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Vinod Kumar Mehta & Ors Petitioners v. Haryana Financial Corporation & Ors S

Delhi High Court
Sep 10, 2003
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Judgment Summary — Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are the sons and legal representatives of the late Sh. P.R. Mehta, who had stood as guarantor to a loan given by the Haryana Financial Corporation (respondent No. 1) to M/s Ego Metal Works Pvt. Ltd., a company which was under liquidation. A recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 was issued by respondent No. 1 from Chandigarh under Section 3 of the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 (the said Act) for recovery of Rs. 45,26,116/- due from, inter alia, late Sh. P.R. Mehta (represented through his legal representatives, the petitioners). Pursuant to that recovery certificate, the Collector in New Delhi (respondent No. 2) issued recovery notices dated 02.07.1998 to the petitioners, treating the sum as arrears of land revenue and directing payment by 13.07.1998.

The petitioners filed this writ petition seeking (a) writ of certiorari to quash the recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 and the recovery notices dated 02.07.1998 and (b) writ of prohibition preventing respondents from taking coercive action on the basis of the recovery certificate and notices. At the threshold, respondents raised the question of territorial jurisdiction, and the court decided to address that question first. The opinion disposes of the petition on territorial jurisdiction grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court of Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide a writ petition challenging the recovery certificate issued by the Haryana Financial Corporation at Chandigarh and subsequent recovery notices issued by the Collector in New Delhi?
  2. Whether the recovery notices issued by the Collector in Delhi are independently challengeable in Delhi, or are they merely ministerial acts dependent on the recovery certificate issued at Chandigarh under Section 3 of the said Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended that the High Court at Delhi has territorial jurisdiction because they did not receive any notice from Chandigarh; the notices they received were the recovery notices issued in Delhi by respondent No. 2.
  • They also submitted that respondent No. 1 (Haryana Financial Corporation) has an office in Delhi and carries on business or works for gain in Delhi, which, they argued, gives the courts at Delhi jurisdiction to decide the matter.

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • Respondent No. 1 submitted that the cause of action arose entirely at Chandigarh where the recovery certificate under Section 3(2) of the said Act was issued, and therefore the High Court at Delhi did not have territorial jurisdiction.
  • It was further argued that the issuance of the recovery notices by respondent No. 2 (the Collector in Delhi) was a mere ministerial function compelled by receipt of the recovery certificate and that respondent No. 2 had no power or duty to examine the correctness of the recovery certificate.
  • Accordingly, any challenge to the recovery certificate must lie before the High Court having jurisdiction over Chandigarh (i.e., the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh), not the Delhi High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Swaika Properties & Anr., 1985 (3) SCR 598 Defines "cause of action" as the bundle of facts which, with the law applicable, gives a right to relief; held that mere service of notice at a place does not create a cause of action there unless the service is an "integral part" of the cause of action. The court relied on this principle to assess whether service/receipt of the recovery notices in Delhi constituted an integral part of the cause of action; it concluded they did not because the decisive act (issuance of the recovery certificate) occurred at Chandigarh.
Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 To confer territorial jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226 the facts pleaded must show a nexus or relevance with the lis so that at least part of the dispute arose within the Court's territorial jurisdiction. The court applied this test and found that the facts pleaded did not show that any part of the cause of action—being the issuance of the recovery certificate—arose in Delhi; therefore Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first analyzed the statutory scheme in the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979. It noted:

  • Section 2 defines "Collector" and "Corporation" for the purposes of the Act.
  • Section 3(1)–(3) sets out that a sum recoverable by a Corporation is to be determined by the Managing Director and that the Officer or Managing Director shall send a certificate to the Collector requesting recovery as if it were arrears of land revenue; Section 3(3) states that such a certificate is conclusive proof of the matters stated and that the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue.
  • Section 3(4) bars civil courts from entertaining or proceeding with matters relating to such recovery.

From the statutory text the court concluded that the Collector's role on receipt of a recovery certificate is purely ministerial: the Collector has "no role to play except to recover the amount stated" and "merely performs a ministerial function," not a quasi‑judicial one. Consequently, a writ of certiorari would not properly lie against the Collector's recovery notices alone because the Collector did not adjudicate or exercise a discretionary judicial function.

