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Ravi Kantpetitioner v. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.S
Judgment Summary — M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners are Mr. Ravi Kant (1st petitioner) and his wife (2nd petitioner). They sought a writ of certiorari to quash:
- the National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission's order dated 8.12.1995 in First Appeal No. 666 of 1993; and
- the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi's orders dated 15.10.1993 in four cases: C-242, C-243, C-255 of 1992 and C-82 of 1993.
By the State Commission's orders dated 15.10.1993 (under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986), the 1st petitioner was sentenced to one year simple imprisonment and fined Rs. 5,000 in each of the four cases (or, in default, three months' simple imprisonment); the 2nd petitioner (a lady) was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 in Case No. C-243. The National Commission confirmed that order on 8.12.1995.
Background facts found in the opinion: the petitioners floated two companies — Instant Growth Funds (Pvt.) Ltd (1987) and I.G.F. Leasing (Pvt.) Ltd (1989) — of which they were the two directors. Large sums were received from the public (recorded bank receipts: Rs. 50.18 lakhs and Rs. 45.57 lakhs respectively). Contractual clauses requiring investment in hire-purchase business and supply of original hire-purchase agreements were not implemented. Various claimants obtained monetary decrees against the companies from the State Commission but could not realize the decrees under Section 25, leading them to invoke Section 27 (penal provision) against the persons responsible.
Procedurally, after State Commission decrees, the petitioners sought winding up of I.G.F. Leasing (P) Ltd; a provisional liquidator was appointed and company records were found missing. The Company Court ordered a CBI inquiry (report and charge sheet were placed before that Court). Execution against company assets was partly stayed and partly directed at different times. The present writ petition was filed on 12.1.1996. The 1st petitioner was accused of evading arrest and was taken into custody on 15.5.1996 after a court direction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (penal provision) applies to a "company" given the definition of "person" in Section 2(1)(m) and the language of Section 27.
- Whether the principle of "lifting the veil" to hold individuals liable applies only where the statute creating penal liability expressly permits action against those in charge of the company.
- Whether detention of the 1st petitioner for non‑payment (when he claims inability to pay) violates Article 21 of the Constitution, in light of Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin.
- Whether liability is limited to the value of shares held by directors or whether recovery (or penal action) must be confined to winding‑up proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Section 27 does not apply to a company because Section 2(1)(m) (definition of "person") does not expressly include a company, and Section 27 refers to "person" not "company", whereas Section 25 explicitly contemplates companies.
- The veil of incorporation can be lifted only if the relevant statute expressly creates penal liability against a company and permits action against those in charge of its affairs; no similar express provision exists in the Consumer Protection Act.
- The 1st petitioner lacks means to pay the decrees; imprisonment for inability to pay violates Article 21 (citing Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin and international covenant principles).
- Liability of the petitioners should be limited to the value of their shares and recovery, if any, should proceed through the pending winding‑up proceedings.
Respondents' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)
- The National Commission and State Commission treated the petitioners as responsible persons who controlled and ran the companies and were therefore liable under Section 27; their orders were confirmed.
