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Dsa Engineers (Bombay) & Ors Petitioners v. Housing & Urban Development Corporation (Hudco)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Objector filed I.A 10715/01 on 29th October 2001 under sections 34(3) and 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging an arbitral award dated 30th June 2001. Prior to this, the Objector had filed an application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking to have the original award, depositions, and documents filed in court; this application was dismissed on 4th October 2001. The Objector was prevented by sufficient cause from filing objections within the prescribed three-month period and sought to invoke the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act to allow the objections to be entertained. Subsequently, I.A 11576/01 was filed on 12th December 2001 to explain the bona fide belief that the award was governed by the 1940 Act and not the 1996 Act. The Non-Objector/claimant did not file any reply. The dismissal of the application under section 14 of the 1940 Act was upheld by a Division Bench and the Supreme Court. The objections were initially filed on 29th October 2001, returned for rectification on 9th November 2001, and refiled on 17th November 2001 after the court holidays.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the objections to the arbitral award, filed beyond the three-month limitation period under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, can be entertained by invoking the proviso for sufficient cause.
- Whether the prior dismissal of the application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and subsequent appellate orders prevent entertaining the objections under the 1996 Act.
- The legal effect of refiling objections after removal of registry objections beyond the limitation period.
Arguments of the Parties
Objector's Arguments
- The Objector alleged sufficient cause for delay in filing objections under section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, invoking the proviso to allow the objections despite being filed beyond the prescribed three-month period.
- The Objector contended a bona fide belief that the award was governed by the Arbitration Act, 1940, justifying the delay and the filing of applications under that Act.
- The Objector argued that the defects pointed out by the Registry were formal and ancillary, not affecting the validity of the objections, and thus the date of re-presentation should relate back to the original filing date.
Non-Objector/Claimant's Arguments
- The Non-Objector raised a preliminary objection that the objections filed were not maintainable in view of the orders dismissing the application under section 14 of the 1940 Act and subsequent appeals.
- No reply was filed to the applications, so detailed arguments beyond the preliminary objection are not recorded.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ashok Kumar Parmar v. D.C Sankhla & Ors., 1995 RLR 85 | Distinction between defects that render a plaint a non-plaint versus formal defects; date of re-presentation relates back to original filing if defects are formal. | The court applied this principle to hold that registry objections were formal and the re-presentation of objections related back to original filing date for limitation purposes. |
| D.C Sankhla v. Ashok Kumar Parmar and others, 1995 1 AD (Delhi) 753 | Rule that the date of presentation, even with defects, is the relevant date for limitation under the Limitation Act; rules do not extend limitation period. | The court used this to affirm that limitation period is calculated from original presentation date, not from date of defect removal. |
| S.R Kulkarni v. Birla VXL Ltd., 1998 RLR 519 | Condonation of delay in refiling applications after removal of defects may be allowed if no mala fide intention is found. | The court found no mala fide intention in delay and condoned delay based on this precedent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the maintainability of the objections filed under section 34 of the 1996 Act despite delay beyond the three-month limitation period. It distinguished the dismissal of the application under section 14 of the 1940 Act, which was based on the parties being governed by the 1996 Act, from the issue of entertaining objections under the 1996 Act's proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34. The court analyzed registry objections raised on initial filing and relied on precedents to conclude these defects were formal and did not render the objections a "no-objection." Accordingly, the re-presentation of objections after removing defects related back to the original filing date. The court also considered the bona fide belief of the Objector's counsel that the award was governed by the 1940 Act, which justified the delay in filing objections under the 1996 Act. Applying these principles, the court found sufficient cause to entertain the objections despite delay.
Holding and Implications
The applications I.A 10715/01 and I.A 11576/01 are allowed, and the objections (OMP 367/01) are permitted to be entertained under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The decision enables the Objector to proceed with objections to the arbitral award despite delay beyond the statutory period, based on sufficient cause including bona fide belief and formal registry defects. No new precedent was established; the ruling applies the existing legal framework and precedents to the facts of this case.
K.S Gupta, J.:— This order will govern the disposal of I.A 10715/01 under sections 34(3) and 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the ‘Act of 1996’) and I.A 11576/01 under section 151 CPC filed by the Objector.
2. I.A 10715/01 was filed on 29th October, 2001 alleging that Objector has filed objections under section 34 impugning the award dated 30th June 2001. On receipt of copy of award, Objector filed application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short the ‘Act of 1940’) for getting the award filed in original alongwith depositions and documents in court which was contested by Non-objector/claimant. By the order dated 4th October 2001 this application was dismissed. Objector was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the objections within the period of 3 months. It was prayed that by invoking proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 the objections may be allowed to be entertained.
3. I.A 11576/01 was filed in continuation of I.A 10715/01 on 12th December 2001 for entertaining the Objections explaining the circumstances how the Objector was under the bona fide belief that award dated 30th June 2001 was governed by Act of 1940 and not by Act of 1996.
4. Non-Objector/claimant has chosen not to file reply to the applications.
5. Admittedly, said application under section 14 of the Act of 1940 for getting the award filed in original together with depositions and documents, was moved by the Objector on 27th July 2001 and the same was dismissed by the order dated 4th October 2001. Appeal taken out against this order by the Objector was dismissed by a Division Bench of this court on 12th December 2001. SLP filed by the Objector was also dismissed on 23rd August 2002 by the Supreme Court. It is also not in dispute that Objections against the award under section 34 being OMP 367/2001 was filed on 29th October, 2001 and the same was returned for removing objections on 9th November 2001. From 10th to 16th November 2001 this court was closed on account if holidays and the Objections (OMP 367/01) was refiled after removing objections by the Objector on 17th November 2001.
