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Shalini Rawat v. State.
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion records an application for bail by the petitioner, Shalini Rawat. The prosecution's case, as narrated in the opinion, is that Harsh Gupta, a second year college student, was abducted on September 16, 1995, kept confined in a house for several days and a ransom was demanded from his father. On October 5, 1995 Kamlesh (a woman who cooked for the victim), accompanied by Uday Pratap and Shalini Rawat, entered the victim's room and the victim was released the same evening. The father of the victim paid ransom in cash after involving the police; the currency notes were signed by the father and the Investigating Officer. Part of the ransom money bearing those signatures was later allegedly recovered from the petitioner Shalini Rawat and from her father Jagdish Singh Rawat. Jagdish Singh Rawat made a statement under section 161, CrPC attributing handing over of the recovered amount to his daughter and her husband. The petitioner was arrested on October 8, 1995; about five days later she refused to participate in a test identification parade. After framing of charges, the Additional Sessions Judge proceeded with the trial: three prosecution witnesses (including Harsh Gupta) were examined and three dates in February 1998 (2nd, 3rd and 4th) were fixed to continue the trial.
Procedurally, this was the petitioner's second bail application in the High Court. The first bail application was dismissed by a learned single judge on February 26, 1997. The present application was argued before Jaspal Singh, J., by Mr. V.P. Chaudhary for the petitioner and Mr. Sawhney for the State. The judge ultimately dismissed the present petition (see Holding below).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner, Shalini Rawat, should be enlarged on bail at the stage when charges have been framed and part of the prosecution case (including the victim's statement) has been recorded.
- Whether a prior dismissal of a bail application operates to preclude a subsequent bail application, or whether a subsequent application can be entertained only if there is a substantial change in the factual situation.
- Whether considerations such as the petitioner being a woman and an advocate, potential prejudice to her defence caused by custody, and the possibility of prolonged detention pending final disposal, weigh in favour of grant of bail in the circumstances of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments — as recorded
- Counsel (Mr. V.P. Chaudhary) emphasized the hardship and loss of liberty suffered by an accused held in custody for long periods and invoked a passage from the judge's earlier judgment in Ajit Kumar v. State to press the point that if an accused is ultimately acquitted after protracted incarceration, that deprivation is a grave wrong.
- It was argued that the petitioner is a woman and an enrolled advocate — factors urged in support of bail.
- Counsel contended that the prosecution evidence suffered from infirmities and that the victim's statement on oath was unworthy of reliance.
- It was argued that remaining in judicial custody would handicap the petitioner in defending herself; counsel relied on authorities (for example, Babu Singh) and other submissions to support the general position that bail is the rule and jail the exception.
Respondent's (State's) Arguments — as recorded
- The State contended that the petitioner and her husband were responsible for the kidnapping; a sum of Rs. 65,000/- was recovered from the petitioner (as stated in the earlier single-judge order) and the father of the petitioner stated that larger sums had been given to him which he deposited in banks.
- The victim (Harsh Gupta) implicated the petitioner; the prosecution had recovered part of the ransom money from the petitioner and her father.
- The State argued that grant of bail at that juncture could jeopardise the prosecution: the petitioner was portrayed as a desperate character and the court should consider the possibility of tampering with witnesses or impeding trial.
