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J.T (India) Exports & Another. v. Union Of India & Another
Judgment Summary — Arijit Pasayat, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
A divergence of views had arisen between two Division Benches on whether the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 requires the grant of an opportunity in the nature of a personal hearing before exercising discretion to waive part or all of the penalty. Because of this divergence, the question was referred to a Larger Bench.
Earlier decisions were in conflict: in Amritlal Ganpatrai v. Union of India (CWP 2890/87 decided on 25th September 1987) it was observed that, in the absence of any statutory requirement, opportunity need not be granted; a Full Bench in Jesus Sales Corporation… v. Union Of India & Ors. (AIR 1994 Delhi 218) held that an opportunity must be given before applying the relevant proviso (then the 2nd proviso). That Full Bench decision was considered by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation (1996 (83) ELT 486 (S.C)), where the Supreme Court observed that it would be difficult to say that denial of an opportunity in every case would violate natural justice.
The present writ petition was heard (Mr. G.L. Rawal appearing for the petitioner). Although the petition became infructuous by passage of time, the Court heard argument at length because identical controversies had arisen repeatedly. The Court ultimately disposed of the reference.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 requires that an opportunity, in the nature of a personal hearing, be granted before discretion is exercised to waive part or all of a penalty.
- Whether a previously rendered decision (in particular the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation) has universal application on this question or is limited by its factual matrix.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Mr. G.L. Rawal submitted that, although a cursory reading of the Apex Court decision (Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation) might suggest that no hearing is required, that decision was rendered on the peculiar facts of that case and therefore cannot be taken to have universal application.
- He argued that the Supreme Court's formulation in that case should be read in light of its factual background, and that it does not foreclose a general requirement of hearing where principles of natural justice demand it.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any arguments advanced on behalf of the Union of India or other respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Amritlal Ganpatrai v. Union of India (CWP 2890/87; 25-9-1987) | Observed that in the absence of any statutory requirement, an opportunity need not be granted before exercising discretion under the relevant proviso. | The Court noted this decision as one side of the divergence between Division Benches and contrasted it with other authority holding the opposite view. |
| Jesus Sales Corporation… v. Union Of India & Ors…. (AIR 1994 Delhi 218, Full Bench) | Held that an opportunity must be given before deciding application of the proviso to Section 4-M (referred in that context as the 2nd proviso at the relevant time). | The Court recorded this Full Bench holding as the other side of the existing conflict and treated it as supporting the view that principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be given. |
| Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation (1996 (83) ELT 486 (S.C)) | Observed that it would be difficult to say that in every case denial of an opportunity would be violative of principles of natural justice (i.e., the issue may depend on factual matrix). | The Court accepted that the Supreme Court's observation was rendered in the facts of that case and agreed with the submission that it cannot have universal application as a blanket rule. |
| Ray v. Local Government Board ((1914) 1 KB 160 : 83 LJKB 86) | Description of the phrase "natural justice" as lacking precision. | The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that natural justice is imprecise in formulation and must be applied according to context and facts. |
| General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K v. Spackman ((1943) AC 627 : (1948) 2 ALL ER 337) | Stated it is not desirable to force "natural justice" into a rigid form; essential that a Tribunal be impartial and give a full and fair opportunity to parties. | Used to underline that tribunals must be impartial and afford parties an opportunity to be heard as part of natural justice. |
| Board of Education v. Rice ((1911) AC 179 : 80 LJKB 796) | Explained that administrative bodies must act in good faith, fairly listen to both sides, and give a fair opportunity though they are not bound to conduct a trial; remedies exist if a body has not acted judicially. | The Court relied on this to show that administrative/quasi-judicial bodies must act fairly and give opportunity to parties; absence of such conduct can attract remedies like mandamus or certiorari. |
| Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1985 (10) AC 229 : 54 LJMC 81) | Held that, absent special procedural provisions, law implies that substantial requirements of justice not be violated; parties must have opportunity to be heard and notice of proceedings. | Quoted to demonstrate the requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard as part of substantial justice applicable to quasi-judicial bodies. |
| Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855 (2) Macg. 1.8) | One of several historical instances in which natural justice was described (here referred to in the context of defining natural justice). | Referred to as an example of historical judicial definitions of natural justice to show variety and continuity of the concept. |
| James Dunbar Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-1878 (3) App. Case 614) | Used the phrase "the requirements of substantial justice" when describing natural justice. | Cited to support the Court's exposition that natural justice is concerned with substantial justice rather than technical formalism. |
| Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884-1885 (10) App. Case 229) | Another historical articulation referring to the "substantial requirement of justice". | Used as part of the survey of authorities showing various judicial expressions describing natural justice. |
| Vionet v. Barrett (1885 (55) LJRD 39) | Described natural justice as "the natural sense of what is right and wrong". | Quoted as one of the illustrative judicial definitions of natural justice relied upon by the Court. |
| Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890 (24) QBD 712) | Described natural justice in the sense of "fundamental justice". | Included among cases cited to show differing judicial formulations of natural justice. |
| Ridge v. Baldwin (1963 (1) WB 569) | Described natural justice as "fairplay in action" (Harman LJ). | The Court noted this description and observed it was cited in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. |
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 (2) SCR 621) | Referenced in the opinion as noting the Ridge v. Baldwin description of natural justice. | Used to connect the concept of natural justice in the Indian constitutional context with established common law formulations. |
| In re R.N (An Infant) (1967 (2) B617) | Lord Parker described natural justice as "a duty to act fairly". | Cited as another judicial definition illustrating the content of natural justice. |
| Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment (1976 WLR 1255) | Lord Russell of Killowen described natural justice as "a fair crack of the whip". | Used as a picturesque judicial formulation included in the Court's survey of authorities. |
| Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WLR 766) | Geoffrey Lane, LJ described natural justice as "common fairness". | Cited to illustrate varied judicial descriptions of natural justice cited by the Court. |
| Bosewell's case ((1605) 6 Co. Rep. 48-b, 52-a) and (1605) 12 Co. Rep. 114; Co. Litt. 1418 | Historical authorities supporting the corollary that one who decides without hearing the other side will not have rendered proper justice; encapsulates the principle "justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done". | Invoked by the Court to trace the classical corollary of audi alteram partem and to support the maxim that justice must be manifestly seen to be done. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the specific point of divergence between Division Benches: whether the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 required a personal hearing before waiving penalties. It recorded past decisions on both sides of the issue (Amritlal Ganpatrai on one side; the Full Bench in Jesus Sales Corporation on the other) and noted the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation which indicated that denial of an opportunity would not in every case amount to violation of natural justice.
After hearing counsel for the petitioner (Mr. G.L. Rawal), the Court accepted the submission that the Supreme Court's observations were fact-specific and should not be read as a universal rule denying application of natural justice in all circumstances. The Court emphasized a basic interpretive principle: judicial decisions are authorities for what they decide, not for what may logically flow from them in other factual settings.
The opinion then undertook an extended exposition of the concept and content of "natural justice," drawing on multiple authorities to show that:
- Natural justice is not a precisely codified set of rules; it is a set of principles shaped by facts and context.
- The twin core rules are (a) nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause) and (b) audi alteram partem (the other side must be heard), with the corollary that decisions made without hearing the other side may be invalid even if substantively right.
- Quasi-judicial and administrative bodies must act in good faith, be impartial, and give fair notice and a fair opportunity to be heard; they need not conduct a full trial but must observe the substantial requirements of justice.
- When a statute is silent about procedure, principles of natural justice will be read into the "unoccupied interstices" of the statute unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Applying these principles to the reference, the Court concluded that the requirement of an opportunity to be heard (where rights or interests are affected) must ordinarily be implied into statutory schemes that are silent, unless a contrary legislative intention is apparent. On that basis the Court disposed of the reference.
The opinion carefully framed this conclusion as a matter of principle and context rather than as an absolute rule that a hearing is required in every conceivable case; it specifically recognized that the necessity of an opportunity may depend on the factual matrix and statutory framework.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that, unless a statute expressly provides otherwise, principles of natural justice — including the requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard — must be read into statutory procedures where rights or interests are likely to be affected. The Court disposed of the reference and the (now infructuous) petition.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The reference was disposed of and the petition was disposed of (the petition had become infructuous by lapse of time).
- Doctrinal effect stated in the opinion: The Court declared that natural justice is to be applied where a statute is silent, by reading fair procedure into the statute's "unoccupied interstices," unless the statute indicates otherwise.
- Scope: The Court emphasized that previous decisions (including the Supreme Court's earlier observation) may be limited by their factual matrix and should not be taken as universal propositions that preclude the application of natural justice in all cases.
The opinion does not purport to lay down an exhaustively detailed procedural formula for every circumstance; it affirms the general principle of reading in fair procedure in the absence of express statutory exclusion.
