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Amita Singh v. Air India & Anr
Court Opinion Summary — A. K. Sikri, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner joined respondent No. 1 (Air India) on 20.9.1974 as a Traffic Assistant and was later promoted to Traffic Supervisor. After more than 23 years of service she submitted a letter dated 13.6.1997 stating her inability to cope with shift work and tendering a notice of resignation. That letter also requested that, if a Voluntary Retirement Scheme were announced and she qualified, the resignation be treated as an option for voluntary retirement.
The petitioner sent further communications: a letter dated 17.7.1997 (seeking expeditious clearance) and a letter dated 25.7.1997 referring specifically to Regulation 46(ii) of the Air India Employees Service Regulations and asserting eligibility for voluntary retirement after completing 20 years' continuous service. By letter dated 22.7.1997 (received 26.7.1997), the employer asked her to submit a fresh unconditional resignation; she replied on 27.7.1997 contending her resignation submitted on 13.6.1997 would be deemed to have taken effect on 13.7.1997 and that the resignation need not be unconditional or operate to preclude a simultaneous request for voluntary retirement.
On 10.9.1997 the employer sent the impugned letter accepting the petitioner's resignation w.e.f. 13.7.1997 and stating that the request for voluntary retirement was not accepted because "there is no provision for the same under the Model Standing Order (Central) which apply to workmen category." The petitioner filed a writ petition in October 1997 challenging the refusal to treat her application as one for voluntary retirement.
In their counter-affidavit respondents maintained that Service Regulations did not apply to "workmen staff" and that Model Standing Orders governed, under which voluntary retirement was not provided; they attempted to distinguish instances relied upon by the petitioner where voluntary retirement had been granted.
During argument counsel for respondents conceded that the Service Regulations (including Regulation 46(ii)) applied to the petitioner. The court thereafter set aside the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 and directed the Managing Director to consider the petitioner's application for voluntary retirement under Regulation 46(ii) within two months; if accepted, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefits of voluntary retirement. The writ petition was disposed of and no order as to costs was made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 rejecting the petitioner's request for voluntary retirement on the ground that Model Standing Orders applied (and did not provide for voluntary retirement) was sustainable.
- Whether the Service Regulations (in particular Regulation 46(ii), which provides for voluntary retirement) apply to the petitioner, who belonged to the workmen category.
- Whether the petitioner's communications (beginning with her letter dated 13.6.1997) constituted a resignation only or also a valid request for voluntary retirement that required consideration under Regulation 46(ii).
- What relief, if any, should follow if the impugned letter is held to be unsustainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted that her initial letter dated 13.6.1997 was a resignation qualified by a request that it be treated as an option for voluntary retirement if a scheme existed or if she otherwise qualified—later letters specifically cited Regulation 46(ii) and her eligibility after 20 years' service.
- The petitioner also produced documentary material (office order dated 24.7.1995, a 13.12.1992 letter granting voluntary retirement to an employee under Regulation 46(ii), and other notices) to show that respondent No. 1 had applied Service Regulations in prior instances where consistent with Model Standing Orders and had granted voluntary retirement to members of the workforce.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents contended in their counter-affidavit that the Service Regulations did not apply to the workmen staff and, therefore, Model Standing Orders governed; because Model Standing Orders contained no provision for voluntary retirement, the petitioner's request could not be acceded to.
- Respondents also argued that the petitioner's letter dated 13.6.1997 was merely a resignation (and not a request for voluntary retirement), so accepting voluntary retirement was not appropriate.
- During argument, however, counsel for respondents (Mr. Lalit Bhasin) conceded that the Service Regulations would apply to the petitioner.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas, AIR (39) 1952 SC 16 | The principle that public orders made by public authorities must be construed objectively from the language of the order itself; reasons given in a public order can only be relied upon (in court) as stated in that order and cannot be supplemented by subsequent explanations by the author of the order. | The court relied on this principle to hold that the employer could not defend the impugned letter on a ground different from the ground stated in the letter (i.e., it could not contend the petitioner never sought voluntary retirement when the impugned letter itself acknowledged consideration of a voluntary retirement request but rejected it on the ground that Model Standing Orders applied). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two analytical strands: (1) a question of applicability of the Service Regulations and (2) the legal effect of the impugned letter and the reasons it gave.
First, the court noted that although respondents had contended Service Regulations did not apply to workmen, during argument their counsel conceded that the Regulations (including Regulation 46(ii)) applied to the petitioner. Because of this concession, the court treated the case on the premise that Regulation 46(ii) applied and therefore did not need to decide the broader controversy about applicability in general.