- The 1st petitioner was evading arrest despite the orders; the court compelled his presence and he was arrested on 15.5.1996.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M.M. Ipoh v. I.T. Commissioner (AIR 1968 SC 317) | Permissibility of resorting to the General Clauses Act's definition of "person" where a statute contains an inclusive definition. | The court relied on this authority to justify applying Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act (definition including companies) to construe "person" in Section 2(m) of the Consumer Protection Act so as to include companies. |
| Motipur Zamindair Co. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1953 S.C 320) | Construction principle: whether a word may include a category in the General Clauses Act depends on the object of the statute; words should be construed to carry the statute's object into effect. | The court invoked this principle to interpret "person" in light of the Consumer Protection Act's object (consumer protection), supporting inclusion of companies within Section 27's reach. |
| Aligarh Municipality v. E.T. Mazdoor Union (AIR 1970 S.C 1767) | Where an order is directed to a corporation, those officially responsible for the corporation's affairs can be held guilty if they prevent or fail to take action to obey the order. | The court used this ruling to support treating penal provisions applicable to a corporate entity as also applicable to the individuals responsible for its conduct (here, the directors), even if a statute lacks an express clause to that effect. |
| Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (AIR 1996 SC 2005) | Principles for piercing the corporate veil where corporate personality is used as a cloak for fraud or improper conduct; protection of public interest may warrant going behind the veil. | Applied to justify lifting the corporate veil where companies were used to defeat consumer rights; the court relied on the principle that courts may look behind corporate personality to reach the real persons responsible. |
| Byford Leasing Ltd. v. Union of India (1995) Vol. LVII DLT 623 | Held that under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act the Chairman and Managing Director can be proceeded against if they are in charge of management and control. | The court respectfully followed this Division Bench view and agreed that persons in charge of management/control (e.g., directors) can be proceeded against under Section 27. |
| Surinder Nath Khosla v. Excise and Taxation Officer (1995) 4 Comp. LJ 343 (P&H) | Concerned recovery of Sales Tax from company assets; dealt with modes of recovery rather than penal provisions against individuals. | The court distinguished this authority, noting it deals with recovery from corporate assets (akin to Section 25) and not with penal provisions like Section 27 directed at persons in charge. |
| Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin (AIR 1980 S.C 470) | Addressed arrest/detention for non‑payment under civil process (Section 51 and Order 21 Rule 37 CPC) and discussed inability to pay and Article 21; referenced international covenant. | The court distinguished Jolly George on facts and statutory basis (civil arrest provisions under CPC), observed the need for municipal transformation of international covenants, and held Section 27 (a penal statutory provision) differs from the civil arrest context addressed in Jolly George. |
| Nova Steel v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1995 (1) Scale 525) | Principle regarding special statutes versus general statutes and pursuing remedies under the special law. | The court distinguished this decision: Nova Steel concerned the Motor Vehicles Act (special law) and was not about a penal provision akin to Section 27; hence it was not applicable to defeat Section 27 proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the four points raised by petitioners in sequence and applied statutory construction principles and precedents to each:
Point 1 — Does Section 27 apply to companies?
The court observed that Section 2(m)'s definition of "person" is inclusive, not exhaustive. It concluded that the inclusive definition permits resort to Clause (42) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act (which includes "company" within "person") under the authority of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, provided there is no repugnancy in subject or context. The court relied on M.M. Ipoh and Motipur Zamindair to hold it is permissible to apply the General Clauses Act to include companies. Moreover, the court considered the object of the Consumer Protection Act — protecting consumer interests — and noted that Section 25 expressly contemplates execution of orders against companies. Reading Sections 25 and 27 together, the court concluded that "person" in Section 2(m) must include a company and that Section 27 applies to companies. Accordingly Point 1 was resolved against the petitioners.
Point 2 — Lifting the veil and penal liability of directors
The petitioners argued that veil‑lifting is permissible only where the statute expressly provides penal liability against those in charge. The court rejected this narrow view. It relied on Aligarh Municipality (contempt context) to illustrate that a command to a corporation is necessarily a command to those responsible for its affairs; failure to implement may render both the corporation and responsible officials liable. The court held that a penal provision applicable to a company must be treated as applicable to those officially responsible for its conduct. The court also applied the principles in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. to justify piercing the veil where corporate personality shields fraud or improper conduct and public interest is paramount. The Division Bench decision in Byford Leasing (holding Chairman/MD liable under Section 27) was endorsed. On these bases, the court held the State and National Commissions were justified in lifting the veil and treating the petitioners (the sole directors) as responsible persons: Point 2 decided against petitioners.
Point 3 — Imprisonment for inability to pay and Article 21
Petitioners relied on Jolly George Varghese, which dealt with civil arrest under CPC provisions and referenced international covenant norms. The court distinguished Jolly George as arising in a different statutory context (civil enforcement under CPC) and noted the Supreme Court in that case had emphasized municipal incorporation of international covenants before they affect domestic law. The court observed that Section 27 creates a statutory offence — non‑compliance with a Tribunal order is punishable by imprisonment or fine — and is different from Section 25 civil recovery mechanisms. Because Section 27 establishes a penal offence created by statute, the court held that punishment under Section 27 is not invalid as violative of Article 21 on the ground advanced. Point 3 was held against the petitioners.
Point 4 — Limitation of liability to share value and effect of winding up
The court rejected the contention that liability of petitioners is limited to the value of shares or that recovery must await winding‑up proceedings. It observed that Section 25 contemplates civil recovery including through civil courts and may require consideration of pending winding‑up on facts, but Section 27's penal provisions operate in addition to civil modes of recovery. Thus the pendency of winding up did not prevent the Commission from passing orders under Section 27. The Nova Steel authority was distinguished as not addressing penal provisions like Section 27. Point 4 decided against petitioners.
