logical order. The Court found that the arbitrator "put the cart before the horse" because a determination on whether the contract had been varied or novated should have preceded an inquiry into the validity of a risk-purchase.
  2. Need for comparison of terms: The Court stated it is settled law (as recorded by the Court) that to uphold a risk-purchase the terms and conditions of the original contract and the risk-purchase should be "more or less similar." The arbitrator's approach — concluding no comparison was necessary because of the respondent's non-participation in the risk-purchase tender — was incorrect in law.
  3. Absence of reasons and missing comparative analysis: Although the arbitrator later asserted he found "no major difference" between the two sets of terms, the award contained no recorded comparison identifying which terms were material, which were identical, or what constituted any "minor differences." The Court held the award suffered from an absence of reasons on this account.
  4. Non-consideration of a central plea: The respondent's plea that the petitioner had changed the original contract terms (amounting to variation/novation) was not addressed in the award; no findings were recorded on that point. The Court regarded this failure to consider a central legal plea as a legal infirmity amounting to misconduct in law by the arbitrator.
  5. Cumulative effect and prejudice: The Court observed that this was a second round of litigation (the earlier ex parte award having been set aside) and that the failure to record reasons and to consider material pleas left the respondent suffering loss from detained amounts. The Court emphasized the arbitrator must disclose the thought process and consider the parties' pleas even if not required to write a judgment equivalent to a judge's.
  6. Remedy selected: Given the defects — improper sequencing of issues, absence of reasons, failure to consider the respondent's legal pleas, and legal infirmity — the Court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to set the award aside and remit the dispute for fresh adjudication by an arbitrator appointed by the Court so that a proper award addressing the contested issues and recording reasoned findings could be rendered.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the application, set aside the award dated 28.12.2004, and remitted the matter for fresh adjudication by a newly appointed arbitrator; the suit was disposed of.

Direct consequences and procedural directions given by the Court:

  • The Court appointed justice R.C. Chopra (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute (by agreement of the parties).
  • The arbitrator's fee was fixed at Rs. 50,000, to be shared equally between the parties.
  • The parties were directed to appear before the arbitrator on 3.6.2006 at 11:00 a.m.
  • The arbitral record was ordered to be collected by learned counsel for the petitioner and handed over to the new arbitrator.
  • The Registry was directed to send a copy of the order expeditiously to the arbitrator before the next date of hearing, and DASTI (personal service) to be effected to learned counsel for the parties.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent. Its immediate effect is to set aside the impugned award and to remit the dispute for a reasoned decision by the newly appointed arbitrator; no broader consequential holding or precedent was articulated in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The respondent was awarded contract for supply of tents and the petitioner carried out the risk purchase at the cost of the respondent and recovered the amount by adjusting the same against amount due to the respondent from other contracts. This gave rise to dispute between the parties and in view of the existence of the arbitration clause between the parties, the matter was referred to the Sole Arbitrator Shri Ram Bahadur. Shri Ram Bahadur rendered an ex parte award which was set aside by this Court by, an order dated 18.10.2001 remitting the matter for reconsideration. Therefore Shri Brijendra Singh Meena, Additional Legal Adviser of the Government of India was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator by the Director General of Supplies & Disposals. Shri Meena entered upon a reference and made and published the award dated 28.12.2004 upholding right of the petitioner to recover the amount of risk purchase and rejecting the counter claim of the respondent.

2. Learned counsel for the respondent, conscious of the limitations of the powers of this Court under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred as “the said Act”), confines the submissions to the error apparent on the face of the record on account of non-consideration of the plea of the respondent, absence of reasons and the award being contrary to law.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to the counter statement of facts to point out the pleas raised by the respondent. The dispute apparently starts from the stage when the respondent having submitted one sample as per specification for approval from the inspector as per the terms of the contract, received a response after about one month whereby the inspecting authority intimated the respondent that the detailed procedure for inspection will be intimated on hearing from the authority at Jabalpur and trial samples would be inspected after formulating the inspection procedure/parameters. It may be noticed that the supplies had to be made within five months of the approval of the samples. The respondent approached the Chief Inspector of Vehicles, Jabalpur soon thereafter. On 23.3.1988 the respondent received a communication from the Senior Quality Assurance Officer, Mumbai, informing them to get their capacity to manufacture cover waterproof assessed from them. The contention of the respondent was that this was totally de hors the contract since if the capacity of the respondent had to be assessed, the same should have been done prior to entering into contract and at least no provision was made in the contract for such assessment of capacity. On a protest from the respondent, the petitioner thereafter informed that instructions had been issued to the concerned authority to accept the tested advance sample and that the delivery period would be re-fixed after the approval of advance sample. Thus according to the respondent the petitioner by their own conduct showed that time was not essence of the agreement and that the breach was committed by the petitioner.