Second, the court examined the language of the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997. That letter expressly accepted the petitioner's resignation w.e.f. 13.7.1997 and stated that the request for voluntary retirement "has not been accepted as there is no provision for the same under the Model Standing Order (Central) which apply to workmen category." The court interpreted this language as an acknowledgement that the petitioner had made a request for voluntary retirement which had been considered and rejected on the stated ground.
Applying the Gordhandas principle, the court held that when reasons are given in an impugned order (or letter), the order can only be defended in court on the grounds mentioned in the impugned order itself. The respondents could not, therefore, rely in court on a different contention (namely, that the petitioner never sought voluntary retirement and had only tendered a resignation) because that was not the reason given in the impugned letter.
The court nevertheless analysed the petitioner’s communications and acknowledged that the petitioner's letters sometimes used the language of both resignation and voluntary retirement, and there was some confusion. However, the court observed that the main thrust of the petitioner's correspondence was a request for voluntary retirement and that respondents had themselves acted on the premise that such a request was made (they considered and rejected it in the impugned letter).
The court also pointed to inconsistent conduct by the respondents: after asking for a fresh unconditional resignation on 22.7.1997 (which would have rejected her conditional resignation), the respondents later accepted the resignation by the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997. Given the concession that Service Regulations applied and that Regulation 46(ii) provided for voluntary retirement, the court concluded the impugned letter was not sustainable and set it aside.
Finally, the court analysed Regulation 46(ii) itself: it accepted that the petitioner (having completed over 20 years' continuous service) was eligible to apply for voluntary retirement under that provision but emphasised that voluntary retirement under Regulation 46(ii) does not automatically take effect after expiry of a three‑month notice; it is "subject to approval in writing of the Managing Director." Accordingly the court directed the Managing Director to consider the petitioner's application under Regulation 46(ii) within two months rather than ordering an immediate grant of voluntary retirement.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court set aside the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 accepting the petitioner's resignation and rejecting her voluntary retirement request on the ground that Model Standing Orders applied.
DISPOSITION: The Managing Director of respondent No. 1 is directed to consider the petitioner's application for voluntary retirement under Regulation 46(ii) within two months from the date of the judgment. If the application is accepted, the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefits attendant on voluntary retirement under that regulation. The writ petition is disposed of in terms of these directions and there is no order as to costs.
Implications: The immediate consequence is that the impugned administrative decision is quashed and the petitioner’s request must be considered afresh under Regulation 46(ii). The court did not order automatic grant of voluntary retirement (recognising the Regulation’s requirement of written approval by the Managing Director). The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader new precedent beyond applying established principles (including the Gordhandas principle) to the facts of this case.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.
A. K. Sikri, J.— Petitioner in this petition has assailed the decision contained in impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 whereby her request for grant of voluntary retirement has been rejected and it is mentioned in that letter that respondent No. 1.management has accepted her resignation w.e.f 10.7.1997 Petitioner is not interested in the job and that is why she had submitted request dated 13.6.1997 for relieving her from duties. However she wants to be relieved as having voluntary retired from service whereas her request is treated as resignation and accepted as such.
The genesis of the dispute has the following factual background. Petitioner joined respondent No. 1 on 20.9.1974 as a Traffic Assistant. She was promoted from time to time and last promotion which she received was to the post of Traffic Supervisor. Having served for over a period of 23 years in various capacities, petitioner submitted letter dated 13.6.1997 in which she wrote that despite her best efforts to strike a balance between organisational interest and family requirements/commitments, she was not able to cope up with the working in shifts which was a part of her assignment at the airport at that time and with deep regret she was compelled to resort to the extreme step of tendering notice of resignation from service of Air India. Letter accordingly mentions that it was notice of ‘resignation’ from the service. However after stating this, she further mentioned in the letter that she had been given to understand that a Voluntary Scheme for employees was in the offing and was likely to be announced shortly and in case such a scheme is announced and she fulfilled the conditions laid down for qualifying under it, the letter of resignation should be treated as an option for voluntary retirement under the scheme and case be considered under the said scheme and not as a resignation. However no reply to the aforesaid letter was received. In these circumstances, petitioner yet submitted another letter dated 17.7.1997 referring to her earlier letter dated 13.6.1997 and requested for expeditious clearance of her request contained in letter dated 13.6.1997 By another letter of even date addressed to In-charge, Uniform Stores, she returned uniform items received from the employer. Not receiving any response to her communications dated 13.6.1997 and 17.7.1997, petitioner yet wrote another letter dated 25.7.1997 in which she wrote that by her aforesaid two letters, she had requested the authorities to accept her application for grant of voluntary retirement in terms of Service Regulations. In this letter, she further referred to Regulation 46(ii) of Air India Employees Service Regulations as per which an employee could opt for voluntary retirement on having completed 20 years or more of continuous service and stated that as she was eligible for grant of voluntary retirement in terms of the aforesaid Regulation, her request for voluntary retirement be accepted under Regulation 46(ii) of the Regulations as already the matter had been delayed. However on 26.7.1997, she received letter dated 22.7.1997 in reply to her earlier letter dated 17.7.1997 stating that she was required to submit fresh resignation letter without any conditions. This letter was replied to by the petitioner vide her letter dated 27.7.1997 stating that under the relevant Rules and Regulations, an employee could resign by giving 30 days notice in writing and on the expiry of the notice period, resignation is deemed to have been automatically granted. As he had submitted her resignation on 13.6.1997, it would be deemed that she resigned from service on 13.7.1997, and therefore, non- acceptance of resignation by letter dated 22.7.1997 was clearly incorrect and illegal. It was further mentioned that Rules did not provide that her resignation had to be unconditional and she could resign without prejudice to an application made for grant of voluntary retirement. In the last para of this letter, she requested that letter dated 22.7.1997 be withdrawn and she be granted voluntary retirement sought by her in her letters dated 13.6.1997, 17.7.1997 & 25.7.1997 forthwith.
