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Surendra Singh v. The Manager, Haryana Shakti Sr. Sec. School, Kanjhawala, Delhi And Ors.

Delhi High Court
Sep 18, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a writ petition challenging the termination of the Petitioner who had been selected by the Selection Committee of a private aided school. The Petitioner responded to an advertisement (Jan Satta dated 4.6.1999), attended an interview before the Selection Committee on 16.6.1999, was selected and taken on duty from 1.7.1999. He worked for approximately four months; salaries for that period were not paid (Respondents assert salary was tendered but allegedly not accepted). A termination letter dated 4.11.1999 stated the Petitioner was overage at the time of appointment and that the necessary relaxation had not been granted by the Competent Authority. The Respondent-School sought an adjournment on grounds that Mr. R.S. Tomar was out of station; the court declined that adjournment noting Mr. Tomar had not earlier appeared in the case.

The parties and the court considered the effect of the Government of India Notification dated 21.12.1998 (increasing upper age limit by two years for certain recruitments) and a Circular of the Additional Director of Education (dated 17.10.1999 as reproduced in the record) clarifying the scope of that Notification for aided schools. A prior writ (C.W.P. 6626/99) in similar circumstances had been allowed by a Single Judge (A.K. Sikri, J.), and an LPA No. 408/2000 filed against that Order was dismissed by a Division Bench which observed it did not find grounds to interfere (with an ambiguous remark about precedent status). The present court considered those decisions and the relevant Rules of the Delhi School Education Act/Rules before quashing the Petitioner's termination and directing reinstatement and payment of specified salaries.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two-year age relaxation announced by the Government of India Notification dated 21.12.1998 applied to the Petitioner's appointment made by a Selection Committee of a private aided school (selected by interview rather than by a "Direct Open Competitive Examination").
  2. Whether the Circular of the Additional Director of Education (addressing applicability of the two-year relaxation to aided school recruitments) could displace or restrict the effect of the Central Government Notification, and whether that Circular was a valid basis to treat the Petitioner's appointment as irregular.
  3. Whether, given the composition of the Selection Committee under Rule 96(3)(b) and the provisions of the Delhi School Education Rules (notably Rule 98(4) and Rule 104), the Petitioner's provisional appointment should be treated as valid and his termination therefore liable to be quashed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Petitioner relied on the Government of India Notification dated 21.12.1998 which increased the upper age limit by two years, and claimed the benefit of that relaxation (effectively increasing the upper limit applicable to his post).
  • It was argued (or at least contended in submissions) that the Selection Committee in the present case was constituted under Rule 96 and thereby partook of the character of a government Selection Board, supporting the validity of the appointment.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Respondent-School sought an adjournment on the ground that Mr. R.S. Tomar was out of station (the court declined the adjournment noting Mr. Tomar had not earlier appeared in the case).
  • Respondents asserted that the Petitioner's services were terminated because he was overage at the time of appointment and that no relaxation had been granted by the Competent Authority.
  • Respondents relied on a Circular issued by the Additional Director of Education (reproduced in the record) which stated that the two-year relaxation applied only to "Direct Open Competitive Examination" and not to recruitments conducted by interview or selection committees of aided schools, and which directed that in aided schools appointments be finalized by the Staff Selection Board under Rule 96 (through an interview) thereby excluding the two-year extension for such appointments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.W.P. 6626/99 (Single Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri) Held that a similarly situated petitioner was eligible to be considered and rightly selected where two-year relaxation was applied (in that case for L.D.C., increasing age limit from 25 to 27). The court relied on the similarity of circumstances and agreed with the Single Judge's reasoning; the prior writ had been allowed and an appointment letter was directed to be issued in that case. This supported the court's conclusion that the present Petitioner's appointment could be valid.
L.P.A. No. 408/2000 (Division Bench appeal against the order in C.W.P. 6626/99) The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, observing it did not find grounds to interfere with the Single Judge's Order (with an ambiguous remark that "those Orders will not be treated as a precedent"). The court noted the dismissal of the appeal and the observation about precedent status but found the Division Bench's non-interference consistent with the Single Judge's reasoning and adopted that reasoning in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of interrelated observations applying statutory rules, the Central Notification, and administrative circulars to the facts:

  1. Adjournment and parties: The court first refused the Respondent-School's adjournment request because the named person (Mr. R.S. Tomar) had not previously appeared; the court also observed that since the Selection was carried out under Rule 96(3)(b) it was paradoxical for the school's management to resist the writ when the Selection Committee included nominees of the Director of Education.
  2. Nature and scope of the Notification (21.12.1998): The Notification increased the upper age limit by two years for recruitment by "Direct Open Competitive Examination" conducted by UPSC/SSC or similar central authorities, and explicitly excluded recruitment "by interview" or by shortlisting, contract, absorption, transfer or deputation. The court noted that if a candidate seeks benefit of the Notification, he must accept it in its entirety and cannot take the benefit while disputing its applicability.
  3. Circular of Additional Director of Education: The court examined the Departmental Circular that clarified the Notification as not extending the two-year relaxation to recruitments by interview in aided schools, and recorded the court's difficulty in appreciating the need for such a clarification given the explicit language of the Notification. The court observed the Circular appeared to have been issued because many aided schools had already granted relaxation and regularised services on that basis.
  4. Equitable treatment and regularisation: The court observed that many candidates had been appointed by Selection Committees with the two-year relaxation and their services had been regularised or not objected to; treating the Petitioner differently from similarly-placed persons required strong reasons which were not apparent.
  5. Reliance on prior decision and statutory Rules: The court relied on the earlier Single Judge decision in C.W.P. 6626/99 (and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal) and analysed Rules of the Delhi School Education Rules. In particular, Rule 104 was highlighted as stipulating that age limits for recruitment to a recognised private school (aided or not) shall be the limits specified by the Administrator for corresponding posts in Government schools. The court concluded that the Notification and the Circular could not be construed to go beyond the scope of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules.
  6. Construction to preserve validity: Although no prayer had been made to declare the Notification or Circular ultra vires the Act/Rules, the court preferred a construction that would save those instruments from being declared ultra vires. The court concluded that the only construction consistent with the statutory scheme was to apply Rule 104 strictly; doing so supported the validity of the Petitioner's appointment.
  7. Effect of provisional appointment and Rule 98(4): The court noted that under Rule 98(4) the Director's approval of an appointment can be deemed granted if no objection is made within 15 days, a provision designed to avoid the unfairness of retrospectively declaring an appointment irregular after the appointee has commenced duties. Given that the Petitioner had worked for four months, this factual element reinforced the court's conclusion.
  8. Conclusion from combined legal and factual matrix: Taking the statutory provisions, the Central Notification, the Departmental Circular, the prior case law, and the Petitioner's period of service together, the court found that termination of the Petitioner's services could not stand and ordered reinstatement with salary directions.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Termination quashed; Petitioner reinstated.

Direct orders and consequences delivered by the court:

  • The court quashed the Order whereby the Petitioner's services were terminated/dispensed with.
  • The Petitioner was directed to report for duty within five days.
  • He was held entitled to salary from the date on which he reports for duty, and specifically permitted to receive his salary for the period July 1999 to October 1999.
  • The petition was disposed of and there was to be no order as to costs.
  • A copy of the order was to be supplied to the parties on payment of the usual charges.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent; it relies on statutory construction (particularly Rule 104 and Rule 98(4)) and existing judicial treatment in a similar matter (C.W.P. 6626/99). The opinion emphasizes that Notification and Departmental Circulars must be read within the scope of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, and applies those rules to validate the Petitioner's appointment. The court did not expressly declare the Notification or Circular ultra vires; instead it adopted a construction to preserve their validity while applying Rule 104 strictly in the factual context before it.

Show all summary ...

1. Rule.

2. An adjournment is prayed for on behalf of Respondent-School on the grounds that Mr. R.S. Tomar is out of station. I have perused the previous proceedings and find that Mr. Tomar has not appeared in this case at all. The prayer for adjournment is declined. In any event since the Selection was carried out by the Selection Committee under Rule 96(3)(b) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), it seems paradoxical for its Management to resist the writ petition. The adversaries in reality are the Petitioner and the School on the side and the Department of Education on the other. If this is not so there appears to be good reason to maintain that all recruitment is aided schools should be through the aegis of the Education Department which pays 95 per cent of the salaries.

