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Sunil Srivastava Petitioner v. Ashok Kalra

Delhi High Court
Sep 25, 2002
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Mahmood Ali Khan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the accused in a criminal complaint filed by the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before a court in Delhi. The petitioner filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of that criminal complaint.

Relevant factual allegations in the complaint (as stated in the opinion): the respondent (proprietor of M/s Transworld Cargo & Travels, New Delhi) alleged that the petitioner had the respondent book consignments and the petitioner issued four post-dated cheques (dated 12.6.1996, 23.7.1996, 27.11.1996 and 23.7.1996) in favour of the respondent for Rs. 1,00,000; Rs. 34,000; Rs. 34,000; and Rs. 32,000 respectively. The cheques were presented through Oriental Bank of Commerce, New Delhi and were dishonoured by State Bank of Patiala, Kanpur on 16.12.1996 for "insufficient funds".

The respondent sent a demand notice dated 23.12.1996 by registered post A.D. to the petitioner, which the complaint alleges was duly received at both of the petitioner's addresses. The petitioner allegedly failed to make payment within 15 days of receipt of that notice. The criminal complaint was filed on 11.2.1997.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the criminal complaint is time-barred under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (i.e., whether the complaint was filed beyond the one-month period prescribed from the date on which the cause of action arises).
  2. Whether there was a legally enforceable debt or liability such as to sustain a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (i.e., sufficiency of consideration / legal debt).
  3. Whether the courts at Delhi had territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint (given the cheques were dishonoured at Kanpur).
  4. Whether the demand notice dated 23.12.1996 was defective or invalid because it sought payment of amounts in addition to the cheque amounts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (summary as stated in the opinion)

  • The criminal complaint was filed beyond the time prescribed by Section 142 of the Act (the complaint was filed on 11.2.1997 and thus allegedly outside the one-month period from the expiration of 15 days after receipt of the notice).
  • There was no legally enforceable debt or liability entitling the respondent to institute criminal proceedings under Section 138 (petitioner asserted the cheques were given as security for a proposed partnership/loan and later disavowed the loan and asked for return of cheques).
  • The cause of action arose at Kanpur where the cheques were dishonoured, therefore Delhi courts lacked territorial jurisdiction.
  • The notice of demand was invalid because it demanded the cheque amounts along with other outstanding dues, making the notice defective.

Respondent's Position (summary as stated in the opinion)

