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R.S Bakshi And Anr. v. H.K Malhari And Anr.

Delhi High Court
Dec 21, 2001
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A learned Single Judge of the High Court made a reference to a Division Bench after noticing an apparent conflict between two Supreme Court decisions: D.N. Sood v. Shanti Devi (1997 (10) SCC 428) and Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi (AIR 1980 SC 2012).

The immediate litigation involved petitioners who filed a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging an order dated 17.3.2001 passed by the second respondent that allowed an application of the first respondent seeking leave to defend. Before the Single Judge a question arose as to whether an application under Article 226 was maintainable.

The opinion reviews how the issue had been treated in D.N. Sood's case (which considered whether a revision petition lies against an order granting leave under Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act) and notes that in that decision the Supreme Court did not have brought to its notice an earlier Full Bench (three-Judge) decision in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary. The present opinion concludes that the judgment in D.N. Sood was rendered per incuriam because it did not notice the binding precedent of Vinod Kumar Chaudhary, and accordingly gives effect to the earlier Full Bench decision and remits the matter to the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution would be maintainable in the circumstances raised before the Single Judge.
  2. Whether the decision in D.N. Sood v. Shanti Devi (1997) was correct in holding that a revision lies under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against an order granting leave to defend, given an earlier Full Bench decision in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi.
  3. What is the correct approach where a two-Judge Bench differs with an earlier Larger-Bench decision (and the related application of the doctrines of hierarchy of benches and per incuriam).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion contains a reported account of the arguments presented in the excerpted D.N. Sood litigation rather than a detailed adversarial narrative in the present writ petition; the following summarizes the positions as recorded in that excerpt.

Appellant's (Tenant) Arguments (as recorded in D.N. Sood excerpt)

  • The appellant (tenant) had been granted leave to defend by the Additional Rent Controller; when the landlord filed a revision petition in the High Court, the appellant objected to its maintainability.
  • The appellant relied on earlier High Court judgments holding that an order granting leave to defend is interlocutory in nature and that a revision does not lie against such an order.

Respondent's (Landlord) Position (as recorded in D.N. Sood excerpt)