6. A preliminary objection was raised by Sh. Chetan Sharma for Non-Objector that Objections (OMP 367/01) itself is not legally maintainable in view of orders dated 4th October 2001, 12th December 2001 and 23rd August 2002. Copy of order dated 4th October 2001 dismissing application under section 14 registered as Suit No. 1582-A/01, is placed on the file and bare perusal thereof would show that said application was dismissed on the ground of being not maintainable as the parties in view of Clause 91.4 of the agreement executed between them, were governed by the Act of 1996 and not the Act of 1940. This finding was upheld in appeal by the Division Bench by the order dated 12th December 2001 and in SLP by the Supreme Court by the order dated 23rd August 2002. In my opinion, these orders would not come in the way of Objector as regards entertaining of Objections under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 or the Act of 1996 as they pertained only to the non-maintainability of application under section 14 of the Act of 1940.
7. This brings me to the main question if the applications on hand disclose sufficient cause for entertaining the Objections (OMP 367/01) as also effect of refiling the Objections after removing objections on 17th November 2001, admittedly, beyond 4 month's period of the receipt of copy of award dated 30th June 2001 by the Objector. As may be seen from office report dated 30th October 2001 the objections pointed out by the Registry were that -(i) Vakalatnama should have been filed, and (ii) neither the caveat report was given nor obtained from the Caveat branch. At this stage reference to the decisions in Ashok Kumar Parmar v. D.C Sankhla & Ors., 1995 RLR 85, D.C Sankhla v. Ashok Kumar Parmar and others, 1995 1 AD (Delhi) 753 and S.R Kulkarni v. Birla VXL Ltd., 1998 RLR 519, has become necessary. In Ashok Kumar Parmar's case(supra), preliminary issue which arose for consideration was whether suit was barred by limitation? Suit was for recovery of damages for the tort of libel. Alleged insinuations were alleged to have been made on 11th September 1986 in a newspaper. Plaint was presented before the officer authorised to receive it on 10th September 1987. The office found the presentation of plaint to be defective on three counts : (1) the certificate copy of the order accompanying the plaint did not bear the court fee stamp of 75 paise ; (ii) photo copies of documents accompanying the plaint were not attested as true copies and (iii) photo copy of a document was in Hindi and was not accompanied by translation in English nor the translation charges paid. Plaint was returned to the plaintiff for rectifying the objections on 15th September 1987 and it was represented on 16th October 1987. On 17th October 1987 the office again returned the plaint pointing out objection No. (iii) having not been removed. Plaint was represented on the same day and directed to be listed before the Registrar for admission on 29th October 1987 whereafter summons were issued to the defendants. Noticing Rules 1 and 2 of Chapter 4 of Delhi High Court (O.S) Rules, 1967, in Para No. 10 (at page 89) it was held :—
“Looking to the language of the Rules framed by Delhi High Court, it appears that the emphasis is on the nature of defects found in the plaint. If the defects are of such character as would render a plaint, a non-plaint in the eye of law, then the date of presentation would be the data of refiling after removal of defects. If the defects are formal or ancillary in nature not effecting the validity of the plaint, the date of presentation would be the date of original presentation for the purpose of calculating the limitation for filing the suit.”
In Para No. 12 it was further held :—
“In the case at hand, the defects pointed by the office were defects not so substantial in character as would reduce the plaint to a no-plaint.... Thus, re-presentation of plaint would relate back to original presentation
8. Suit was, thus, held to be not barred by limitation.
9. Appeal taken out against this order reported in 1995 1 AD (Delhi) 753 above by D.C Sankhla was dismissed by a Division Bench noticing that neither Rule 1 nor Rule 2 purports to extend the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the date on which the plaint was presented, even with defects, would, therefore, have to be the date for the purpose of Limitation Act.
10. In S.R Kulkarni's case (supra), question of condonation of delay in refiling the application seeking leave to defend the suit after removal of defects fell for consideration before a Division Bench of this court. In this case objection was raised by the Registry on 21st August 1995 that names of parties did not tally. Defendant-appellant who received back the application after great delay on 4th March 1996, re-filed it after necessary correction on the same day. Registry on 16th March 1996 noticed that one of the pages of application was without signature and application was re-filed after removing that objection on 27th March 1996. Delay of about 200 days in re-filing the application was condoned on the ground that apart from casual approach on the part of counsel of defendant there was no mala fide intention on the part of defendant to delay the proceedings.
11. Aforementioned twin defects pointed out by the Registry, obviously, were defects not so substantial in character as would render the Objections (OMP 367/01) to a no-objection nor any mala fide intention could be attributed to the Objector in filing the objections with defects to delay the proceedings. Taking note of the ratio of aforesaid decisions the re-presentation of Objections after removing defects would, thus, relate back to original presentation. Further, under sub-section (3) of Section 34 an application for setting aside award has to be made within 3 months and limitation would start running from the date of receipt of award or date of disposal of application under section 33, if made. Proviso appended to the sub-section permits extension for sufficient cause by a further maximum period of 30 days. Filing of application being Suit No. 1582-A/01 under Section 14 of the Act of 1940 and preferring appeal and SLP against the said order of dismissal thereof, by the Objector would show that Objector's counsel was under a bona fide belief that award dated 30th June 2001 was to be governed by the Act of 1940 and not the Act of 1996. In this backdrop, in my view, there is sufficient cause for entertaining the Objections filed on 29th October 2001 and the applications, thus, deserve to be allowed.
12. Consequently, while allowing applications, the Objections (OMP 367/01) is allowed to be entertained under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
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