4. The matter did not rest at this since the terms and conditions of contract were sought to be amended as per the plea of the respondent in terms of the letter of the petitioner dated 28.4.1988 The petitioner is stated to have issued a letter dated 9.6.1988 being another amendment letter making approval of two advance samples as a condition precedent to the commencement of bulk manufacture. This was again stated to be a variation of the original terms of the contract and the respondent did not agree to the same. The respondent made a representation dated 2.8.1988 pointing out alleged breaches of the petitioner and stating that they treated acceptance of contract as cancelled without financial repercussion on either side.

5. The aforesaid facts have been set out to show that the controversy which had arisen before the arbitrator was whether the petitioner had sought to vary the original terms and conditions of the contract which would entitle the respondent to close the contract. In case the arbitrator found in favour of the petitioner the next question to be examined was whether the risk purchase had been carried out by the petitioner validly or not.

6. A perusal of the award shows, that the arbitrator tried to put cart before the horse and first considered the issue of risk purchase. The arbitrator on consideration of the legal pleas came to the conclusion that since the respondent had failed to participate in the risk purchase advance tender, despite the judgments cited of different courts by the respondent, it was not necessary to compare the terms and conditions of the original purchase order and the risk purchase.

7. In my considered view this is contrary to law and is not even seriously disputed that in order for the risk purchase to be upheld, the terms anc conditions of the two tenders should be more or less similar. It may however, be noticed that the arbitrator thereafter proceeds to state that on comparison of the terms and conditions he finds no major difference. There is no comparison recorded in the award of what terms and conditions were material and identical and if there were some “minor difference” what was the same. The award certainly suffers from absence of reasons on this account.

8. The arbitrator thereafter proceeds to record that since the respondent failed to supply the material, the petitioner was within its rights to make risk purchase. The arbitrator was required to consider the plea of the respondent whether the petitioner had not followed the terms of the original contract, calling upon the respondent to do certain things which were not envisaged in the original contract and thus the same amounted to novation of the contract. This plea of the respondent has not at all been considered. No finding has been recorded in respect of the same. Thus the award does suffer from absence of reasons even on this account.

9. It has been noticed above that there is not only absence of reasons but legal infirmity in the approach of the arbitrator. The arbitrator has misconducted himself in law by not appreciating and considering the legal pleas advanced by the respondent. The arbitrator ought to have proceeded to first consider the aspect of whether the petitioner had changed the terms and conditions of the original contract and if a finding had been arrived at in favour of the petitioner, thereafter proceeded to determine whether the risk purchase was carried out in accordance with law. The arbitrator has failed to do all these things.

10. It must be noticed that this is the second round of litigation in this behalf being a second award which is now being set aside. The disputes are referred to Legal Officers in the Department who proceeded to make award without any reason and contrary to law. An arbitrator is nor required to write a judgment like a Judge but certainly the pleas are required to be considered and thought process of the arbitrator must be disclosed. All these aspects are absent in the present case. The amount is being detained by the petitioner and thus it is the respondent who is suffering loss on account thereof. The matter has now dragged on from 1988 till now for almost 18 years.

11. I am of the considered view that this is a fit case where an arbitrator be appointed by this Court to enter upon reference and to adjudicate upon the disputes of the parties, so that a proper award is rendered and the parties know the fate of their respective pleas.

12. Learned counsel for the parties state that the matter is only to be finally heard on the basis of the material already placed on record by the parties and the matter will not take more than 2 to 3 hearings. It is agreed that justice R.C Chopra (Retd.) be appointed as the Sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. In view of the limited nature of dispute the fee of the arbitrator is fixed at Rs. 50,000 to be shared equally between both the parties.

13. The application is accordingly allowed and the award is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh adjudication by the new arbitrator in terms thereof. The suit stands disposed of.

14. The parties to appear before the Arbitrator on 3.6.2006 at 11.00 a.m

15. The arbitral record be collected by learned counsel for the petitioner and handed over to the new arbitrator.

16. A copy of the Order be sent expeditiously by the Registry to the Arbitrator well before the next date of hearing.

17. DASTI to learned counsel for the parties.