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B. Banerjee v. Romesh Mahajan
Judicial Opinion Summary — Usha Mehra, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The landlord, Mr. Romesh Mahajan, filed a petition for eviction against the present petitioner (tenant) in respect of premises bearing No. 8-A/99, Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The stated ground was bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own occupation because he intended to vacate accommodation he then occupied and wished to occupy his own house.
On receipt of notice the tenant applied for leave to defend, contending inter alia that Romesh Mahajan was not the owner/landlord; the property vested with Delhi Land & Finance Limited or Bombay Life Insurance Company Limited; the father of the respondent was a lessee and the sale/transfer had not been completed; a Will relied on by the respondent was not produced; the premises were being used for residential-cum-commercial activities (music coaching and dance teaching); and that the lease dated 23 April 1988 was forged (stamp paper dated 4 May 1988). The tenant further asserted that the respondent had rent-free accommodation from his employer.
The Trial Court examined affidavits and documents, heard parties, and declined to grant leave to defend by order dated 8 March 1995. The tenant moved the court in revision, advancing the same contentions and raising additional objections about the summons and the genuineness of the lease documents.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether leave to defend should have been granted because there were triable issues regarding the respondent's title/ownership and the genuineness of the lease deed dated 23 April 1988.
- Whether the respondent (Mr. Romesh Mahajan) qualified as the "owner" or "landlord" for purposes of filing an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
- Whether a summons that did not indicate the name of the Act or provisions under which it was issued rendered the proceedings invalid or raised a triable issue.
- Whether the premises had been let for residential use only (per the lease deed) or were being used for commercial purposes (music coaching and dance teaching) thereby affecting the landlord's bona fide need.
- Whether the lease deed dated 23 April 1988 was forged (given the discrepancy between the lease date and the stamp-paper purchase date).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments
- Mr. Romesh Mahajan was neither the owner nor the landlord; the property vested with Delhi Land & Finance Limited or Bombay Life Insurance Company Limited and the respondent's father was only a lessee.
- The respondent's asserted rights by way of a "Will" were not substantiated because the Will was not produced.
- The lease deed dated 23 April 1988 was forged: the stamp paper bears a purchase date of 4 May 1988 whereas the deed is dated 23 April 1988.
- The respondent had employer-provided rent-free accommodation and therefore did not bona fide require the premises.
- The premises were being used for commercial purposes (music coaching; dance teaching) contrary to residential use claimed in the lease, and the landlord's consent to such use was not on record.
- The summons were incomplete because they did not mention under which statutory provisions they were issued or the name of the Act, which allegedly misled or prejudiced the tenant.
- The documents and lease terms created triable issues which should have led the Trial Court to grant leave to defend rather than dismissing the application at the threshold.
Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments / Trial Court Findings Adopted by the High Court
- The landlord denied the tenant's averments and produced documents showing title/possession tracing to the father, Dr. M.R. (Munshi Ram) Mahajan.
- The lease deed of 23 April 1988 showed that the father of the respondent was admitted to be the owner; the tenant had signed that deed in 1988 and thereby admitted the father's ownership at that time.
- The explanation for the stamp-paper purchase date (4 May 1988) vis-à-vis the lease date (23 April 1988) was that tenancy commenced on 23 April and the paper was purchased subsequently in May; this explanation was plausible and supported by the lease recital.
- An indenture dated 26 May 1949 established that Prof. M.R. Mahajan purchased Plot No. 99 (134 sq. yards) from Delhi Land & Finance Limited and that the purchase was on a perpetual lease from Delhi Improvement Trust; the indenture did not prohibit letting the constructed house on rent.
- The tenancy in the lease was expressly for residential purposes; no evidence of landlord consent to commercial use was placed on record; the claim of subsequent commercial use did not create a triable issue in presence of the written lease.
- The Additional Rent Controller had correctly concluded that the father purchased the property and let it out as owner (lease dated 23 April 1988), and there was no re-entry by the vendor (Delhi Land & Finance Limited).
- The respondent was residing in his own house and could not be compelled to continue occupying employee-provided accommodation in preference to his own residence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Swadesh Ranjan v. Hardeb Banerji, 1992 RLR (SC) 392 | The principle that an owner requiring tenanted premises for his own use need not strictly show absolute ownership; the owner's claim is sufficient against all except the true owner — he must show a better and superior title than the tenant. | The Court applied this principle to hold that the respondent's title (through his father) was better than that of the petitioner and that no other person claimed ownership. On that basis the respondent's claim of bona fide requirement was acceptable even without proof of absolute ownership. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by addressing the tenant's contentions in sequence and applying documentary evidence, admissions and applicable legal principle:
- Summons completeness: The court found the objection to the summons (that it did not mention the name of the Act or the statutory provisions) to be without force because the tenant had appeared and filed an application for leave to defend within the time prescribed by Section 25-B(5) of the Act. The lack of explicit mention of the Act did not amount to a triable issue.
- Ownership/landlord status: The lease deed dated 23 April 1988 — which the petitioner had not denied execution of — contained a recital admitting Dr. M.R. Mahajan as owner. The petitioner had signed that document in 1988 and therefore was estopped from challenging the owner's status years later. The explanation offered for the apparent discrepancy in dates (lease dated 23 April but stamp paper purchased on 4 May) was accepted as plausible and supported by the lease recital; it did not prove forgery.
