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Federal Chemical Works Ltd. v. Nutsco (Nigeria) Ltd.
Factual and Procedural Background
K.S. Gupta, J. framed the preliminary issue on 26th July 1999: “Whether the suit is instituted within time.” The plaintiff company, engaged in export of medicines, alleged that defendant No. 1 (a company) approached it to purchase Hyoscine Butyl Bromide Tablets B.P (10 mg). The plaintiff sent a proforma invoice dated about 29th September 1992 (No. 5/92-93) for US$47,250. By letter dated 2nd November 1992 the defendant No. 1 accepted the proforma invoice and asked the plaintiff to draw documents through Canara Bank, Longbow House, 14–20 Chiswell Street, London ECIY 4SR A/C Palm Investment Ltd.
The plaintiff dispatched the consignments via defendant No. 2 under Master Airway Bill No. 05693122, comprising four House Airway Bills (Nos. 071-RTC 184–187), all dated 4th January 1993, showing the Canara Bank branch in London as consignee. The plaintiff paid freight and sent the airway bills and other documents through Bank of India to the said Canara Bank branch in London for collection of the amount. A letter dated 9th February 1993 from defendant No. 1 admitted receipt but raised objections. A letter dated 20th April 1993 from Canara Bank, received by Bank of India on 3rd May 1993, revealed that defendant No. 1 had refused to honour the documents sent for collection. Bank of India took up the matter with Reliable Cargo & Travel Pvt. Ltd. (agent of defendant No. 2), which advised lodging a claim with defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 later informed Reliable Cargo by letter dated 16th September 1993 that the consignments had been wrongly delivered to defendant No. 1. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 2, in collusion with defendant No. 1, unauthorizedly delivered the consignments to defendant No. 1 and claimed US$47,250 (plus interest), praying for a decree approximately equivalent to Rs. 15 lakhs. The suit was filed on 14th November 1995.
Defendant No. 2 filed a written statement admitting dispatch under the cited airway bills and payment of freight but denying that Canara Bank was the consignee. Defendant No. 2 alleged the plaintiff had modified consignees to Afro Drug (NIGERIA) Ltd. and Nutsco (NIG) Limited (Lagos) and that it delivered the consignments to defendant No. 1 because the bank named as consignee was in a different country from the country of destination. Defendant No. 2 denied collusion and denied liability; it also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit is instituted within time (i.e., whether the claim is barred by the period of limitation).
- Whether Rule 30 of Schedule II of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (providing a two-year limitation for actions for damages) applies to the claim for unauthorized delivery, or whether the Limitation Act, 1963 governs the limitation question.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant No. 2's Arguments
- Counsel for defendant No. 2 (Sh. M. Wadhwani) contended that Rule 30 of Schedule II of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 is attracted and that the right to damages is extinguished if an action is not brought within two years reckoned from the date of arrival or from the date on which carriage stopped — here said to be two years from 9th February 1993 (the date on which delivery was taken by defendant No. 2 as argued), so the suit filed on 14th November 1995 is barred by limitation.
- Reliance was placed on the decision in East and West Steamship Co. George Town, Madras v. S.K. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1960 SC 1058 to support the limitation plea.
