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Soma Devi Jain v. Union Of India & Ors .
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner took a loan of Rs. 25 lakhs from the respondent, Union Bank of India, on 23.9.1989. Recovery proceedings related to this loan were instituted before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Delhi, in OA No. 494/1996, which are still pending. The petitioner has filed three writ petitions related to this matter. The first writ petition (Writ Petition (C) No. 9846/2003) was decided on 28.9.2004, directing the bank to consider the petitioner’s application under RBI guidelines dated 29.2.2003. The bank responded by declaring the petitioner’s account a non-performing asset from 1996 with an outstanding liability of Rs. 12.75 lakhs. The second writ petition (Writ Petition (C) No. 1182/2005) challenged the bank’s letter and was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to make a representation to the Chief General Manager of the RBI, who was directed to consider it after hearing the bank. This is the third writ petition filed by the petitioner, while the recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal remain ongoing.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ petition is maintainable in the absence of any adverse final order passed against the petitioner by the Debt Recovery Tribunal.
- Whether a writ petition filed before the exhaustion of alternative remedies, such as appeal against a final order from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, is premature and amounts to abuse of process.
- Whether repeated writ petitions aimed at obstructing ongoing recovery proceedings constitute an abuse of the court’s process.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 (6) S.C.C 545 (para 43) | Writ is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 and should not be exercised in cases of abuse or dilatory tactics. | The court held this was not a fit case to exercise discretion under Article 226 due to abuse of process and obstruction of recovery proceedings. |
| Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors, AIR 1962 SC 1044 | A writ petitioner must have a legal right infringed to seek relief under Article 226. | Supported the principle that only a person whose rights are affected can maintain a writ petition, reinforcing the prematurity of the petitioner’s claim. |
| State of Punjab and Anr. v. Suraj Prakash Kapur, AIR 1963 SC 507 | The existence and infringement of a right are foundational to High Court jurisdiction under Article 226. | Reiterated that no cause of action arises without infringement of a right, supporting dismissal of the petition as premature. |
| Attorney General of the Gambia v. N'Jie, (1961) AC 617 (634) | A person is aggrieved if an order prejudicially affects his interest. | The court applied this to confirm that without legal injury or prejudice, a writ petition is not maintainable. |
| Chanan Singh v. Co-op. Societies, Punjab and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1821 | Writ petition against a show cause notice is premature if no punitive action has been taken. | Supported dismissal of the petitioner’s writ as premature since no final order or punitive action was taken by the DRT. |
| The Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors, JT 1995 (8) S.C 331 | Similar principle of prematurity of writ petitions before final adverse action. | Reinforced the principle that writ petitions should await final orders before being entertained. |
| Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Anr, AIR 2004 SC 1467 | Prematurity of writ petitions before final adverse action. | Applied to support dismissal of premature writ petitions. |
| Mrs. Kunda S. Kadam and Ors. v. Dr. K.K Soman and Ors, AIR 1980 SC 881 | Writ petition against recommendation without final appointment order is premature. | Used as precedent to hold the writ petition premature as no final adverse order was passed. |
| Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2428 | Writ petition against selection committee recommendation is premature. | Supported dismissal of premature writ petitions where no final order exists. |
Multiple cases including:
|
Collective authority on the principle that writ petitions filed prematurely without final adverse orders are not maintainable. | These cases collectively underpin the court’s reasoning to dismiss the petition as premature and an abuse of process. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the writ petition in the context of the ongoing recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). It emphasized the settled legal principle that a writ petition is maintainable only when a legal right of the petitioner has been infringed or adversely affected, constituting a cause of action. Since no final order or recovery certificate has been issued against the petitioner by the DRT, no legal injury or grievance has arisen. The petitioner’s repeated filing of writ petitions was seen as an attempt to obstruct the recovery process and delay the final adjudication by the DRT. The court relied on established precedents to assert that writ petitions filed prematurely, before exhaustion of alternative remedies such as appeal after a final order, are liable to be dismissed. It further noted that the writ is a discretionary remedy and should not be exercised to enable mala fide or dilatory tactics. The petitioner was found to have abused the process of the court by filing this third writ petition without awaiting the conclusion of the recovery proceedings.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the writ petition as premature and an abuse of the court’s process.
The petitioner is ordered to pay exemplary costs of Rs. 25,000 to the respondent bank within two months, failing which the amount will be recovered as arrears of land revenue by the Collector and paid to the bank. The decision directly affects the parties by clearing the way for the Debt Recovery Tribunal to proceed without interference from premature writ petitions. No new legal precedent was created; rather, the court reaffirmed established principles regarding the maintainability of writ petitions and the discretionary nature of the remedy under Article 226.
Markandeya Katju, C.J (Oral):— This writ petition is a sheer abuse of the process of this Court.