- Indenture and effect of vendor restrictions: The indenture of 26 May 1949 showed Prof. M.R. Mahajan purchased the plot pursuant to a perpetual lease and that while the lease forbade assignment, sub-letting or parting with possession without vendor consent, the terms did not prohibit letting the completed building as a dwelling on rent. The court reasoned that letting is not the same as parting with possession or sub-letting in the sense prohibited by the indenture.
- Application of precedent: Invoking Swadesh Ranjan v. Hardeb Banerji, the court explained that a person asserting bona fide requirement need not prove absolute ownership; it suffices that his title is better than the tenant's. The court found the respondent's title (derived from his father) superior to the petitioner's and noted absence of any competing claim of ownership.
- Use of premises (residential vs commercial): The lease expressly specified residential use. The tenant's allegation of subsequent commercial use was unsupported by any consent from the landlord/owner. In view of the written lease, the alleged change of use did not constitute a triable issue warranting leave to defend.
- Bona fide requirement and occupation: The court accepted that the respondent was to occupy his own house and that he could not be compelled to continue residing in employer-provided accommodation; thus bona fide requirement was established as to the respondent's intention to occupy.
The court consistently relied on documentary evidence, contemporaneous admissions (signature on the lease), and the legal principle from the cited Supreme Court authority rather than speculative inferences.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
Holding (core ruling): The revision petition was dismissed. The High Court found no merit in the petitioner's objections to the Additional Rent Controller's order dated 8 March 1995 and no triable issues were shown that warranted granting leave to defend.
Implications:
- The Trial Court's/Additional Rent Controller's order refusing leave to defend is upheld and remains binding between the parties.
- The court accepted the lease and indenture evidence and applied the Supreme Court principle that a landlord asserting bona fide need need not show absolute title but must show a title superior to that of the tenant; on the facts the respondent satisfied that test.
- No broader or novel precedent was created by this decision; the court applied existing authority and resolved the dispute on the documentary record. The direct practical effect is the vindication of the landlord's eviction petition pathway and the denial of the tenant's leave to defend in this case.
Usha Mehra, J.:— The petition for eviction was filed by Mr. Romesh Mahajan against the present petitioner from the premises bearing No. 8-A/99, Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act). The ground taken in the petition was that the premises in question was required bonafide by the landlord owner for his use as he was to vacate the tenanted premises in his occupation. He wanted to occupy his own house.
2. On notice being served, the tenant (petitioner herein) filed an application seeking leave to defend, inter alia, on the ground that the Mr. Romesh Mahajan was neither the owner nor the landlord of the premises. Property vested with Delhi Land & Finance Limited or Bombay Life Insurance Company Limited. The father of the respondent herein was simply a lessee and as per the terms of the lease the property belonged to the lessor or vendor and not to the lessee. Moreover, original lessee was the father of Mr. Romesh Mahajan. Respondent herein asserted his right on the property as per the ‘Will’. But the said ‘Will’ had not been produced hence respondent herein (petitioner before the Trial Court) had no right over the property. The premises was let out for residential-cum-commercial purpose. The present petitioner was giving coaching of music and his wife imparting teaching of dancing to various boys and girls in the premises in question. Finally, Mr. Romesh Mahajan was entitled to rent free accommodation from his employer. He in fact was residing in such an accommodation, therefore, did not require the premises for his bonafide use.
3. These averments were not only denied by the landlord owner but proved to be wrong. The Trial Court after scrutinising their affidavits and documents annexed with it and after hearing the parties declined to grant leave to the tenant vide its order dated 8th March, 1995.
4. It is against the impugned order dated 8th March, 1995 that the present petition has been preferred, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner had raised triable issues with regard to the title of the respondent. As per the documents filed by the respondent it is clear that the premises was leased out to his father by Delhi Land & Finance Limited. The respondent had no right to use the said building untill the sale was complete. He could not assign, under-let, sub-let or part with possession of the said premises without first obtaining the written consent of the vendor. The vendor in this case i.e Delhi Land & Finance Limited had not given any such consent, hence Mr. Romesh Mahajan or for that matter he also could not be called the owner of the premises. Respondent being neither the owner nor landlord of the premises could not file petition under Section 14(i)(e) of the Act. This raises a triable issue which required adjudication. Hence his application could not have been dismissed in limini. Secondly, the summons received from the Court did not indicate under what provisions these were issued. Moreover, the purpose of eviction had also been disputed, but without affording opportunity to prove that it was being used with the consent for commercial purpose his leave has been rejected. The lease deed dated 23rd April, 1988 is a forged document. The stamp paper on which it has been typed is dated 4th May, 1988 whereas lease deed is dated 23rd April, 1988. Finally the respondent is residing in an accommodation provided by his employer. He does not require the premises in question. It is in this background that the present revision petition has been preferred.
