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Vishal Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Dda

Delhi High Court
May 26, 2006
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Opinion Summary — Manju Goel, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a private limited company engaged in construction. On 28.11.1972 the Delhi Development Authority (DDA, defendant No.1) put Lot No.95, District Centre, Nehru Place, New Delhi (743.22 sq. mts.) to auction. The plaintiff offered a premium of Rs. 16,06,000/-, was declared the successful bidder, and possession of the suit property was delivered on 5.3.1973. The plaintiff constructed a building and remained in continuous peaceful possession.

The plaintiff did not place the auction conditions on record but believed they were the same as in Suit No. 409/1973 (Vishal Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. DDA & Ors.). In that suit the High Court held on 23.3.1977 that the DDA's auction was illegal because the DDA could not sell Nazul land until rules were framed under section 22 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and until the Central Government gave directions. An appeal (RFA (OS) No. 15/77) was dismissed. Pursuant to that judgment, the Central Government framed rules in 1981.

The plaintiff paid the bid money in 1973 but no lease deed has ever been executed in its favour. The plaintiff contends that because the DDA was incompetent to dispose of the plot the auction was null and void and that, having been in possession since 5.3.1973, it perfected title by adverse possession (invoking Article 111 of the Limitation Act — a 30-year period against the State). The plaintiff also received a demand notice dated 29.11.2001 (from defendant No.2 on behalf of the DDA) seeking Rs. 10,35,090/- as arrears of ground rent up to 14.1.2002 plus interest; the plaintiff alleges it has consistently not paid ground rent because there was no valid contract.

The plaintiff sought, among other reliefs, declarations that (a) the property was Nazul land placed at DDA's disposal under section 22 of the DD Act, (b) the DDA was incompetent to hold the auction of 28.11.1972, (c) the plaintiff has been in adverse possession since 5.3.1973 and perfected title on 4.3.2003, (d) the plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser free of encumbrances and not liable to pay ground rent, and (e) permanent injunctions restraining defendants from interference and re-entry. The plaintiff also moved for interim reliefs. The court heard the plaintiff's counsel on maintainability and claim.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the auction held by the DDA on 28.11.1972 was valid and whether the DDA was competent to dispose of the suit property.
  2. Whether the plaintiff, having taken possession pursuant to that auction and without execution of a lease, acquired title by adverse possession (and thus perfected title against the State under Article 111 of the Limitation Act).
  3. Whether the plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser of a freehold interest free of encumbrances or is a tenant/lessee of the DDA and thus liable to pay ground rent.
  4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaratory and injunctive reliefs claimed (including a declaration that the defendants are not competent to re-enter).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff asserts it was the successful bidder at the DDA auction, paid the bid money in 1973, and received possession on 5.3.1973.
  • The plaintiff contends the DDA was incompetent to sell Nazul land (relying on the decision in Suit No. 409/1973) and thus the auction was null and void.
  • Because no lease deed was executed, the plaintiff claims to have held the land as owner (freehold/bona fide purchaser) and/or to have perfected title by adverse possession after the requisite period (claiming adverse possession against the State under Article 111 of the Limitation Act).
  • The plaintiff denies any contractual obligation to pay ground rent and challenges demand notices (e.g., dated 29.11.2001) as illegal attempts to re-enter the property.

