J.D Kapoor, J.— Petitioner seeks setting aside of the award dated 31.8.2001 whereby respondent who was once it employee was awarded higher pay scale of Rs. 2500-2700/- w.e.f 1.1.1973 with all consequential benefits alongwith interest on the all the dues with cost Of Rs. 20,000/-

2. The challenge of any award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is very limited. Award is liable to be set aside firstly if it deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration and secondly if the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force and thirdly if the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.

3. However, remedy under Section 34 can also be availed if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside.

4. The petitioner is a Government Public Sector Undertaking who instead of paying salary to its employee to which he is entitled under the law is resisting the rightful claim of the respondent merely on the plea that by virtue of writ petition filed by the respondent against its termination, he was allowed back wages and other monetary consequential benefits as permissible under the law as the termination order was set aside.

5. While allowing the writ, the court vide order dated 28.8.1986 made the following observations:—

“On the facts of the present case there is nothing to show that at any time there was any explanation called for from the petitioner or that there are any special circumstances why once the order of termination is set aside being in breach of rules of natural justice the normal consequential directions should not be given. Since the impugned order is set aside the petitioner would be entitled to all such monetary consequential benefits as permissible under the law.”

6. Pursuant to this order, the respondent raised the claims of arrears of his salary with consequential benefits vide letter dated 20.12.1986 The claim preferred by him was to the tune of Rs. 9,70,422.33. On receiving said representation, the petitioner corporation vide letter dated 6.4.1989 calculated the arrears of salary and consequential benefits to the tune of Rs. 2,92,554.15. The tax deducted was to the tune of Rs. 1,09,321/-. Feeling aggrieved of this order the respondent preferred a suit for declaration and rendition of accounts wherein gist of the claims as culled out in paras 10 and 17 are as under:—

“10. However, the orders regarding leave and leave salary for the period 5.9.1977 to 5.8.1980 were never issued by the defendants, despite persistent requests. Further the plaintiff basic was not fixed since 1975 as per the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission Report, 1975 and no annual increment has been given to the plaintiff since 1975, ever after allegedly rejoining service on 5.8.1980, without any rhyme and reason.

17. That however, after completely ignoring all cannons of justice and after deliberately misinterpreting the judgment of this Hon'ble Court dated 28.8.1986, the defendant wrongly calculated the total monetary benefits payable to the plaintiff for the years 1977-1978 to 1985-1987 at Rs. 2,92,554.15. These calculations are communicated to the plaintiff vide letter dated 6.4.1989 It is submitted that the defendant has arrived at the said figure by mis-calculation, deliberately ignoring Government circulars and in complete violation of all known cannons of interpretation. The plaintiff has completely ignored various aspects. The plaintiff has failed to supply, despite several requests, copies of various Government circulars, notifications etc. relating to the salary and perks which the plaintiff is entitled to. These details are not in the knowledge of the plaintiff.”

7. While disposing of the suit vide order dated 22nd July, 1999, this Court referred the matter to arbitration. The said order reads as under:—

“Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the parties jointly state that Mr. R.C Gupta, Vice President (Hotels) I.T.D.C may be appointed as arbitrator to look into the disputes relating to the payment which are still required to be made to the plaintiff, if any. In view of the statement of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter is accordingly referred to Mr. R.C Gupta Vice President (Hotels) I.T.D.C for decision, as prayed. He shall get Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the petitioner initially and the question of his fee and cost shall be ultimately decided by the learned Arbitrator.”

8. The main thrust of the contention of Mr. A.K Singla, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Arbitrator has traversed beyond the terms of the submissions or the terms of reference by awarding arrears of the salary on the basis of revised salary recommended by the Third Pay Commission. The genesis of this argument stems from the plea that reference to arbitration was made as a consequence of setting aside of termination order of respondent by the aforesaid writ and followed by a suit for declaration. Another argument advanced by Mr. Singla is that pay scale of respondent was fixed with reference to third pay commission vide office order dated 23.9.1975 and this fixation of pay was never challenged by the respondent.

9. I am afraid none of these contentions holds water. Those are wholly groundless and without substance. The limited question before the Court in the aforesaid writ petition was whether termination of the respondent was bad in law or not. This Court held that termination was against the principles of natural justice and set aside the same with all consequential benefits accruing to the respondent by holding the termination illegal.

10. So far as the suit for declaration and rendition of accounts was concerned, it was an independent suit claiming all past and future benefits accruing to the respondent after the revision of pay scale by the Third Pay Commission and consequential benefits accruing therefrom and also for the post termination period. This civil suit has no relevance with the averments and claims made in the writ petition as the solitary question in the writ petition was the validity of termination order of the respondent and nothing more and nothing less. So far as the civil suit was concerned it had wide implication and amplitude. That was why this Court while disposing of civil suit vide order dated 22.7.1999 appointed Mr. R.C Gupta, Vice President (Hotels) ITDC as an Arbitrator t© look into the disputes relating to the payment which are still required to be made to the plaintiff, if any. The words “the payments which are still required to be made to the plaintiff” encompassed in it all payments past and present including pre-termination and post termination period.

11. Since it is well settled law that findings of the Arbitrator on the factual matrix need not be interfered with as the Court does not sit in appeal and the Courts are also refrained from re-appre.ciating or re-evaluating the evidence or the material before the Arbitrator unless perversity is writ large on the face of the award or the award suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error, sanctity of award should always be maintained. The conception of learned counsel for the petitioner that reference to the Arbitrator was only confined to the post termination period is wholly erroneous. Had it been so, the suit would have been for the payment accruing from the averments made in the writ petition but it was not so. Though the suit was filed after the order of termination was held illegal but through this suit, the plaintiff claimed every payment which accrued to him at every given point of time including the benefit of Third Pay Commission and that is why this Court specifically observed that Arbitrator would look into the disputes relating to payments which are still required to be made to the plaintiff, if any, which meant that Arbitrator was to go to all payments other than those which the petitioner had already agreed to make to the respondent.

12. As is apparent from the aforesaid conspectus of facts and legal position, the award is neither beyond the terms of reference or submissions nor is in conflict with public policy. Petition under Section 34 of the Act moved by the petitioner is wholly misconceived and frivolous and is hereby dismissed.