  • The respondent alleged that the demand notice dated 23.12.1996 was sent by registered A.D. and was duly received by the petitioner at both addresses, and that the petitioner failed to pay within 15 days.
  • The respondent relied on the return memos (dated 16.12.1996) showing dishonour for insufficient funds and on the statutory notice/demand as the basis for filing the complaint.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajender Prasad v. Bashir & Others (2001 III AD (Cr.) SC 334) High Court should exercise inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in special circumstances (reference to earlier Krishnan judgment). The court noted this principle and proceeded to decide the petition on merits, applying the settled approach to Section 482 petitions.
Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, 1997 (4) SCC 241 High Court may exercise power under Section 482 where there is failure of justice, misuse of judicial mechanism, incorrect sentence or order, to prevent abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. Used as foundational authority for the circumstances in which Section 482 may be invoked; the court framed its approach to the petition accordingly.
Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal & Anr., JT 2000 (1) SC 493 Interprets "said amount" in Section 138 as the cheque amount; and holds that a demand notice that separately states cheque amount and incidental charges is valid — payment of cheque amount absolves criminal liability though other claims may remain civil. The court relied on this to interpret the term "said amount" and to hold the demand notice dated 23.12.1996 valid because it specified the cheque amounts and demanded those within 15 days.
M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours v. State of Bihar & Anr., JT 2000 (7) SC 563 Where a criminal complaint does not mention that the demand notice was served on the drawer, the complaint may be held not maintainable. The court distinguished that case: here the complaint specifically alleged the notice was sent by registered A.D. and duly received, so Shakti Travel was not directly applicable.
Sridhar M.A v. Metalloy N. Steel Corporation, 2000 (1) SCC 397 Presumption of service of notice is not to be treated as conclusive; presumption of due service must be accepted or rejected on facts of each case. The court observed that presumption of due service (Section 27, General Clauses Act) is available to the sender but rebuttable; evidence will determine service — this case did not foreclose that factual inquiry.
M/s. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. M/s. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. and others (AIR 2001 SC 676) To constitute offence under Section 138, complaint must prove its ingredients including receipt of notice by the accused; emphasis on 'receipt' rather than mere 'giving' of notice; Section 27 General Clauses Act affords a rebuttable presumption of service. The court invoked this principle to state that the respondent may lead evidence to prove actual receipt of notice and that the presumption of service is available but rebuttable.
Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sun/7 Kumar, 1998 (2) JCC (SC) 91 Harmonises repeated presentation of cheques with the one-time opportunity to file complaint: each presentation gives a right, but once notice under Section 138 is given and drawer fails to pay, the cause of action for complaint accrues and the one-month limitation starts after expiry of 15 days. The court used this to hold that subsequent presentations after issuance of the statutory demand do not create fresh causes of action and that limitation is reckoned from expiry of the 15-day period after receipt of notice.
Shri Taher N. Khambati v. M/s. Vinayak Enterprises, 1995 Cri.LJ 560 On facts where blank signed cheques were filled by creditor to create cause for criminal prosecution, Section 138 may not be attracted; risk of abuse if such practice allowed. The court treated this as factually peculiar and not helpful to the petitioner at preliminary stage because the present facts differ and evidence is yet to be recorded.
Uplanche Mallikarjun & others v. Rat Kanti Vimala & another, 1997 Cri.LJ 4237 Where a criminal complaint does not allege that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legal enforceable debt, proceedings under Section 138 may be quashed. The court observed that the present complaint does allege issuance in discharge of a legally recoverable debt, so that authority is distinguishable.
K. Bhasakaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, 1999 SCC (Crl) 1284 Territorial jurisdiction in Section 138 cases: offence is completed on failure to pay within 15 days (per proviso to Section 138) and cannot be fixed solely by the location of the bank; place of offence may be where drawer resides, where payee resides, or where either carries on business. The court relied on this to conclude that Delhi has jurisdiction since part of the cause of action arose where the payee (respondent) resided/carried on business in Delhi.
Canbank Financial Services Ltd v. Gitanjli Motors Ltd. & Ors., 1995 Crl.LJ 1222 Place of payment is material for jurisdiction; if cheque was given to complainant at Delhi, subsequent dishonour elsewhere does not preclude Delhi courts from jurisdiction. The court cited this to support the conclusion that Delhi courts had territorial jurisdiction because the cheques/transaction involved the complainant in Delhi and payment could be tendered there.
R.K. Jain v. State, (1988) 1 Crimes 514 Illustrative support for the proposition that the place where the cheque was given/handed over may be the place of the offence for jurisdictional purposes. The court cited it as supporting authority in the discussion of place of handing over/payment being relevant to territorial jurisdiction.
M.M. Malik & Ors. v. Prem Kumar Goel & Another, 1991 (2) CC Cases 157 (HC) Dishonour of cheque is part of cause of action; offence completes when drawer fails to discharge liability to creditor at creditor's place (offence may thus be completed where creditor's office is). Used to support the view that an offence under Section 138 may be completed at the creditor's place (here, Delhi), giving the Delhi court jurisdiction.
Central Bank of India v. M/s. Saxons Farms, (1999) 8 JT (SC) 58 Object of demand notice is to give drawer chance to rectify omission; payment of cheque amount absolves criminal liability even if other heads of claim are also mentioned in the notice. The court relied on this to hold that the notice dated 23.12.1996 was not legally infirm merely because it mentioned other outstanding dues in addition to cheque amounts.
United Credit Ltd., Calcutta v. Agro Sales India & Ors., IV (2000) CCR 50 (SC) Followed Suman Sethi: notice of demand that mentions cheque amount and other claims can be valid; payment of cheque amount absolves criminal liability under Section 138. The court cited this as further authority validating the sufficiency of a notice that demands cheque amount plus other sums, and used it to uphold the notice in present case.
Gopa Debi Ozha v. Sujit Paul, 1995 Cri.LJ 3412 (Calcutta High Court) Held that if a notice mentions a bigger or smaller amount than the cheque amount without clarity, the notice may be insufficient and vague. The court distinguished the present facts, noting that the notice here did indicate the cheque amounts and so Gopa Debi Ozha did not assist the petitioner.
A.C. Raj, Thottathu Veedu, Parasala v. M. Rajan, Ezhakudivila Veedu and another, 1997 Cri.LJ 1939 Where the demand notice did not specify cheque amount and demanded amount with interest without particulars, the notice was invalid under Section 138(b). The court distinguished this precedent on facts, noting that the present notice specified the cheque amounts and therefore was not invalid on that ground.
Hukumchand Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The Bank of Baroda and others, AIR 1977 Karnataka 204 On contracts of guarantee: there must be three parties in contemplation (principal debtor, creditor, and guarantor); principle relates to guarantees. The court noted that this authority did not advance the petitioner's argument regarding territorial jurisdiction and therefore was not helpful to the petitioner.
H. Mohamed Khan (deceased by LRs) and others v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and others, AIR 1983 Karnataka 73 On contract of guarantee: requires express participation or implied assent among the three parties necessary for guarantee. The court observed that this precedent did not assist the petitioner's jurisdictional arguments and was not applicable to the present issues.
State of Maharashtra v. Dr. M.N. Kaul (dead) by his LRs and another, AIR 1967 SC 1634 Held that in a case of contract of guarantee the guarantor cannot be made liable beyond the term of his engagement (citation used in context of guarantees). The court noted the citation but stated it was not understood how this judgment advanced the petitioner's argument on territorial jurisdiction; thus it was not applied to grant relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each of the petitioner's grounds in turn, applying statutory provisions and precedent as follows.

