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Bureau Of Indian Standards v. Bureau Of I.S Employees Assoc. .
Judgment Summary — Letters Patent Appeal (Mukul Mudgal, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal under the Letters Patent procedure challenges the learned Single Judge's judgment dated 18 September 2002, which restored parity of pay scales between Technical Assistants (members of respondent No.1, Bureau of Indian Standards Laboratory Employees Association) and Assistants employed by the appellant.
Key factual and procedural events, as recorded in the opinion, include:
- Before revision w.e.f. 1 January 1986, Technical Assistants were recruited on a pre‑revised pay scale of Rs. 425-500-EB-560-20-700 EB-800.
- On 25 March 1987 the appellant adopted the Fourth Central Pay Commission's recommendations and revised pay scales for Grade II, III and IV posts w.e.f. 1 January 1986.
- By an Office Memorandum dated 31 July 1990 the Ministry prescribed a revised pay scale of Rs. 1640-2900 for the pre‑revised scale Rs. 425-800 for posts included in the Assistant Grade of Central Secretariat Service, with applicability conditions stated in that OM.
- On 21 January 1991 the members were recorded as downgraded to Group 'C' in the seniority list after implementation of 4th Pay Commission recommendations in the Bureau.
- A writ petition concerning Assistants and Stenographers (CWP 1633/1996) was allowed on 21 April 1999; the subsequent LPA (LPA 2322/99) was dismissed on 1 August 2000 and the related Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 12 January 2001.
- The respondents (Technical Assistants), who previously enjoyed parity before 1996, filed CWP No. 3925/1991 and obtained relief by the learned Single Judge on 18 September 2002 — the order under challenge in this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Technical Assistants employed by the Bureau are entitled to parity in pay with Assistants by virtue of the Office Memorandum dated 31 July 1990 and/or prior practice of parity that existed before 1996.
- Whether the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" applies in this case given the asserted differences in educational qualifications and duties between Technical Assistants and Assistants.
- Whether the learned Single Judge's restoration of parity by the impugned judgment dated 18 September 2002 should be interfered with on appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents (Technical Assistants) are graduates in Science with First Division, while Assistants were recruited with Matric First Division or Intermediate Second Division; being better qualified, the Technical Assistants should have parity of pay restored.
- The Office Memorandum dated 31 July 1990 (which revised the pre‑revised scale Rs. 425-800 to Rs. 1640-2900 for Assistant Grade posts) ought to have been extended to the Technical Assistants; prior to 1996 Technical Assistants and Assistants enjoyed parity.
- The learned Single Judge's decisions in related writs (including CWP No. 1633/1996) had granted the benefit of the OM and those orders supported the respondents' entitlement to parity, leading to the relief granted in CWP No. 3925/1991 that was upheld by the Single Judge on 18 September 2002.
Appellant's Arguments
- Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Sood) contended that differences in duties and educational qualifications between Assistants and Technical Assistants preclude application of the principle of equal pay for equal work.
- The appellant relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh (2006) 9 SCC 321; AIR 2006 SC 161 (particularly paragraphs 17 and 18) to support the proposition that equal pay is available only for equal work of equal value and that differing educational qualifications can justify different pay.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321 : AIR 2006 SC 161 | Sets out the proper approach to the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work": it must be equal work of equal value; the doctrine has no mechanical application; classifications based on differences (such as educational qualifications, method of recruitment, merit or experience) can justify pay differentiation; burden lies on claimant to plead and prove equality of work and other relevant factors. | The court accepted the principles in that decision but observed the factual distinction in the present matter: Charanjit Singh dealt with claimants seeking parity with higher qualified persons, whereas here higher qualified Technical Assistants claim parity with lesser‑qualified Assistants. The court applied the principle to examine whether the Single Judge's restoration of parity was vitiated; it concluded it was not. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded along the following lines, based solely on the contents of the opinion:
- Acknowledgement of the Supreme Court authority (State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh) which explains that "equal pay for equal work" requires equality of work and value and that differences in educational qualifications may justify different pay scales. The opinion reproduces and relies on paragraphs 17 and 18 of that judgment discussing burden of proof and the non-mechanical application of the doctrine.
- The court accepted that educational qualifications between Assistants and Technical Assistants were different. However, it observed the factual matrix in this case was the converse of the typical scenario addressed in the cited Supreme Court authority: here the Technical Assistants are the higher qualified employees (graduates with First Division) seeking parity with Assistants who had lesser qualifications.
- The court recorded that the appellant had treated Assistants and Technical Assistants on par until 1996. It further noted that the claim of Assistants for the benefit of the OM dated 31 July 1990 had been upheld by the Supreme Court in related litigation. Those factual and precedential points weighed in favour of the respondents.
- On these facts — higher qualifications of the Technical Assistants, prior parity in practice, and the earlier rulings granting the OM's benefit to Assistants — the court found no fault in the learned Single Judge's decision restoring parity and declined to interfere with that judgment.
- As a result of that reasoning, the court dismissed the appeal and the interim relief application, and directed that the impugned judgment's directions be complied with by 15 January 2007.
The opinion does not elaborate further factual proof or evidentiary findings beyond the points summarized above; it frames its reasoning by reference to the cited Supreme Court authority and the particular factual distinctions in this case.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED. The court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal against the learned Single Judge's judgment dated 18 September 2002 restoring parity of pay scales between Technical Assistants and Assistants. The interim relief application was also dismissed.
Consequential directions and immediate effect:
- The directions issued by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment were ordered to be complied with on or before 15 January 2007.
Implications:
The direct effect is that the learned Single Judge's restoration of parity stands and will be implemented by the appellant in accordance with the directions given. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying and distinguishing the Supreme Court authority it cited; no broader rule‑making implication is discussed in the text of the opinion.
