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Mohd. Jafar v. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent company petitioned the Company Law Board under Section 17 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking confirmation of an alteration to Clause (ii) of its Memorandum of Association to shift its registered office from the National Capital Territory of Delhi to the State of Punjab. The special resolution approving this alteration was passed at the Annual General Meeting held on 29.9.1995. The appellant, a member holding 100 equity shares, filed objections to the petition before the Company Law Board.
The Company Law Board (Northern Region Bench, New Delhi) heard the petitioner, the objector (the appellant) and the Assistant Registrar of Companies, and rejected the appellant's objections. The Board confirmed the resolution relating to the alteration, subject to the condition that the certified copy of the order confirming the alteration together with a printed copy of the Memorandum as altered be filed by the company with the Registrar of Companies within three months from the date of the order. The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 10-F of the Companies Act challenging the Company Law Board's judgment and order dated 31.5.1996 (Company Petition No. 449/17/95-CLB).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court can entertain this appeal under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, i.e., whether any question of law arises out of the Company Law Board's order.
- Whether the Company Law Board erred in holding that the Minutes could not be challenged under Section 179 of the Companies Act because the requisite support to demand a poll (at least 10% of voting power) was not brought forward by the appellant.
- Whether the aggregate sum paid by seven members whose ballot papers were filed by the appellant (asserted by the appellant to have exceeded Rs. 50,000) brings the case within Section 179(1)(a)(ii) and thereby permits challenge to the Minutes.
- Whether short notice of the meeting invalidated the meeting or prejudiced the appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Company Law Board committed a grave error of law in not appreciating that the aggregate sum paid even by the seven members whose ballot papers were filed by the appellant far exceeded Rs. 50,000, and therefore the challenge to the Minutes was possible under Section 179 (specifically Section 179(1)(a)(ii)).
- The questions raised in the appeal are questions of law arising out of the Company Law Board's order and therefore the Board's order should be interfered with.
Respondent's Arguments
- The contention about the aggregate sum paid by the seven members was not taken in the written objection filed before the Company Law Board nor argued before it; it is therefore impermissible to raise it for the first time on appeal, especially as it pertains to questions of fact.
- The matters the appellant characterizes as questions of law are actually conclusions of fact drawn from the evidence and findings; they do not amount to questions of law.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steel Navigation Company Ltd., 1961 (42) ITR 589 (Supreme Court) | The criteria for when a question can be regarded as "arising out of" an order of a tribunal — four propositions about (1) questions raised and dealt with; (2) raised but not dealt with; (3) not raised but dealt with; (4) neither raised nor considered do not arise out of the order. | The Court applied these four propositions to classify the appellant's late-raised contention (about aggregate sums exceeding Rs. 50,000) as belonging to the fourth category — a question neither raised before nor considered by the Company Law Board — and therefore not a question of law arising out of the Board's order for the purpose of Section 10-F appeal. |
| Calcutta Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Dhresh Chandra Rai, 1985 (58) Company Cases 275 (Calcutta High Court) | Principle that late receipt of notice by one member does not invalidate a meeting if notices were posted in time. | The Company Law Board relied on this decision in rejecting the appellant's short-notice objection; the High Court treated that Board finding as a factual finding and held no question of law arose from it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by examining the scope of Section 10-F of the Companies Act which permits appeal to the High Court only on questions of law arising out of an order of the Company Law Board. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steel Navigation Company Ltd. to elucidate when a question can be said to arise out of a tribunal's order, setting out the four-category framework from that decision.
Applying that framework, the Court analysed the Company Law Board's order and the objections actually taken before the Board. The Board had recorded two principal objections raised by the appellant:
- Objection 1 — Alleged short notice of the meeting: The Board found notices had been posted in time, the appellant had actually attended the meeting, and there was no prejudice; it relied (as did the High Court) on the Calcutta High Court decision in Calcutta Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Dhresh Chandra Rai that late receipt by one member does not invalidate a meeting where notices were posted in time. The High Court characterised this as a finding of fact from the Board's appreciation of evidence and held no question of law arose from it.
- Objection 2 — Demand for a poll: The Board found that in order to demand a poll at least 10% of voting power is required under Section 179, and the petitioner/objector failed to bring support of members holding at least one-tenth of the voting power; the Minutes were to be deemed a true record. The High Court treated this as also a factual finding, not giving rise to a question of law.