Defendants' Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The court summarises that the plaintiff's own conduct and the facts (entry by auction and receipt of recurring ground rent demands) demonstrate that the plaintiff occupies as a lessee/tenant — that is, in permissive or licence-based possession under the DDA/Union of India.
  • Section 116 of the Evidence Act operates to estop a tenant from denying the title of the landlord; accordingly the plaintiff cannot deny the title of the DDA/Union of India and claim adverse possession/freehold status.
  • The defendants (DDA and Union of India) retain the right to recover ground rent following law and procedure where there is default by the tenant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vishal Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. DDA & Ors. (Suit No. 409/1973) — High Court judgment dated 23.3.1977; appeal RFA (OS) No.15/77 dismissed Held that DDA's auction was illegal because DDA could not sell Nazul land until rules were framed under section 22 of the Delhi Development Act and until directions were obtained from the Central Government. The court notes that pursuant to that decision the Central Government framed rules in 1981 and accepts that the DDA was initially incompetent to dispose of the plot; this factual/legal background underpins the plaintiff's contention but does not, on the court's analysis, convert the plaintiff's possession into adverse possession vis-à-vis the DDA/Union of India.
Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 73 Principle that mere long possession, if originally permissive, does not automatically convert permissive possession into adverse possession; heavy burden on claimant to prove change of animus from permissive to hostile. The court relies on this authority to hold that the plaintiff has not discharged the heavy burden of proving that permissive possession (entry after auction) became adverse; mere non-payment of rent does not show the necessary hostile animus to mature title by adverse possession.
State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR 1970 SC 1778 Where the State denies the grant under which possession was taken, possession may be treated as adverse and title can be perfected by possession in absence of the grant. The court distinguishes this case: in Dalhousie the possessor admitted the grant and claimed protection; here the plaintiff does not admit a valid lease in a way that would put the State/lessor in the position of denying the grant; Section 116 operates to estop the plaintiff from denying the lessor's title. Thus Dalhousie is not applicable to aid the plaintiff.
Brij Lal v. Ram Saran, (1970) 72 Punj.L.R (D) 8 Where a person enters lawfully, he cannot later pretend to have no title in order to assume adverse possession and mature title by hidden hostile intentions. The court cites this principle to support the conclusion that the plaintiff, who entered lawfully (through auction and possession delivered by DDA), cannot covertly convert his permissive possession into adverse possession by denying the title through which he entered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertakes a sequential analysis:

  1. The plaintiff's case is internally inconsistent. The plaintiff simultaneously claims to be a bona fide purchaser/freehold owner and to be an adverse possessor. The court treats these as incompatible positions because the plaintiff's entry and continued possession flowed from the auction by the DDA.
  2. The absence of a formal lease deed does not, by itself, convert permissive possession into adverse possession. The plaintiff's receipt of recurring demands for ground rent is evidence consistent with a tenancy/lessee relationship rather than independent ownership.
  3. Section 116 of the Evidence Act estops a tenant (or one who entered by licence) from denying the title of the landlord during the continuance of the tenancy or licence. Applying Section 116, the court holds the plaintiff cannot deny the DDA/Union of India's title when his possession commenced by virtue of the auction.
  4. Reliance on the High Court decision in Vishal Builders (which held certain DDA auctions invalid) does not aid the plaintiff to convert his position into one of adverse possession vis-à-vis the DDA/Union of India. At best any defect in DDA's authority is a dispute between the public authorities; the plaintiff remains in possession through them.
  5. The court applies Thakur Kishan Singh to emphasize that the plaintiff bears a heavy burden to show a change in animus — that is, cogent evidence that permissive possession became hostile. The plaintiff has not provided evidence of such a change; his initial animus remains unchanged and consistent with tenancy.
  6. The court distinguishes State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society because in that case the possessor acknowledged the grant and the State sought to deny it; here the plaintiff is the party who seeks to deny the contractual/tenancy relationship under which he entered, but Section 116 bars such denial.
  7. The court cites Brij Lal v. Ram Saran for the proposition that one who enters lawfully cannot later assume the character of an adverse possessor by surreptitiously denying the title by which he entered.

Based on these reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff's possession remains permissive/tenancy-based; non-payment of rent does not convert it into adverse possession; the plaintiff has failed to prove hostile animus; and the plaintiff's claim is contradictory and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED IN LIMINE

Direct consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in the suit (including declarations of freehold title, perfected adverse possession, and immunity from payment of ground rent), and the suit is dismissed forthwith.
  • The court records that the plaintiff's position is that of a tenant/lessee vis-à-vis the DDA/Union of India and that the plaintiff is liable to pay ground rent. If the plaintiff defaults, defendant Nos. 1 and 3 retain the right to recover ground rent according to the procedure prescribed by law.

The opinion does not set out any broad new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; it resolves the dispute between these parties by applying established doctrines (Section 116 estoppel, the requirement to prove hostile animus for adverse possession, and related authorities).