Other constitutional challenge — Article 14
The petitioners contended Section 27 violated Article 14; the court rejected this, finding no arbitrariness in permitting punishment for non‑compliance with orders of consumer forums.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: For the reasons stated, the Civil Writ Petition is DISMISSED.
Direct effects on the parties:
- The orders of the State Commission dated 15.10.1993 (imposing one year simple imprisonment on the 1st petitioner and fines) and the confirmation by the National Commission on 8.12.1995 stand.
- The State Commission and National Commission were correct in lifting the corporate veil to hold the petitioners (the directors) personally responsible for non‑compliance under Section 27.
- Imprisonment and fines imposed under Section 27 are upheld; the petitioners' claim of inability to pay does not render the punishment invalid on Article 21 grounds in the statutory context of Section 27.
- Pendency of winding‑up proceedings does not bar the Commissions from proceeding under Section 27; liability is not confined solely to the value of shares.
Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles of statutory construction and veil‑piercing to confirm that penal statutory provisions directed at "persons" can reach companies and the individuals in control where appropriate; however, the court did not purport to lay down any novel rule overruling existing authorities it relied upon. The judgment primarily applies and reconciles existing precedents to the facts before the court.
M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J— The 1st petitioner is Mr. Ravi Kant and his wife is the 2nd petitioner, they seek issue of a Writ of Certiorari quashing the orders of the National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (herein called the “National Commission”) dated 8.12.1995 in First Appeal No. 666 of 1993 and the orders of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter called the “State Commission”) dated 15.10.1993 in 4 cases viz. Case Nos. C-242, C-243, C-255 of 1992 and C-82 of 1993.
2. By orders dated 15.10.1993 passed under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called “the Act”), the State Commission imposed a sentence of 1 year simple imprisonment on the 1st petitioner and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in each of the 4 cases (or in default, simple imprisonment of 3 months). The 2nd petitioner being a lady was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in the Case No. C-243 of 1992. The abovesaid order was confirmed by the National Commission on 8.12.1995
3. The petitioners floated two companies, one in 1987 called the Instant Growth Funds (Pvt.) Ltd and the other in 1989 called the I.G.F Leasing (Pvt.). They were the two directors in each of these companies. Members of the public invested huge sums in these companies. It is revealed from the Bankers that Instant Growth Funds (P) Ltd received an amount of Rs. 50.18 lakhs, while I.G.F Leasing (P) Ltd. received Rs. 45.57 lakhs. The 1st petitioner issued post-dated cheques for principal interest. Clause 2 of the agreement required that the loan - trust money be invested in hire purchase business in 30 days. Clause 3 stated that hire purchase agreement should be entered between the investor/Shareholder, hirers and company, and the original hire purchase agreement will be supplied to the investor/shareholder. These two clauses were not implemented. The claimant in Case No. 242, who is a housewife obtained decrees from the State Commission for Rs. 1 lakh in Case No. 242, Rs. 1,94,000/- in Case No. 82/93. One Amritlal, a retired official, obtained decree in Case No. 243 for Rs. 1,70,000/- and one Deepak Chopra obtained decree in Case No. 335/92 for Rs. 1 lakh.
4. The above claimants, who obtained decrees from the State Commission, could not realise their monies under Section 25 of the Act. Therefore, they moved the State Commission under Section 27 of the Act. The State Commission - after applying the principle of “lifting the veil”, held the two petitioners personally liable as they were the persons actually controlling and running the companies and passed the impugned order of imprisonment for one year and fine on the 1st petitioner and fine on the 2nd petitioner, which order was confirmed by the National Commission.
5. The petitioners 1 & 2, after State Commission had passed decrees on 10.2.1992, 4.2.1992 and 29.5.1992 as aforesaid, moved the Company Court on 2.6.1992 for winding up of M/s I.G.F Leasing (P) Ltd. The Court appointed a provisional liquidator. The investors anticipated a similar winding up petition for M/s Instant Growth Funds (P) Ltd. and filed a caveat averting appointment of a provisional liquidator. The Official Liquidator filed 2 reports in C.P 122/92. In para 4 of the 1st report dated 8.11.1993, he stated that vital books of account and other records, such as minutes book, shareholders register, Board's minutes book, title deed etc. were not available.