The Court then addressed the specific point now advanced by the appellant — that the aggregate sum paid by seven members (whose ballot papers were filed by the appellant) exceeded Rs. 50,000 and thus would fit within Section 179(1)(a)(ii). The Court examined the record and the written objections presented to the Company Law Board and found that this specific contention was not pleaded in the written objection (paragraphs relied upon did not contain that allegation), nor is it mentioned in the Board's order as having been argued or considered. The respondent's counsel also stated that no such argument had been made before the Board.
Applying the Scindia four-category test, the Court held that the appellant's new contention falls in the fourth category — neither raised before nor considered by the Board — and therefore it does not constitute a "question of law arising out of" the Board's order for the purposes of Section 10-F. The Court further emphasised that the contention appears to be one of fact and should have been taken in the objection petition before the Company Law Board; raising it for the first time on appeal is impermissible.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct effect on the parties: The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, thereby upholding the Company Law Board's order which had rejected the appellant's objections and confirmed the alteration in the company's Memorandum of Association (subject to the condition that the company file the certified copy of the order and the printed Memorandum as altered with the Registrar of Companies within three months). The dismissal was ordered without any costs.
Broader implications: The Court treated the Board's findings on short notice and the poll-demand requirement as findings of fact; it confirmed that under Section 10-F an appeal to the High Court is limited to questions of law arising out of the Company Law Board's order and that factual issues not raised and considered before the Board cannot be entertained for the first time on appeal. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond applying the principles from the cited authorities.
Dr. M.K Sharma, J.— This is an appeal filed by the appellant under Section 10-F of the Companies Act against the judgment and order dated 31.5.1996 passed by the Company Law Board, Northern Region Bench, New Delhi in Company Petition No. 449/17/95-CLB.
2. The respondent Company presented a petition before the Company Law Board under Section 17 of the Companies Act, 1956 for confirmation of alteration of Clause (ii) of the Memorandum of Association of the Company for shifting the registered office of the Company from the National Capital Territory of Delhi to the State of Punjab as approved by special resolution passed at the Annual General Meeting held on 29.9.1995 The appellant is a member of the respondent Company holding 100 equity shares. He filed objections to the aforesaid petition filed by the respondent Company under Section 17 of the Companies Act. The Company Law Board heard the Counsel appearing for the petitioner as also for the Objector and the Assistant Registrar of Companies and thereafter rejected the objections filed by the appellant and confirmed the resolution relating to alteration in the Memorandum of Association of the respondent Company, subject to the condition that the certified copy of the order confirming alteration together with printed copy of the Memorandum as altered shall be filed by the Company with the Registrar of Companies within 3 months from the date of the order The special resolution as recast was set out in the schedule to the order.
3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Company Law Board, the appellant has preferred this appeal. The Counsel appearing for the appellant submits before me that the Company Law Board committed grave error in law in not a appreciating that the aggregate sum paid even by the 7 members whose ballot papers were filed by him far exceeded Rs. 50,000/- and thereby arrived at a wrong finding that the challenge to the Minutes was not possible as envisaged under Section 179 of the Companies Act. The learned Counsel also submits that the questions of law also do arise out of the order and findings recorded by the Company Law Board and, therefore, the order passed by the Board is required to be interfered with.
4. In the light of the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, I have also heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the issue now sought to be raised by the learned Counsel for the, petitioner that the aggregate sum paid by the 7 members whose ballot papers far exceeded Rs. 50,000/- was neither taken up in the objection filed by the appellant before the Company Law Board nor was the same argued before the Company Law Board and therefore, the same cannot be permitted to be argued for the first time at the appellate stage particularly when the same relates to questions of fact. The learned Counsel further submits that the questions sought to be raised as questions of law by the appellant are not questions of law but are merely conclusions of fact from which no question of law arises.
5. In the context of the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties let me consider the legal position with regard to ambit of power of the Court in a case of the present nature. Section 10-F of the Companies Act provides as follows:
“10-F. appeals against the orders of the Company Law Board.-Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Company Law Board may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Company Law Board to him on any question of law arising out of such order:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.”
6. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision would make it crystal clear that an appeallies before the High Court from a decision of the Company Law Board on any question of law arising out of the order passed by the Company Law Board. In this context reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steel Navigation Company Ltd.; reported in 1961 (42) ITR 589, wherein the Supreme Court has held in the context of similar provisions in the Income Tax Act that the Court cannot direct the Tribunal to refer questions unless it is one which arises out of the order of the Tribunal and was specified by the applicant in his application under Section 66(1). The Supreme Court in that case laid down four propositions in this connection which are as follows:
(1) When a question is raised before the Tribunal and is dealt with by it, it is clearly one arising out of its order;
(2) When a question of law is raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal fails to deal with it, it must be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is, therefore, one arising out of its order;
(3) When the question is not raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal deals with it, that will also be a question arising out of its order;
(4) When the question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it, it will not be a question arising out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it.
In the light of the facts of the present case read with 10-F and in the light of the aforesaid decision the question of law sought to be raised by the appellant falls within the fourth category as would be apparent from the discussions hereunder.
7. On perusal of the order passed by the Board I find that the appellant sought to raise two main grounds of objection. The first objection related to short notice of the meeting. The Board, on appreciation of evidence and the legal position found that the notices were posted in time although the same might have been received by the appellant on 25.9.1997 The Board has further recorded that the appellant was in no way prejudiced as he had actually attended the meeting. It was also found by the Board that there was no other complaint of short notice excepting that of the present appellant. In the context of the aforesaid position and on consideration of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Calcutta Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Dhresh Chandra Rai, 1985 (58) Company Cases 275, the Board held that late receipt of notice by one member cannot invalidate the meeting provided the notices were posted in time. In view of the aforesaid finding the first objection raised by the appellant/Objector was rejected. In my considered opinion, on appreciation of evidence on record the Board has recorded a finding which in my opinion, is a finding of fact, out of which no question of law could be said to have arisen:
The next objection raised by the Objector is with regard to the poll on the resolution. In respect of the said issue by the appellant/Objector, the Board recorded a finding that in order to demand a poll atleast 10% voting power is required as provided for under Section 179 of the Act and that the petitioner could not bring about a support of members holding atleast 1/10th of the voting power. The Board further held that the Minutes of the Meeting should be deemed to be true record of the proceedings which prove and establish that the resolution was passed by show of hands and that the Objector was unable to prove to the contrary. The findings of the Board in that respect to the effect that the appellant had failed to bring about the support of members holding atleast 1/10th of the voting power is also a finding of fact and in my considered opinion, therefore, no question of law arises therefrom.
8. Coming to the issue now sought to be raised by the appellant that the aggregate sum paid even of the 7 members whose ballot papers were filed by the Objector far exceeded Rs. 50,000/- so as to bring the case of the appellant within the provisions of Section 179(1)(a)(ii), on perusal of the records I find that the said issue was not urged in the written objection filed by the appellant before the Company Law Board. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant in that context drew my attention to paragraphs 1 & 7 and in none of those paragraphs I find that the appellant had stated that the aggregate sum paid even by the 7 members whose ballot papers were filed by the appellant far exceeded Rs. 50,000/-. The learned Counsel for the appellant sought to state that the aforesaid aspect was argued before the Board. However, on perusal of the order passed by the Company Law Board I do not find any mention of the aforesaid angle in the order at all. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent states that he personally represented the respondent at the time of arguments of the matter before the Board but n such argument was made by the learned Counsel for the appellant before the Board. Since the aforesaid aspect was not urged in the objection filed by the appellant nor was argued and dealt with by the Company Law Board while-recording its finding in the impugned order it cannot be said that the said issue arises out of the order of the Board. The Board has categorically recorded the two objections raised by the appellant before the Board to which reference has already been made and none of them related to the provisions of Section 179(1)(a)(ii). Therefore, in my considered opinion, the aforesaid question now sought to be raised by the Counsel for the appellant cannot be said to have arisen out of the order of the Board. Even otherwise the aforesaid issue raised appears to be questions relating to facts which should have been taken up in the objection petition filed by the appellant/Objector before the Company Law Board and having not done so the same cannot be allowed to be urged at this appellate stage.
9. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, I find no merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed, but without any costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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