- In its written statement defendant No. 2 denied that the Canara Bank was consignee, claimed the plaintiff had modified consignees, and asserted it delivered to defendant No. 1 because the consignee bank was in a different country from destination; it also alleged that defendant No. 1 confirmed being consignee by a letter dated 6th February 1993.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- Counsel for the plaintiff (Sh. J.P. Gupta) contended that this case involves unauthorized delivery rather than destruction, loss or damage, so Rule 30 has no applicability; the limitation question should be decided with reference to the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Reliance was placed on the decision in M/s. Vij Sales Corporation v. Lufthansa German Airlines, ILR (1981) II Delhi 749 to support the proposition that the two-year rule of Rule 30 does not cover unauthorized delivery claims of this character and that Rule 18/29/30 are referable to destruction/loss/damage during carriage by air.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| East and West Steamship Co. George Town, Madras v. S.K. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1960 SC 1058 | Interpretation of the scope of the word "loss" in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 (Article III, para 6) and the limitation provision thereunder; cited by defendant to support a limitation plea. | The court reproduced and considered the reasoning in East & West (noting that the Supreme Court there construed "loss" broadly under the Sea Act). However, the court distinguished East & West as it arose under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925, and thus held it did not assist defendant No. 2 in the present case under the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 where rules (e.g., Rule 18) are limited to destruction, loss or damage to registered baggage or cargo occurring during carriage by air. |
| M/s. Vij Sales Corporation v. Lufthansa German Airlines, ILR (1981) II Delhi 749 | Used to support the proposition that Rule 18/29 and Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act refer to destruction, loss or damage to the goods during carriage by air and do not encompass unauthorized delivery; relied on plaintiff's contention regarding limitation. | The court agreed with the view expressed in paragraph 19 of the Vij Sales decision that the words "destruction or loss of, or of damage to" are referable to registered luggage or cargo (i.e., damage to the goods during carriage by air). The court followed that approach in concluding Rule 30 does not bar the present suit for unauthorized delivery. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a focused analysis of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 provisions invoked by the parties, principally Rule 30 (limitation) and Rule 18 (liability of the carrier), and compared them with the position under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 as discussed in East & West.
1. The court set out Rule 30 which provides that the right to damages is extinguished if an action is not brought within two years reckoned from the date of arrival at destination (or when carriage stopped), and that the method of calculating limitation is determined by the law of the forum.
2. The court then examined Rule 18 which confines carrier liability to "damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any registered baggage or any cargo" if the occurrence causing such damage took place during carriage by air. Rule 18 also defines the period of carriage by air and clarifies that damage presumed to have occurred during carriage if it happened in the performance of a contract for carriage by air during loading/delivery/transhipment, subject to proof otherwise.
3. The court considered the plaintiff's airway bill (Master AWB No. 05693122 dated 4th January 1993) showing the Canara Bank London branch as consignee and the plaintiff's assertion that delivery to defendant No. 1 required a bank release order obtainable only on payment of US$47,250. It was not disputed that delivery to defendant No. 1 occurred without the bank release order.
4. Applying Rule 18's textual limitation, the court held that an "unauthorized delivery" by the carrier to defendant No. 1 without a bank release order cannot, "by no stretch of imagination," be characterized as "damage" during carriage by air within the meaning of Rule 18. The court emphasized that Rule 18's "damage" is referable to destruction, loss of, or damage to goods occurring during carriage by air.
5. The court analyzed East & West and noted that that decision interpreted "loss" broadly in the context of the Sea Act, where the legislative context supports a broader meaning (loss to owner). The court concluded East & West was distinguishable because the Carriage by Air Act contains express rules (Rule 18 and 30) referring specifically to damage to registered baggage or cargo during carriage by air; therefore the Sea Act interpretation was not directly applicable to the Air Act context.
6. The court adopted the reasoning in paragraph 19 of M/s. Vij Sales Corporation v. Lufthansa (ILR (1981) II Delhi 749) that Rules in the Carriage by Air Act are not all-embracing and refer to loss/destruction/damage to the goods themselves during carriage by air. Following that view, the court held that Rule 30 (the two-year extinguishment provision) did not apply to unauthorized delivery claims of this character.
7. Consequently, the court concluded that the correct statute governing limitation for the plaintiff's cause of action was the Limitation Act, 1963, and not the two-year period of Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act.
8. On the application of the Limitation Act, the court found that the suit filed on 14th November 1995 was within the applicable limitation period. The court therefore answered the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff.
Holding and Implications
Issue answered in favour of the plaintiff.
