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K. Kishore & Construction (Huf) v. Allahabad Bank.

Delhi High Court
Jan 28, 1998
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Judicial Order Summary — J.B. Goel, J. (IA No. 1383/97)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, stated to be the tenant of Flat No. 29, First Floor, Regal Building, Parliament Street, Connaught Place, New Delhi, had sublet the premises to M/s United Industrial Bank Ltd. (UIB) under a registered sub-lease dated 18.5.1987. The sub-lease provided for staged rent increases (initially Rs. 10,500/- per month for the first three years, then higher rates for subsequent periods as specified in the sub-lease).

UIB was amalgamated with the defendant bank pursuant to a Central Government notification dated 30.10.1989 under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The plaintiff did not accept the defendant as their tenant and alleged the defendant was in unauthorised possession. The defendant, by way of written statement, admitted that UIB had been a sub-tenant and pleaded that by the amalgamation the defendant succeeded to UIB's tenancy rights and continued as sub-tenant.

The suit is for recovery of possession and mesne profits. On the pleadings, six issues were framed (listed below). During trial, the registered sub-lease expired by efflux of time on 1.2.1997. The plaintiff filed the present application (IA No. 1383/97) under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC seeking a decree for possession based on admissions in the defendant's written statement. The defendant contested the application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff proves that on account of amalgamation of United Industrial Bank with the Allahabad Bank (the defendant), the defendant is in unauthorised occupation?
  2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the tenancy of the defendant has been legally terminated?
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits? If yes, from which date and at what rate?
  4. Whether the defendant, by way of counter-claim, is entitled to Rs. 16,286.85, as averred in the written statement?
  5. To what relief, if any, the plaintiff/defendant is entitled?
  6. What order and decree?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The defendant admitted in the written statement that it succeeded to the rights of UIB, the former sub-tenant, thereby admitting the landlord-tenant relationship.
  • The sub-lease dated 18.5.1987 (admitted by the defendant) was for ten years and expired on 1.2.1997; therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a decree on the basis of that admission.
  • The Court can and should take into account subsequent events (i.e., expiry of the sub-lease during pendency) under Order 12, Rule 6 to shorten litigation and grant appropriate relief; reliance was placed on authorities including S.L. Associates v. Karnataka Handloom Development and others.

Defendant's Arguments

  • Issues have been framed on the pleadings and these issues require investigation — the matter is at trial and cannot be disposed on admissions alone without investigation.
  • The plaintiff has not admitted that the defendant is their tenant or sub-tenant; therefore, no decree for possession can be passed on the basis contended by the plaintiff.
  • When the suit was filed the sub-lease was subsisting, so there was no cause of action for possession at that time; thus the suit was not maintainable on that ground.
  • No decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC can be passed without amendment of the plaint (as contended by defendant's counsel).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Firm Srinivas Rant v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 The proposition that where a defendant admits an alternative case in his written statement, a decree may be granted on that admission even if it is inconsistent with the plaintiff's pleading, provided no injustice or surprise results. The Court relied on and quoted this authority to justify granting relief based on the defendant's admissions in the written statement despite those admissions differing from the plaintiff's pleaded case.
S.L. Associates v. Karnataka Handloom Development, 62 (1996) DLT 386 The principle that a court may, in suitable cases, take notice of events occurring after institution of the suit and afford relief on the basis of altered circumstances to shorten litigation. The Court applied this principle to hold that, since the sub-lease expired during pendency of the suit, it could take the altered circumstances into account and grant relief under Order 12, Rule 6.
Sikhar Chand & Ors. v. Mst. Bari Bai & Ors., AIR 1974 MP 75 Support for the proposition that courts can consider events occurring after institution of the suit in appropriate cases to do complete justice. The Court cited this decision as a corroborative authority for taking notice of events that occurred during the pendency of the suit (the sub-lease expiry) and affording relief accordingly.
D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India, JT 1993 (7) SC 114 The proposition, as referenced in this opinion, that the Delhi Rent Control Act may not apply in the circumstances described and that after termination of tenancy the landlord is entitled to seek possession and civil courts are competent to grant a decree. The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the Delhi Rent Control Act was not applicable (given the rent figures admitted) and therefore the civil court could grant possession once the tenancy had terminated.
Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Air India, 65 (1997) DLT 533 This authority was cited by the plaintiff's counsel in support of his contentions (as recorded in the opinion). Recorded as being relied upon by the plaintiff's counsel. The judgment does not otherwise indicate specific application of this precedent in the Court's reasoning.
M/s Sun Chandra & Co. v. Punjab & Sind Bank, 1996 (5) AD (Del) 323 Cited by the plaintiff's counsel (as recorded). Recorded as relied upon by plaintiff's counsel; not specifically applied in the Court's articulated reasoning.
Surjit Sachdev v. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 66 (1997) DLT 54 (DB) Cited by the plaintiff's counsel (as recorded). Recorded as relied upon by plaintiff's counsel; the judgment does not show specific reliance or application by the Court in its reasoning.
R.N. Sachdevpetitioner v. Ram Lal Mahajan Charitable Trust, 1997 (III) AD (Del) 997 Cited by the plaintiff's counsel (as recorded). Recorded as relied upon by plaintiff's counsel; not specifically applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning as recorded in this opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by reference to admissions in the pleadings and established principles governing Order 12, Rule 6, CPC. The relevant Sub-rule (1) of Order 12, Rule 6 was set out in the opinion: where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, the Court may at any stage and without waiting for determination of other questions, make such order or give such judgment as it thinks fit, having regard to such admissions.