After a lull for about one & half months, petitioner received impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 referring to her letter dated 13.6.1997 and stating as under:
“We are pleased to inform you that Management has accepted your resignation w.e.f 13.07.1997 Please note that your request for voluntary retirement has not been accepted as there is no provision for the same under the Model Standing Order (Central) which apply to workmen category.”
After receiving this letter, petitioner filed the present writ petition in October 1997 challenging the ground on which voluntary retirement was sought to be refused as there was no provision in the Model Standing Order relating to voluntary retirement. It is further stated in the writ petition that the respondent No. 1 itself had been applying the said Regulations to the extent that the same were consistent with the model standing orders. In fact, the respondent No. 1 had adopted a consistent policy of following the said Regulations where no provision had been made under model standing orders. The petitioner also annexed documentary proof to the above effect; viz an office order dated 24.7.1995 wherein it has been notified to all employees that an employee on retirement under Regulations 46(i) or 46(ii) of the Regulation would be entitled to sick leave. Letter dated 13.12.1992 whereby one Mr. Dev Raj has been granted voluntary retirement under Regulation 46(ii) of the Regulations and a notice wherein Regulation 24 has been referred to by the respondent No. 1 itself.
Respondents filed counter affidavit to the aforesaid writ petition in which stand taken by the respondent No. 1 is that Service Regulations did not apply to the ‘workmen staff of Air India’ and therefore, Model Standing Orders would apply and as there was no provision for grant of voluntary retirement as per the Model Standing Orders, the request of the petitioner for voluntary retirement could not be acceded to. Attempt is also made to distinguish the cases cited by the petitioner where request of voluntary retirement in respect of workmen staff was acceded to by the respondent No. 1.
However, I may state that the controversy as to whether Service Regulations, particularly Regulation 46 would be applicable or not need not be decided simply because at the time of arguments, Mr. Lalit Bhasin conceded that said Regulations would apply to the petitioner also. However what was emphasised by the respondents during the arguments was that the letter dated 13.6.1997 submitted by the petitioner was simply a letter of resignation and not request for voluntary retirement, and therefore, the question of accepting voluntary retirement did not arise and by letter dated 10.9.1997 petitioner's resignation was rightly accepted w.e.f 13.6.1997 Thus the present case is to be dealt with on the basis that the aforesaid Service Regulations apply to the case of petitioner also.
Once it is conceded that the Regulations apply to the case of petitioner, the disposal of present writ petition would not pose any problems at all. The relevant portion of letter dated 10.9.1997 has already been reproduced above. In the said letter, while accepting the request of the petitioner for resignation, it is stated that her request for voluntary retirement was not accepted as there was no provision for the same under Model Standing Orders (Central) which apply to her case. Therefore, the said letter clearly acknowledges that there was a request by the petitioner for voluntary retirement as well, which was considered but could not be accepted only on the ground that Model Standing Orders were applicable in the case of the petitioner and there was no provision for voluntary retirement in these Model Standing Orders. The reason given in the impugned letter is not that petitioner did not make request for voluntary retirement as is sought to be contended now by respondent No. 1. It is obvious from the reasons given in this letter that as per respondent No. 1, Regulation 46(ii) of the Service Regulations which contains the provision for voluntary retirement was not applicable to the petitioner who belonged to workmen category. If that was the only reason as stipulated in the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 and if request for voluntary retirement was rejected on the ground that Model Standing Orders were applicable to petitioner's category and there was no provision for voluntary retirement, the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 is not sustainable once it is conceded that Regulation 46(ii) of the Service Regulations that provides for voluntary retirement is applicable in the case of the petitioner.