- The State observed that successive bail applications are not automatically maintainable absent a substantial change of circumstances and that the prosecution was proceeding with due diligence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ajit Kumar v. State (1997 IV AD (Delhi) 469) | The judge quoted a passage from his earlier judgment stressing the human cost of prolonged pre-trial incarceration and the possibility of eventual acquittal after prolonged detention. | The passage was read out by petitioner's counsel to evoke sympathy and to highlight the hardship of prolonged custody; the judge acknowledged the feeling but analyzed it in the context of the present case. |
| State Of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292 | The principle that successive bail applications are permissible but where there is no substantial change in fact situation thereafter necessitating release of accused on bail, an order granting bail would be illegal. | The court applied this principle to conclude that a subsequent bail application requires a substantial change in facts; it found no such change favourable to the petitioner (only that three witnesses had been examined, including the victim who supported the prosecution). |
| State through Public Prosecutor Indore v. Balwant Singh Onkar Singh, AIR 1950 MB 43 | The statement (as cited) that where the accused is represented by counsel the court would not be justified in releasing the accused merely on the ground that it would facilitate his defence. | The judge relied on this to reject the submission that custody handicapped the petitioner because she was represented by an able counsel who could present her case. |
| Babu Singh v. State of U.P (1978) 1 SCC 579 / AIR 1978 SC 527 | Principles concerning the interplay between individual liberty and public interest: the accused's right to personal liberty may be subordinated to public justice and welfare objectives; family-related hardships can be a factor but are not decisive if other considerations prevail. | The court noted that while Babu Singh had been relied upon by petitioner's counsel (including aspects about family hardship), the principle was that personal liberty may yield to public interest; the case was treated as authority that considerations of public justice can outweigh liberty claims. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, AIR 1977 SC 2447 | The oft-quoted proposition "bail, not jail" as the basic rule, but subject to notable exceptions such as risks of flight, repeating the offence, intimidating witnesses — the gravity and heinousness of the offence must weigh. | The court reiterated that "bail, not jail" is not absolute and that exceptions apply; it relied on this to weigh the gravity of the alleged offence and attendant risks against the petitioner's bail plea. |
| G. Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor A.P, AIR 1978 SC 430 | Where final disposal of a petition is likely to be delayed for years, the Court should ordinarily release the accused on bail unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise. | The court acknowledged the principle but noted qualification: even where delay is likely, bail is not automatic and is subject to cogent grounds to refuse it. The judge found that the present case involves a trial in progress (not an admitted special leave petition pending long delay) and therefore the Narasimhulu principle did not mandate bail here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a step-by-step analysis grounded in the materials and authorities placed before it:
- Successive applications and "substantial change": The court accepted that successive bail applications are not barred per se but emphasized the settled principle (citing State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao) that entertainment of a subsequent application normally requires a substantial change in the factual situation. The court found no substantial change favourable to the petitioner; the only material development since the earlier denial was that three prosecution witnesses (including the victim) had been examined and the victim supported the prosecution.
- On the quality of prosecution evidence: The court declined to dissect or microscopically examine the prosecution material at the bail stage. Although counsel for the petitioner attacked the quality of the victim's statement, the judge considered such detailed appraisal to be the task of the trial judge at an appropriate stage.
- Personal characteristics of the accused: The court addressed and rejected submissions that the petitioner's status as a woman and an advocate required bail. The judge held that such characteristics do not automatically tilt the balance when there is prima facie material connecting the accused to a grave offence; the court noted charges had been framed under sections 364A/411/120-B and that prima facie involvement existed.
- Ability to defend while in custody: The court relied on authority (State through PP Indore v. Balwant Singh Onkar Singh) to conclude that representation by counsel negates the contention that custody would unduly handicap the defence; the petitioner was being represented by senior counsel who could present her case.
- Weighing the "bail, not jail" principle and its exceptions: The court reiterated that while "bail, not jail" is a basic rule (State of Rajasthan v. Balchand), it is subject to important exceptions including flight risk, repeating offences, intimidating witnesses and the gravity of the offence. The court enumerated the relevant factors to consider: nature/circumstances of the offence, nature of evidence, circumstances peculiar to the accused, reasonable apprehension of tampering with witnesses, the likelihood of the accused's presence at trial and the larger public interest.
- Application of factors to facts: Applying the factors, the court observed the offences charged were grave and heinous; part of the ransom money, bearing identifying signatures, had allegedly been recovered from the petitioner and her father; the victim had implicated the petitioner; and the State was proceeding diligently with trial dates fixed shortly. The court accepted the State's submission that granting bail then could jeopardise the prosecution and be hazardous to the victim and public interest, including the risk of impeding the trial or tampering with witnesses.