1. Limitation under Section 142 / timing of complaint:

  • The court reproduced Sections 142 and 138 to identify when the one-month limitation for filing a complaint under Section 142 begins: the one-month period runs from the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, i.e., after 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice if the drawer fails to make payment within that 15-day period.
  • The petitioner contended the complaint was filed beyond the one-month period (complaint filed on 11.2.1997). The court noted that the complaint alleged the notice was sent by registered A.D. and "duly received" but did not specify the date of receipt; accordingly the respondent has the right to lead evidence to prove the actual date of receipt and that the complaint was within limitation.
  • The court relied on authorities (including Dalmia Cement, Shakti Travel, Sridhar and Suman Sethi) to explain that it is the receipt of the notice by the drawer that gives rise to the cause of action and that presumption of service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is available but rebuttable. Because factual proof of receipt is a matter for evidence, the court found the first ground not tenable at the preliminary stage.

2. Alleged absence of legally enforceable debt (Section 139 presumption):

  • The court noted Section 139 creates a presumption that a cheque was issued for discharge of a legal debt or liability; this presumption is rebuttable.
  • The petitioner had asserted that the cheques were given in connection with a proposed partnership/loan and were not in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. The court held this contention to be premature at the quashing stage because resolution requires evidence; mere assertion by the petitioner could not justify quashing the complaint.

3. Territorial jurisdiction:

  • The court considered Supreme Court authority (K. Bhasakaran) and other decisions (Canbank Financial Services, R.K. Jain, M.M. Malik) establishing that the place where the offence under Section 138 is completed is not necessarily the bank branch where the cheque was dishonoured; it may be where the drawer resides, where the payee resides, or where either carries on business, and the place of payment is material for jurisdiction.
  • Applying those principles to the facts, and noting that the respondent resided and carried on business in Delhi and that payment could be tendered to the respondent in Delhi, the court concluded that part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi and that the Delhi courts had territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the complaint.

4. Validity of the demand notice:

  • The court acknowledged that the notice must be construed strictly but also in context. The notice of 23.12.1996 identified the cheques and their amounts and also referred to other outstanding dues. The court relied on Suman Sethi, Central Bank of India v. Saxons Farms, and United Credit Ltd. v. Agro Sales to hold that a demand notice which specifies the cheque amount and separately indicates other incidental claims is valid and that payment of the cheque amount within 15 days would absolve the drawer of criminal liability under Section 138.
  • Because the notice here specified the cheque amounts in the relevant paragraphs (paras 2 and 4 of the notice read together), the court held the notice did not suffer legal infirmity. The court distinguished precedents where the notice failed to specify cheque amount or was vague.

Final assessment:

  • The court concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated a basis for quashing the criminal complaint at the preliminary stage. Questions of receipt of notice, the existence of legal debt, and other factual matters required evidence at trial rather than summary disposal by quashing. There was no illegality or impropriety warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 in the petitioner's favour.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was dismissed in limine.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The criminal complaint filed by the respondent remains extant and the trial court may proceed with the criminal prosecution against the petitioner.
  • Questions raised by the petitioner (limitation, existence of legally enforceable debt, territorial jurisdiction, and notice validity) were held to be matters requiring evidence and factual determination at trial rather than grounds for summary quashing; the court refused to exercise Section 482 to quash the complaint on the material before it.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond application of existing authorities; the decision is limited to denying the petition and allowing the normal course of trial/evidence to determine disputed factual matters.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what is stated in that text.

Show all summary ...

Mahmood Ali Khan, J.:— The petitioner is an accused in a criminal complaint filed by the respondent for his prosecution for offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the Act) before a court in Delhi. He has filed this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing of this criminal complaint.

2. Supreme Court, in Rajender Prasad v. Bashir & Others, 2001 III AD (Cr.) SC 334 after referring to the earlier judgment in Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, 1997 (4) SCC 241 held that the High Court should exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C in special circumstances. In Krishnan and another (supra) the Supreme Court had laid down that the High Court may exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C where High Court finds that there had been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice. It is now well settled that a criminal complaint which does not disclose commission of offence may be quashed in order to prevent abuse of process. In the light of the above law, I proceed to decide the petition on merits.

