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Novartis Ag v. Wander Pvt. Ltd.
Factual and Procedural Background
The defendant (applicant) filed an application seeking a short extension of time (12 days) to perform certain obligations arising from a settlement between the parties dated 20th August, 2002 which had been approved by the Court. The settlement had been recorded by the parties through a joint application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The plaintiff opposed the application. The central procedural question referred to the Court was whether it had power to extend time and alter terms of a settlement embodied in a court-approved compromise, notwithstanding the opposition of one party.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court has the jurisdiction under Section 148 CPC to enlarge the time fixed for performance of obligations contained in a compromise decree obtained by a joint application under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, even if one party objects.
- Whether the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani (AIR 1983 SC 428) and related authorities permit the Court to extend time in such circumstances where the contract/settlement has merged in the Court's order.
- Whether the contrary view taken in precedents of this Court (notably Pioneer Engineering Co. v. D.H Machine Tools and Creative Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. Joginder Singh Palta) is binding and controls the outcome.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant / Defendant's Arguments
- The applicant sought only a 12-day enlargement of time to comply with the settlement terms approved by the Court.
- Counsel for the applicant relied on Section 148 CPC, which permits the Court in its discretion to enlarge any period fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act under the Code, even after expiry of the original period (subject to the statutory limit in the section itself).
- The applicant argued that the phrase "any period fixed or granted by this Court" in Section 148 is not strictly confined to acts prescribed or allowed by the Code and therefore covers the present situation where time was fixed pursuant to a compromise recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.
- Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani (AIR 1983 SC 428) for the proposition that where the contract merges in the Court's order the Court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice is not curtailed and the Court can, in appropriate cases, extend time even without the consent of the other party.
- Additional support was drawn from a Calcutta High Court decision in Smt. Mangala Ghosh v. Rabindra Nath Hazra (AIR 1987 Calcutta 307), particularly paragraph 17, which was interpreted as holding that the Court can extend time stipulated in a compromise decree without consent, treating stipulated time as not the essence and akin to a penal clause.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff opposed the application, relying on precedents of this Court which held that the Court does not have jurisdiction under Section 148 CPC to extend the time fixed in a compromise decree arrived at under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.
- Counsel for the plaintiff cited Pioneer Engineering Co. v. D.H Machine Tools (AIR 1986 Delhi 165) — a Single Judge decision — and the Division Bench decision in Creative Travels Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Joginder Singh Palta (1993 (52) DLT 371) which adopted the view that, in the absence of the parties' consent, the Court cannot enlarge the time fixed by the parties in a compromise.
- Creative Travels relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hukamchand v. Bansilal and others (AIR 1968 SC 86) to support the proposition that when parties bring litigation to an end by agreeing terms, it would be unfair and unjust for the Court to later alter those terms without consent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Periyakkal and others v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428 | Held that where a contract merges in the Court's order the Court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice is not curtailed; the Court would relieve against a forfeiture clause and could extend time in appropriate cases. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and remanded for fresh consideration. | The applicant relied on Periyakkal to argue the Court could enlarge time even without the other party's consent. The Court examined Periyakkal but found earlier and later decisions of this Court (Pioneer Engineering and Creative Travels) controlling and distinguished Periyakkal as inapplicable to the facts before those courts; the present Court followed the local precedents. |
| Smt. Mangala Ghosh v. Rabindra Nath Hazra, AIR 1987 Calcutta 307 | Paragraph 17 was cited for the proposition that under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act the Court can extend time for deposit of purchase-money in a compromise decree and that such time is not the essence of the contract (treated as a penal clause), enabling the Court to relieve the party from the rigours of that clause without the other's consent. | The applicant relied on this decision as supportive authority. The Court noted the reliance but ultimately preferred the binding decisions of this Court (Single Judge and Division Bench) which held otherwise in the context of compromises recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. |
| AIR 1921 Cal 356 (referred in Mangala Ghosh) | Referenced by the Calcutta High Court as part of the authority supporting extension of time in certain contexts (as cited in Mangala Ghosh). | Included within the chain of authorities relied upon by Mangala Ghosh; the present Court did not apply this older Calcutta decision directly but acknowledged it as part of the Calcutta High Court's reasoning. |
| AIR 1970 Cal 199 (referred in Mangala Ghosh) | Referenced by the Calcutta High Court as part of supporting authorities for the proposition that courts can extend time in certain compromise-related contexts. | Not directly applied by the present Court; noted as part of the authorities relied on by the Calcutta High Court in Mangala Ghosh. |
| AIR 1982 Cal 243 (Tapan Kr. Chatterjee) (referred in Mangala Ghosh) | Referred to by the Calcutta High Court in the chain of decisions concerning extension of time under compromise decrees. | Not directly applied; acknowledged as part of the Calcutta High Court's reliance in Mangala Ghosh. |
