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Om Prakash Gulshan v. J.D Gulshan And Others

Delhi High Court
Feb 18, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a judgment and preliminary decree dated 8 March 2004 of the learned Additional District Judge in Suit No. 311 of 2003. The trial court had framed seven issues, heard evidence and passed a preliminary decree for partition of the suit land and for payment of mesne profits at Rs. 1,000 per month from the date of filing of the suit until handing over possession of one-half portion of the property.

The suit had been filed by respondent No. 1 (the plaintiff in the trial court and brother of the appellant) in 1986 claiming partition, possession, recovery of Rs. 36,000 and rendition of accounts. The appellant (defendant No. 1 in the original suit) appealed the trial court decree to this Court. While the appeal was pending, the appellant, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 filed a joint application dated 5 August 2004 (C.M. No. 9765/2004) stating they had amicably settled their disputes and asking for disposal of the appeal in terms of the settlement.

At the stage of considering that joint application, an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC (registered as C.M. No. 10349/2004) was filed by Manoj Gulshan (son of respondent No. 1). He sought impleadment on the ground that the subject property was HUF property purchased/constructed from joint family funds and that he had a share; he contended no settlement or decree should be passed without his being made a party. The other parties contested his application, asserting that the property was self-acquired by late Manak Chand Gulshan and relying on a Will and prior family settlement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application under Order I Rule 10 CPC by Manoj Gulshan for impleadment as a necessary party was maintainable.
  2. Whether the subject property is a Joint Hindu Family (HUF) property (as contended by the applicant) or a self-acquired property of late Manak Chand Gulshan (as contended by the other parties), for the purposes of deciding the necessity of impleadment and the effect of the settlement.
  3. Whether the joint settlement recorded by the parties before this Court can be acted upon under Order XXII Rule 3 CPC and a final decree passed in terms of that settlement.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Manoj Gulshan) Arguments

  • The suit property is HUF property purchased in the name of late Manak Chand Gulshan from Joint Hindu Family funds and the construction on it was raised from joint family funds.
  • As a member of the HUF (being the son of Jai Dev Gulshan/respondent No. 1), the applicant has a share in the property and was a necessary party to the partition suit and any settlement affecting the property; he should have been impleaded under Order I Rule 10 CPC.
  • If the compromise is permitted and the property is partitioned without his consent, he will suffer irreparable loss because the decree was obtained "at the back of" the applicant without his being made a party.

Other Parties' Arguments

  • The property was self-acquired by late Manak Chand Gulshan: it was purchased by him in March 1953 by sale deed and the construction (two storeys and barsati) was raised at his cost (Rs. 36,000), supported by the Will dated 16 June 1956 which bequeathed the property.
  • The Will and a family settlement dated 31 July 1966 show that the property was to be owned equally by the appellant and respondent No. 1; other legal heirs agreed not to claim any right, title or interest.
  • The applicant lived with his father, attended proceedings in the High Court with him during the litigation and therefore was aware of the suit; yet he never sought impleadment during the long pendency, suggesting mala fide motives aimed at extorting money from his father's share.
  • Accordingly, the applicant is not a necessary or proper party and his application for impleadment is not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Master Aditya Murgai v. Ashok Murgai (Division Bench decision in Suit No. 2365/2000, disposed 19.10.2000; FAO (OS) No. 553/2001 disposed 1.11.2002) Principle that on partition of a coparcenary property the share allotted to a coparcener assumes a dual character: (a) separate/individual property as regards other coparceners; (b) ancestral property as regards his male lineal descendants who take by birth. The Court relied on this authority to hold that even if the property were HUF property, any claim of the applicant (Manoj) would have to be asserted through his father (respondent No. 1), because a son's rights in a coparcener's allotted share arise through the coparcener; therefore the applicant could not be impleaded independently in the present proceedings.
Mulla on Hindu Law, Eighteenth Edition, Vol. I, p. 383 (textbook) Textual statement that a share allotted on partition is ancestral property as regards the coparcener's male issue, who take by birth whether born before or after partition. The Court cited this doctrinal text to reinforce the proposition that a coparcener's allotted share retains ancestral character for his male lineal descendants and thus supported the conclusion that any claim of the applicant would arise vis-à-vis his father's share rather than independently justifying impleadment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the factual matrix and procedural history and proceeded in the following analytical steps:

  1. Knowledge and Conduct of the Applicant: The Court found that the applicant (Manoj) is the son of respondent No. 1, resided with him throughout and is about 38 years old (a major) and that respondent No. 1 swore that the applicant accompanied him to court and was aware of the partition suit throughout its roughly 17–18 year pendency. The Court treated the applicant's claimed ignorance of the suit as not believable given these facts.
  2. Character of the Property: The Court reviewed the Will dated 16 June 1956 and the surrounding facts set out in pleadings and found the property was purchased by Manak Chand in March 1953 and construction paid for by him; the Will described the property as his and provided for division. On this basis the Court concluded the property was self-acquired by Manak Chand and not HUF property, a position acted upon by the family and relied upon by the parties.
  3. Effect of HUF Claim if Accepted: The Court analysed the applicant's position hypothetically: even if the property were HUF property, partition after the death of Manak Chand would have produced notional shares (including one-third shares for each son and the notional share of the deceased), and the applicant's potential entitlement would be through his father and limited in quantum. The Court observed that the applicant, by pursuing his claim, would in effect reduce his father's share — i.e., it would be self-defeating for his father's interests.
  4. Doctrinal Support: The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in Master Aditya Murgai v. Ashok Murgai and the text in Mulla on Hindu Law to state the settled principle that a coparcener's allotted share on partition is ancestral for his male lineal descendants, and therefore, any right the applicant may have would be claimable through his father rather than independently.
  5. Conclusion on Maintainability: Synthesising the factual findings (knowledge of suit, family conduct, the Will and settlement) and the legal principle, the Court held the Order I Rule 10 application to be not maintainable, malafide and an abuse of process; the applicant was not a necessary party to the present appeal and his application was dismissed.
  6. Settlement and Final Decree under Order XXII Rule 3: Having rejected the impleadment application, the Court examined the joint settlement under Order XXII Rule 3 CPC. It found the settlement terms to be bona fide, supported by affidavits, signed by the parties and counsel, and that multiple respondents had stated they did not claim any rights. The Court accepted the settlement, recorded statements of several parties confirming the settlement, and concluded the parties would be bound by their undertakings.
  7. Disposition: The Court passed a final decree of partition in the suit in terms of the settlement; the joint application (Ext. C-1) was ordered to form part of the decree and the appeal was disposed of, parties bearing their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

(a) The application under Order I Rule 10 CPC by Manoj Gulshan for impleadment was dismissed as not maintainable; the applicant was not a necessary party and the application was malafide and an abuse of process.

(b) The joint settlement filed by the appellant, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 was held to be bona fide and a final decree of partition in terms of that settlement was passed under Order XXII Rule 3 CPC; the joint application (Ext. C-1) shall form part of the decree and the appeal stands disposed of with parties to bear their own costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect on parties: The applicant (Manoj) cannot be impleaded as a party in the present appeal; the settlement between the primary parties is recorded and made enforceable as part of a final decree of partition. The suit property is to be partitioned according to the terms of the joint application and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.
  • Scope of rights: The Court clarified that, even on the assumption of HUF character, any rights of the applicant would arise through his father (respondent No. 1) in light of the principle that a coparcener's share on partition is ancestral for his male issue; therefore, independent impleadment was not warranted.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion adjudicated the procedural and substantive questions presented in the case and applied existing principles; the judgment did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application of settled doctrine and the facts of this case.
Show all summary ...

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.:— This appeal arises out of judgment and decree dated March 8, 2004 passed by the learned Additional District Judge in Suit No. 311 of 2003 whereby the learned Additional District Judge passed a preliminary decree for partition of the suit land and also for payment of mesne profits.