3. The grounds on which the petitioner wants this criminal complaint to be quashed may be summarised as belows :—

(1) The criminal complaint is filed beyond the time prescribed by Section 142 of the Act, as such, the trial court was debarred from taking cognizance of the offence, and proceed with the trial.

(2) There is no legal enforceable debt or liability against the petitioner accused entitling the respondent complaint to institute the criminal proceeding under Section 138 of the Apt.

(3) The cause of action had arisen at Kanpur where the cheques were dishonoured by the bank. Therefore, courts at Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain these criminal complaints.

(4) A notice of demand is invalid as much as it has demanded the amount of cheque and other outstanding dues.

Before adverting on the above grounds and the case law cited by the petitioner, it will be necessary to state the relevant facts for appreciating the arguments on merit.

4. A criminal complaint was filed by the respondent alleging that he was proprietor of M/s Transworld Cargo & Travels having its office at 2197/3, Chuna Mandi, Paharganj, New Delhi. The petitioner accused used to get consignments for his various clients booked for transportation through the respondent in respect of which the respondent had raised bills in the name of the clients of the petitioner as requested and demanded by the petitioner but the payments were being made by the petitioner in respect of those consignments. In order to make the payment of the outstanding dues of the respondent, the petitioner issued, amongst others, four cheques dated 12.6.1996, 23.7.1996, 27.11.1996 and 23.7.1996 all drawn on his banker State Bank of Patiala, Naveen Market, Kanpur for the sum of Rs. 1.00 lac, 34,000/-, 34,000/- and 32,000/- respectively in favour of respondent firm in part payment of the freight payable in respect of the consignment, The cheques were presented to the banker of the petitioner through Oriental Bank of Commerce, Rajindra Nagar, New Delhi within the validity period of the cheques but they were dishonoured by State Bank of Patiala, Naveen Market, Kanpur vide their cheque return memorandum dated 16.12.1996 for the reason “insufficient funds” in the account of the petitioner. The petitioner thereupon issued a notice dated 23.12.1996 by registered post A.D demanding payment of the amount of the cheques as well as other outstanding dues within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice of demand. Notice dated 23.12.1996 was duly served and received by the petitioner accused at both office addresses but he failed to make the payment within the stipulated period of 15 days from the receipt of the notice. The petitioner thereby had committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and was liable to be punished.

5. The first ground on which the quashing of the criminal complaint is prayed for by the petitioner is that the criminal complaint is filed beyond the period prescribed by Section 142 of the Act. Section 142 of the Act provides as under :—

“142. Cognizance of Offences :—

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause-of-action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138;

(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.”

6. Clause (1) bars taking of cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Act except by the written complaint filed by (1) a payee of the cheque, and (2) the holder in due course of the cheque. Clause (b) of the aforesaid section prescribed the limitation for filing the criminal complaint. The limitation is one month of the date “on which cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138”. Clause (c) of Section 142 on the other hand specifies the class of the court which would try an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. It says that only a court of Metropolitan Magistrate of Judicial Magistrate or above will have jurisdiction to try this offence. Since the criminal complaint could be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, it will be necessary to reproduce Section 138 of the Act also to determine the limitation.

“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.-

Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this sections shall apply unless—

(a) the cheque has beer presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.

(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and

(c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”

7. Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 mandates the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount of the cheque to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of the notice of demand. The period of one month limitation alluded in clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act, as such, would accrue on the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the ‘said amount of money’ within 15 days of the date of which the notice of demand referred to in clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 aforementioned is received by him. The expression ‘said amount of money’ as bare reading of Section 138 would indicate is the amount of the cheque issued by the drawer. (See Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal & Anr., JT 2000 (1) SC 493).

8. The contention of the counsel for petitioner is that as per the allegations made in the criminal complaint the notice is dated 23.12.1996 but the receipt of this demand notice by the petitioner did not find mention in the complaint. The demanded amount was to be paid by the petitioner within 15 days, which period expired on 5.1.1997 The criminal complaint, as such, could be filed for prosecution of the petitioner under Section 138 upto 5.2.1997 But in the instant case the criminal complaint was actually filed on 11.2.1997 i.e much beyond the limitation of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice of demand prescribed by clause (b) of Section 142. For this reason it is contended that the petition should be dismissed as barred by time.

9. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours v. State of Bihar & Anr., JT 2000 (7) SC 563, Sridhar M.A v. Metalloy N. Steel Corporation, 2000 (1) SCC 397, M/s. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. M/s. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. and others, AIR 2001 SC 676.