The court next turned to the question of where the cause of action arose. Applying the precedents (State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties and Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.), the court treated the recovery certificate issued at Chandigarh as the causa causae—the essential cause of the subsequent recovery notices. The opinion emphasized that the recovery notices were effects of the recovery certificate; without the certificate the notices could not have been issued. Therefore the real and substantial cause of action was the issuance of the recovery certificate at Chandigarh, not the ministerial issuance of notices by the Collector in Delhi.

Because the decisive operative act giving rise to the grievance (the recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998) was performed at Chandigarh, the court held there was no sufficient nexus to treat any part of the cause of action as arising in Delhi. Applying the test that a High Court's territorial jurisdiction requires at least part of the dispute to have arisen within its territory, the court concluded that the Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed on the ground that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Implications:

  • The direct practical effect is that the petitioners' challenge in the Delhi High Court fails for want of territorial jurisdiction; the petition is dismissed without consideration of the merits.
  • The petitioners have been granted liberty to approach the appropriate court having jurisdiction (i.e., the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over Chandigarh) to challenge the recovery certificate and related proceedings.
  • There shall be no orders as to costs.
  • The court's decision rests on applying established jurisdictional principles and the statutory scheme; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying existing authorities on cause of action and territorial jurisdiction.

This summary was prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond that text was presumed or added.

Show all summary ...

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.:— This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing impugned notices dated 02.07.1998 issued by the respondent No. 2 (Assistant Collector, Grade-I/II, 37, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi) and the recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 issued by the respondent No. 1 (Haryana Financial Corporation) at Chandigarh. The petitioners have also sought a writ of prohibition against the respondents 1 and 2 from taking any coercive action against the petitioner On the basis of the aforesaid recovery notices and a recovery certificate.

2. At the threshold, the respondents have raised the question of territorial jurisdiction. The respondents state that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain this petition and this question be decided first before examining the merits of the case. Accordingly, the question of territorial jurisdiction is being disposed of by this judgment.

3. The petitioners are the sons of late Sh. P.R Mehta, who was a guarantor to a loan extended by the Haryana Financial Corporation to the respondent No. 3 company (M/s Ego Metal Works Pvt. Ltd) which was under liquidation.

4. The recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 has been issued by the respondent No. 1 from Chandigarh and is addressed to the Collector at New Delhi with the request to affect the recovery from, inter alia, the petitioner and to remit the same to the Haryana Financial Corporation at the earliest. The recovery certificate has been issued u/s 3 of the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) for the recovery of Rs. 45,26,116/- due to the Haryana Financial Corporation, Chan digarh from, inter alia, late Sh. P.R Mehta (by now deceased) represented through his LRs (i.e, the petitioners herein). Based upon the said recovery certificate, the respondent No. 2 issued recovery notices dated 02.07.1998 to the petitioners herein stating therein that a sum of Rs. 45,26,116/- on account of Haryana Financial Corporation, Chandigarh was recoverable from them as arrears of land revenue and directed them to deposit the dues by 13.07.1998, failing which further action for realisation of the same would be taken against them.

5. The petitioners have challenged these notices as well as the recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 While the recovery certificate has been issued from Chandigarh, the recovery notices have been issued by the respondent No. 2 in Delhi itself. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition inasmuch as the petitioners have not received any notice from Chandigarh. The notices that they have received are those issued by the respondent No. 2 in Delhi. They further submit that an office of the respondent No. 1 is also situated at Delhi. The respondent No. 1 also works for gain and/or carries on business at Delhi and, accordingly, the Courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction to decide the present matter. On the other hand, respondent No. 1 submitted that this Court would not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition as no part of the cause of action has arisen in Delhi. He submitted that the issuance of the notices by the respondent No. 2 is a mere ministerial function and the cause of action as such is the issuance of the recovery certificate which has been issued at Chandigarh. Accordingly, he submitted that any writ petition challenging the issuance of the recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 lies only before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh and not before this Court.

6. In this context, it would be relevant to notice a few provisions of the said Act. Section 2 (a) defines ‘Collector’ to mean a Collector of the District and includes any person appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of a Collector under the said Act. Section 2 (b) defines ‘Corporation’ to mean the Haryana Financial Corporation established under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 and includes any other corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government which the State Government may, by notification specify. Section 3 of the said Act which relates to the recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue reads as under:—

“3. Recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue.