2. The aforesaid suit was filed by respondent No. 1, who is the brother of the appellant herein and also of the respondents 2 to 5. In the said suit a decree was sought for partition of the suit property and also for possession and also for recovery of an amount of Rs. 36,000/- and for rendition of accounts. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned trial court framed as many as seven issues. The parties also led their evidence and thereafter the learned Additional District Judge proceeded to hear the parties. He passed a preliminary decree of partition in the suit and also for payment of mesne profits by the appellant at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month from the date of filing of the suit till handing over of possession of the half portion of the property.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appellant, who was defendant No. 1 in the suit, filed the appeal making the plaintiff as respondent No. 1 and the defendants 2, 3 and 4 as respondents 2, 3 and 4 in the present appeal. Notice was issued on the appeal with a direction to the parties to maintain status quo of possession and title of the property. Thereafter a joint application was filed in this court by the appellant, the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 2. This application was registered as C.M No. 9765/2004 and was dated 5.8.2004 In the said joint application they have stated that they have arrived at a settlement out of court amongst themselves in respect of the subject-matter of the suit and that in terms of the aforesaid settlement the appeal could be disposed of. The said joint application is filed by all the aforesaid parties and is also supported by their affidavits. In paragraph 2 of the said application it is stated that the parties to the appeal have resolved all their disputes amicably in order to achieve the family harmony. The terms of the settlement are also set out in the said application. It is also stated in the joint application that the defendants 3 to 5 of the original suit (respondents 2 to 4 in the present appeal) have already given their no objection and they do not claim any right, title and interest in the said property. It was stated in the said application that, therefore, the appeal be disposed of in terms of the aforesaid settlement arrived at.

4. The aforesaid application was being taken up for consideration and at that stage an application being application registered as C.M No. 10349/2004 under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by Shri Manoj Gulshan, who is the son of Shri Jai Dev Gulshan, respondent No. 1 herein. In the said application he has stated that the said suit property is an HUF property as it was purchased in the name of late Shri Manak Chand Gulshan son of Shri Kirpa Ram and, therefore, the applicant has a share in the said property and, therefore, the suit could not have been filed without making him a party, nor any settlement could be arrived at by the parties without the consent and approval of the applicant. It is also stated that if the compromise is allowed to be arrived at between the parties and the suit property is partitioned then the applicant, who is a necessary party in the suit, will suffer an irreparable loss and injury as he has share in the said property and since the decree was obtained at the back of the applicant without making him a party although he was a necessary party for the determination of the suit. In view of the aforesaid stand taken by the son of the respondent No. 1 herein, we heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties on both the applications.

5. It is contended by the counsel appearing for the applicant in the application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the suit property which is also the subject-matter of appeal is a Joint Hindu Family Property as the said property was purchased from the Joint Hindu Family funds and that even the construction on the said property was raised from the Joint Hindu Family funds. Consequently, it is stated that the applicant being the son of Jai Dev Gulshan has got a share in the said property and, therefore, the suit could not have been filed seeking for partition of the suit property without making the applicant a party and no compromise could be effected in the said suit property without the consent and approval of the applicant.

