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Shri Bhagwant Finance Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax And Another

Delhi High Court
May 5, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (a company) filed a negative return declaring total income of Rs. 7,65,310 on December 31, 1992 for the assessment year 1992-93. The case was selected for scrutiny and a notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act (the Act) was issued; the assessee appeared. The Assessing Officer (AO), by an order dated March 29, 1995, recorded violation of sections 269SS and 269T and issued a notice initiating penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) after finding no substance in the assessee's reply dated January 27, 1995. The AO also accepted a surrender by the assessee to the extent of Rs. 12.75 lakhs. The assessee appealed; the Commissioner of Income-tax dismissed the appeal on July 29, 1998, confirming the penalty. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), and subsequently challenged the ITAT's order before this Court in an appeal under section 260A of the Act.

During the assessment proceedings the AO recorded a contemporaneous office note (dated March 29, 1995) indicating (inter alia) that penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) had been separately initiated, that surrender(s) had been made by the assessee for multiple years, and that penalty had been initiated "as a safeguard against any default in payment of tax" for the assessment year 1992-93 but with a provision that, if full payment were made by a stipulated date, penalty proceedings would be dropped. The High Court received and examined that office note.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal erred in sustaining the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act for assessment year 1992-93, because the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer as contemplated in section 271(1)(c) of the Act had not been recorded.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on decisions of this Court (including Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi-III v. Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd and Diwan Enterprises v. Commissioner Of Income Tax) and other authorities to contend that no satisfaction was recorded by the AO for initiation of penalty proceedings; therefore initiation was improper.
  • The petitioner argued that the AO accepted a voluntary surrender (Rs. 12.75 lakhs) during assessment proceedings and thus there was no occasion to initiate penalty proceedings.
  • It was contended that the AO did not record satisfaction specifically indicating concealment of particulars of income, and that the assessee had provided plausible reasons and grounds in its reply to the show-cause notice.