6. Initially the 1st petitioner, Mr. Ravi Kant filed C.W.P No. 3858/94 and a Division Bench of this Court passed orders on 1.5.1995 directing the petitioners to appear before the National Commission and by that order the writ petition was disposed of.
7. Meanwhile, in the Company Court, the petitioners filed C.A 572/95 for disposal of assets of the Company. After some hearings, the Company Court ordered on 30.11.1995 a CBI inquiry. The CBI has submitted a report and it is before the Company Court. A charge sheet has been filed. It appears that the Company Judge stayed execution against the company's assets on 15.2.1994 and 17.2.1994 and directed execution on 8.8.1994 in other respects. Present writ petition was filed on 12.1.1996
8. According to the respondents, the 1st petitioner was evading arrest in spite of the orders of the State Commission on 15.10.1993 and of the National Commission dated 8.12.1995 We directed on 9.5.1996 that the 1st petitioner must be present in Court on 16.5.1996 It was only thereafter that the 1st petitioner was arrested on 15.5.1996
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the following questions before us :—
(1) Section 27 of the Act permitting penalties to be imposed by the Commission does not apply to a “Company” in view of the definition of “person” in Section 2(1)(m) and also because Section 27 refers to a “person” and not to a company and this is in contrast to Section 25 which refers to a company.
(2) The principle of “lifting the veil” applies only if the concerned statute creates a penal liability against a company and permits action against those who are in charge of the affairs or in control of the actions of the company.
(3) As the case of the petitioners is that they have no money to pay the decrees passed by the Commission the detention of the 1st petitioner in Jail is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in view of Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin (AIR 1980 S.C 470).
(4) The liability of the petitioners is only upto the value of shares held by them. Any recovery of monies against the company could be only through the winding up proceedings which are pending in respect of the two companies.
10. Point 1 : Section 27 of the Act deals with penalties to be imposed against a “trader” or “person” who “fails or omits to comply” with any order passed by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be Learned counsel submits that this section does not refer to action against a “company”. Reference is also made to Section 2(m) :—
“Section 2(m) : “Person” includes (i) a firm whether registered or not; (ii) a Hindu Undivided Family; (iii) a cooperative society; (iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or not;
It is argued that neither section 27 nor Section 2(m) refer to a company, and hence Section 27 does not apply to a “Company”.
In our view, this contention cannot be accepted. The definition of person in Section 2(m) is an “inclusive”, definition and not an exhaustive definition. Question arises whether, in such a situation, we can bring in the definition of “person in Section 3 (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. That provision defines ‘person’ as follows:
“Person” shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.”
Here it may be noticed that the definition of “person” in the General Clauses Act is also an “inclusive” definition, even so, in our view, the said definition can be resorted to inasmuch as the definition of “person” in the Act before us is an “inclusive” one and not an exhaustive one. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act clearly says, that “in this Act, and in all central acts and regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the definitions given in the General Clauses Act” would apply.
11. A question arose before the Supreme Court in M.M Ipoh v. I.T Commissioner (AIR 1968 SC 317) as to whether the definition of ‘person’ in the General Clauses Act can be applied in a case where another statute contained an inclusive definition of the word ‘person’. It was held that it was permissible to do so. The Supreme Court observed : “The expression “person” is defined in Section 2(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 as including “a Hindu undivided family and a local authority”. The definition is inclusive and resort may appropriately be had to the General Clauses Act to ascertain the meaning of the expression “person”. Clause (42) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act defines a “person” as inclusive of any company, association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not and that inclusive definition in the General Clauses Act would also apply under the Income Tax Act. A firm is, therefore, a “person” within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, and a firm and an individual or a group of individuals may form an association of persons within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act. Following the aforesaid precedent, we hold that “person” in Section 2 (m) under the Act can be construed as including a “company” by resorting to Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act even though definition in Section 2(m) of the Act is in inclusive definition and does not included a ‘Company’.
12. Further, as per the principle laid down in Motipur Zamindair Co. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1953 S.C 320), the question whether the word in a statute can be treated as including a category referred to in a corresponding definition of the word in the General Clauses Act depends on a consideration of the object of the statute and of the enactments passed, and the Court has to construe the words “with a view to carry that object into effect”.