10. In Dalmia Cement (supra) the Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment has observed “to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the complaint is obliged to prove its ingredients which includes the receipt of the notice by the accused under clause (b). It is to be kept in mind that it is not the ‘giving’ of the notice which makes the offence but it is the ‘receipt’ of the notice by the drawer which gives the cause of action to the complaint to file the complaint within the stipulated period”. It was further observed that the thrust in clause (b) of proviso to 138 of the Act was on the need to make demand. It is only the mode of making such demand which the Legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice for doing his part. Once it is despatched his part is over and the next depends on what the sendee does. The Supreme Court also observed that Section 27 of the General Clauses Act deais with presumption of service of a latter sent by post. The despatcher of a notice has, therefore, a right to insist upon and claim the benefits of such a presumption. But the presumption is rebuttable. The sender of the notice may either concede to the stand of the sendee that he did not receive the notice or he could contest the sendee's stand and take risk of proving that he had in fact received the notice.

11. The petitioner in this case does not admit the receipt of the notice of demand nor does he give the date on which he had received it. The notice was sent from Delhi to the petitioner at his Kanpur address. As per the averment in the criminal complaint, it was sent by registered A.D post. It could not have been delivered to the petitioner on the same date on which it was shown to have been written i.e 23.12.1996 The sender of the notice i.e respondent, therefore, has a right to lead evidence and prove the date on which the notice was received by the petitioner and further that the amount of the cheque demanded was not paid within 15 days from that date. He has also right to prove by leading evidence that the criminal complaint filed on 11.2.1997 is within one month from the date on which 15 days default in the payment of the amount of cheque in terms of clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 was committed so the complaint was filed within the limitation period prescribed by Section 142 of the Act.

12. In M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours (supra) there was no mention in the criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act that the notice of the demand had been served on the drawer of the cheques, therefore, it was held that the criminal complaint itself was not maintainable. The present case is distinguishable on facts. In the criminal complaint it has been specifically stated that the notice of demand dated 23.12.1996 was sent by registered A.D post was duly received by the petitioner at both of his addresses. It is only the date on which it was received by the petitioner, which has not been mentioned. Therefore, the cited judgment is of no help to him.

13. In Sridhar M.A (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the question of service of notice of demand after the full trial and it was held that the notice of demand should not be deemed to have been served as a matter of course but such presumption of due service of the notice of payment which arise, should be accepted in the facts of each case. Considering the facts in that case the Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt as to whether such service in fact had been effected on the appellant. In the instant case the case is yet to go into trial. Parties will gel an opportunity to adduce evidence and the sender of the notice can lead evidence to prove that the notice has been received by the petitioner or may prove the receipt of the notice by the petitioner on presumption of due service arising from Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Such presumption of deemed service will depend upon the evidence which has been adduced. The judgment, therefore, does not advance the argument of the petitioner at this stage. The first ground, therefore, is not tenable at this stage.

14. The second ground is also premature. Section 139 of the Act gives rise to presumption that the cheque issued by the drawer was for discharging of a legal debt or liability. This presumption like other presumptions is rebuttable. Contention of counsel for petitioner is that he was carrying on business of transportation of goods at Kanpur in the name and style of M/s Crown Cargo and he came into contract with the respondent who was carrying on business in the name and style of M/s Transworld Cargo & Travels in Delhi. Respondent promised the petitioner to constitute a partnership business with him at Delhi and asked for a loan of Rs. 2.00 lacs which was to be converted into investment in the partnership when it came into existence. Through common friends the petitioner was pursueded to advance the said amount on 01.06.1996 The petitioner issued four post-dated cheques, which are the foundation of the present complaint. After the cheques were delivered the petitioner came to know that the respondent was untrustworthy and unreliable so he decided not to advance any loan to him. The petitioner asked the respondent to return all the post-dated cheques but he did not return them so the petitioner decided not to arrange the amount of the cheque in his bank account at Kanpur. The respondent tried to encash the cheques although the petitioner had refused to advance the loan. All the cheques were post-dated and were issued on the same date. The allegations made in the criminal complaint as to the consideration of these cheques is false. The respondent has not produced any documentary evidence in corroboration of the allegations made in para-2 of the complaint in this behalf. These four cheques were presented for encashment between 17.6.1996 and 29.11.1996 and all of them lastly presented for encashment on 29.11.1996

15. Contention of the petitioner is unsubstantial. There is no bar to the presentation of the cheques for encashment again and again within the period of six months or the validity of the cheque but once the notice of demand required by clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 is issued cause of action for filing complaint in accordance with clause (b) of Section 142 arises and subsequent presentation of the cheques and issuance of fresh demand notice based on its dishonour would not give a fresh cause of action to the payee for filing the criminal complaint. The Supreme Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sun/7 Kumar, 1998 (2) JCC (SC) 91 observed in para 10 as under :—

“Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. Having given our anxious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonised, with the interpretation that one each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right and not cause of action-accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheques so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which-the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires.