Respondent / Department's Arguments

  • The Department relied upon Tube Fabrico (I.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax and CIT v. S.V. Angidi Chettiar to submit that where entries are not found in the books of account, it is apparently a case of concealment and no further reasons need be recorded by the AO to initiate penalty proceedings.
  • The Department did not produce the AO's office note before the adjudicating authorities (it was produced before the Court), but admitted the note when it came on the record before this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi-III v. Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd, [2000] 246 ITR 568 (Delhi) The opinion in the reported decision was cited for the proposition that unless requisite satisfaction is recorded in the assessment proceedings the jurisdiction to initiate penalty proceedings cannot be exercised; satisfaction must be before issue of notice or initiation of penalty steps. The Court relied on this authority (as following Supreme Court law) to hold that the AO had not recorded requisite satisfaction in the assessment proceedings and therefore initiation of penalty proceedings was jurisdictionally defective.
Diwan Enterprises v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, [2000] 246 ITR 571 (Delhi) The Court quoted this decision as explaining the effect of the Explanation to the statute: the Explanation creates a presumption which shifts the burden of proof and the earlier principle that mere rejection of the assessee's explanation is insufficient no longer holds; the standard for undisclosed or unexplained cash deposits and other concealments is the same in the light of later cases. The petitioner relied upon this decision to argue improper initiation; the Court cited its exposition regarding the penal nature of penalty proceedings and the changed law on burden and proof when considering the facts and the requirement of recorded satisfaction by the AO.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Super Metal Re-Rollers, [2004] 265 ITR 82 (Delhi) The opinion referenced this decision as one of the authorities relied upon by the petitioner. The Court noted it among the authorities furnished by the petitioner for the proposition that initiation of penalty without recorded satisfaction is impermissible; no separate principle from that decision was detailed in the text beyond its use in support of the petitioner's position.
Tube Fabrico (I.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [1994] 210 ITR 1035 The Department relied on this decision for the proposition that absence of entries in books of account constitutes apparent concealment and that no other reasons are required to be recorded by the AO to initiate penalty proceedings. The Court recorded the Department's reliance on this authority but examined the contemporaneous office note and AO's failure to record satisfaction; the Court found initiation here to be coercive and without proper application of mind.
CIT v. S.V. Angidi Chettiar, [1962] 44 ITR 739 (SC) The Department relied upon this Supreme Court decision in support of the proposition that concealment may be inferred where entries are absent; the decision was also referenced as part of the chain of authorities followed in other cited judgments. The Court acknowledged the Department's reliance but treated the central defect as the AO's failure to record requisite satisfaction; it applied the requirement of recorded satisfaction (as indicated by other authorities) to set aside the initiation of penalty proceedings in this case.
D.M. Manasvi v. CIT, [1972] 86 ITR 557 Mentioned as a Supreme Court authority followed in subsequent decisions cited by the Court; used in reasoning that satisfaction must be recorded before initiation of penalty steps. The Court referenced that later Delhi decisions followed D.M. Manasvi in holding that requisite satisfaction must be recorded in the assessment proceedings before initiating penalties; this supported the conclusion of jurisdictional defect.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC) The opinion notes that the rule regarding burden of proof enunciated in Anwar Ali is "no longer valid" for cases to which the Explanation applies; this was cited in Diwan Enterprises and quoted in the present opinion. The Court reproduced Diwan Enterprises' statement that Anwar Ali's rule on burden of proof no longer applies where the Explanation applies; the Court used this context when discussing the nature of penalty proceedings and standards of proof but the ultimate decision rested on absence of recorded satisfaction by the AO.
Mussadilal Ram Bharose, [1987] 165 ITR 14 (SC) Mentioned in Diwan Enterprises (as among the authorities relevant to applying the Explanation and standards for concealment), and cited in the present opinion's reproduction of Diwan Enterprises' reasoning. The Court referred to the body of case law (including Mussadilal) referenced in Diwan Enterprises to describe the current legal position on burden and standards in concealment cases; the present decision, however, turned on jurisdictional defect (lack of recorded satisfaction) rather than re-deciding those principles.
K.R. Sadayappan, [1990] 185 ITR 49 (SC) Mentioned (via Diwan Enterprises) as part of the body of Supreme Court decisions guiding the application of the Explanation and standards in concealment/penalty cases. The Court noted these authorities in setting out the broader legal background cited by Diwan Enterprises; the Court's application focused on the procedural/jurisdictional requirement of recorded satisfaction in the AO's proceedings rather than reworking substantive tests from K.R. Sadayappan.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the AO's contemporaneous assessment order and an office note dated March 29, 1995 (produced to the Court and admitted by the Department). The office note explicitly records that "Penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) have separately been initiated" and further explains in its paragraphs 2 and 3 that penalty was initiated "as a safeguard against any default in payment of tax for the assessment year 1992-93" and that penalty proceedings would be dropped if the assessee made full payment by a stipulated date. The note also describes multiple voluntary surrenders by the assessee for the assessment year in question and earlier years.

The Court observed that the AO's formal assessment order did not set out the contents of the notice or the assessee's reply, nor did it record satisfaction that the assessee had concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars. The office note, however, revealed that the initiation of penalty proceedings was influenced by a concern to secure revenue — i.e., it was intended as a safeguard or coercive measure against possible default — rather than being founded upon the AO's independent, judicially-formed satisfaction about concealment as required by section 271(1)(c).

The Court held that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the office note demonstrate lack of proper application of mind by the AO and an arbitrary use of the power to initiate penalty proceedings. The Court emphasized that recording of satisfaction by the AO under section 271(1)(c) is a condition precedent to initiation of penalty proceedings and must result from a bona fide, unbiased application of mind to the statutory ingredients. The Court relied on prior decisions (as set out above) which it said require that requisite satisfaction be recorded during the assessment proceedings and before initiating penalty steps.

Because the requisite satisfaction was not recorded in the assessment proceedings and the office note showed that penalty proceedings were initiated as a safeguard rather than as the result of a recorded judicial satisfaction of concealment, the Court found a jurisdictional defect in initiation of penalty proceedings. The Court held that initiation and all subsequent proceedings culminating in the penalty order were thereby vitiated.

The Court also criticized the Department's failure to disclose the office note to the adjudicating authorities earlier and observed that relevant records in the hands of revenue authorities should be disclosed and considered by the appropriate forum.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned order dated October 20, 2003, insofar as it relates to the initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c), is liable to be set aside.