6. The said application is, however, opposed by all other parties in the appeal contending inter alia that the said property was not an HUF property. In support of the aforesaid contention reliance was placed on the Will executed by the father of the parties hereto, late Manak Chand Gulshan. It was categorically stated in the reply filed that the property in question was the self acquired property of late Shri Manak Chand Gulshan, father of the appellant and the respondent No. 1, and the said plot was purchased by him in the month of March 1953 for Rs. 5,500/- under sale deed dated March 5, 1953 and the construction of two storeys and barsati was raised by him at a cost of Rs. 36,000/- purely out of his own resources. It is also stated that late Manak Chand Gulshan by his Will dated June 16, 1956 bequeathed the property in question as well as the other movable and immovable properties in favour of his wife Mrs. Mohan Devi. It is also the plea that the appellant was disinherited by his late father to succeed to his estate till the appellant mended his ways and was taken back into the family fold by the trustees appointed in the said Will. It is also stated that the immovable property situated at Jallandhar was disposed off by the mother during her life time and the immovable property situated at Chandigarh was given by the mother to her daughter, namely, Chander Lata Kumar. It is also stated that the mother resolved the disputes between the brothers and a settlement was recorded on July 31, 1966 whereby it was settled that property bearing No. 5C-33, Rohtak Road, New Delhi, would be owned equally by the appellant and respondent No. 1 and, therefore, no other legal heir of late Manak Chand Gulshan had any right, title or interest in the property, in question. The Will, a copy of which is also placed on record, reiterates similar position and, therefore, reliance was sought on the said Will by the parties hereto. In the light of the aforesaid pleadings, therefore, we may consider the merits of both the applications.

7. We have heard the parties on the matters raised before us. We find that the suit was filed by the respondent No. 1 in the year 1986 seeking partition of the suit property in terms of this Will. The said litigation continued for about 18 years and was ultimately decreed by judgment and decree dated March 8, 2004. The applicant herein is the son of respondent No. 1 and had all along been residing with the respondent No. 1 at G-8, Naraina Vihar, New Delhi. He is stated to be aged about 38 years now and, therefore, was a major at the time of commencement of the lis. Although the applicant has stated that he was not aware of the partition suit filed by respondent No. 1, however he being the son of the respondent No. 1, who was the plaintiff in the suit, must have had knowledge about the aforesaid pendency of the suit between the parties. It cannot be believed that the applicant had no knowledge about the pendency of the aforesaid suit seeking for partition of the suit property. In this behalf we may refer to the reply filed by the applicant's father, the respondent No. 1, to this application under Order I Rule 10 CPC which is to the following effect:—

“2. That the aforesaid suit for partition was filed by the respondent No. 1 in the year 1986. It is submitted that after a prolonged litigation of almost 17-18 years, the said suit for partition was ultimately decreed vide Order dt. 8.3.2004 The present applicant who is son of respondent No. 1 had all through been residing with the respondent No. 1 at ground floor at G-8, Naraina Vihar, New Delhi. The applicant had all through been well aware of the partition suit as filed by respondent No. 1 and also was fully abreast with all the proceedings which were taking place in the said suit from time to time. Not only this, the applicant had been actively attending this case from time to time in High Court of Delhi along with his father, i.e, respondent No. 1. The applicant never came forward to move any application for his impleadment as a party to the said suit as the applicant was well aware of the fact that he had no right, title or interest in the said property and was neither a necessary party nor a proper party in the said suit. The applicant is motivated by ulterior motives of extorting money out of the share of the respondent No. 1 which he is likely to get by the sale of the property in consequence of the compromise having been arrived at between the applicant and respondent No. 1. The sole aim of the applicant is to extort money illegally out of respondent No. 1. Even the conduct of the applicant dis-entitles to his to be impleaded as a party in the present proceedings.

3. That the property in question was self acquired property of late Sh. Manak Chand Gulshan, father of the respondent No. 1. The said plot was purchased by him in March, 1953 for Rs. 5,500/- vide Sale Deed dt. 5.3.1953 and the construction of two stories and barsati Was raised by him at a cost of Rs. 3,6000/- purely out of his own resources. The said property in all respect was a self acquired property. Late Sh. Manak Chand Gulshan vide his Will dt. 16.6.1956 bequeathed the property in question as well as the other moveable and immoveable properties in favour of his wife Mrs. Mohan Devi. The present appellant was dis-in-herited by his late father to succeed to his estate till the appellant mends his ways and is taken back into the family fold by the trustees appointed in the said Will. The immoveable property situated at Jhalendar was disposed off by the mother during her life time and the immovable property situated at Chandigarh was given by the mother to her daughter names Mrs. Chander Lata Kumar. The mother resolved the dispute between the brothers and a settlement was recorded on 31.7.1966 whereby it was settled that property bearing No. 5C-33, Rohtak Road, New Delhi shall be owned equally by the appellant and respondent No. 1. No other legal heir of late Sh. Manak Chand Gulshan had any right, title or interest in the property in question. The applicant can not be claim any independent right or title in the property in question as the same was self acquired property of late Sh. Manak Chand Gulshan. No such right has even been given in the Will. Nor does Will point out that the property in question is ancestral or Joint Hindu Family Property.”