- Speedy trial and delay: The court acknowledged the importance of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 and section 309, CrPC, and sympathized with concerns about prolonged incarceration. However, it found that in the present case there had been no avoidable delay so far and that the right to personal liberty did not override competing public interest considerations in the circumstances presented.
- Final evaluative conclusion: Considering the totality of facts and the authorities, the court concluded that the grant of bail would likely be harmful to the victim, dangerous to society, and might impede the trial; accordingly, bail was refused.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition for bail is DISMISSED.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner, Shalini Rawat, was refused bail and remains in custody while the trial proceeds.
- The court expressly stated that "nothing said in this order shall be read as an expression of opinion on the case," indicating that the order declines to resolve the substantive guilt or innocence of the petitioner and confines itself to the bail question.
- Broader precedent: The decision applies established principles regarding successive bail applications, the qualified nature of the "bail, not jail" rule, and the balancing of personal liberty against public interest. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond the application of these established authorities.
This summary is confined strictly to matters contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond those recorded by the court in the text supplied.
Jaspal Singh, J.— In Ajit Kumar v. State (1997 IV AD (Delhi) 469) while accepting the appeal against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, I wrote:
“The very first month of the year 1993 saw the appellant convicted and sentenced under sections 366 and 376 of the Indian penal Code. Though no time was lost by him in filing the appeal, we let years slip by. The long and dreary wait within the high walls and iron gates of the prison, in the meanwhile, must have made his life grow insipid and lose its relish. Was it not Oscar Wilde who said in The Ballad of Reading Gaol:
I know not whether laws be right,
Or whether laws be wrong;
All that we know who lie in gaol
Is that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.
And what if I now acquit? And if I do so, and that is what I propose to do, what about his withered years and shattered dreams?”
Mr. V.P Chaudhary, Senior Advocate while arguing on the bail application of Shalini Rawat read out to me the passage quoted above and thereby made me relive the overwhelming feeling of contrition which had besieged me while acquitting Ajit Kumar. What if Shalini Rawat too is not enlarged on bail and is acquitted years later? Asked Mr. Chaudhay. But then this was not the only contention. Other points too were raised in support of the plea for bail. I shall delineate the same a little later and ofcourse in greater detail but first let us have a peep at the canvas brought out by the prosecution.
At the centre-stage is Harsh Gupta, a second year student of Bhagat Singh college and the son of a businessman. On September 16, 1995 in broad day-light he was abducted by two persons who were later joined by yet another and whisked away to a distant locality and kept confined there in a house for days and days together. In the meanwhile the persons keeping the vigil had made enquiries about his father and had assured to release him after receipt of the ransom amount. On October 5, 1995 Kamlesh, a lady who used to cook food for him and wash his clothes told Harsh Gupta that she would talk about his release with “Shalini Mami”. The same evening Kamlesh accompanied by Uday Pratap and Shalini Rawat entered his room, where Shalini while stating that the police might have arrested “the other persons” ordered his release. The same evening he was a free man.
Is it all? Surely not. As per the prosecution, there was a demand for ransom from the father of Harsh Gupta who made the payment in cash but only after getting in touch with the police. One thing more. The currency notes, before being handed over as ransom money, had been stealthily signed by the father of Harsh Gupta and the Investigating Officer. This ingenuity was to reap rich dividends later. To cut short, a part of the rupees 15 lacs ransom money bearing those signatures was later recovered allegedly from the petitioner Shalini Rawat and her father Jagdish Singh Rawat who made a statement under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the amount so recovered from him had been handed over to him by none other but his own daughter Shalini Rawat and her husband. It may also be noticed that Shalini Rawat was arrested on October 8, 1995 while she was with Kamlesh and that about five days later she refused to participate in test identification parade. And, before I conclude this narrative I may as well mention that after the framing of charges the learned Additional Sessions Judge is proceeding ahead with the trial. Three witnesses including Harsh Gupta stand examined and three dates in February 1998 (2nd, 3rd and 4th) stand fixed for proceeding ahead with the trial.