13. Now the Act in question before us has been passed by Parliament, as stated in the preamble, to provide for the better protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the establishment of consumer councils and for matters connected therewith. Parliament, in our view, was surely aware that substantial part of consumer goods or services to the consumers were rendered by “companies” incorporated under the Companies Act and action was necessary under section 27 of the Act against companies. There is also evidence in section 25 of act in this behalf because section 25 states that the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission shall execute their respective orders in the same manner as in suits, and in case of inability to execute, send the execution proceedings to the civil courts in whose jurisdiction the registered office of a company is situate or where the judgment-debtor (“any other person”) is residing or carrying on business or is personally working for gain. This section makes it clear that orders passed under the Act could be orders against a company. When we come to Section 27, it refers to failure or omission to comply with an order passed by the District Forum, State Commission or National Commission against a trader or person i.e under Section 25. By reading Section 25 and section 27, it is clear that the word “person” in Section 2(m) must necessarily include a company against which orders could be executed as stated in Section 25. Therefore, going by the object and purpose of the Act, it is clear that Section 27 of the Act applies to failure or omissions on the part of a “company” to comply with the provisions of orders passed. Point I is decided against the petitioners.
14. Point 2 : It is argued that the principle of “lifting the veil” as applied to companies is attracted only to cases where the concerned statute contains specific provisions for penal action against those in charge of or controlling the affairs of a company. Reference in this connection is made by the petitioners counsel to the specific provisions in section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Section 371 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 and other statutes. It is argued that there is no similar provision in the Act before us.
15. It is true that certain statutes contain specific provision for criminal prosecution of persons in charge or controlling companies. But, that in our opinion, makes no difference. For example, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 did not contain any provision like Sub-Clauses (4) or (5) of Section 12 of the new Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The latter made specific provision for contempt action against persons in charge or the management or control of companies. Even though, in the 1952 Act, there was no specific provision, it was held by the Supreme Court in Aligarh Municipality v. E.T Mazdoor Union (AIR 1970 S.C 1767) that :
“A command to a Corporation is in fact a command to those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs. If they after being apprised of the order directed to the Corporation, prevent compliance or fail to take appropriate action, within their power, for performance of the duty of obeying those orders, they and the corporate body are both guilty of disobedience and may be punished for contempt.”
In our view, likewise a penal provision which as stated above is applicable to a ‘company’ by the Commission in Section 27 must be treated as applicable to those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs. Here, the two petitioners are the directors of each of the two companies. We may also point out that in the Supreme Court Judgment aforementioned though on facts, the Executive Officer of the Corporation was exonerated, that was not because he could not be legally made liable but because he was factually not proved to be responsible for not obeying the command of the Court. In our view, as per the principle laid down in the above ruling of the Supreme Court, the penal provisions in Section 27 of the Act can be applied to the Directors of the Companies, not withstanding the absence of a specific provision for action against those in charge of or in control of the affairs of the company.
16. The same conclusion can be reached by applying the principles of lifting the veil explained in the recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (AIR 1996 SC 2005) (at p. 2013). If the corporate personality is used as cloak for fraud or improper conduct, the court can go behind the veil. Where the protection of public interests is of paramount importance the court is entitled to go behind the corporate personality. The principle was laid down by Sanb-orn, J. (see para 24 of Supreme Court Judgment) that “when the notion of legal entity is used to ....defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of person” (1990) (53 Mod. L. Review 338, Prof. S. Ottolenghi, “From keeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to ignoring it completely). The Supreme Court also referred to Prof. L. Maurice Wormser's article ‘Piercing the veil of Corporate entity) (1912) (12 Columbia Law Review 496) that ‘where the concept of corporate entity is employed to...... protect crime, the Court will draw aside the web of the entity, will regard the corporation or company as an association of live, up and doing, men and women shareholders, and will do justice between real persons.”
17. In Byford Leasing Ltd. v. Union of India (1995) Vol. LVII DLT 623 a Division Bench of this Court held that under Section 27 of the Act, the Chairman and Managing Director of a company can be proceeded against, he being in charge of the management and control of the affairs of the company. We respectfully agree with this view.