8. Thus, we find that the respondent No. 1, who is his father, has stated on oath that his son (the present applicant) used to come to the court with him to take steps in the suit during its pendency.

9. Despite the aforesaid position he never intended to file any suit or any other proceedings to claim or establish rights, if any, in the property. After the decree was passed and a settlement is arrived at amongst the parties for amicable settlement of their disputes, he has come up with this application pleading that the property is HUF property which is belied by the very fact that late Manak Chand Gulshan, the admitted owner of the said property, executed the Will stating categorically and in clear terms stated that the said property was his self acquired property and by the aforesaid Will he intended to bequeath and divide the aforesaid property in two shares giving in equal proportion to his two sons, the appellant and the respondent No. 1 herein. There are three sisters in the family who are daughters of late Manak Chand Gulshan. They have also agreed not to seek for any share in the said suit property honouring the Will of the father and also in the interest of family accord. This Will was fully acted upon.

10. In the Will dated June 16, 1956, a copy of which is placed on record at page 273 of the paper book, it is clearly stated that the suit property known as ‘Ashiana Gulshan’, 5-C/33, Rohtak Road, New Delhi-5, was purchased by late Manak Chand Gulshan in March 1953 only for Rs. 5,500/- by a sale deed registered on March 5, 1953 and that construction of the two storeys and a barsati had cost him altogether Rs. 36,000/- including the cost of modern sanitary fittings, electric installation for lighting and power and other accessories. It was stated clearly in the said Will in paragraph 9 that should his wife pre-deceased him then after his death all his property, movable and immovable, shall be divided in two equal proportions as suitably as possible of which one portion shall pass on to his son Jai Dev, who is respondent No. 1 herein, and the other to be kept in trust by the family for the benefit of his second son Om Parkash in case he mended his ways and taken back into the family fold by the trustees appointed in the said Will. Therefore, it is proved and established that the said property was self acquired property of Manak Chand Gulshan and, therefore, cannot be said to be HUF property for any purpose and circumstance.

11. The applicant herein is the son of Jai Dev, the respondent No. 1 herein. Even if he had any right in the said property provided the same is held to be an HUF property even then the right and claim of the applicant could be claimed through his father, namely, Jai Dev.

12. It is note worthy that even in the suit which had been filed by the respondent No. 1, the claim was not based on any plea that the property was joint family property.

13. The claim made by the applicant can also be tested thus. Assuming that the property was joint Hindu family property, even in such an event, upon the death of late Sh. Manak Chand, there would have been a deemed notional partition of such property into three shares, namely, one of Shri Manak Chand and one each of his sons, that is the present appellant and the respondent No. 1. Therefore, each of them would have got only one-third share each. The one-third share of late Shri Manak Chand would have been divided between all heirs including his wife, his two sons and four daughters, i.e each would have got one by twenty-one share in the property. Therefore, in case the plea set up by the applicant is accepted, his father, respondent No. 1, is entitled to only 1/3 + 1/21 share in the property which is equivalent to 8/21 share. Therefore, even on the case set up by the applicant, his father and brother would be entitled to only a share out of this 8/21. It would thus appear that the applicant is only indulging in an exercise of cutting his nose to spite his face.