Arijit Pasayat, C.J— In view of a divergence of views between two Division Benches on the question, whether the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (in short the ‘Act’) requires grant of an opportunity, that is, in the nature of a personal hearing before exercising discretion to waive part or full of the penalty, reference has been made to a Larger Bench. While in Amritlal Ganpatrai v. Union of India, CWP 2890/87 decided on 25th September 1987, it was observed that in the absence of any statutory requirement to that effect opportunity was not to be granted. In the present writ petition, the prima facie view of the learned Judges hearing the matter was that principles of natural justice require grant of such an opportunity. We may note that in Jesus Sales Corporation… v. Union Of India & Ors…., AIR 1994 Delhi 218, the same issue was considered and it was held by a Full Bench that an opportunity has to be given before deciding application of the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Act. It was 2nd proviso to Section 4-M of the Act at the relevant point of time, when the Full Bench took up the matter. The matter was carried to the Apex Court and in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation, 1996 (83) ELT 486 (S.C), it was observed that it will be difficult to say that in every case denial of an opportunity would be violative of the principles of natural justice.
2. We have heard Mr. G.L Rawal, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Though by passage of time the petition has become infructuous, yet in view of the fact that similar controversy has come up frequently while dealing with identical provisions, we have heard him at length. It was his submission that though on a cursory reading of the decision of the Apex Court as referred to above, it would appear that the requirement was held to be not there, but that was rendered in the facts of that particular case and cannot have universal application. We are in agreement with this submission as a detailed reading of the judgment shows the peculiar factual position which was considered by the Supreme Court and in the background facts of that case, the decision was rendered. It is trite law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not for what logically flows from the judgment.
3. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as Statutes. Judicial utterances are made in the settings of the facts of a particular case. There is always peril in treating words of a judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified cannons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
4. The expression “natural justice and legal justice” do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law.
5. The adherence to principle of natural justice as recognised by all civilizad States is of supreme importance when a quasi-juridical body embarks on determining disputes between the parties. These principles are well-settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partent rule. It says that none should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time, given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed against the person in absentia becomes wholly vitiated. Thus it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play.
6. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial quasi-judicial authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
7. What is meant by the term “principles of natural justice” is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J) in Ray v. Local Government Board, (1914) 1KB 160 at p. 199 : 83 LJKB 86) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K v. Sanckman, (1943 AC 627 : (1948) 2 ALL ER 337), Lord Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt “to force it into any procusteam bed” and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give a full and fair opportunity” to every party of being heard.
8. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. The most important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice, (1911 AC 179 : 80 LJKB 796), where Lord Loreburn, L.C observed as follows:
“Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial… The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari.”
9. Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observations of the Lord Chancellor that “the Board can obtain information in any way they think best always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view”. To the same effect are the observation of Earl of Solbourne, LO in Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, 1985 (10) AC 229 : 54 LJMC 81, where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:
“No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated he is not a Judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice.”
10. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase “justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done”.
11. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression “civil consequences” encompasses in fraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.
12. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura, (1855 (2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as “universal justice”. In James Dunbar Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen, (1877-1878 (3) App. Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy Council, used the phrase “the requirements of substantial justice”, while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, (1884-1885 (10) App. Case 229, 240). Earl of Salbourne, S.C Preferred the phrase “the substantial requirement of justice”. In Vionet v. Barrett, (1885 (55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, Mr. defined natural justice as “the natural sense of what is right and wrong”. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health, (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet v. Barret (supra) chose to define natural justice as “fundamental justice”. In Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963 (1) WB 569, 578) Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal described natural justice as “fairplay in action”. This was noted in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978 (2) SCR 621). In re R.N (An Infaot) (1967 (2) B617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ. preferred to describe natural justice as “a duty to act fairly”. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment, (1976 WLR 1255) Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as “a fair crack of the whip” while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. in Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex parte Hosenball, (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the homely phrase “common fairness”.
13. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is nemo judex in causa sua” or nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua” as stated in (1605) 12 Co. Rep. 114, that is,” no man shall be a Judge in his own causa”. Coke used the form aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars” (Co. Litt. 1418), that is, “no man ought to be a judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party”. The form “nemo potest esse simul actor et judex”, that is, “no one can be at once suitor and judge” is also at times used. The second rule and that is the rule with which we are concerned in this case is saudi alteram partent”, that is, “hear the other side”. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form “audietur at altera pars” is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the saudi alteram pattern rule, namely “qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit” that is, “he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right” (See Bosewell's case: (1605) 6 Co. Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, “justice should no only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done.”
14. Even if grant of an opportunity is not specifically provided for it has to be read into the unoccupied interstices and unless specifically excluded principles of natural justice have to be applied. Even if a statue is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or Rules spelling out the need to hear the party whose rights and interests are likely to be affected, the requirement to follow the fair procedure before taking a decision must be read into the statute, unless the statute provides otherwise. Reference is accordingly disposed of.
15. In the normal course, we would have asked the Division Bench to hear the matter. But it has been submitted by Mr. Rawal the petition has become infructuous by passage of time. We therefore dispose it of.
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