Implications:

  • The initiation of penalty proceedings in this matter was held to be jurisdictionally defective because the Assessing Officer did not record the requisite satisfaction in the assessment proceedings as required by section 271(1)(c) and, based on the office note, had initiated proceedings as a safeguard to secure tax recovery rather than on a bona fide satisfaction of concealment.
  • As a direct consequence, the penalty proceedings and the penalty order arising from that initiation were set aside in favour of the assessee; the appeal was answered in the assessee's favour and the parties were left to bear their own costs.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, novel test beyond restating and applying existing precedents; the decision is founded on the absence of recorded satisfaction (a jurisdictional/ procedural defect) and on the factual content of the AO's office note. The Court did not state that it was creating a new precedent beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts of this case.
Show all summary ...

Swatanter Kumar, J.:— The petitioner's company filed their negative return declaring total income of Rs. 7,65,310 on December 31, 1992 for the assessment year 1992-93. The case of the assessee was taken up for scrutiny and a notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was issued in response to which the assessee appeared and the Assessing Officer vide his order dated March 29, 1995 recorded that there was violation of the provisions of sections 269SS and 269T. A notice was issued to the assessee who filed a reply on January 27, 1995. As the Assessing Officer found no substance in the reply of the assessee, on the ground that ignorance of law is not an excuse and he directed initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act and also accepted the surrender of the assessee to the extent of Rs. 12.75 lakhs. Aggrieved by this order, the assessee preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax vide his order dated July 29, 1998, confirming the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. This order of the first appellate authority was an improvement (?) by the assessee before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner assessee thus has challenged the order of the Appellate Tribunal before this court in an appeal under section 260A of the Act.

2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that out of all the questions framed by the assessee, only the following question of law arises for consideration of the court in the present appeal:

“(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has erred in sustaining the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act in the case of the appellant, for the assessment year 1992-93, inasmuch as the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer as contemplated in section 271(1)(c) of the Act was not recorded in the present case?”

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi-Iii v. Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd, [2000]246 ITR 568; Diwan Enterprises v. Commissioner Of Income Tax., [2000]246 ITR 571 (Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Super Metal Re-Rollers, [2004]265 ITR 82 (Delhi) and contended that to the show-cause notice served upon the assessee for initiation of penalty proceedings, the assessee had given a detailed reply with plausible reasons and grounds and no satisfaction whatsoever has been recorded by the Assessing Officer for initiation of such proceedings.

4. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer should specifically indicate that there was concealment of particulars of income. More so, when surrender made by the assessee was accepted by the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, there was no occasion for directing initiation of such penalty proceedings. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Department relied upon a judgment of this court in the case of Tube Fabrico (I.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax., [1994]210 ITR 1035 and CIT v. S.V Angidi Chettiar, [1962]44 ITR 739 (SC) to argue that once the entries were not found in the books of account of the petitioner, it was apparently a case of concealment and no other reasons were required to be recorded by the Assessing Officer for initiation of penalty proceedings. The Assessing Officer, in his order dated March 29, 1995, has noticed that the assessee was served with a notice to which he filed a reply on January 27, 1995, however, neither the contents of the notice nor the reply submitted by the assessee has been mentioned in the order. The Assessing Officer has only noticed that there was no substance in the reply and as such the penalty proceeding should be initiated. In the order, it has not been recorded that the Assessing Officer was satisfied even on the facts noticed in the order that it was a case of concealment of income. Admittedly, the assessee had surrendered a sum of Rs. 12.75 lakhs during the course of assessment and as per the statement of the assessee, it was so done for the purposes of purchasing peace of mind coupled with a genuine desire to avoid further litigation and the surrender was volunteered. However, none of these facts has discussion in the order of the Assessing Officer, but after the initiation of the penalty proceedings, the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle (III)(1), New Delhi, vide order dated September 29, 1995 held that the plea has no merit and penalty needs to be imposed upon the petitioner. In the order imposing penalty, it was noticed that the alleged loan creditors were found to be non-existent and genuineness of the loans remained unverifiable. However, in the order of the Assessing Officer, it was noticed that some of the notices were returned unserved by the postal authorities while there were no remarks with regard to others. These facts by themselves, may not have been sufficient to interfere with the concurrent order passed by the concerned authorities. What is most material in the present case is, that the Assessing Officer on the very day, when he passed the assessment order, had also recorded a separate note which has been produced before us having a direct bearing on the matter in controversy before us. It will be appropriate to reproduce the note itself rather than referring its some extracts, which was recorded on March 29, 1995. It reads as under:

“M/s. Shri Bhagwant Finance Co. Ltd.