14. We may at this stage appropriately refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Suit No. 2365/2000 disposed of on October 19, 2000 titled Master Aditya Murgai v. Ashok Murgai, and the order passed by the Division Bench on the appeal taken [FAO (OS) No. 553/2001], which was disposed of on November 1, 2002. The issue that arose for consideration in the said case was whether on disruption of coparcenary by partition, individual coparcener takes his share as exclusive property or as a separate coparcenary with his male lineal descendants. The Division Bench held that the family arrangement determines the rights and liabilities between the parties thereto at the time of settlement, but it cannot be said that the same would determine the rights of male lineal descendants of individual coparceners nor the same could operate to extinguish the rights of their male lineal descendants which they acquire under the law on their birth. In Mulla on Hindu Law, Eighteenth Edition, Vol. I, at page 383, the learned author has to say as follows:—

“(4) Share allotted on partition—The share, which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property, is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards other relations, it is separate, and if the coparcener dies without leaving a male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession….”

15. In FAO (OS) 553/2001, Master Aditya Murgai v. Ashok Murgai, disposed of on November 1, 2002, it was observed by the Division Bench that it is settled law that on partition of a coparcenary property, the property falling into the share of each coparcener assumes a dual character. It was further observed that it becomes his separate and individual property qua other coparceners with whom partition has taken place, but as regards his own male lineal descendants it retains the character of ancestral property and, therefore, a son, grandson born before/or after partition, take a share in the property by birth. Therefore, even assuming that the property is HUF property, whatever share the applicant may have in such joint family property, the same could be claimed only through his father, the appellant herein.

16. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid discussion and the aforesaid decision of this Court, the application which is filed by the applicant under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is held to be not maintainable and cannot be entertained in the present appeal. The stand of all the parties in the appeal are that the property is a self acquired property. This position was not only accepted but fully acted upon by all the legal heirs of late Shri Manak Chand Gulshan. The applicant, Manoj Gulshan, has also accepted this position and assisted his father in pursuing the claim made on such basis. The present application is clearly malafide and an abuse of the process of law. We, therefore, hold that the applicant has no right to file the application and is not a necessary party to the present proceedings.

17. We may point out that in view of the aforesaid discussion, the applicant can at best have a claim only against his father's share. If the applicant's claim was sustained, his father would get a much lesser share than he has got or is taking by settlement. Therefore, also looked at from any angle, even if the applicant has a right as claimed, the same is only vis-a-vis his father and the same has not been impinged upon in any manner. Therefore, the applicant cannot be impleaded as a party in the present appeal and he cannot be said to be a necessary party in any manner. The judgments relied upon by the applicant are not applicable in the facts of this case and in view of our findings that the applicant is not a necessary party for the present suit. In that view of the matter, the application is found to be without any merit and is dismissed.

18. Having held thus, we may now proceed to examine the application filed by the parties hereto under Order XXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. During the pendency of the aforesaid appeal in this court the parties have arrived at a settlement. The terms and conditions of the settlement have been set out in the application filed by the appellant, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. So far the respondents are concerned, they have not contested the suit and have filed their written statements and affidavits contending that they have no objection and they do not claim any right, title and interest in the said property. One of them has also given a statement in this Court stating that she does not claim any right, title and interest in the said property. Provisions have been made in respect of respondent No. 2 who has also put her signatures in the joint application acknowledging and admitting the terms of settlement. We have also gone through the aforesaid terms of settlement arrived at between the parties and we are satisfied that the said terms and conditions are bonafide. The application is signed by all the parties and their counsel. The averments made in the application are also supported by the affidavits filed by the parties. We have recorded the statements of the appellant, the respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 4. They have all agreed that they have arrived at a settlement out of court in terms of which division of property is made amongst them and that they are bound by the aforesaid undertakings. The aforesaid statements are taken on record. The parties shall be bound by their undertakings given to this Court and they shall act upon the same.

19. In the light of the aforesaid settlement arrived at between the parties, a final decree of partition is passed in the suit. The joint application which is marked ‘Ext.C-1’ shall form part of the decree. In terms thereof the appeal stands disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The parties shall get the suit property partitioned in terms of the settlement.