The Court observed that:

  • The defendant's written statement admitted that UIB was a sub-tenant and that the sub-lease of 18.5.1987 (admitted in the written statement) had been executed; the sub-lease was registered and specified terms including rent escalation.
  • The amalgamation scheme (referred to in the opinion as vesting rights by operation of law) applied with effect from 31.10.1989, by which the defendant succeeded to tenancy rights of UIB.
  • The registered sub-lease period of ten years expired by efflux of time on 1.2.1997 during the pendency of the suit.

The Court relied on Firm Srinivas Rant v. Mahabir Prasad to justify granting relief based on admissions made by the defendant, even where such admissions differ from the plaintiff's pleaded case, so long as no prejudice or surprise results and the defendant's own plea forms the basis for relief.

The Court also applied the authority in S.L. Associates (and cited Sikhar Chand) for the proposition that a court may, in suitable cases, take notice of events that occur after institution of the suit and grant relief on the basis of altered circumstances to shorten litigation and secure complete justice. Applying that approach, the Court treated the expiry of the sub-lease during pendency as a relevant altered circumstance.

Further, on the facts as admitted (including the rate of rent agreed and earlier admitted rent figures), the Court invoked the decision in D.C. Bhatia to hold that the Delhi Rent Control Act was not applicable in the circumstances recorded and that, after termination of tenancy, the landlord is entitled to seek possession and the civil court is competent to grant such decree.

Summarising the legal position as derived from admissions and applicable authorities, the Court concluded that: (i) landlord-tenant relationship was admitted; (ii) the defendant's sub-lease had come to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.1997; (iii) the last rate of rent as per the sub-lease was Rs. 22,500/-; (iv) the admitted initial rent exceeded Rs. 3,300/- per month leading to the conclusion (as per D.C. Bhatia) that the Rent Control Act was not applicable. Given these findings, there remained no triable issue on the relief of possession and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree under Order 12, Rule 6.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

APPLICATION ALLOWED; DECREE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

Direct consequences and specific orders recorded by the Court (as stated in the opinion):

  • A decree for recovery of possession was granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant in respect of the premises (property No. 29, 1st floor, Regal Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi) let out by the sublease dated 18.5.1987.
  • The Court held that the defendant was a lawful tenant/occupant of the premises only until 1.2.1997, when the lease came to an end by efflux of time; accordingly the defendant would not be liable to pay damages for the period up to that date.
  • Issue Nos. 1 and 2 (relating to unauthorised occupation on account of amalgamation and termination of tenancy) were disposed of in accordance with the above findings.
  • There would be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The Court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying established principles — principally that admissions by a defendant may be treated as the basis for relief under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC, and that courts can, in suitable cases, take account of events occurring during the pendency of the suit to grant relief on altered circumstances. The order's effect is the immediate grant of possession to the plaintiff on the factual admissions recorded; no broader novel legal rule was promulgated in this opinion.

Show all summary ...

J.B Goel, J.— By this order application (IA No. 1383/97) under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC the plaintiff seeks a decree for possession against the defendant in respect of the suit premises on the basis of admissions made by the defendant in the written statement in a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits.

2. Plaintiffs case is that they are tenants in respect of Flat No. 29 First Floor, Regal Building, Parliament Street, Connaught Place, New Delhi and they had sublet the premises to M/s; United Industrial Bank Ltd. (for short ‘UIB’) under a registered sublease dated 18.5.87 at a monthly rent of Rs. 10,500/- with escalation clause regarding increase in rent.