Assessment year 1992-93

Taxable Income b/d : 5,09,693

Assessed. Issue demand notice and challan. Give credit of prepaid taxes and charge intt. accordingly. Penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) have separately been initiated.

(Sanjay Bahadur)

Asst. Commissioner of Income-tax,

Coy. Cir. 3(1), New Delhi.

Dated : 29-3-1995

D & CR No. : 64/9

Copy to the assessee coy.

Office note:

1. Against the fresh unsecured loans of Rs. 16.5 lakhs the assessee has made a surrender of Rs. 11.10 lakhs on the principal and Rs. 1.65 lakhs on intt. for the assessment year 1992-93. The assessee has made similar surrenders for the assessment years 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92 amounting to Rs. 2 lakhs, Rs. 7 lakhs and Rs. 5 lakhs, respectively. The total thus comes to Rs. 26.75 lakhs which includes interest element as well. As a result of this surrender made during the proceedings for the assessment year 1992-93, earlier assessment years 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92 are being reopened. Issue notices under section 147/148.

2. The assessee has made a payment of Rs. 3 lakhs against its demand for the assessment year 1992-93 and has also given an undertaking in the form of indemnity bond from the director, Sh. L.K Jain, to pay the entire demand which will be raised for the assessment years 1989-90, 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93, in equal instalments over three months. In the case of default against payment of taxes the assessment years against which the default occurs shall be excluded from surrender and penalty under section 271(1)(c) may be initiated.

3. Penalty under section 271(1)(c) has been initiated for the assessment year 1992-93 as a safeguard against any default in payment of tax for the assessment year 1992-93. In the case of a default the surrender shall be treated as concealment. However, if the asses-see makes the full payment against the tax demand for the assessment year 1992-93 within the time frame stipulated, i.e, up to June 30, 1995. The penalty proceedings for the assessment year 1992-93 shall be dropped since the assessee has made a surrender of its own accord before the entire increase of unsecured loans was investigated.

4. Show-cause notices under section 271D for violation of sections 269SS and 271E for violation of section 269T in respect of accepting/payment of loans/deposits, etc., as per details given above.

Dated: March 29, 1995

ACIT, Coy. Cir. 3(1), N.D”

5. The bare reading of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above note clearly indicates that there was no proper application of mind by the Assessing Officer and penalty proceedings were initiated which were confirmed and penalty imposed by the Assistant Commissioner vide his order dated September 29, 1995. It cannot be said that the satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer is the result of due application of mind to the ingredients of section 271(1)(c) of the Act, but is founded on the threat of the mighty Revenue to an assessee. We are unable to understand as to how penalty proceedings can be initiated against an assessee as a safeguard against any default in payment of tax for the same year, i.e, 1992-93. It will not only be unjust and unfair, but also contrary to the scheme of the Act if the revenue authorities are permitted to use the initiation, continuation of penalty proceedings and imposition thereof, as a threat to an assessee for recovery of the tax due from the concerned assessee. Established canons of law impose a duty upon the concerned authorities to apply their mind, record satisfaction and then alone initiate penalty proceedings in conformity with the provisions of section 271 of the Act. Such application of mind essentially must be free of bias and the opinion arrived at should not offend the basic rule of law. The afore-referred to office note vitiates the very initiation of penalty proceedings being adopted as a coercive measure to recover the revenue rather than be founded on a subjective satisfaction in regard to the fact that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The Assessing Officer could not have passed two self-contradictory orders on the very same day, one computing the income of the assessee chargeable to tax and initiation of penalty proceedings while the other that such proceedings were being initiated as the safeguard and to ensure recovery of tax from the assessee. Such an approach is not contemplated under the provisions of section 271 of the Act and apparently would be impermissible. The satisfaction of the Assessing Officer under section 271 is a condition precedent to initiation of a penalty proceedings. At this stage, we may refer to the case of Diwan Enterprises, [2000]246 ITR 571 (Delhi), where the court held as under (pages 577, 578):