1) Where any sum is recoverable from a defaulter-

(a) by the State Government, such officer as it may, by notification, appoint in this behalf;

(b) by a Corporation or a Government company, the Managing Director thereof,

shall determine the sum due from the defaulter.

(2) The Officer or the Managing Director, as the case may be, referred to in sub-section (1), shall send a certificate to the Collector mentioning the sum due from the defaulter and requesting that such sum together with the cost of proceedings be recovered as if were an arrear of land revenue.

(3) A certificate sent under sub-section (2) shall be conclusive proof of the matters stated therein and the Collector, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover the amount stated therein as an arrear of land revenue.

(4) No civil court shall have jurisdiction-

(a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any case; or

(b) to adjudicate upon or proceed with any pending case,

relating to the recovery of any sum due as aforesaid from the defaulter. The proceedings relating to the recovery of the sums due from the defaulters, pending at the commencement of this Act in any civil court, shall abate.”

7. It is, therefore, clear that the recovery proceedings are initiated by such officer as the State Government may appoint by notification or by the Managing Director by the issuance of a recovery certificate under Section 3 (2) of the said Act. It is also clear that this certificate is sent to the “Collector” as defined in the Act for the purposes of recovering the sum due as if it were arrears of land revenue. Section 3 (3) makes it clear that the recovery certificate under Section 3 (2) of the said Act shall be conclusive proof of the matters stated therein and the Collector, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover the amount stated therein as arrears of land revenue. From this, it becomes apparent that the Collector, who receives such a recovery certificate, has no role to play except to recover the amount stated in the recovery certificate as arrears of land revenue. He merely performs a ministerial function. He does not decide any lis and any action taken by him does not have the trappings of a qasi judicial function. As such, in the first instance, no writ of certiorari could at all be issued quashing the recovery notices dated 02.07.1998 This is one aspect of the matter.

8. The other and main aspect of the matter is that the cause of action entirely arose at Chandigarh where the recovery certificate under Section 3 (2) was issued. In the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Swaika Properties & Anr., 1985 (3) SCR 598, the Supreme Court observed that cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. In that case, the Supreme Court held that mere service of notice under Section 52 (2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 on the respondents therein at their registered office at Calcutta, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such a notice was an “integral part” of the cause of action. The Supreme Court further held that the answer to the question whether service of notice is integral part of cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. Again in the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd: (2002) 1 SCC 567, the Supreme Court categorically observed that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. In particular, the Supreme Court observed as under:—

“It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned.”

9. In this particular case, we have to examine, therefore, what is the ac tual grievance of the petitioner. The petitioners, in view of Section 3 (3) of the said Act, cannot have any grievance with regard to the issuance of notices dated 02.07.1998 because these have been issued merely in compliance of the recovery certificate received by the respondent No. 2 from the Haryana Financial Corporation at Chandigarh. The respondent No. 2 had no option in the matter. He was not in any manner enjoined with any duty to examine the correctness or otherwise of the recovery certificate issued under Section 3 (2) of the said Act. The issuance of the recovery certificate is conclusive proof of the matters stated therein. In fact, the actual cause of action is in respect of the recovery certificate which is the causa causae and it is well-known that causa causae est causa causati(the cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused) and the cause of the cause is to be considered as the cause of the effect also (see: Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, p. 220). Thus, the recovery notices are nothing but the effect and the cause, in point of fact, is the issuance of the recovery certificate. In other words, the recovery certificate is the causa sine qua non (a necessary or inevitable cause); a cause without which the effect in question could not have happened (see: Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, p. 221). Sans the recovery certificate, the recovery notices could not have been issued. Thus, it is clear that the recovery notices dated 02.07.1998 cannot be set aside without the recovery certificate dated 21.01.1998 also being set aside. The recovery notices have no life of their own and must necessarily depend for their sustenance on the existence of the recovery certificate. If the petitioners are to succeed, they must challenge the recovery certificate and the cause of action for which arose entirely in Chandigarh. The recovery notices do not form an integral part of the cause of action. Thus, this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.

10. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction. The petitioners are, however, granted liberty to approach the appropriate Court having jurisdiction in this matter. There shall be no orders as to costs.