3. UIB was amalgamated with the defendant Bank in pursuance of Notification dated 30.10.89 issued by the Central Government under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 but plaintiff has not accepted the defendant as their tenant alleging that the tenancy of UIB could not have been transferred in favour of the defendant by means of the aforesaid amalgamation order and the defendant is in unauthorised ‘possession of the premises.

4. The defendant in their written statement is contesting the suit. On the question of possession it is admitted that formerly UIB was a sub-tenant of the plaintiff, the subtenancy had started under sub-lease dated 28.1.77 at a monthly rent of Rs. 3,750/-, the rent could not be increased under the Delhi Rent Control Act but in 1987 the plaintiff pressurised and coerced the UIB to increase the rent from Rs. 3,750/- to Rs. 32,000/- by executing-sub-lease dated 18.5.87 in favour of plaintiff and another licence deed in favour of Smarts (P) Ltd. which is sham agreement; that in pursuance of aforesaid Central Government Notification dated 30.10.89 all the assets, liabilities, rights and interests of UIB including the tenancy rights have vested in the defendant Bank, the defendant Bank is thus a sub-tenant in the said premises on the same terms and conditions at the monthly rent of Rs. 3,750/- with increase if any not more than 10% under Delhi Rent Control Act. The defendant is not in unauthorised possession of the premises and is not liable to vacate as the sub-tenancy is still continuing.

5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:—

1. Whether the plaintiff proves that on account of amalgamation of United Industrial Bank with the Allahabad Bank, the defendant, i.e Allahabad Bank, is in unauthorised occupation?

2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the tenancy of the defendant has been legally terminated?

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits? If yes, from which date and at what rate?

4. Whether the defendant, by way of counter-claim, is entitled to Rs. 16,286,85, as averred in written statement?

5. To what relief if any, the plaintiff/defendant is entitled to?

6. What order and decree?

The case is at the trial stage and in the meantime as the sub-lease has come to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.1997, taking advantage of this fact the present application was filed by the plaintiff under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC. The defendant has filed a reply contesting the said application.

6. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has contended that defendant has admitted in the written statement that’ they have succeeded to the rights of UIB, the former sub-tenant of the plaintiff and thus they have admitted the relationship of landlord; and tenant; the sub-lease dated 18.5.1987 is also admitted; this sub-lease was for ten years which has come to an end on 1.2.1997 by efflux of time and as such plaintiff is entitled to a decree on the admission of the defendant and the Court can take into consideration subsequent events. He has placed reliance on S.L Assotiates Pvt. Ltd. v. Karnataka Handloom Dev., 62 (96) DLT 386; Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. AirIndia, 65 (1997) DLT 533; M/s. Sun Chandra and Company v. Punjab & Sind Bank, 1996 (5) AD : (Del) 323; Surjit Sachdev, v. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 66 (1997) DLT 54 (DB) and R.N Sachdevapetitioner v. Ram Lal Mahajan Charitable Trust.S, 1997 (III) AD (Del) 997. Whereas learned Counsel for the defendants has contended that on the pleadings of the parties issues have been framed, issues need investigation and on the cause of action as pleaded by the plaintiff no decree of possession could be passed as the plaintiff has not admitted the defendant as their tenant or sub-tenant and also that no cause of action had arisen to file suit for possession as the tenancy was subsisting when the suit was filed. In any case without amendment of the plaint no decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC can be passed.

7. The case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint no doubt is that the defendant has not succeeded to the tenancy rights of the erstwhile UIB and is in unauthorised possession of the premises. But the defendant in its written statement claimed to be a subtenant having succeeded to the rights and interest including the tenancy rights of UIB by virtue of amalgamation in pursuance of Notification of the Central Government dated 30.11.89 issued under Section 45 of the Banking Regulations Act.

8. Normally, a party cannot be allowed to abandon its own case, adopt that of the defendant and claim on that footing where the latter is prejudiced by such a course. However, where a party makes an admission, a finding in favour of the other party based on such admission is not in competent even though it is at variance with the case set up by the latter in its pleadings inasmuch as there could be no surprise or prejudice in such a case.