  • The respondent (landlord) filed a revision petition under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, challenging the order granting leave to defend.
  • The respondent's position succeeded before a learned Single Judge of the High Court which held that a revision lies under Section 25(B)(8) against an order granting leave to defend (a view later addressed by the Supreme Court in the excerpt).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
D.N. Sood v. Shanti Devi, 1997 (10) SCC 428 Considered whether a revision petition would lie against an order granting leave under Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Identified as a later decision that did not take into account an earlier Full Bench (Vinod Kumar Chaudhary) and held to have been rendered per incuriam in the present opinion; therefore it does not prevail over the earlier Full Bench decision.
Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi, AIR 1980 SC 2012 Full Bench decision (three Judges) on the legal question relevant to orders granting leave to defend. Held to be binding and to prevail over D.N. Sood because D.N. Sood did not consider this Full Bench authority; the Court gives effect to this earlier decision.
Coir Board Ernakulam Kerala State v. Indira Devai P.S. and Ors., 2000 (1) SCC 224 Reinforces that a two-Judge Bench is bound by the decision of a Larger Bench and that a two-Judge Bench should not seek to reconsider a Larger Bench judgment. Used to illustrate the hierarchy of benches and the need for reference to a Larger Bench when there is conflict with a Larger Bench decision.
Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 Example of a judgment delivered by seven Judges; illustrates binding nature of Larger Bench decisions. Referred to in support of the proposition that larger Bench decisions are binding and not to be lightly re-opened by smaller benches.
Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator-General of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 Addresses judicial decorum and certainty; coordinated benches should not overrule one another and should refer to Larger Bench where appropriate. Quoted to emphasise the need for certainty and the undesirability of coordinate Benches overruling each other without reference.
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 7933 Confirms practice that when benches differ, the later bench should ordinarily refer to a Larger Bench rather than overrule a coordinate bench. Used to support the view that divergent Division Benches should refer to a Larger Bench instead of deciding correctness between themselves.
Acharya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji Anandprasadji Mahraj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 2 SCR 317 : AIR 1974 SC 2098 Principle that one Division Bench should not decide the correctness of another Division Bench of equal strength. Referred to as part of a line of authority forbidding one Division Bench from overruling another of the same strength without a Larger Bench.
Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1986 SC 806 Re-affirmation of the principle that benches of co-ordinate strength should not overrule one another and should refer issues to a Larger Bench. Applied as part of the jurisprudence on judicial discipline between benches of equal strength.
Jit Ram v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 SCR 689 : AIR 1980 SC 1285 Example of a Division Bench differing from an earlier Division Bench; illustrates requirement to refer rather than overrule. Referenced within the chain of authorities demonstrating that differing Division Benches should seek Larger Bench consideration.
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCR 641 : AIR 1979 SC 621 Used as antecedent decision in the discussion of conflicting Division Bench rulings. Cited as part of the jurisprudential context requiring reference to Larger Benches where benches appear to conflict.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531 Discusses the concept of per incuriam and identifies decisions given in ignorance of binding authorities or statutory provisions as potentially erroneous. Used to explain when a later decision may be treated as per incuriam and hence not followed.
Anwar Ali Sarkar's Case, AIR 1952 SC 75 Referenced in the context of per incuriam and doctrine surrounding decisions given without regard to binding authorities. Quoted as an authority in the broader discussion of decisions rendered per incuriam.
State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., (1985) AIR 1985 SC 1293 Referenced in the context of illustrations of per incuriam and related authorities. Included among authorities explaining the scope and application of per incuriam.
Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish, 2001 AIR SCW 223 Holds that the Court's earlier decision is binding on it, and that the rule of per incuriam may be applied where binding precedents were omitted. Relied upon to support the proposition that a decision may be treated as per incuriam if it omitted to consider a binding precedent.
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Satyanarayana Rao, 2000 (4) SCC 262 Discusses application of the rule of per incuriam where a court omits to consider a binding precedent or statute. Used to illustrate that per incuriam may be invoked where binding precedent was overlooked.
Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2264 States that a two-Judge decision is binding on another coordinate two-Judge Bench unless subsequent change in law or decision demonstrates it ceases to lay down correct law. Referenced in support of the rule that coordinate benches are bound by earlier coordinate bench decisions until altered by a Larger Bench or change in law.
A-One Granites v. State of U.P., 2001 AIR SCW 848 Considered in the context of whether earlier three-Judge decisions should have been placed before two-Judge Benches. Used to reinforce the need to place controlling Larger Bench decisions before later benches.
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha, (2001) 4 SCC 448 Five-Judge Bench holding that a Constitutional Bench decision binds a two-Judge Bench and that doubt about correctness should lead to a reference to a larger Bench. Applied to emphasize that constitutional/Larger Bench decisions are binding on two-Judge Benches and the correct remedy for doubts is a reference to a larger Bench.
Gammon (India) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1974) 1 SCC 596 Referred to in the context of the scope of a statutory provision before the Constitution Bench in subsequent cases. Mentioned in the chain of authorities regarding binding effect of Constitution Bench decisions on smaller benches.
Gururat Mini Roller Flour Mills v. Govt. of India, 2001 (6) Andhra Law Times 67 (Full Bench) Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh HC held a Division Bench's observations were incorrect and that Division Benches ought not to take a different view from another Division Bench having regard to precedent. Referred to as a regional Full Bench endorsement of the principle that Division Benches should not diverge from coordinate Division Bench rulings without Larger Bench consideration.
B Rajeshwar Reddy v. K. Narasimhachari, 2001 (6) Andhra Law Times Reports 104 (Full Bench) Addresses how to cull out ratio decidendi from judgments and cautions against reading judgments as statutes. Used to underline methods for extracting binding ratio and distinguishing obiter dicta.
General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1987) 4 SCC 13 On construing words in judgments and on understanding adjudication of merits vs. objections; assists in extracting ratio decidendi. Referred to in support of principles for discerning the operative ratio from a judgment.
State of U.P. v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra Referred to in the context of what constitutes adjudication of merits and how to interpret words used in judicial decisions. Cited as part of the authorities guiding interpretation of judgments for their binding principle.
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, AIR 1999 SC 2372 Holds that a decision is authoritative for what it actually decides, not for everything said in passing. Used to stress the limited, question-specific binding effect of judicial decisions.
Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 43 Referred to in the context of the principle that a decision is an authority only for what it decides. Relied upon to highlight that only the ratio is binding, not all observations.
Union of India & Ors. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu, 2000 (3) Scale 336 Holds a three-Judge Bench decision should have been placed before a two-Judge Bench that heard and decided a subsequent case. Referred to in support of the proposition that earlier Larger Bench decisions must be placed before later benches.
Dharam Pal Kukrety (three-Judge Bench) — (referenced) Referenced as an example of a three-Judge Bench decision that should have been placed before a two-Judge Bench. Used to illustrate the obligation to place three-Judge Bench authorities before later two-Judge determinations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion proceeds through the following analytical steps, explained in the text:

  1. Identification of conflict: The Single Judge perceived a conflict between two Supreme Court decisions (D.N. Sood and Vinod Kumar Chaudhary) and made a reference to a Division Bench accordingly.
  2. Focus on D.N. Sood: The Court examines the Supreme Court's decision in D.N. Sood which held that a revision under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act lies against an order granting leave to defend. The D.N. Sood decision departed from prior High Court coordinate decisions on the ground that statutory amendments (the Amendment Act of 1988) had changed the legal landscape.
  3. Larger-Bench precedence: The opinion emphasizes the hierarchical principle that a decision of a Larger Bench (including a Full Bench of three Judges or a Constitutional Bench) is binding on smaller benches. A two-Judge Bench differing from a Larger Bench should refer the matter to an appropriate Larger Bench rather than sitting singly to overturn prior coordinate decisions.
  4. Per incuriam analysis: The Court observes that D.N. Sood did not place before it or consider the earlier Full Bench decision in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary. Because the earlier Full Bench authority was not brought to the Court's attention and the legal question was neither noticed nor considered in D.N. Sood, that later decision was rendered per incuriam (i.e., in ignorance of controlling precedent) and therefore cannot prevail over the earlier Full Bench authority.
  5. Doctrinal support: The opinion surveys and applies established principles from a range of authorities: (a) the obligation of later benches to follow Larger Bench decisions (Coir Board, Bangalore Water Supply, etc.); (b) the rule that coordinate benches should not overrule each other and should refer matters when they consider a prior view to be erroneous (Mahadeolal Kanodia and related authorities); and (c) the limited circumstances in which the rule of per incuriam may be invoked (A.R. Antulay, Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho, Government of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Satyanarayana Rao).
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Having regard to those principles and the fact the earlier Full Bench decision (Vinod Kumar Chaudhary) was not considered in D.N. Sood, the opinion concludes that Vinod Kumar Chaudhary prevails and that the D.N. Sood decision was rendered per incuriam. No arguments on merits were advanced in the context that necessitated this decision about precedence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the earlier Full Bench decision in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi prevails over the later decision in D.N. Sood v. Shanti Devi, and that the D.N. Sood decision was rendered per incuriam because the binding precedent was not brought to its notice. The question before this Court is answered accordingly and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits.

Implications:

  • The immediate procedural effect is that the writ petition under Article 226 (challenging the order dated 17.3.2001 allowing leave to defend) is to be decided on merits by the Single Judge, as the question of precedent has been resolved in favour of the earlier Full Bench authority.
  • The opinion reiterates the hierarchical doctrine: Larger Bench decisions bind smaller benches, and coordinate benches should not overrule each other without recourse to a Larger Bench. Where a later decision omits to consider a binding precedent, it may be treated as per incuriam.
  • The Court did not purport to create any new substantive legal precedent beyond applying existing hierarchy and per incuriam principles; its ruling determines which existing precedent controls the present controversy and directs further adjudication on merits by the Single Judge.
Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, C.J— The reference to a Division Bench has been made by a learned Single Judge of this Court noticing conflict in the decisions of the Supreme Court in D.N Sood v. Shanti Devi, 1997 (10) SCC 428 and Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi, AIR 1980 SC 2012.

2. The petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed by the petitioners herein questioning the order dated 17.3.2001 passed by the second respondent whereby and whereunder an application of the first respondent herein seeking leave to defend was allowed.

3. Before the learned Single Judge a question arose as to whether an application under Article 226 would be maintainable.

4. Learned Single Judge noticed that a Division Bench comprising of two Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court in D.N Sood's case (supra) considered the question as to whether a revision petition would lie against an order granting leave under Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

5. A learned Single Judge of this Court in a similar situation entertained the revision petition where against the Supreme Court was moved. The Apex Court held:

“This appeal arises out of a petition filed by the respondent (landlord) for the eviction of the appellant (tenant) under the provisions of Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In the said proceedings the appellant has been granted leave to defend by the Addl. Rent Controller, Delhi by order dated 22.9.1992 Feeling aggrieved by the said order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller, the respondent filed a revision petition in the Delhi High Court under Section 25(B)(8) of the Act. The appellant raised an objection about the maintainability of the said revision petition and placed reliance on the earlier judgments of the High Court holding that an order granting leave to defend is interlocutory in nature and a revision does not lie against the said order. By the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge of the High Court has disagreed with the said view in the earlier judgments of the Court and has held that a revision lies under Section 25(B) (8) of the Act against an order granting leave to defend. The learned Judge has differed from the earlier judgments of the High Court on the ground that at the time the said judgments were delivered the provisions of Section 14-B, 14-C and 14-D were not there and they were introduced by the Amendment Act of 1988 and that in view of the changed scenario it must be held that a revision to the High Court will lie against an order of the Rent Controller granting to defend.