16. Counsel for petitioner has referred to Shri Taher N. Khambati v. M/s, Vinayak Enterprises, Secunderabad and others, 1995 Cri.LJ 560 wherein in an appeal against the order of the trial Court passed in a complaint under Section 138 of the Act the facts were that the appellant had advanced some money to the respondents and obtained a pronote. It was stipulated that the respondents should pay interest every month. At the same time appellant creditor took blank signed cheques from the respondent with the understanding that the complainant could fill the other columns in the cheque and present it if the respondent committed default in the payment of interest. The respondent paid interest for about 8 months and, thereafter, defaulted. The appellant put the date and his own name in the space intended for the date and also mentioned amount of the cheque and presented it for encashment. Even at the time of presentation of the cheque he would not have expected the cheque to be honoured and wanted only an endorsement to be made to enable him to file criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Act. The High Court on these facts held that if this sort of practice was allowed, every creditor would abuse the provisions of Section 138 of the Act by obtaining blank cheques and putting the debtors in the fear of presentation insist on discharge of the debts at any time. It was on these facts and circumstances of the case that it was held that the provision of section 138 was not attracted. This judgment, therefore, has its own peculiarity of fact and can lead no assistance to the contentions of the petitioner raised in this petition that too at the preliminary stage. Evidence is yet to be recorded. Counsel for petitioner also referred to Uplanche Mallikarjun and others v. Rat Kanti Vimala and another, 1997 Cri.LJ 4237. It was also a case in which in the criminal complaint it was not mentioned that the cheque was issued in discharge of whole or part of the legal enforceable” debt or liability and the court held that in the absence of such an allegation in the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Act the criminal proceeding was not maintainable and was liable to be quashed. It is also not a case here. The petitioner has mentioned about the legally recoverable debts in discharge of which the four cheques in question were issued by the petitioner. The petitioner disputed the allegations made in the complaint and has set up his own defence claiming that the cheques were without any legally enforceable debt, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. The question cannot be resolved by considering mere claim made by the petitioner. It needed evidence for resolution. The complaint, therefore, cannot be quashed on the bare allegation of the petitioner at this stage.

17. The third ground on which the petitioner wants quashing of the criminal complaint is that the courts in Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Act in the criminal complaint instituted by the respondent here. It is contended in the petition that the cheques were dishonoured at Kanpur, therefore, the cause of action had arisen at Kanpur and Delhi Court has no jurisdiction. The argument is devoid of any substance. Recently Supreme Court in K. Bhasakaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, 1999 SCC (Crl) 1284 considered as to what are the various causes of action in a case under Section 138 of the Act to give territorial jurisdiction to a court. In para 11 of the judgment the Supreme Court held as under:

“11. We fail to comprehend as to how the trial court could have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under section 177 of the code “every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed”. The locality where the Bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criterion to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act.”

18. It is manifest from the law laid down in the aforementioned judgment that the cause of action for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Act may also be at a place where the drawer of the cheque resided or the place where the payee resided or the place where either of them carried on business or the place where payment was to be made. The complaint can be filed before the court which has jurisdiction over any of these places. In the cited case a complaint under Section 138 was filed before a Magistrate at Adoor in Pathanamthitta District in Kerala. The accused challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the court to try the case. His contention was that the cheque was dishonoured at the bank of the Branch at Kayam-kulam, situated in another District. He also denied the issue of cheque and also receipt of notice of demand. The latter two objections were decided against the accused. On the first question the Supreme Court enunciated the law as reproduced above.

19. In Canbank Financial Services Ltd v. Gitanjli Motors Ltd. & Ors, 1995 Crl.LJ 1222 the Supreme Court on the question of territorial jurisdiction of the court in criminal proceeding under Section 138 of the Act observed as under :—

“Payment for purpose of the proviso is required to be made to the creditor at his place. In the present case the cheques in question were handed over to the complainant at Delhi. After the service of the notice if debtor had to pay, it had to pay to the creditor at Delhi. Therefore, place of payment will always be important and relevant in such matters. I am supported in this view by a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in R.K Jain v. State, (1988) 1 Crimes 514. In this case the cheque was given at Delhi but was deposited by the payee in his account at Rajouri (J & K). Prosecution was sought to be launched at Jammu for dishonour of the cheque. It was held that such cheque was given at Delhi. The alleged incident was committed at Delhi and Delhi Courts will have jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court further held that “The place of payment is thus material for purpose of jurisdiction of a court to try an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act”.

Again in para 14 the Supreme Court made the following observations:

“14. That as per Section 179 when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued. The offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose legal jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. Payment of cheque against an account having insufficient funds to meet the liability under the cheque is one act while dishonour of the cheque is a consequence of such an act. Therefore as per Section 179 also the place where the cheque was given or handed over will have jurisdiction and the courts of that place will have jurisdiction to try the offence. Likewise for purposes of Section 178(b) payment of cheque may be one part of an offence and dishonour of the cheque may be another part and, therefore, both places, i.e place where the cheque was handed over and the place where it was dishonoured will have jurisdiction.”