This summary is prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Manju Goel, J.:—

The Suit

1. Briefly stated the case of the plaintiff is as under:

The plaintiff is a private limited company engaged in the business of construction of buildings. On 28.11.1972 lot No. 95, District Centre, Nehru Place, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the suit property) was put to auction by defendant No. 1 (DDA) and the plaintiff offered a premium of Rs. 16,06,000/- for the suit property measuring 743.22 sq. mts. The plaintiff was declared the successful bidder. The bid was accepted by defendant No. 1 and the possession of the suit property was delivered to the plaintiff on 5.3.1973 A building thereon was constructed. The plaintiff is in continuous peaceful possession of the suit property. The plaintiff is not in possession of the conditions of auction. The plaintiff believes that the conditions were the same as was for a property in respect of which another suit being Suit No. 409/1973; Vishal Builders Pvt. Ltd…Plaintiff; v. Dda & Ors…Defendants. was filed. In the suit one of the questions for determination was what the nature of the land for which the bids were invited by auction was and if it was Nazul land whether DDA had right to sell. It was held by the High Court that the auction by the DDA was illegal as DDA could not have sold the property till the rules had not been framed under section 22 of the The Delhi Development Act, 1957 (in short ‘DD Act’) and the Delhi Development Authority had not obtained any directions from the Central Government. This decision was rendered on 23.3.1977 The appeal preferred over the judgment of the Single Judge (RFA (OS) No. 15/77) was dismissed.

All lands placed at the disposal of the DDA by the Central Government throughout the Union Territory of Delhi were held to be Nazul lands placed at its disposal under section 22 of the DD Act. Pursuant to the judgment and decree in Suit No. 409/73, the Central Government framed rules in 1981. The plaintiff paid the bid money in 1973. Since the DDA was incompetent to dispose of the plot, auction held by the DDA in which the plaintiff obtained the possession of the suit property was null and void. Till date no lease deed has been executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. Thus, the possession of the plaintiff qua defendant No. 1 is adverse. The period of limitation prescribed for perfecting title by adverse possession against the State is 30 years as per Article 111 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiff has, thus, perfected his title by adverse possession. The possession of the plaintiff is open and hostile qua the Union of India as well as of the DDA. The plaintiff received demand notice dated 29.11.2001 from defendant No. 2, acting on behalf of defendant No. 1, demanding a sum of Rs. 10,35,090/- as amount outstanding towards arrears of ground rent upto 14.1.2002 with 10% interest thereon from the due date of appointment till actual date of payment. The plaintiff has been receiving such notices over the years in the past but has never paid the ground rent because there was no valid contract between the parties to pay ground rent.

As such the plaintiff being the bona fide purchaser having purchased the land for consideration and having been delivered possession by defendant No. 1 on 5.3.1973 is holding the land as owner without any conditions having been attached thereto by defendant No. 1, within the knowledge of Union of India (defendant No. 3). The plaintiff is, therefore, in possession of freehold plot as a legal consequence of normal sale purchase. Since no lease deed was ever executed there was no liability on the part of the plaintiff to pay any ground rent or arrears thereof. The notice dated 29.11.2001 threatening to recover the ground rent under Punjab Land Revenue Act is illegal and is an attempt to re-enter the suit property. The plaintiff is being threatened of dispossession by defendant No. 4, which is an agency of defendant No. 1, for recovering the dues. The plaintiff accordingly claims a decree for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, a decree of declaration that the suit property was placed at the hands of defendant No. 1 under section 22 of the DD Act as Nazul land, a decree of declaration that the defendants were legally incompetent to hold auction of the suit property on 28.11.1972, a decree of declaration that the plaintiff is in adverse possession ever since 5.3.1973, a decree of declaration that since no ground rent was paid despite bills having been raised by the defendants the possession is open and hostile, a decree of declaration that the plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser for consideration free of all encumbrances, a decree of declaration that the plaintiff has perfected his title on 4.3.2003, a decree for declaration that the plaintiff is not liable to pay any ground rent and a decree of declaration that defendant No. 1 is not competent to re-enter the suit property.

2. The plaintiff has also filed an interim application seeking interim reliefs. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has been heard in detail about the maintainability of plaintiff's suit and plaintiffs claim.