We are unable to endorse this approach of the learned Judge in departing from the law laid in the earlier decisions of the High Court holding that an order granting leave to defend is an interlocutory order against which a revision does not lie. If the learned Judge was not inclined to agree with the said view, on the basis of the amendments introduced in the Act by the Amendment Act of 1988, the proper course for him was to refer the matter to be considered by a Larger Bench. Sitting singly the learned Judge could not disagree with the view expressed earlier by other coordinate Benches of the High Court. Till the view taken in the earlier decision was reversed by a Larger Bench the learned Judge was bound by it. We are, therefore, unable to upheld the impugned judgment of the High Court taking the view that the revision filed by the respondent was maintainable and on the basis of the law as laid down in the earlier decisions of the High Court which has not been overruled, it must be held that the revision filed by the respondent was not maintainable.”

6. Before the Apex Court in D.N Sood's (case), however, a judgment of Full Bench comprising of three Judges of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar's case (supra) had not been brought to it.

7. In the aforementioned situation, the reference has been made in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution, a decision of the Apex Court is binding on all Courts including itself. Having regard to the hierarchy of courts, it is axiomatic that a decision of Larger Bench shall be binding on a decision of the smaller bench. When a Division Bench comprising of two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court differs with the judgment of a co-ordinate bench or a bench comprising of larger number of Judges it can refer the matter to a bench of three Judges. It cannot even refer the matter to the Constitutional Bench. In Coir Board Ernakulam Kerala State v. Indira Devai P.S and Ors., 2000 (1) SCC 224, it was held:

“1. We have considered the order made in Civil Appeals Nos. 1720-21 of 1990. The judgment in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 was delivered almost two decades ago and the law has since been amended pursuant to that judgment though the date of enforcement of the amendment has not been notified.

2. The judgment delivered by seven learned Judges of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply's case does not, in our opinion, require any reconsideration on a reference being made by a two-Judge Bench of this Court, which is bound by the judgment of the Larger Bench.”

8. The Apex Court, undoubtedly however, having regard to the provisions of Article 137 of the Constitution has requisite jurisdiction to review its own judgment.

9. In Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator-General Of West Bengal of WB, AIR 1960 SC 936, the Apex Court observed:

“19…. Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a Larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all courts subordinate to the High Court would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissenting judgments of their own High Court.”

10. And yet in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 7933, it has been held:

“28. This Court also laid down in Acharya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji Anandprasadji Mahraj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 2 SCR 317 : AIR 1974 SC 2098, that even where the strength of two differing. Division Benches consisted of the same number of Judges, it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the views of the other. The principle was re-affirmed in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 : (AIR 1986 SC 806) which noted that a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court in Jit Ram v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 SCR 689 : (AIR 1980 SC 1285) had differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P (1979) 2 SCR 641 :(AIR 1979 SC 621), on the point whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity, and holding that to do so was wholly unacceptable reference was made to the well accepted and desirable practice of the later Bench referring the case to a Larger Bench when the learned Judges found that the situation called for such reference.”

11. In A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531, it was held:—

“It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid directions on 16th February, 1984, for the disposal of the case against the appellant by the High Court, the directions were given oblivious of the relevant provisions of law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (AIR 1952 SC 75) (supra). See Halsbury'.s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol 26 page 297, para 578 and page 300, the relevant notes 8, 11 and 14: Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn, pages 128 and 130: Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) 2 All ER 293, at page 300. Also see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt (1947) 2 All ER 270 at p.272-A) and Penny v. Nicholas (1950) 2 All ER 89, 92A. “Per incuriam” are those decisions given an ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle v. Wakeling, (1955) 1 All ER 708, 718F. Also see State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., (1985) 3 SCR 26 : (AIR 1985 SC 1293)”

