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Union Of India And Another Petitioners v. Saboo Minerals Pvt. Ltd
Summary of Opinion — S.K. Mahajan, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The arbitral award was made on 17.4.2000 and was received by the appellant on 20.4.2000. The appellants filed an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act ("the Act") before the arbitrator for correction of the award on 19.7.2000. The Arbitrator issued notice of that application to the respondents, who pointed out that an application under Section 33 could be filed only within 30 days; the Arbitrator dismissed the Section 33 application on 15.9.2000. Thereafter the appellants filed objections under Section 34 of the Act on 27.11.2000. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the Section 34 objections as time‑barred, holding that objections must be filed within three months of receipt of the award and, if delayed for sufficient cause, within a further period of 30 days, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the objections after those periods had expired. The appellant challenged that order in this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the time for filing objections under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act starts only after disposal of an application under Section 33 by the arbitral tribunal (i.e., whether the period for Section 34 should be tolled while a Section 33 application is pending).
- Whether a party can exclude the time taken in pursuing a Section 33 application from the limitation period under Section 34(3) when the Section 33 application itself was filed after the period prescribed for Section 33.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellants contended that the period for filing objections under Section 34(3) would not commence while an application under Section 33 was pending before the arbitral tribunal; time would begin only from the date the Section 33 request was disposed of by the tribunal.
- On that basis, the appellants submitted that their Section 34 objections (filed on 27.11.2000) were within time if limitation were calculated from the date the Section 33 application was rejected.
Respondent / Arbitrator Position
- The respondents pointed out that an application under Section 33 must be filed within 30 days; they relied on the time‑bar to challenge the maintainability of the Section 33 application.
- The Arbitrator dismissed the Section 33 application on the ground that it was filed beyond the 30‑day period.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined whether the time consumed in pursuing a Section 33 application can be excluded from the limitation period for filing Section 34 objections. The Court stated that exclusion of time spent on a Section 33 application is permissible only if the Section 33 application itself was filed within the period prescribed by the Act. The judge reasoned that allowing tolling where the Section 33 application was filed well after the prescribed period would enable a party to circumvent the statutory limitation in Section 34 by routinely filing belated Section 33 applications and awaiting their disposal before filing Section 34 objections.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted the chronology: award dated 17.4.2000, received 20.4.2000; Section 33 application filed 19.7.2000 and dismissed by the Arbitrator on 15.9.2000 as time‑barred. Because the Section 33 application was itself not within the time prescribed by the Act, the appellant could not rely on Section 34(3) to treat the limitation for Section 34 objections as starting from the date the Section 33 application was rejected. If the Section 33 application had been timely filed, exclusion of time for pursuing it would be available; but that was not the case here.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act were rightly dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge as being beyond time.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the appellants' Section 34 objections remain time‑barred and the trial court's order is upheld. The Court emphasized that time spent in pursuing a Section 33 application can be excluded from the Section 34 limitation only where the Section 33 application was itself filed within the prescribed period; because the Section 33 application in this matter was time‑barred, the appellant could not rely on tolling under Section 34(3). The opinion does not discuss any broader precedent beyond the application of these statutory limitation principles to the facts of this case.
S.K Mahajan, J.:— Admit.
2. On a reference being made to the Arbitrator, the award was made on 17.4.2000 The award was admittedly received by the appellant on 20.4.2000 The appellants moved an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (in short referred to as the “Act”) before the arbitrator for correction of the award, on 19th July, 2000. Notice of this application was issued by the Arbitrator to the respondents. On being pointed out by the respondents that an application under Section 33 of the Act could be filed only within 30 days, the Arbitrator dismissed the application on 15.9.2000 Objections to the award under Section 34 of the Act were thereafter filed by the appellants on 27.11.2000 Since under Section 34 of the Act, objections could be filed within three months of the date of receipt of the award by the party and if the party is prevented by sufficient cause from making an application within the period of three months, the Court could entertain the application within a further period of 30 days, the objections were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on the ground that the same were clearly barred by time and the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the objections after 30 days of the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the award by the parties. This order has now been challenged by the appellant in this Court.
3. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that time for filing objections under Section 34(3) of the Act would not start till such time the application under Section 33 of the Act was pending before the arbitral Tribunal and time will start only from the date the request made under Section 33 of the Act is disposed of by the arbitral Tribunal. It is submitted that as the application under Section 34 of the Act was within time calculating the same from the date of rejection of the application under Section 33 of the Act, the appellant could not be dismissed by the Arbitrator only on the ground of limitation.
4. To exclude the time taken in pursuing the application under Section 33 of the Act, the application filed under Section 33 has to be within the period prescribed in the Act. In a case where an application under Section 33 of the Act has been filed say after a period of six months from the date of receipt of the award by the party, it cannot be said that the time for filing objections under Section 34 of the Act would start from the date of rejection of such an application. If this contention is accepted, any party with a view to circumvent the limitation provided in Section 34 of the Act would make an application before the Arbitrator under Section 33 of the Act and wait for his decision and file objections after disposal of such an application, which was not even maintainable because of the same having been filed beyond the time prescribed in Section 33 of the Act. I am, therefore, not impressed with the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that the limitation would start from the date of rejection of the application under Section 33 by the Arbitrator. If the application under Section 33 had been filed within time, no doubt, the appellant would have been entitled to the exclusion of time taken in pursuing the said application but as the application under Section 33 of the Act itself was barred by time, in my opinion, the appellant cannot take advantage of Section 34(3) of the Act so as to start limitation from the date of rejection of such an application.
5. The objections under Section 34 of the Act being beyond time were rightly dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. I find no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. There are no merits in the appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
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