Holding (direct effect on the parties): The court held that Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (the two-year extinguishment provision) does not apply to an action based on unauthorized delivery by the carrier in the circumstances of this case because Rule 18 confines "damage" to destruction, loss or damage to goods occurring during carriage by air. Accordingly, the Limitation Act, 1963 governs the question of limitation, and the suit filed on 14th November 1995 was held to be within limitation; the preliminary issue (whether the suit was instituted within time) was decided in favour of the plaintiff.
Implications: The immediate consequence is that the plaintiff's suit is not barred by the two-year period under Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act and may proceed on merits under limitation rules of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court distinguished prior authority under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and endorsed the reasoning in M/s. Vij Sales Corporation's case; the opinion does not purport to create a new binding precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing authority on the facts before it.
K.S Gupta, J.— Following preliminary issue was framed on 26th July, 1999:—
“Whether the suit is instituted within time.”
Suit was filed, interalia, alleging that plaintiff company is engaged in the business of export of medicines. Sh. M.N Khanchandani on behalf of defendant. No. 1 company approached the plaintiff for purchase of Hyoscine Butyl Bromide Tablets B.P (10 mg). In regard to this medicine on or about 29th September 1992 the plaintiff sent a proforma incoice bearing No. 5/92-93 of the value of US $ 47250. Vide letter dated 2nd November 1992 the defendant No. 1. accepted said proforma invoice and asked the plaintiff to draw documents through Canara Bank, Longbow House, 14-20, Chis-well Street, London ECIY, 4SR A/C Palm Investment Ltd. in pursuance of this letter the plaintiff despatched consignments of the said medicine through defendant No. 2 vide their Master Airway Bill No. 05693122 comprising of 4 House Airway Bill Nos. 071-RTC 184, 185, 186 and 187, all dated 4th January 1993. Said Canara Bank, Longbow House, 14-20, Chiswell Street, London, ECIY 4SR A/C Palm Investment Ltd., was shown as consignee in all the said Airway bills. The plaintiff also paid freight to defendant No. 2. It is stated that said Airway bills and other documents were sent through Bank of India to said Canara Bank branch in London for collection of the amount of consignments covered by them. In the letter dated 9th February 1993 sent by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff although it admitted the receipt of consignments in question but it raised some frivolous objections. It is further alleged that on receipt of the letter dated 20th April 1993 from said Canara Bank by Bank of India on 3rd May 1993, it was revealed that defendant No. 1 had refused to honour the documents sent for collection of amount to the former bank. Thereafter on matter being taken up by Bank of India with Reliable Cargo and Travel Pvt. Ltd., agent of defendant No. 2 in Delhi, the later advised the former by a letter dated 28th September 1993 to lodge the claim with defendant No. 2. It is further pleaded that defendant No. 2 by the letter dated 16th September 1993 informed said Reliable Cargo & Travel Pvt. Ltd. that the consignments had been wrongly delivered to defendant No. 1. It is claimed that defendant No. 2 in collusion with defendant No. 1 unauthorisedly delivered the consignments covered by said Airway bill(s) to defendant No. 1 and both of them are, therefore, liable to pay US $ 47250 being the value of consignments in question together with interest @ 24% p.a It was prayed that a decree for US $ 47300 equivalet to Rs. 15 lakhs be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against defendants along with pendente lite and future interest @ 24% p.a
Defendant No. 2 contested the suit by filing written statement. It is not disputed that the plaintiff despatched the consignments in question vide Master Airway bill No. 05693122 comprising of 4 House Airway bill Nos. 071-RTC 184, 185, 186 and 187, all dated 4th January 1993 and it paid the freight as alleged. However, it is denied that consignee of the said Airway bills was Canara Bank. It is claimed that the plaintiff had modified the names of consignees as (i) Afro Drug (NIGERIA) Ltd. and (ii) Nutsco (NIG) Limited, 11, Cufin Road, P.O.Box 5268 Lagos (NIGERIA) as the bank named as consignee, was in a country different from that of the country of destination. Answering defendant as such delivered the consignments to defendant No. 1. It is denied that consignments were delivered by the answering defendant in collusion with defendant No. 1 as alleged. It is alleged that in the letter dated 6th February 1993 the defendant No. 1 confirmed that it was the consignee instead of the said bank. Answering defendant was never informed about negotiating the documents through Canara Bank, London. Liability to pay the suit amount is denied. Suit is also alleged to be barred by limitation.