9. In Firm Srinivas Rant v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177, in a suit for specific performance of a contract, in part performance the plaintiff had advanced a sum of Rs 30,000/-, the defendant denied the contract of sale and pleaded that money was taken by him as a loan. The suit of the plaintiff for specific performance was dismissed by the Trial Court but a decree for recovery of this amount with interest was passed; the High Court in appeal dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and allowing the cross-objections set aside the decree of the money as well on the ground that no case of a loan was made by the plaintiff and no relief was claimed on that basis. In further appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of the plaintiff that the decree for money was wrongly set aside and it was held as under:

“It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs. 30,000/- was advanced by way of loan to the defendants, second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil P.C to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations & claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the Act. to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the Act. cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings & which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in this suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter & no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the deff., it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff, to a separate suit.”

10. Ex. P-2 is the sub-lease dated 18th May, 1987 executed between the plaintiff and UIB, admitting the latter as a sub-tenant of the premises for a period of 10 years from 1st February, 1987, agreeing to pay rent of Rs. 10,500/ - for first three years Rs. 16,000/- for the next three years and then Rs. 22,500/- for the remaining four years. This sub-lease is registered and is admitted in the written statement by the defendant.

11. Ex. P-2 is the scheme of the amalgamation sanctioned by the Central Government amalgamating UIB with Allahabad Bank under Section 45 of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 with effect from 31.10.89 and vesting all rights, powers, claims, interests, assets, properties - immovable and movable including premises subject to all incidents of tenure and to the rents and other sums reserved by or contained in leases or agreements under which they are held.

The Allahabad Bank, the defendant herein thus had succeeded to, the tenancy rights in the premises with effect from 31.10.89 and from that date is the sub-lease of the plaintiff in respect of the unexpired term of the sub-lease by operation of law. The sub-lease came to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.1997 It is also the case of the defendant pleaded in its written statement that they have succeeded to the right and interest of UIB as a sub-lessee. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Order 12 reads as under:

“6(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without Waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.”

12. A plaintiff may move for judgment under this provision at any stage. This can obviously be availed even after he has joined issues on the defence. The admission may be made either in pleadings or otherwise which means that the admissions contained in documents written or executed between the parties before the action is brought are also sufficient for the purpose of this rule.

13. Learned Counsel for the defendant has contended that there was no cause of action for the relief of possession when the suit was filed as sub-lease was still subsisting and the suit is not maintainable and as such the question of passing a decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC does not arise. Whereas learned Counsel for the plaintiff has contended that the Court can always take into consideration the altered circumstances or the events which take place after the suit is instituted to shorten the litigation and pass appropriate orders. He has relied on S.L Associates v. Karnataka Handloom Development, 62 (1996) DLT 386.

14. In the case of S.L Associates (supra) the tenant had taken a plea that suit for possession was not maintainable as after the expiry of the initial lease period of three years the lease has further been renewed for a period of three years. The plaintiff had not admitted this renewal however this extended period also came to an end during the pendency of the suit and on that basis the plaintiff claimed decree under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC. It was held “that no doubt the suit must be practical (sic) in all stages on the cause of action as it existed on its date of commencement but the Court may however in suitable cases take notice of the events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties on the basis of the altered conditions. This must be done by the Court by giving relief to the parties on the basis of altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation and get complete justice between the parties”. Similar view had also been taken by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sikhar Chand & Ors, v. Mst. Bari Bai B Ors., AIR 1974 MP 75.

15. In the present case also the sub-lease period of 10 years had expired on 1.2.1997 during the pendency of the suit. To shorten litigation the Court obviously can take into consideration the altered circumstances.

16. The position that, thus, emerges is that, (i) the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted, (ii) the sub-lease of defendant had come to an end by efflux of time on 1.2.97; (iii) the last rate of rent as agreed in the sub-lease is Rs. 22,500/- and (iv) in any case it is admitted in the written statement that initially the rent of the premises was RS. 3,750/- which is more than Rs. 3,300/- per month. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of D.C Bhatia v. Union of India, JT 1993 (7) SC 114, the Delhi Rent Control Act is not applicable and after the tenancy had been terminated and had come to an end; the landlord is entitled to seek possession and the Civil Court is competent to grant a decree for possession.

17. In that view of the matter there is no triable issue which needs investigation so far as the relief of possession is concerned. Suit to this extent thus can be decreed under Order 12, Rule 6, of the Code.

18. Allowing this application a decree for recovery of possession is accordingly in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant in respect passed of the premises in property No. 29, 1st floor, Regal Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi let out by sublease dated 18.5.1987 (Ex. P-12).

19. In that view, it is also held that the defendant was a lawful tenant/occupant of the premises till 1.2.1997 when the lease came to an end by efflux of time and the defendant will not be liable to pay damages till then. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 also stand disposed of accordingly.

20. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs. This application is, accordingly, allowed.