It is well settled law that when reasons are given in support of the impugned order, it can be defended in the Court of Law, when challenged, on the grounds mentioned in the impugned order alone and not on any other or additional grounds. This proposition of law was stated by the Supreme Court way back in the year 1952 in the case of Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas, AIR (39) 1952 SC 16 which principle has been restated time and again. It would be apt to quote below para 9 of this judgment which reads as under:—
“Para 9: An attempt was made by referring to the Commissioner's affidavit to show that this was really an order of cancellation made by him and that the order was his order and not that of Government. We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.”
In view of the aforesaid position in law, it does not lie in the mouth of respondent to argue that since the petitioner did not submit request for voluntary retirement, and what the petitioner submitted was only a letter of resignation, her request of voluntary retirement could not be acceded to. This is not all the reason disclosed in letter dated 10.9.1997 On the contrary, as observed earlier, this letter proceeds on the basis that petitioner made request for voluntary retirement but the same cold not be acceded to only on the ground that there was no provision for the same in respect of workmen category to which the petitioner belonged. Thus respondents having themselves proceeded on the basis that there was a request for voluntary retirement made by the petitioner are precluded from contending that petitioner submitted letter of resignation only and not the request for voluntary retirement.
Even otherwise, I am persuaded to accept the argument of the respondents that petitioner had not submitted request for voluntary retirement. No doubt in letter dated 13.6.1997, petitioner had stated that she was submitting her resignation but it was qualified with the request that in case voluntary retirement scheme is announced, which was in the offing and she qualifies under the said scheme then the letter dated 13.6.1997 be treated as request for voluntary retirement and not as a resignation. May be at that time, she was not aware of the fact that there was already in existence provision for voluntary retirement in the form of Regulation 46 of Service Regulations. That is why in her subsequent request letter dated 25.7.1997, she referred to Regulation 46(ii) of the Service Regulations and also mentioned that as she had completed 20 years of service, she was eligible for grant of voluntary retirement. Although, a reading of her various letters would show that she has been simultaneously making request for resignation as well as voluntary retirement and at times she has confused between resignation and voluntary retirement but the main thrust of all her letters is that the respondents should grant her voluntary retirement sought by her. Moreover, in so far as her request for resignation is concerned, by letter dated 22.7.1997, respondent called upon her to submit fresh resignation letter without any conditions. Thus her request for resignation having been rejected on 22.7.1997 what prompted the respondents to accept the same request by impugned letter dated 10.9.1977 is not understood. Although letter dated 22.7.1997 was received on 26.7.1997, in the meantime, petitioner had made another request dated 25.7.1997 categorically mentioning the provisions of Regulation 46(ii) of the Service Regulations and making a specific request that she should be granted voluntary retirement. It seems that in view of these facts, even the respondent No. 1 was conscious of fact that the petitioner made request for voluntary retirement. In fact, as mentioned above, the respondent has itself acted on the premise that request for voluntary retirement was made by the petitioner which was even considered. However it rejected vide letter dated 10.9.1997 on the ground which has not been supported by the respondents themselves inasmuch as it is now conceded that provisions of Service Regulations including Regulation 46(ii) apply in the case of petitioner. also. Resultantly impugned letter dated 10.9.1997 is hereby set aside.
Now comes the question of relief. Once the case is to be proceeded on the premise that Regulation 46(ii) applies in the case of petitioner and that petitioner had made request for voluntary retirement, her request has to be considered in terms of Regulation 46(ii). Regulation 46(ii) reads as under:
“Regulation 46(ii):
The Managing Director may require an employee to retirement after he/she attains the age of 55 years on giving three months' notice in writing without assigning any reason. An employee may also on giving three months' notice in writing retire voluntarily after attaining the age of 55 years or, subject to approval in writing or the Managing Director at any time on completion of a continuous service of not less than 20 years.
There is no dispute that petitioner is eligible to apply for voluntary retirement in terms of aforesaid Regulation inasmuch as she has completed more than 20 years of continuous service. However this request for voluntary retirement does not become automatically effective after the expiry of three months' notice but is subject to approval in writing of the Managing Director. Therefore the prayer as sought for by the petitioner i.e directing the respondents to grant voluntary retirement cannot be granted straight way. While quashing the impugned letter dated 10.9.1997, Managing Director of respondent No. 1 is accordingly directed to consider the application of the petitioner for voluntary retirement as per Regulation 46(ii) within a period of two months from the date of this judgment. In case the request is accepted, petitioner shall also be entitled to the benefits of the said voluntary retirement.
This writ petition is disposed of in terms of the aforesaid directions. No order as to costs.
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