It was contended by Sh. M. Wadhwani appearing for defendant No. 2 that Rule 30 of Schedule II in Carriage by Air Act 1972 (for short ‘the Act”) is attracted in this case and as the suit was filed beyond two years of 9th February 1993 on which date delivery -of consignments in question was taken by defendant No. 2, this suit filed on 14th November 1995 is barred by limitation. In support of the submission strong reliance was placed on the decision in East and West Steamship Co. George Town, Madras v. S.K Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1960 SC 1058. On the other hand while controverting the said submission it was contended by Sh. J.P Gupta for plaintiff that it being a case not of destruction/loss/damage but of unauthorized delivery of consignments in question by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 said Rule 30 has no applicability and question of limitation for the purpose of filing suit is to be decided with reference to the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963. Reliance was placed on the decision in M/s. Vij Sales Corporation v. Lufthansa German Airlines, ILR (1981) II Delhi 749.
Said Rule 30 which is material, provides as under:—
“(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the carriage stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court seized of the case.”
Rule 18 which deals with the liability of carrier and is material, runs as under:—
“(1) The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction er loss of, or of damage to, any registered baggage or any cargo, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air.
(2) The carriage by air within the meaning of the preceding sub-rule comprises the period during which the baggage or cargo is in charge of the carrier, whether in an aerodrome or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an aerodrome, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the carriage by air does not extend to any carriage by land, by sea or by river performed outside an aerodrome. It, however, such a carriage takes place in the performance of a contract for carriage by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during the carriage by air.”
Identical rules are contained in Rules 29 and 18 of the First Schedule attached to the said Act.
It will be advantageous also to refer here the decision in East & West Stream Ship Co's case (supra) relied on behalf of defendant No. 2. In that case, scope of the word ‘loss’ in the 3rd clause of 6th paragraph of Article III in the Schedule attached to Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 came to be considered by the Supreme Court while deciding the plea of limitation taken on behalf of one of the parties to the suits. Said 3rd clause in Para 6 which is relevant, provides as follows:—
“In any event the carrier and the shipper shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless a suit is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.”
Para 17 on page 1063 of the report which is relevant, is reproduced below:—
“17. It has to be noticed that before providing in the 6th paragraph an immunity to the carrier from “all liability in respect of loss or damage” in certain circumstances the Legislature had in the earlier paragraphs laid on the carrier the duty of making the ships seaworthy, property manning, equipping and supplying the ship; and making the holds and all other parts of ship fit and safe for the reception, carriage and preservation of the goods; properly and carefully loading, handling, stowing, carrying, keeping and caring for and discharging the goods carried and provided that ordinarily the bill of lading should show the quantity or weight of the goods or the number of packages or pieces. “Loss or damage” which paragraph 6 speaks of should, therefore, reasonably be taken, to have reference to such loss or damage which may result from the carrier not performing some or all of the duties which had been mentioned earlier. One of these duties is to discharge the goods carried in accordance with the quantity or weight or the number of packages or pieces as mentioned in the bill of lading. The shipper and the consignee of goods are more concerned with the duty of the carrier to discharge the goods in proper order and condition and in full than anything else. Indeed the other duties cast on the carriers so far as the owners of the goods are concerned, are really incidental to this duty of discharging the goods in full and in good order and condition. When in the context of the previous paragraphs of Article III the 6th paragraph seeks to provide an immunity to the carrier “from all liability in respect of loss or damage” after a certain time, it is reasonable to think that it is loss or damage to the owner of the goods, be he shipper or the consignee, which is also meant, in addition to the “loss to the goods”. When the goods themselves are lost, e.g, by being jettisoned or by being destroyed by fire or by theft, there will be failure to discharge the goods in full and loss to the owner of the goods will occur. Even where the goods are not lost the carrier may fail to discharge the goods in full or not in proper order and there alos loss will occur to the owner of the goods. In such a case, even though there may not have been “loss of the goods” the goods are lost to the owner. The word “loss” as used in paragraph 6 is in our opinion intended to mean and Include every kind of loss to the owner of the goods-whether it is the whole of the consignment which is not delivered or part of the consignment which is not delivered and whither such non-delivery of the whole or part is due to the goods being totally lost or merely lost to the owner by such fact of nondelivery there is in our opinion ‘loss’ within the meaning of the word as used in paragraph 6.”