20. It is clear from the reading of the principles of law laid down in this judgment that the place where the payment is to be made is relevant for determining the jurisdiction of the court. It is also clear that the drawer of the cheque on receipt of notice of demand is bound to tender the amount of the cheque to the payee at the place of the payee of the cheque i.e the complainant. It is on the basis of well known principle of civil law that a debtor should seek the creditor.

21. In M.M Malik & Ors, v. Prem Kumar Goel & Another, 1991 (2) CC Cases 157 (HC) it was held in para 7 as under:

“Dishonouring of the cheque was only a part of cause of action and the offence was completed only when the petitioner-Company failed to discharge its liability to creditors (the complainant herein). For discharging the debt, the petitioners had to find out their creditors and since the creditor had its office at Pehowa, the offence was completed at that place and in this situation, the Court at Kurukshetra had the territorial jurisdiction to try the matter. No ground for quashing the impugned complaint and the subsequent proceedings is made out.”

22. The facts of the present case when examined in the light of the principles of law which have been laid down in the aforementioned judgments it has to be held that the part of cause of action has arisen to the respondent at Delhi where he was residing since in response to the statutory notice of demand as per Section 138 the drawer of the cheque was to tender the amount of the cheque to the respondent at the place where he was available. In the present case the respondent was residing at Delhi. The petitioner No. 2 was obliged to tender the amount of the cheque and meet the demand raised in the notice of demand at Delhi. Therefore, part of cause of action has arisen at Delhi. The Court at Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Sec. 138 of the Act, take cognizance and also try the petitioner.

23. As such the courts at Delhi where the petitioner creditor resided and carried on his business had jurisdiction to entertain this petition. It is also pertinent to note that in the petition it was alleged by the petitioner that the cheques were issued as advance of the loan which was to be treated as an investment in the partnership business which was to be established at Delhi. Therefore, the payment was intended to be received at Delhi. For this added reason it can be safely held that part of the cause of action had also accorded in Delhi.

24. Counsel for petitioner referred to the judgment of this court in Canbank Financial Services Ltd v. Gitanjli Motors Ltd. & Ors, 1995 Cri.LJ 1222 where it was held that places where the cheque was handed over and the place where it was dishonoured have jurisdiction. He also referred to The Hukumchand Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The Bank of Baroda and others, AIR 1977 Karnataka 204 where it was held that in a contract of guarantee, there must always be three parties in contemplation; a principal debtor (whose liability may be actual or prospective) a creditor, and a third party who, in consideration of some act or promise on the part of the creditor, Promise on the part of the creditor, promises to discharge the debtor's liability. It cannot be appreciated how this judgment advances the case of the petitioner that Delhi court would not have territorial jurisdiction. Similarly, another judgment referred to by counsel for petitioner H. Mohamed Khan (deceased by LRs) and others v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and others, AIR 1983 Karnataka 73 has laid down that the contract of guarantee express participation or implied assent among the three parties necessary. Counsel for petitioner also relied upon State of Maharashtra v. Dr. M.N Kaul (dead) by his legal representatives and another, AIR 1967 SC 1634 where it was held that in a case of contract of guarantee the guarantor cannot be made liable beyond the term of his encashment. It is not understood how these two judgments advance the argument that Delhi Court do not have jurisdiction to try the case. The court is bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran (supra) and Canbank Financial Services Ltd. (supra) and it is held that the courts in Delhi have jurisdiction to try the criminal complaint. The argument to the contrary is repelled.

25. The last ground pleaded in the petition is that the notice of demand is defective and invalid since it has asked for payment of the amount more than the amount of the cheques. Relevant extract of the notice of demand dated 23.12.1996, copy of which has been filed as annexure P4 to the petition, is as under :—

“2. In course of business you issued certain cheques in the name of our clients, particularly, the cheques bearing Nos. 978120, 978127, 978128 and 978129 dated 12.6.1996, 23.7.1996, 27.11.1996 and 23.7.1996 all drawn on State Bank of Patiala, Naveen Market, Kanpur for Rs. 1,00,000/-, Rs. 34,000/-, Rs. 34,000/- and Rs. 32,000/- respectively. All the abovesaid cheques were duly deposited by our clients with their bankers, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Old Rajindra Nagar, New Delhi. However, the said cheques were returned by your bankers State Bank of Patiala, Naveen Market, Kanpur vide their cheque Return Memo for the reason “insufficient funds”. The returned cheques and the said Memo were forwarded to our clients by their bankers 16.12.1996 You have in the circumstances committed offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

3. That besides the above cheques, you are also a defaulter in payment of your other dues as well.

4. By this notice we call upon you to remit the entire outstanding dues including the amount of the abovesaid cheques within a period of 15 days from the receipt of this notice, failing which our clients shall be at liberty to institute legal proceedings, both civil and criminal, which may be available to our clients under the law including proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, against you, at your costs and consequences for the recovery of the outstanding dues.”