“Even after the amendment of 1964, penalty proceedings continue to be penal proceedings. Similarly, the question whether the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income continues to remain a question of fact. Where the Explanation has made a difference is while deciding that question the presumption created by it has to be applied which has the effect of shifting the burden of proof. The rule regarding burden of proof enunciated in Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali , [1970]76 ITR 696 (SC), is no longer valid. Whether it is a case of undisclosed or unexplained cash deposit or any other concealment the standard is the same. The principle enunciated in Anwar Ali's case, [1970]76 ITR 696 (SC) that mere rejection of the explanation of the assessee is not sufficient for levying penalty no longer holds good and it is no longer necessary that the Department must go further and establish that there was conscious concealment of particulars of income or a deliberate failure to furnish accurate particulars. The cases to which the Explanation is attracted have to be decided in the light of the law enunciated in the cases of Mussadilal Ram Bharose, [1987]165 ITR 14 (SC) and K.R Sadayappan, [1990]185 ITR 49 (SC)…….

In spite of the above said plea of the petitioner having been rejected, the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) has still to be set aside though for a different reason and because the very foundation for initiation of the penalty proceedings is conspicuous by its absence. The opening clause of sub-section (1) of section 271 itself contemplates a finding as regards satisfaction of availability of grounds under clause (c) being recorded during the assessment proceedings. Recently, in Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi-Iii v. Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd (I.T.C No. 13 of 1996 decided on October 8, 1998—since reported in [2000]246 ITR 568 (Delhi)), following the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in D.M Manasvi v. CIT, [1972] 86 ITR 557 and CIT v. S.V Angidi Chettiar, [1962]44 ITR 739 (SC), we have held that unless requisite satisfaction was recorded in the proceedings under the Act, which would mean the assessment proceedings, the jurisdiction to initiate the penalty proceedings could not have been exercised. Satisfaction has to be before the issue of notice or initiation of any step for imposing penalty. In the case at hand we find the Assessing Officer having nowhere recorded till the conclusion of the assessment proceedings his satisfaction that the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. This is a jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured. The initiation of the penalty proceedings was itself bad and, consequently, all the subsequent proceedings leading up to the passing of the penalty order must fail. C.W.P No. 3869 of 1997 is, therefore, liable to be allowed.”

6. This note was obviously not referred to, for the reason that the same was not produced before the concerned authorities. The Department is expected to act fairly and disclose before the adjudicating forum all true facts from the record of the authorities, as they are holder of records in discharge of their public duties. More so, recording of a note in exercise of quasi-judicial powers have a bearing on the matter in controversy. However, the record was produced before this court and the attention of the court has been drawn to this note which is admitted by the Department. The court cannot ignore such a relevant document. The bare reading of the order and the office note shows that the order passed by the Assessing Officer initiating the penalty proceedings under section 271 of the Act suffers from a jurisdictional error and an element of arbitrariness in forming opinion and recording the satisfaction with an object which is not permissible under the provisions of the Act. What is known to an adjudicating authority should be non-judicial and once a fact is judicially known to the authority, it should not escape mentioning thereof in its order. It is obligatory upon the authorities to apply their mind to various facets of the case pending before them and the orders passed under the stringent provisions of the revenue law should not be enforced against an assessee for a purpose which is not so stated in the provisions. The law always is not, what is said but what is done. What is said in the note is what is the background to the order initiating penalty proceedings. It is expected of the Assessing officers to understand the law in its correct perspective in the light of the judgments. Non in legendo sed in intelligendo leges consistunt. Correct understanding of law is a sine qua non to its proper application to the facts of a given case.

7. In view of our detailed discussion, we would answer the question of law in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee holding that the impugned order dated October 20, 2003 in so far as it relates to initiation of penalty proceedings is liable to be set aside. The question framed in the appeal is answered accordingly while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.