| AIR 1985 Cal 282 (Sunity Chandra Bose) (referred in Mangala Ghosh) | Discussed by the Calcutta High Court; the Calcutta Court considered it not in conflict with Tapan Kr. Chatterjee on the issue of extending time under S.28 Specific Relief Act. | Referenced by the applicant via Mangala Ghosh; the present Court did not treat this as controlling authority for the present application. |
| Pioneer Engineering Co. v. D.H Machine Tools, AIR 1986 Delhi 165 | Single Judge held that when a compromise decree is arrived at under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, the Court does not have jurisdiction under Section 148 CPC to extend time fixed by the parties in the compromise; Section 148 was held not applicable to such a compromise decree. | The Court treated this Single Judge decision as directly on point and binding unless persuaded otherwise. The present Court followed Pioneer Engineering and relied on its reasoning to deny jurisdiction under Section 148 in the present context. |
| Creative Travels Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Joginder Singh Palta, 1993 (52) DLT 371 | Division Bench held that in the absence of the consent of either party the Court has no jurisdiction to extend time fixed by the parties in a compromise recorded in court; relied upon Hukamchand and distinguished Periyakkal. | The Court treated the Division Bench decision as binding and persuasive; it followed Creative Travels to conclude that without the consenting party's agreement the Court cannot enlarge the time stipulated in a compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. |
| Hukamchand v. Bansilal and others, AIR 1968 SC 86 | Large Bench authority relied upon by Creative Travels for the proposition that when parties agree terms to end litigation it would be unfair for the Court to subsequently alter those terms without consent; cited in contexts where execution or postponement was involved. | The Division Bench in Creative Travels relied on Hukamchand to refuse extension without consent. The present Court accepted the Division Bench's reliance on Hukamchand and followed the resultant rule that the Court cannot unilaterally alter terms of a compromise approved by the parties under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, staying strictly with the materials and reasoning contained in the opinion:
- Identification of the statutory provision relied upon by the applicant: Section 148 CPC, which authorizes the Court to enlarge any period fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act under the Code, even after expiry of the original period (subject to the limits in the section).
- Consideration of the applicant's principal contention that Section 148's phrase "any period fixed or granted by this Court" is wide enough to include periods fixed pursuant to a compromise decree recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and therefore the Court could enlarge such a period even without the other party's consent.
- Review of the applicant's supporting authority (Smt. Periyakkal) where the Supreme Court held that where a contract merges in a court order the Court's power to act to further the ends of justice is not curtailed and it could relieve against forfeiture and extend time in appropriate cases. The Court acknowledged this authority and the applicant's reliance upon it.
- Consideration of the counter-argument advanced by the plaintiff relying on two precedents of this Court: (a) the Single Judge decision in Pioneer Engineering Co. v. D.H Machine Tools which directly addressed whether Section 148 applied to times fixed in a compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and held Section 148 inapplicable; and (b) the Division Bench decision in Creative Travels which found Periyakkal inapplicable and relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Hukamchand to hold that the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time in the absence of the parties' consent.
- The Court analysed the precedents and emphasized the binding nature of earlier decisions of this Court: it noted that the Single Judge in Pioneer Engineering had squarely dealt with the precise issue and concluded Section 148 did not permit enlargement of time fixed in a compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. The Court regarded this Single Judge decision as directly on point.
- The Court further noted that the Division Bench in Creative Travels had distinguished Periyakkal, applied Hukamchand, and held that, absent consent, the Court could not unilaterally alter the terms of a compromise which had been agreed to end litigation. The present Court observed that, as a Single Judge, it could not take a view inconsistent with that of a Division Bench.
- Given that both the Single Judge (Pioneer Engineering) and the Division Bench (Creative Travels) of this Court had addressed the issue and reached the conclusion that Section 148 CPC did not empower the Court to enlarge time fixed by the parties in a compromise recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC (and that the Court could not alter the time without the consenting party), the Court held itself bound by these decisions and declined to accept the applicant's interpretation of Section 148.
- Consequently, the Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to enlarge the time under Section 148 CPC for a period or condition prescribed in a compromise petition forming the basis of a court order under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, and therefore dismissed the application.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application for extension of time is DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the defendant's request for a 12-day extension to comply with the terms of the settlement approved on 20th August, 2002 is refused.
- The Court followed and applied binding precedent from this Court (Pioneer Engineering and the Division Bench in Creative Travels) and consequently held that Section 148 CPC does not grant jurisdiction to enlarge periods fixed in compromise decrees obtained under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC in the absence of the other party's consent.
- The opinion does not set out a new precedent; rather, it adheres to and applies existing decisions of this Court and explains why those decisions control the present application.