18. The case in Surinder Nath Khosla v. Excise and Taxation Officer (1995) 4 Comp. LJ 343 (P&H) relied upon for the appellants deals with recovery of Sales Tax from the assets of the company and not from its Directors and merely deals like section 25 of this act with mode of recovery of money from a company and does not with a penal provision like Section 27 and is distinguishable.
19. Following the above principles of law, we hold that the State Commission and the National Commission were right in refusing to permit the two petitioners - the two sole directors of the two companies, being husband and wife to defend themselves under the cloak of corporate entity - and the Commissions were right in lifting the veil and identifying the petitioners as the persons who were responsible for committing the statutory offences referred to in Section 27 of the Act. Point 2 is held against the petitioners.
20. Point 3 : The contention is that the petitioners has no wherewithal to obey the orders passed by the State and National Commissions and hence its petitioner cannot be detained in prison by passing an order for simple imprisonment. Reliance is here placed upon certain observations in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin (AIR 1980 S.C 470). In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with Section 51 and Order 21 Rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure permitting arrest of a person who does not obey a decree for money based on contract passed by a civil court. Reference was made to Article 11 of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” which contains a prohibition :
“No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation”.
and reference was also made to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On the facts of the case, the properties of the judgment debtors stood attached and the detention was ordered because earlier a similar warrant was issued. The Supreme Court set aside the order and directed inquiry into the means of the judgment debtors. Though the Supreme Court referred to Article 11 of the Covenant to which India is a party, the Court said (para 6) that even so, until the municipal law is changed to accommodate the covenant, what binds the Courts is the former, not the latter.” Their Lordships quoted A.H Robertson on ‘Human Rights - in National and international Law” (p. 13) to the effect that
“International Conventional Law must go through the process of transformation into municipal law before the international treaty can become an internal law.
and they refused to strike down Section 51 as being violative of Article 21.
21. In fact, Section 27 of the Act has created a statutory offence the non-compliance of on order of a duty constituted Tribunal under the Consumer Protection Act 1986 — and has made the said non - compliance an offence punishable with simple imprisonment or fine. A statute can create a Tribunal and might say that non - compliance with the orders of the Tribunal is an offence and is punishable by the way of imprisonment or fine (as in Section 27) and this penal provision can be in addition to any other mode of recovery (as in Section 25). Section 25 permits recovery as a civil court and may also permit arrest under Section 51 and Order 25 Rule 37 as a mode of recovery. But under Section 25 no statutory offence is created; while under Section 27 a separate offence is created if Section 25 order is not implemented. We are, therefore unable to hold that Section 27 is either bad or that the order of punishment of simple imprisonment passed against the petitioner is violative of Article 21. Point 3 is held against the petitioners.
22. Point 4 : The contention is that the liability of the company or of the petitioner is to be restricted to the value of the shares held by them or has to be dealt with only during the winding up proceedings of the two companies is again untenable. It may be that the proceedings for recovery under Section 25 of the Act may on the facts, require the taking into account of the pendency of the winding up proceedings but the penal provisions under Section 27 of the act are in addition to the mode of recovery contemplated by Section 25 and, therefore, the pendency of winding up proceedings will not come in the way of the Commission passing orders under Section 27 of the Act.
23. Petitioners counsel also relied upon Nova Steel v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1995(1) Scale 525) to contend that the Companies Act is a special Act and the Consumer Protection Act is a general one. The Supreme Court was there dealing with a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act and said that the parties must pursue remedy under the special law, Motor Vehicles Act. There the Supreme Court was not dealing with any order of the Consumer Court creating an offence or penalty such as Section 27. That decision is therefore, clearly distinguishable in Byford Leasing (supra), a Division Bench of this Court had also held that the Commission is to evolve its own procedure without reference to the Criminal Procedure Code. Point 4 is decided against the petitioners.
24. Learned counsel for the appellants has circulated further submissions a few days back. Learned counsel has quoted some judgments of the Supreme Court in regard to interpretation of statutes. In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to us in particular in M.M Ipoh v. I.T Commissioner (AIR 1968 SC 317) we do not think necessary to deal with the rulings quoted in the additional written submissions furnished by the counsel.
25. A point has been raised that Section 27 is violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But we did not think that there is any merit in this contention. It cannot be said that the provisions which permit punishment to be imposed for not complying with orders of the State Forum or National Forum are arbitrary. This contention is to be rejected as being totally unsubstantiated.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Writ Petition is dismissed.
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