5. So far as the petitioner's objection regarding summons being incomplete and lacked details, to my mind, this has no force. In fact petitioner on the basis of this summons not only put in appearance before the Court but also applied for leave to defend within time as per the provision of Section 25-B(5) of the Act. It is not his case that he could not file leave to defend application within time or that he was misled due to the vagueness of the summons. Because of non-mentioning of the name of the Act, to my mind, did not ten-tamount to a triable issue. Hence on this ground no leave to defend could be granted. Having exhausted the remedy of filing the leave to defend application within time, the arguments that summons did not contain the name of the Act has no force.
6. So far as the question of respondent being neither the owner nor the landlord, to my mind, this argument has also no force. In the Lease Deed executed on 23rd April, 1988 of which execution has not been denied by the petitioner it has been clearly mentioned that Dr. M.R Mahajan, father of the present respondent, was admitted to be the owner of the premises in question. As regards the question of purchase of stamped papers in May, 1988, it has been explained by the respondent. Even from the reading of para No. 4 of the lease Deed it gets clear that tenancy was to commence from 23rd April, 1988, therefore, this date was given though paper was purchased subsequently in May, 1988. This explanation appears to be plausible coupled with the fact it gets supported from the reading of para No. 4 of the lease deed. It does not raise any triable issue nor can prove that the lease deed dated 23rd April, 1988 is a forged document. This was duly signed by the petitioner herein in 1988 itself. The recital of this document clearly shows that this petitioner admitted the father of present respondent to be the owner of this premises and never challenged by the present petitioner. Now he is estopped from challenging the same after number of years.
7. So far as the indenture dated 26th May, 1949 by virtue of which the father of the respondent Prof. Munshi Ram Mahajan purchased the land underneath this property shows that the same was purchased by him from Delhi Land & Finance Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act. This indenture shows that Prof. M.R Mahajan purchased a piece of land bearing Plot No. 99 admeasuring 134 sq. yards held on a perpetual lease from Delhi Improvement Trust. This lease provided that the plot purchased by Mr. Mahajan would not be assigned, sub let or part with possession without the consent of vendor and in violation of the terms of the lease, meaning thereby that the purchaser could not transfer nor could sell the plot. There is no restriction on the purchaser that after constructing the house he could not give it on rent. Letting the house on rent is neither parting with possession nor sub-letting. Therefore, the argument that the purchaser could not have let out the house in view of this clause is without substance. As a matter of fact, one of the clause of the indenture shows that the building constructed on this plot has to be used as a private dwelling only and not for any other purpose whatsoever. It is also a term of the indenture that in case the purchaser failed to comply any of the conditions, the vendor would be within its right to forfeit the earnest money and take back the possession. It is not the case of the petitioner herein that Delhi Land & Finance Limited has re-entered the property in question. Clause 5 of the indenture shows that after the building was completed the vendor was to allow the purchaser to use this building as per the terms and conditions of the lease. There is no condition in the lease imposing on the purchaser that he cannot let out the premises on rent. Therefore, the contentions of Mr. Girdhar Govind that the respondent or for that matter his father had no authority to let out the premises on rent being not an owner of the house does not hold good. In fact in view of the terms of the indenture which document Mr. Girdhar Govind has relied it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner herein to contend that the property does not belong to the father of the respondent or that he was not the owner. The Additional Rent Controller rightly concluded that father of the respondent purchased the property. He let out the same to Mr. B. Banerjee on rent as owner vide lease deed dated 23rd April, 1988. Ownership of Mr. Mahajan was not denied by the present petitioner at the time of execution of the lease deed dated 23rd April, 1988. The Supreme Court in almost similar circumstances in the case of Swadesh Ranjan v. Hardeb Banerji, 1992 RLR (SC) 392 held that an owner requiring the tenanted premises for own use need not strictly show that he is absolutely owner. His claim is good against all the world (including tenant) except true owner. He has only to show that he has better and superior title than tenant. In the case in hand title of ownership of the respondent is better than that of the petitioner. There is no one else who has claimed ownership of this premises. The Indenture dated 26th May, 1949 proves that Prof. Munshi Ram Mahajan purchased this property and became the owner and his ownership was accepted by the present petitioner as tenant when he executed lease deed on 23rd April, 1988. Therefore, from the perusal of the affidavits and the documents annexed with it, I find no force in the submissions of the petitioner nor find any triable issue.
8. The question as to for what purpose the premises was let out for that we have to see the purpose when the premises was let out. The terms of the lease deed dated 23rd April, 1988 clearly show that this premises was let out for the residential purpose only. The contention of Mr. Girdhar Govind that subsequently the petitioner started using it for commercial purpose has no force because no consent of the landlord/owner to use the premises for commercial purpose placed on record. Premises was let out for residential purpose as per the lease deed, hence it is sufficient to conclude that the premises was let out for residential purposes only. In view of the written lease deed, it cannot be called a triable issue.
9. So far as the present premises occupied by the respondent, it is not denied by the petitioner that it is a tenanted premises. He is occupying it as an employee. It is stated at the Bar that he is to retire in March, 1997. The respondent cannot be forced to occupy the tenanted premises in preference to his own house.
10. For the reasons stated above, I find no merits in this petition nor any infirmity in the order of the Additional Rent Controller. Dismissed.
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