Mukul Mudgal, J.:— By this application the defendant is seeking extension of time to perform certain obligations in respect of settlement between the parties dated 20th August, 2002 approved by this Court. It is not in dispute that the settlement was arrived at by virtue of a joint application by the parties under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. The principal submission of Mr. Chandhiok, learned counsel for the applicant/defendant is that he is seeking extension of time only by 12 days to comply with the conditions imposed by the said terms of settlement. Thus the question of law which has been raised and arises for determination is the power of this Court to extend the time and alter terms of settlement between the parties notwithstanding the opposition by one of the parties to the settlement. The learned senior counsel for the applicant Mr. Chandhiok has relied upon provisions of section 148 cpc to contend that where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the originally fixed period may have expired: Section 148 CPC reads as follows:—
“148. Enlargement of time - Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, [not exceeding thirty days in total] even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.”
2. He states that the phrase ‘any period fixed or granted by this Court’ used in Section 148 need not be fully governed by the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code and would also include a situation such as the present case. He has also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Smt. Periyakkal and others v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:—
“True, the Court would not re-write a contract between the parties but the Court would relieve against a forfeiture clause; And, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the Court, the Court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed. Nothing said in Hukamchand's case militates against this view. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was in error in thinking that they had no power to extend time. Even so, Shri Jawali submitted that this was not an appropriate case for granting any extension of time. We desire to express no opinion on that question. The High Court will decide that question. We accordingly, set aside the judgment dated 15th January, 1979 of the High Court and direct the High Court to dispose of LA. No. VII in Execution Second Appeal No. 89/74 afresh in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs.”
He has contended that the above judgment applies to the present case on the ground that the dicta of law laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that where the contract of parties merges in the order of the Court, the Court's power or freedom to act further the ends of justice would not stand curtailed.
3. He has further relied upon the judgment of Calcutta High Court in Smt. Mangala Ghosh v. Rabindra Nath Hazra, AIR 1987 Calcutta 307 and in particular paragraph No. 17 of the judgment which reads as under:
“17. Therefore, relying upon the decisions reported in 33 Cal LJ 244 : (AIR 1921 Cal 356(2)); AIR 1970 Cal 199 and AIR 1983 SC 428 and also following the decision in Tapan Kr. Chatterjee's case (AIR 1982 Cal 243) (supra) as in my view the decision in Sunity Chandra Bose's case (AIR 1985 Cal 282) (supra) is not in conflict with the Tapan Kumar Chatterjee's case (supra) on the point that under S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Court can extend the time for deposit of the purchase-money or balance of the purchase-money, I hold that upon an application made by a party the Court can extend the time stipulated in the compromise petition upon which the consent decree has been passed in a suit for specific performance of contract, even without any consent of the other party, as in such a case the time so stipulated is not the essence of the contract and is a penal clause and such time becomes part of the Court's order and the Court is empowered to relieve the party concerned of the rigours of such penal clause in appropriate cases.”
4. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff while opposing this application has contended that the position of law is well settled in this Court by the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Pioneer Engineering Co. v. D.H Machine Tools, AIR 1986 Delhi 165 and by the judgment of the Division Bench in Creative Travels Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Joginder Singh Palta, 1993 (52) DLT 371, wherein the Division Bench of this Court by referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Periyakkal's case (supra) found the judgment inapplicable and applied the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hukamchand v. Bansilal and others, AIR, 1968 SC 86.
5. In my view, the learned Single Judge of this Court in Pioneer Engineering (supra) had squarely dealt with the issue whether a compromise decree arrived at between the parties by virtue of an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court could have alleged the time agreed to by the parties and held that the Court did not have jurisdiction under Section 148 CPC. Thus this decision which also refers to and explains the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Periyakkal's case (supra) is clearly and directly on the issue involved in the present case. The relevant position of law laid down by the learned Single Judge reads as under:—
“15. In Smt. Periyakkal v. Smt. Dakshyani, AIR 1983 SC 428 the respondent had obtained a money decree against the appellant. Later in execution of that decree certain property belonging to the appellant was brought to sale and the decree-holder herself purchased that property for Rs. 28,000/-. The appellant filed an application for setting aside the sale. The execution Court dismissed the application but on appeal the sale was set aside. The respondent-holder filed second appeal in the High Court. At the hearing of that appeal the parties entered into a compromise whereby the judgment debtor agreed to deposit and the decree-holder agreed to receive a sum of Rs. 60,000/- in full and final settlement of the decree. It was further agreed that if the deposit of the aforesaid amount was made on or before 1976 the sale was to stand set aside and the second appeal of the respondent was to stand dismissed. It was also agreed that if the amount of Rs. 60,000/- was not deposited on or before the date fixed the second appeal was to stand allowed and the sale was to stand confirmed. The time was stated to be the essence of the contract between the parties. The judgment debtors failed to deposit the agreed amount within the stipulated time. They later filed an application under S. 148 of the Code in the High Court for extension of time for deposit of Rs. 60,000/- in terms of the compromise. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that the Court could not extend time where the time had been stipulated by the parties themselves in the compromise arrived at between them. The Supreme Court reversed that finding. In that judgment time was not fixed under a decree but during the course of execution proceedings it was held that the time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. It was held that the Court had jurisdiction and the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court. There are thus mutual obligations under the decree and the time of three months is the essence of the contract which is the basis of compromise decree. Although the time was granted by the Court under the decree but it was not an act prescribed or allowed by any provision of the C.P.C or the rules made thereunder. It is held that S. 148 of the Code is not applicable and the Court under this section has no jurisdiction to extend the time fixed for the performance of an obligation under the compromise decree.”