Appeal dismissed.
Mukul Mudgal, J. (Oral)— This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the judgment dated 18th September, 2002 of the learned Single Judge granting parity in the pay scales of the respondent No. 1, Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) Laboratory Employees Association who are the Technical Assistants with the appellant. By the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge restored the parity of pay scales of the Technical Assistants as compared to the Assistants.
2. The brief facts of the case are as under:
(a) The members of the respondent Association have been working as Technical Assistants Laboratory in the office of the appellant, who were recruited directly on a pay scale of Rs. 425-500-EB-560-20-700 EB-800, prior to the revision of the pay scale on 1st January, 1986.
(b) By an order dated 25th March, 1987, the appellant adopted the recommendations of the Fourth Central Pay Commission and adopted the revised pay scales of Grades II, III and IV posts in the Institute w.e.f 1st January, 1986.
(c) By a notification dated 15th January, 1998, the appellant framed the Bureau of Indian Standards (Terms and Conditions of Service of employees) Regulations 1988, wherein it was stated that the Central Government Service (Classification, Control and Appeal (Rules), 1965, shall apply to the employees of the bureau and they shall enjoy all the benefits enjoyed by the employees of the Central Government.
(d) On 31st July, 1990, the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions issued an Office Memorandum whereby the revised pay-scale of Rs. 1640-2900 was prescribed for the pre-revised scale of Rs. 425-800 for the posts included in the Assistant Grade of Central Secretariat Service with effect from 1st January 1986. The pay-scale was also to be applicable where the posts were in comparable grades with classification and pay-scales and the method of recruitment through open competitive examination is also the same. As a result of the said order, the pay-scale of the Ministierial Staff was revised from Rs. 425-800 to Rs. 1640-2900 with effect from 1st January, 1996.
(e) However, on 21st January, 1991, in the seniority list the Members of the appellant were downgraded as Group ‘C’ after the implementation of the 4th Pay Commission's recommendations in the Bureau.
(f) A writ petition (CWP 1663/96) was filed in respect of Assistant and Stenographers. The writ petition was allowed on 21st April, 1999. Against the said writ petition the respondent preferred an appeal being LPA 2322/99 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on 1st August, 2000. Against the said dismissal the respondent filed a Special Leave Petition which was also dismissed on 12th January, 2001.
3. The main plea of the learned Counsel for the respondents was that the qualification of the respondents is Graduation in Science with First Division whereas the Assistants are recruited with an educational qualification of Matric with First Division or Intermediate with Second Division. It is, therefore, contended that since the respondents are much better qualified than the Assistants, the least that the appellant ought to have done was to restore the parity to the said Technical Assistants.
4. The writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 Association is also founded on the fact that prior to 1996, Technical Assistants and the Assistants were enjoying the parity of pay scales and the O.M dated 31st July, 1990 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training ought to have extended to the Technical Assistants also. By virtue of the said Office Memorandum, the Technical Assistants though better qualified started getting pay scale lower than that of the Assistants. The benefit of the said O.M dated 31st July, 1990 was granted to the Technical Assistants also by virtue of a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1633/1996 dated 21st April, 1999. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge was challenged in LPA and the Division Bench dismissed the said LPA leading to the Special Leave Petition and the judgment of the learned Single Judge granting the benefit of the O.M dated 31st July, 1990 to the Assistant/Stenos was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The respondents who were Technical Assistants and had parity prior to 1996, feeling aggrieved filed the CWP No. 3925/1991 and were granted relief by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 18th September, 2002, which is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal.
5. Mr. Sood appearing for the appellant states that there is difference of duties between the Assistants and the Technical Assistants and there is difference in educational qualifications and therefore principle of equal pay for equal work is not applicable to the present case. In this connection he has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321 : AIR 2006 SC 161, and in particular paragraphs 17 and 18 thereof which read as follows:
“17. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology and Tarun K. Roy, lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or a craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ Court can lightly interfere. Normally, a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regard. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of material placed it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective writ petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.
18. As stated above in all these cases the High Court has followed a Full Bench decision of that Court. The Full Bench has also observed that the essential ingredient is similarity. This would be correct. However, at one stage the Full Bench observes that even if some dispute is raised. That would be wrong law. In each case the Court must satisfy itself that the burden of proving that the work and conditions are equal is discharged by the aggrieved employee.”
6. We are in entire agreement with the plea of the learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Sood that educational qualification of the Assistants are not the same as that of the Technical Assistants. However, this argument in the facts of the present case is rather against the appellant, for the reason that the Technical Assistants are Graduates in Science with First Division whereas the Assistants are recruited on the basis of of qualification of Matric with First Division or Intermediate with Second Division. It is stated that presently Graduates with First Division are recruited as Assistants in the BIS. However, this is not the issue arising in the present appeal.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the position of law in the above judgment that if the Educational Qualifications are different, the principle of equal pay for equal work is not applicable. However, the above findings were made in the case of parity being claimed by a litigant who claimed parity with higher qualified persons. We have however a converse situation in the present case, where employees who are having higher qualifications i.e the respondent Technical Assistants who are First Class Graduates are in fact claiming parity only with the employees such as Assistants who have lesser qualifications i.e Matriculation. We have also noticed the fact that even the appellant had treated both the Assistants and the Technical Assistants on par till 1996. The claim of the assistants for the benefit of O.M dated 31st July, 1990 has even been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Consequently, the learned Single Judge's judgment cannot be faulted on any account. In this view of the matter, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The interim relief application is also dismissed.
8. The directions issued by the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge shall be complied with on or before 15th January, 2007.
Appeal dismissed.
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