12. In Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish., 2001 AIR SCW. 223, the Apex Court held that its earlier decision is binding on it. The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent. This aspect of the matter has been considered recently in Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Satyanarayana Rao, 2000 (4) SCC 262, where it has been held that rule of per incuriam should be applied. Rule of. per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider my statue while deciding that issue. A case cannot be referred to a Larger Bench on mere asking of a party. A decision by two Judges, has a binding effect on another coordinate Bench of two Judges, unless it is demonstrated that the said decision by any subsequent change in law or decision ceases to laying down a correct law. (See Arnit Das v. State Of Bihar., AIR 2000 SC 2264.) The question yet again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in A-One Granites v. State of U.P., 2001 AIR SCW 848. Recently in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha and Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 448, a five Judge Bench of the Apex Court held:

“The order of reference to a Constitutional Bench is dated 13.1.1998 Two learned Judges of this Court have doubted the correctness of the scope attributed to Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970- in the Constitution Bench judgment in Gammon (India) Ltd. v. UOI, (1974) 1 SCC 596. This is how the matter comes before us. We are of the view that a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness. At the most, they could have ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench of three learned Judges. Accordingly, this matter shall now be heard and decided by a Bench of two learned Judges.”

13. This aspect has also been considered recently by Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gururat Mini Roller Flour Mills v. Govt. of India, 2001 (6) Andhra Law Times 67, it was held :

“23. Keeping in view of our findings aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the observations made by the Division Bench in WP No. 13603 of 1987 are not correct and cannot be said to be laying down a good law. The latter Bench, in our opinion, could not have taken a different view from that taken by another Division Bench in WA No. 1489 of 1987 having regard to the law of precedent operating in this behalf.”

14. Yet again, a Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in B Rajeshwar Reddy v. K. Narasimhachari, 2001 (6) Andhra Law Times Reports 104 held that judgment of the court is not to be read as a statute. The ratio decidendi must be culled out from reading a judgment in its entirety in the following terms:

“26. It is also well-known that judgment of a Court is not to be read as a statute. In General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1987) 4 SCC 13, it was held:—

“As often enough pointed by us, words and expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or as word and expressions defined in statutes. We do not have any doubt that when the words, adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit were used by this Court in State of U.P v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra, the words were not used to take in every adjudication which brought to an end the proceeding before the Court in whatsoever manner but were meant to cover only such adjudication as touched upon the real dispute between the parties which gave rise to the action. Objections to adjudication of the disputes between the parties, on whatever ground, are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles to such progress. Adjudication of such objections cannot be termed as adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. As we said earlier a broad view has to be taken of the principles involved and narrow and technical interpretation which tends to defeat the object of the legislation must be avoided.”

27. Dias on Jurisprudence at page 139 observed that:

What is law in a precedent is its ruling or ratio decidendi, which concerns future litigants as well as those involved in the instant dispute. Knowing the law in this context means Knowing how to extract the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. Three shades of meaning can be attached to the expression ‘ratio decidendi’, the first which is the translation of it is the reason for (or of) deciding. Even a finding of fact may this sense be the ratio decidendi. Thus a Judge may state a rule and then decide that the facts do not fall within it. Secondly it may mean ‘the rule of law preferred by the Judge as the basis of his decision; or thirdly, it may mean ‘the rule of law which other regard as being a binding authority’……there is temptation to suppose that a case has once fixed ruling which is there and discoverable here and now and once and for all. This is not so far the ratio is not only the ruling given by the deciding Judge for his decision, but any one of a series of rulings as elucidated by subsequent interpretations. The pronouncement of the Judge who decided the case is a necessary step towards ascertaining the ratio but the process by no means ends there, subsequent interpretation is at least as significant, sometimes more so.”

28. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, AIR 1999 SC 2372 after referring to Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 43, it was held that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not that everything said therein constitutes a precedent. The Courts are obliged to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedent bearing it in mind that a decision of the Court takes it colour from the questions involved in the case in which it was rendered.”

15. We, therefore, are of the opinion that judgment of the Apex Court in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi (supra) having not been brought to the notice of the Apex Court in the later judgment in D.N Sood v. Shanti Devi (supra) that the former judgment shall prevail over in D.N Sood's case wherein the legal question was neither noticed nor considered. No arguments on merit were advanced. The binding precedent in Vinod Chaudhary's case was not brought to its notice. The said decision was, therefore, rendered per incuriam.

16. In Union of India & Ors. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu, 2000 (3) Scale 336, it was held:

“We agree with submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the case of Dharam Pal Kukrety being a Three-Judges Bench decision of this Court should have been placed before the Two-Judges Bench which heard and decided Major Radha Krishan'a case.”

17. The question raised before this Court is answered accordingly and the matter is remitted to the learned single Judge for disposal of the matter on merits.