3. There is much wisdom in the proverb that the person who pays the piper calls the tune. In aided school since the Government defrays 95 percent of the expenses through grants-in-aid it must be given the unfettered prerogative to lay down conditions which in their opinion are conducive for the proper administration of the School, and the systematic imparting of quality education. It is obviously for this reason that even in the case of private recognised schools which are receiving grants-in-aid, in the matter of appointment of teachers one Educationist (to be nominated by the Director) and one Representative of the Director must be included in the Selection Committee. This is prescribed in Rule 96(3)(b) of the Rules. In the present case there is no dispute that these two persons were part of the composition of the composition of the Selection Committee. The Petitioner had responded to advertisement published in the 'Jan Satta' dated 4.6.1999. On 16.6.1999 the Petitioner appeared in the interview before the Selection Committee of the Respondent-School. He was selected by the Selection Committee and was taken on duty from 1.7.1999. It appears that he continued to perform his duties for four months, even though salaries were not paid to him. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents states that the salary had been tendered to the Petitioner but has not been accepted by him. Be that as it may, it appears that the services of the Petitioner were discontinued with effect from November 1999. A letter of termination issued to him is dated 4.11.1999. It has been stated in this letter by the Manager of the Respondent-School that since the Petitioners were found to be overage at the time of appointment and relaxation had not been granted by the Competent Authority, the Petitioner were relieved from their services in the School.

4. Reliance has been placed learned counsel for all the parties on the Notification dated 21.12.1998 of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. It is by virtue of this Notification that the Petitioner can claim two year relaxation. Since this is so he must be bound by the Notification in its entirety, it would be anomalous and hence impermissible for him to claim the advantage of the age relaxation and simultaneously dispute the application of the Notification thereto. Paragraph three of the Notification reads as follows:

"3. Increase in the upper age limit:-

The upper age-limit for recruitment by the method of Direct Open Competitive Examination to the Central Civil services and civil posts specified in the relevant Service/recruitment rules on the date of commencement of the Central Civil Services and Civil posts (Upper Age-limit for Direct Recruitment) Rules 1998, shall be increased by two years.

Note:- "Direct Open Competitive Examination" for the purpose of these rules shall mean direct recruitment by Open Competitive Examination Conducted by the Union of Public Service Commission or the Staff Selection Commission or any other authority under the Central Government and it shall not include recruitment through Limited Departmental Examination or through shortlisting or by interview or by contract or by absorption or transfer or deputation."

5. On 16.6.1999, the date when the Selection Committee had met, at least the nominees appointed by the Direct of Education ought to have been aware or made aware of the requirement of this Notification. The Selection Committee after due deliberations had granted relaxation of not more than two years in the case of Petitioner. Learned counsel for Respondents have also relied on a Circular issued by the Additional Director of Education dated 17.10.1999, which reads as under:

" CIRCULAR The Govt. of India vide its notification No. 15012/6/98-Estt.(D) dated 31.12.98 notified Central Civil Services and Civil Services and Civil posts (upper age limit for direct recruitment) the rules 1993 which inter-alia provided that the upper age limit for recruitment by the method of direct open competitive examination to the Central Civil Services and Civil posts shall be increased by two years. The said notification was endorsed by the Dy. Secretary Services and was further circulated by the JDE(Admn) vide circular dated 17.5.99, It has come to the notice that in some of the aided school the recruitment of employees is being done keeping in view the increased age limit of two years. It is hereby clarified that:

"Direct Open Competitive Examination" shall mean direct recruitment by open competitive examination conducted by UPSC or SSC and shall not included recruitment through limited departmental examination or by interview or by contract or shall listing.

In aided school, all the appointments are to be finalised by Staff Selection Board under rule 96 through an interview. Therefore, upper age limit of two years shall not be extended to the existing upper age limit of recruitment for non teaching staff of 25 years and for teaching staff in case of Assistant Teachers and TGTs 30 years and for PGT's 35 year.

This issue with the prior approval of the Director of Education.