6. Mr. Chandhiok has attempted to persuade me that this is not the correct position of law. He submitted that the Single Judge did not appreciate the correct position of law laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the time was fixed by the Court based upon the terms of settlement and the Court could enlarge such time without consent of one of the parties. I am of the view that the law laid down in the above judgment of learned single Judge is binding on me unless I am persuaded to the contrary in which case the only course left to me to refer the matter to the Division Bench after recording my views.
7. The Division Bench of this Court in Creative Travel's case (supra) after finding the judgment of Supreme Court in Periyakkal's case (supra) inapplicable, relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Hukamchand's case (supra). The learned Judges noticed the fact that during the appeal, a compromise was arrived at. The Division Bench thus held as follows:—
“(13) In the present case also there is a decree for possession in favour of the respondent which was liable to be executed immediately but for the consent of the parties who had agreed that the execution should be deterred till after 31st October, 1993. This agreement was arrived at when the compromise was recorded in this Court on 15th May, 1993. Just as in the Hukamchand's case, with the disposal of the application under Order XXI Rule 90 the sale was bound to be confirmed, similarly with the disposal of this appeal the execution of the decree had to follow but just as in Hukamchand's case, with the consent of the parties; the date of execution was postponed, similarly in the present case, with the consent of the parties the date of execution has been postponed till after 31st October, 1993. In Smt. Periyakkal's case however, the question was with regard to deposit of money within the time stipulated. We find that the present case is squarely covered by the decision of a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Hukamchand (supra) and, therefore, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time in the absence of the consent of either of the parties. It is to be borne in mind that when litigation is brought to an end by the parties agreeing to certain terms, it would be unfair and unjust for the Court to pass orders, subsequently and without their consent, which would be at variance with the terms of the agreement. In Periyakkal case it was observed that “The Court would hot rewrite contract between the parties” When there is a term in the agreement that if the premises are not vacated by 31st October, 1993 the Court decree would be executed and an undertaking to this effect is furnished, in our opinion that term of agreement cannot be unilaterally altered and the undertaking not acted upon. The parties avoided judgment at the time when the compromise was arrived at. A solemn undertaking was given to this Court that the premises will be vacated by 31st October, 1993. Had the time been fixed for vacating the premises without the consent of the parties, and merely by orders of the Court, there would have been no difficulty for the Court in granting extension. We do feel that the facts as made out in the application give sufficient reasons for extending the time because it appears that the applicants are constructing another house but with the respondent not giving his consent to the extension of any time this Court, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukamchand's case has no jurisdiction to entertain a request for enlargement of time. For the aforesaid reasons this application is dismissed.”
8. The above position of law laid down by the Division Bench clearly states that without the consent of the parties, it is not possible to grant extension of time even though there was cause made out for granting of extension of time. Mr. Chandhiok has attempted to distinguish the judgment of the Division Bench as not binding on the ground that the dicta of law in Periyyakal's case (supra) extracted above holding that once the contract of the parties is merged in the court's order, the Court's power to act to further the ends of justice would not stand curtailed, to contend that the Division Bench has not correctly applied and wrongly distinguished Periyyakal's case. In my view the Division Bench having noticed the judgment in Periyyakal and distinguished it and thereafter taken the aforesaid view, it is not open for me sitting as a Single Judge to take a view contrary to the view taken by the Division Bench. A plea as to whether or not the decision of Division Bench is not in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court, can not be raised before this Court particularly when the Division Bench noticed the position of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Periyyakal's case (supra).
9. Following the view of the Division Bench and the Single Judge of this Court, I am of the view that this Court has no jurisdiction to enlarge the time under Section 148 CPC in respect of time granted or condition prescribed in a compromise petition forming the basis of a Court order under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.
10. This application is accordingly dismissed. A copy of the order be given dasti under the signatures of the Court Master/Private Secretary.
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