I think I need to mention one more fact, for it is material, before I revert back to Mr. V. P. Chaudhary and his arguments. And it is that the present is not the first bail application in this court. In fact it is the second. The first was dismissed by a learned single judge on February 26, 1997. Mr. V.P Chaudhary at that time too was the counsel. The order runs as under:
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is an innocent lady. She is an enrolled advocate. She has got absolutely nothing to do with the present incident. She has been in custody since October 8, 1995. Thus the present case is a fit case for bail.
Learned PP on the other hand has contended that the petitioner and her husband Dinesh Singh are behind the present incident. It was at the instance of the petitioner and her husband that Shri Harsh Gupta was kidnapped. A sum of Rs. 65,000/- was recovered from the petitioner.
Then there is the statement of Shri Jagdish who has stated before the police that the petitioner and her husband came to his house and gave to him a sum of Rs. 5,75,000/- which he got deposited in different banks.
Then there is the statement of the person kidnapped who has stated that Smt. Kamlesh told him that she would talk to the petitioner with regard to his release.
Considering the above facts and circumstances I do not think present case is a fit case for bail. Dismissed.”
Mr. Chaudhary says that the earlier order is no bar to the present application though Mr. Sawhney appearing for the State, without referring to any authority in support, says it is. True, successive bail applications by an accused are not barred as there is nothing like a principle of res judicata operating in the field but there must be a substantial change in the fact situation for the court to entertain a subsequent bail application. Where there is no substantial change in fact situation thereafter necessitating release of accused on bail, order granting bail would be illegal [See: State Of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao . AIR 1989 SC 2292]. As for me, I see no substantial change in fact situation excepting this that after the said order three witnesses including Harsh Gupta have been examined by the prosecution and unfortunately for Mr. Chaudhary the victim supports the prosecution version and points accusing finger at the petitioner. Though, as per Mr. Chaudhary, the prosecution suffers from certain infirmities and though according to him the statement on oath given by Harsh Gupta is unworthy of reliance, this, to my mind, is no stage to dissect the material and examine it microscopically. That would be for the learned trial judge and that too at an appropriate stage.
Mr. Chaudhary says that the petitioner is a lady and add to it an advocate too. This was said by him earlier too but without success. In any case, the provision of bail to a woman is not mandatory when there is, as in the case in hand, ample material to prima facie connect her with the commission of an heinous offence. May be she is an Advocate. As her involvement is prima facie established (charges having already been framed under sections 364A/411/120-B), the mere fact that she belongs to what we have been regarding a noble profession is not sufficient to be weighed in her favour.
Mr. Chaudhary seeks bail on yet another ground. He says that remaining confined in judicial custody, the petitioner would be handicapped in defending herself. Why should she feel so when she is being represented and defended by a senior advocate who took not only all the time to present her case but showed all anxiety to know also whether his arguments were registering with the court or not (for this is what he said) without ever complaining of any handicap? The Madhya Bharat High Court said in State through Public Prosecutor Indore v. Balwant Singh Onkar Singh AIR 1950 MB 43 that where the accused is represented by a counsel the court would not be justified in releasing the accused merely on the ground that it would facilitate his defence. Ofcourse, this judgment was not referred to. The judgment which was referred to is Babu Singh v. State of U.P 1978) 1 SCC 579. It came from the armoury of Mr. Chaudhary. It was an appeal before the Supreme Court and one of the grounds for grant of bail was that all the appellants were the entire male members of a family and all of them were in jail. As noticed, this was not the only ground. It was an additional ground. In the case in hand and as stated by Mr. Sawhney, the petitioner has other family members to stand by and extend a helping hand and the way Mr. Chaudhary went about arguing the matter those family members must be complimented for having done a good job.