26. The notice has to be construed strictly since it is one of the constituent of the criminal offence under Section 138 of the Act. But it has to be construed keeping in mind that it was addressed to the petitioner, who is not stranger to the transaction, but he is the drawer of the four cheques which were dishonoured by his banker for insufficiency of funds. The respondent indeed has demanded some other amount which is outstanding and payable by the petitioner to respondent but it has specifically demanded the amount of the dishonoured cheques within a period of 15 days. The notice has demanded the amount of the cheque which was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds in the account of the petitioner drawer of the cheque and the petitioner by making the payment of the amount of the cheque could have absolved himself of the criminal liability under Section, 138 of the Act. In Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal & Anr., JT 2000 (1) SC 493 a similar question about validity of the notice of demand was raised by the accused. In that case in addition to the amount of the cheque the creditor had demanded charges of Rs. 1500/- spent on the cheque on its presentation and also Rs. 340/- as notice charges within the period of 15 days from the notice thereof failing which he had warned of taking necessary legal steps holding the drawer of the cheque liable for all costs and consequences thereof. The Supreme Court has held as under :—

“In the notice in question the “said amount”, i.e the cheque amount has been clearly stated. Respondent No. 1 had claimed in addition to the cheque amount, incidental charges and notice charge. These two amounts are severable. In the notice it was clearly stated that failure to comply with the demand necessary legal steps will be taken up. If respondent No. 1 had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal liability under Section 138. Regarding other claims, a civil suit would be necessary.”

27. In Centra/ Bank of India v. M/s. Saxons Farms, (1999) 8 JT (SC) 58 while dealing with provision of section 138 of the Act the Supreme Court has held that the object of the notice of demand was to give chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission. It was further held that though in the notice of demand for compensation, interest etc., is also made but the drawer will be absolved from his liability under Section 138 of the Act if he makes the payment of the amount covered by the cheque of which he was aware within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice or before complaint is filed. In another judgment United Credit Ltd., Calcutta v. Agro Sales India & Ors., IV (2000) CCR 50 (SC) the Supreme Court again considered a notice of demand in which not only the amount covered by the cheque but also some other amount towards interest and cost was demanded by the complainant. The Supreme Court following the law laid down in Suman Sethi v. Ajay Kr. Churiwal & Anr. (supra) held that the notice of demand was valid and in conformity with requirement of Section 138 of the Act. The notice of demand dated 23.12.1996 relied upon by the petitioner does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

28. Counsel for petitioner, however, contended that in Suman Sethi v. Ajay Kr. Churiwal & Anr. (supra) the Supreme Court has laid down that the notice of demand cannot be faulted if in addition to the cheque amount any other sum by way of interest cost etc. was separately indicated, but in the instant case the amount of the cheque has not been separately stated. The Supreme Court had held that if in the notice an omnibus demand was made without specifying what was due under the dishonoured cheques the notice would fail to meet the legal requirement and might be regarded as bad. But in the instant case as would be clear from the averment in para-2 and para-4 of the notice dated 23.12.1996 read conjointly that the amount of the cheque which was demanded by this notice was specified. Therefore, argument of the counsel for petitioner has no merit. Counsel for petitioner also sought support to his argument from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Gopa Debi Ozha v. Sujit Paul, 1995 Cri.LJ 3412 wherein it was laid down that if bigger amount or smaller amount than the cheque amount was mentioned in the notice, it would not be possible for the drawer of the cheque to know as to how much amount is to be paid and that made the demand notice insufficient and vague, so it was illegal. Even the fact of the present case are distinguishable. The amount of cheques demanded in the notice is indicated. So, the judgment does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Counsel for petitioner referred to A.C Raj, Inchivila, Thottathu Veedu, Parasala v. M. Rajan, Ezhakudivila Veedu and another, 1997 Cri.LJ 1939 wherein also it was held that the amount covered by the cheque was not mentioned in the demand notice and the amount together with interest without specifying the rate of interest and the amount of interest was demanded by the notice, therefore, the notice could not be considered to be the notice contemplated by Section 138(b) and the accused was entitled to acquittal for want of proper notice. The facts are clearly distinguishable and the law laid down is not applicable on the fact of this case.

29. The result of the above discussion is that the petition has no merit. There is no illegality or impropriety in the order warranting interference by this court in exercise of its inherent powers vested by Section 482 of the Cr.P.C The petition, therefore, is accordingly dismissed in limini.