(N.S. TOLIA) ADDL. DIRECtor OF EDUCATION (ACT) SCHOOLS"

6. I am unable to appreciate why a clarification was required when the Notification of the Central Government was itself quite explicit. perhaps it was issued keeping in perspective the fact that a number of persons had been appointed by Selection Committees of various Private Aided Schools by granting age relaxation. Such persons' services have already been regularised, or not objected to. It is also explained by Shri Kamaldeep, and not without reason, that this Circular was necessitated because of the vast number of persons who are involved in the various Schools receiving grant-in-aid by the Respondents. One aspect which is borne out of the Circular is the admission contained in paragraph 2 thereof to the effect that in some of the Aided School the recruitment of employees is being done keeping in view the increased age limit of two years. This palpably refers even to the Petitioner and the Respondents. It is not in dispute that an employment has already been received by a number of persons on a misunderstanding or wrong interpretation of the two year relaxation. There must be very strong reason to treat the Petitioner differently to other persons similarly placed.

7. The identical question came up for consideration in C.W.P. 6626/99 in which Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri had, in almost identical circumstances, declared that the Petitioner before his Lordship was eligible to be considered for the post of L.D.C. and that he was rightly considered. In that case, by granting the benefit of two years, the age limit stood increased from 25 to 27 years. In the present case of the Petitioner, since he was appointed to the post of T.G.T., the effect of the relaxation was to increase the upper limit from 30 to 32 years. The impact of the Notification and of the Circular was fully considered in the previous writ petition and it was only thereafter that my Learned Brother A.K. Sikri, J. had directed that the appointment letter be issued to the Petitioner within two weeks. That writ petition had been allowed.

8. Learned counsel for the Respondent has drawn my attention to the fact that an L.P.A. No. 408/2000 had been filed against the said Order. The fact remains that the Appeals was dismissed with the observation that the Hon'ble Division Bench did not find any ground to interfere in the Order passed by the Learned Single Judge. There is also an observation that those Orders will not be treated as a precedent but it is nebulous as to whether this refers to the Orders of the Hon'ble Division Bench or to that of single Judge. In any case, I am in agreement with the reasoning of the Learned Single Judge. I am fortified by the consideration of Rule 104 of the Delhi School Education Rules which stipulate that the minimum and maximum of age of the limit for recruitment to a recognised private school, whether aided or not, shall be the limits specified by the Administrator for appointment to corresponding posts in Government schools. Applying this the Rule it appears that there may be no justification for laying down the distinction of two years being applicable to those candidates who have been selected by the U.P.S.C./D.S.S.S.B. and those appointed by the Selection Committees of the individual Schools. In the former case, the candidates are ordinarily appointed in Government Schools. Faith and discretion should be completely vested in the Selection Committee of the private school. The Notification and Circulars cannot go beyond the scope and ambit of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules. Although there is no prayer for declaring the Notification and the Circulars as ultra vires the Act and Rules, it is advisable that a construction be given to the Notification and Circulars which would save them from being declared ultra vires. If this exercise is followed the only construction possible is to apply Rule 104 of the Rules strictly. If so done then the appointment of the Petitioner by the Respondent-School would be fully legal. Although there appears to be considerable weight in the argument of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Selection Committee in the present case was constituted under Rule 96 of the Rules, which would partake of the character of a Government Selection Board, I do not find the need to pursue the argument further. In the case in hand the Petitioner had already been appointed, all be it provisionally. Under Rule 98(4) of Delhi School Education Act, 1973 the approval of the appointment by the Director can be deemed to have been granted if not objected to within 15 days. This is a salutary provision intended to obviate the impasse of a person commencing his employment and later being told that his appointment was irregular and therefore non est. The Petitioner has already worked for four months, an aspect which cannot be lost sight of.

9. In these circumstances the Order whereby the Petitioner's services were terminated/dispensed with is quashed. The Petitioner is directed to report for duty within five days. He shall be entitled to salary from the date on which he will report for duty. The Petitioner may receive his salary from July 1999 to October 1999.

10. The petition stands disposed off. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

11. The copy of this order be given dusty to the parties on payment of usual charges.