The ‘damage’ right to claim whereof would extinguish if the suit is not brought within twq years contemplated by aforesaid Rule 30, is referable to ‘damage’ as defined in aforementioned Rule 18. Under that Rule 18 liability can be fastened on the carrier only in the event of destruction, loss of or damage to any registered luggage or goods if the occurrence which caused such damage, had taken place during carriage by air. Copy of Airway bill No. 05693122 dated 4th January 1993 referred to in para 6 of the plaint, is placed on record. Name of Canara Bank branch at 14-20, Chiswell Street, London is shown as consignee therein. Needless to repeat that according to the plaintiff consignments covered by said Airway bill were to be delivered to defendant No. 1 only on release order from the said consignee bank. Such a release order could be obtained by defendant No. 1 on payment to the said bank of US $ 47250, being the value of consignments plus other charges. It is not in dispute that delivery of consignments in question was made by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 on 9th March 1993 without bank release order from said Canara Bank branch in London. Such an unauthorized delivery by no stretch of imagination can be termed as ‘damage’ during the carriage by air within the meaning of aforesaid Rule 18.
In M/s. Vij Sales Corporation's case (supra) the plea of limitation taken by defendant in somewhat identical circumstances was negated by a learned single Judge of this court after referring to said Rule 29 in the First Schedule and Rule 30 in the Second Schedule and also Rule 18 in each of the Schedules as also the decision in East & West Steamship Co's case (supra). In para 19 of the decision on page 757 of the report it was held:—
“Now in the present case Rule 18 to the sechedules to the Carriage by Air Act 1972 is not all embracing when it speaks of ‘destruction or loss of, or of damage to’ They have been made referable to ‘any registered luggage or any cargo.’ In other words destruction, loss or damage must be to the goods and not to the air carrier or the consignee. This circumstance alone distinguishes the provisions under the Carriage by Air Act 1972 from those contained in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1925. As already observed above, the distinction was taken note of in para 18 of the Supreme Court decision in the case of East and West Steamship Co. (supra).” It may be noticed that in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1925 there exists no rule similar to aforesaid Rule 18. Further, from the discussions made in Para 17, extracted above, in East & West Steamship Co's case (supra) it is manifest that it was rendered with reference to the provisions contained in Article III of Th Schedule attached to that Act. For both these reasons, no help can be sought by defendant No. 2 from the interpretation put to the word ‘loss’/‘damage’ occurring in said 3rd clause of 6th paragraph of Article III in East & West Steamship Co's case. I fully agree with the view taken in said para No. 19 in M/s. Vij Sales Corporation's case (supra) that words ‘destruction or loss of or of damage to’ have been made referable, to ‘any registered luggage or any carago’ only. Thus, unauthorized delivery made by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 without bank release order would not be a ‘damage’ either during the carriage by air or ‘destruction or loss of or of damage to’- the consignments in question within the meaning of said Rules 18 and 30 so as to render this suit being barred by time as having been instituted beyond two years of said 9th February 1993. Provisions contained in Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable and the suit filed on 14th November 1995, is thus well within limitation period. Issue is, therefore, answered in favour of the plaintiff.
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