2. It appears that the petitioner had taken a loan of Rs. 25 lacs from the respondent/Union Bank of India as far back as on 23.9.1989 In connection with the loan, recovery proceedings were instituted by the bank before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Delhi which are still pending being OA No. 494/1996. This is the third writ petition in connection with the same matter. The first being Writ Petition (C) No. 9846/2003 was decided on 28.9.2004 and the second being Writ Petition (C) No. 1182/2005 which was decided on 22.3.2005
3. The Writ Petition (C) No. 9846/2003 was filed in this Court claiming the benefit under the RBI guidelines dated 29.2.2003 This petition was disposed of by order dated 28.9.2004 directing the respondent bank to decide the petitioner's application, which was decided by the bank by its letter dated 14.10.2004 declaring the petitioner's account as non-performing asset from 1996 and informing him of the outstanding liability of Rs. 12.75 lakhs and odd.
4. The petitioner then filed WP(C) 1182/2005 in this Court challenging the aforesaid letter of the bank. This petition was disposed of with the liberty to the petitioner to make a representation to the Chief General Manager of the RBI stating her case, why and how his account was declared to be non-performing asset from 1990 and not 1996. The Court further directed the Chief General Manager to consider the said representation of the petitioner after putting the respondent Union bank under notice and seeking its version. Thereafter, the said representation was directed to be decided within one month.
5. This is thus the third writ petition by the petitioner, although the proceedings before the DRT are still pending before it. In our opinion, this writ petition is premature and its aim obviously is to obstruct the proceedings before the DRT.
6. It is well settled that a writ lies only when the right of some party has been affected. In other words, a writ lies only when a cause of action has arisen. In the present case no right of the petitioner has been affected at present nor has any cause of action arisen and only proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal are going on. Even a recovery certificate has not been issued against the petitioner but she has rushed thrice to this Court by way of writ petitions. Thus, it is obvious that the whole aim of this petition and the previous two writ petitions was to block the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal so that no final order may be passed in the same.
7. In our opinion, this writ petition is pre-mature and has been filed mala fide. If and when any final order is passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, then it is open to the petitioner to file an appeal before the DRT and only thereafter should she approach this court. She cannot short circuit these alternative remedies.
8. In our opinion, this writ petition should not be entertained. The petitioner has abused the process of the Court and tried to block the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal repeatedly. We cannot allow these kinds of dilatory tactics. It is well settled that writ is a discretionary remedy vide Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2003 (6) S.C.C 545 (para 43) and this is not a fit case of exercise of our discretion under Article 226.
9. In Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. AIR 1962 SC 1044 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed:
“The legal right that can be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. We do not see any reason why an each principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
10. Similarly in State of Punjab and Anr. v. Suraj Prakash Kapur AIR 1963 SC 507 another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed:
“The existence of a right and the infringement thereof are the foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
11. The basis of entitlement of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is hence a legal injury from violation of a legal right of a person. The writ is maintainable by a person who is aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise, or causes him some prejudice in one form or other. As observed by Lord Denning, M.R In Attorney General of the Gambia v. N' Jie, (1961) AC 617 (634):
“A person can be said to be aggrieved who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest.”
12. In our opinion, if a writ petition is filed before any adverse order is passed against a party or before any adverse action is taken against a person, that writ petition should be dismissed as premature.
13. Thus in Chanan Singh v. Co-op. Societies, Punjab and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1821, the Supreme Court observed that the writ petition against a show cause notice should be dismissed as premature as no punitive action has yet been taken and there is no present grievance which can be ventilated in Court. A similar view was taken in The Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors. JT 1995 (8) S.C 331 and Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1467.
14. Similarly in Mrs. Kunda S. Kadam and Ors. v. Dr. K.K Soman and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 881, a writ petition had been filed against the recommendation of a certain candidate by the Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was premature as no final orders of appointment had been passed. Similarly in Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 2428, the petitioner had approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the recommendation made by the Selection Committee. It was held that the petition against such recommendation was premature.
15. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Chandra Sekhar Singh Bhoi etc. v. The State of Orissa etc. AIR 1972 SC 486, Balmadies Plantations Ltd. and Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1972 SC 2240, Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 516, Prag Ice and Oil Mills and Anr. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 1296, Laxmi Khandsari etc. v. State of U.P and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 873, State of U.P v. Sh. Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr. AIR 1987 SC 943, State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 and Union of India and Ors. v. A.N Saxena AIR 1992 SC 1233.
16. In the present case, we are of the opinion that the writ petition is clearly premature as no final orders have been as yet passed against the writ petitioner by the DRT. It is obvious that the whole game of the petitioner is not to allow any final orders to be passed by the DRT and she is repeatedly trying to stall such proceedings by filing writ petitions. In our opinion the whole object of the petitioner is malafide and mischievous.
17. Hence while we dismiss the writ petition, we impose exemplary costs of Rs. 25,000/- which the petitioner must pay to the bank within two months from today failing which it would be recovered by the Collector as arrears of land revenue and paid to the bank.
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