Analysis of the claim of the plaintif

3. The claim of the plaintiff is self-contradictory which is clear from the prayer clauses themselves. The plaintiff has not placed on the record the terms of the auction, following which he came into possession but it is clear that the auction was only of leasehold right as the plaintiff himself says that every year the plaintiff has been receiving the demand for ground rent. On the one hand, the plaintiff claims that he is bona fide purchaser and on the other hand he claims that he is in adverse possession. If he is a bona fide purchase of the leasehold title over the suit property his status of a tenant/lessee in respect of the suit property is admitted. He having admitted his position of a lessee cannot dispute the title of the DDA and the Union of India who are nothing other than the agents and the principal. Section 116 of the Evidence Act bars a tenant from denying the title of the landlord. Similarly, no person who comes into possession of an immovable property on the basis of licence or permission of the person in possession thereof cannot be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such property when such licence was given. Section 116 is reproduced below:

“116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person inpossession.

—No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.”

4. Whatever may have the authority of the DDA and whatever may have been the invalidity in the deal or the auction, the plaintiff can assume no position other than that of a tenant under the DDA/Union of India, defendants Nos. 1 & 3. The plaintiff is, therefore, liable to pay ground rent. If the plaintiff is a defaulter in payment of ground rent, defendant Nos. 1 & 3 have right to recover it according to the procedure laid down under the law.

5. The plaintiff does not deny the title of the DDA and the Union of India, defendant Nos. 1 & 3, but says that defendant No. 1 (DDA) was not entitled to sell the Nazul land. This, however, cannot make the possession of the plaintiff adverse to that of defendant No. 1. At best this could be a matter of dispute between defendant Nos. 1 & 3. So far as the plaintiff is concerned, he is in possession through defendant Nos. 1 & 3 and not independent of defendant Nos. 1 & 3. Despite such failure, if any, the plaintiffs title cannot become adverse to defendant Nos. 1 & 3.

6. The plaintiff has not paid the rent. This is a default on the part of the plaintiff. By not paying the rent a tenant does not become a person in adverse possession. It was held in Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar., AIR 1995 SC 73 that mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.

7. The plaintiff has raised another plea that since no lease deed has been executed, he has become a person in adverse possession. It does not deny, however, that his entry in the land was consequent on the auction by DDA. It was held in Thakur Kishan Singh's case (Supra) that if the possession was initially permissive it was a heavy burden on the appellant to show that it had become adverse at any subsequent point of time. The development of hostility at any subsequent point of time had to be proved by cogent evidence. In the present case the plaintiff does say that initially he entered with permission of defendant Nos. 1 & 3 but at no subsequent point of time his animus for the possession had become hostile to defendant Nos. 1 & 3. The animus with which he entered the land continues till date and, therefore, till date his possession can be nothing other than possession of a tenant.

8. The plaintiff's counsel has tried to take shelter under the Supreme Court judgment in the case of State Of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR 1970 SC 1778 in which the respondent society had obtained a grant in respect of a land from the Government and the appellant-Government wanted to acquire the land without paying compensation on the ground that the grant was nonest because the documents required for such a grant had not been executed. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was either in possession under the grant or in case such a grant is denied, then his title had been perfected by possession which, in the absence of the grant, could only be adverse. The plaintiff cannot take advantage of this judgment for the simple reason that the plaintiff's case is entirely reverse of the case before the Supreme Court. The respondent in that case, namely, The Dalhousie Institute, who was in possession of the land did not deny the grant. It admitted the grant and claimed that in view of the grant the Government could not have acquired the land without paying him the compensation. Since the appellant, State of West Bengal, was interested in denying the grant it was held that if the State was denying the grant, the possession of the respondent would be nothing other than adverse. The respondent was in possession for over 60 years and had built on it without any objection from the Government/State of West Bengal. In the present case the petitioner is saying that the auction was bad and the lease was bad. This he cannot do in view of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The lessor in this case is not denying the lease. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot say that his possession has become adverse because of non-execution of any lease deed or on account of any defect in the lease.

9. In was held in Brij Lal v. Ram Saran, (1970) 72 Punj.L.R (D) 8 that where a person enteres into possession lawfully, he cannot, by pretending to have no title at all, divest himself of the lawful title and assume the character of an adverse possessor in order to mature his title through the process of hidden wrongful intentions.

Decision

10. The plaintiff's case is entirely frivolous. His case has no merit. He is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in the suit. The suit is accordingly dismissed in limine.