Mr. Chaudhary reminded me that bail and not jail is the basic rule. The inspiration for this obviously comes from State of Rajasthan v. Balchand AIR 1977 SC 2447. But then Mr. Chaudhary perhaps forgets, if I may say so with respect, that the statement so vociferously proclaimed and advocated is subject to certain very notable exceptions and Krishna Iyer J. who penned that statement underlined the same in the same breath. Lest we forget or are led astray, let us listen to what his Lordship says and that too in clear and unambiguous terms:
“The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like by the petitioner who seeks enlargement of bail from the court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.” (emphasis supplied)
Can it be said still that bail and not jail is the basic rule with no exceptions attached? Let us neither mutilate nor distort. In Balchand's case itself the court observed that the gravity of the offence and heinousness of the offence “must weigh”. I am mentioning it so that our vision is not clouded. Neither today nor tomorrow.
At this stage what requires to be noticed would be the nature and circumstances of the offence, nature of evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused at trial and larger interest of the public or the State.
The petitioner has been charged with and is facing trial for, offences which are grave and heinous. Three prosecution witnesses including the victim already stand examined and the learned trial judge, with a view to deal with the matter expeditiously, has very properly fixed three dates in the near future for remaining evidence. The State, it appears is proceeding ahead with due diligence. Mr. Sawhney appearing for the State submitted that grant of bail at this juncture may jeopardise the prosecution as the petitioner though attached to a noble profession, is hardly noble in deeds and appears to be a desperate character. The fact that Harsh Gupta was abducted in broad day light, and kept in confinement for ransom and the fact that the petitioner was a party to the entire sordid drama and the fact that part of ransom money was recovered from her and her. father stands prima facie proved and all this surely lends credence to the apprehension voiced by Mr. Sawhney.
Undoubtedly, inability of the existing judicial machinery to try an accused expeditiously is known. It is also true that right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 and section 309 of the Code needs to be kept in mind. To that extent I find myself one with Mr. Chaudhary. Surely enough accused person's right of personal liberty is important but let us not forget that in case of a conflict between accused person's right of personal liberty and interest of public justice and welfare objectives of society, the former should be subordinated to the later (See: Babu Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1978 SC 527) Mercifully, in this case, there has not been any delay so far and surely, for the reasons already delineated, it is not a case of avoidable incarceration.
Lastly, the question posed firstly. What if Shalini Rawat is not enlarged now on bail and is acquitted later? And, in that case, what about her withered years and shattered dreams? The thought had tormented the Supreme Court too in G. Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor A.P (AIR 1978 SC 430). I was thus not the first. Nor, in fact, was the Supreme Court. The question is as old as the hills and has been bothering criminolo-gists and penologists. The Supreme Court, in G. Narasimhulu was faced with a case where special leave petition stood admitted and where the final disposal of the petition would have, in all likelihood, consumed years before disposal. It held that in such a situation “the Court should ordinarily unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise release the accused on bail”. Thus emphasis on likelihood of delay in disposal of special leave petition and its becoming a persuasive ground for grant of bail, too is qualified by: “unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise”. In short even in such cases bail is not an unqualified right. And, let us remember that what we have be fore us is a trial in progress and thus a situation entirely different. To say that a distant dream of ultimate acquittal should prevail and entitle the accused to bail would nullify the law of bail with regard to non-bailable offences. The argument even goes far beyond the demand of the Delhi Bar Association put before the Law Commission years ago that section 497(1) should be made more liberal by providing that if the offence is not punishable with death, bail ought to be granted. The Law Commission in it's 41st Report observed:
“We are afraid that this would be a radical and undesirable change in law. Offences punishable with imprisonment for life are serious enough to justify the present position.”
Another suggestion was to the effect that in section 497(1) for the words “he may be released on bail” the following words be substituted—“he shall be released on bail unless the court for reasons recorded in writing otherwise directs”. The Report observed:
“We are unable to accept the suggestion either. Its acceptance would practically amount to an abolition of distinction between bailable and non- bailable offences”
I have no manner of doubt that the argument of Mr. Chaudhary, if accepted, too would completely wash away the distinction between bailable and nonbailable offence. We cannot allow it to happen.
Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I have absolutely no doubt that equipping the petitioner with an order as sought by her, would be hazardous to the victim and dangerous to the society in general. It may even impede the trial. Public interest would thus suffer as a consequence. The petition is thus dismissed. However, nothing said in this order shall be read as an expression of opinion on the case.
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