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Vinod Saluja v. Sita Rani.
Factual and Procedural Background
This order disposes of the plaintiff's application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 seeking an ad‑interim injunction restraining the defendant from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third party rights in the property described as House No. N‑1, Green Park Extension, New Delhi. The plaintiffs allege that by an agreement dated 15 September 1994 the defendant agreed to sell the terrace rights of the property to them for Rs. 48,00,000. The written agreement is on a sheet of an exercise book and dated 15 September 1994; several other documents (affidavits, indemnity bond, undertaking, forms for municipal and income tax authorities) dated 20 September 1994 are on stamp paper and notarised. The plaintiffs paid Rs. 21,000 at the time of signing. The plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell and, along with the suit, an application for an injunction restraining the defendant from creating third party rights in the property. The defendant filed a written statement denying the execution of an agreement to sell and resisting the injunction application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an ad‑interim injunction should be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 to restrain the defendant from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third party rights in the property pending determination of the suit for specific performance.
- Whether there was a binding agreement to sell the terrace rights to the plaintiffs (and therefore whether plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance), having regard to the defendant's denial that any agreement to sell was entered into and the defendant's claim that the papers were signed for a collaboration agreement.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs rely on an agreement dated 15 September 1994 by which the defendant agreed to sell terrace rights for Rs. 48 lakhs and on the fact that Rs. 21,000 was paid at the time of signing.
- Because the defendant allegedly entered into the agreement and received the advance, the plaintiffs seek specific performance and an interim injunction to prevent irreparable injury and multiplicity of proceedings pending the suit.
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant (through her counsel Mr. Gupta) contends she is an illiterate widow who was pressured by her son; she denies that any agreement to sell was ever entered into.
- It is alleged the defendant signed papers under pressure and that a blank paper was signed which the plaintiffs later used to prepare the agreement to sell; the true transaction, the defendant says, was a contemplated collaboration agreement for building construction with the plaintiffs' firm (Posh Wears Private Limited).
- The defendant points out that requisite forms/applications under Section 269UC of the Income‑Tax Act were not signed by the parties; affidavits and indemnity bond dated 20 September 1994, in the defendant's case, show intentions consistent with a collaboration/construction scheme (demolition and building), not a straight sale of terrace rights.
- The defendant argues that the agreement on an exercise‑book page (not on stamp paper) cannot be relied upon and that the Rs. 21,000 was only “token money”, not a substantial advance warranting an injunction.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by setting out the relevant background documents and the rival factual narratives: the plaintiffs' case of an agreement to sell dated 15 September 1994 with Rs. 21,000 paid, and the defendant's denial and explanation that papers were signed for a collaboration agreement under pressure from her son.
The judge analysed the legal nature of a contract for sale and its effect on property rights: a contract of sale does not itself create a proprietary right in the land and cannot bind the property estate in the way a registered transfer would; it creates a personal right enforceable by specific performance, which may bind a subsequent transferee only where such transferee takes the property with notice of the agreement. The court noted that while restraint on the vendor may be necessary in some circumstances to protect the purchaser (for example, where substantial consideration has been paid, where the purchaser has been put in possession, or where acts have been done in furtherance of the agreement), such restraint is not automatically warranted in every case.
The judge focused on the proportionality between the claimed consideration and the value of the property: the property value was admitted to be at least Rs. 48 lakhs, whereas only Rs. 21,000 had been paid (described in the agreement as “Token Money”). On the facts before the court at the interlocutory stage, the judge found it difficult to conclude that the plaintiff had established a case warranting injunction where the defendant denied execution of the agreement to sell and there was no clear evidence that she signed the particular document or that the parties had agreed to a sale rather than a collaboration.
The court also considered statutory formalities: for permission under Section 269UC of the Income‑Tax Act both parties must sign requisite papers/forms; it was noted that neither party had signed such forms prior to the plaintiffs' notice dated 12.12.1994 (which only then offered readiness to sign form 37(i)). This absence of prior compliance with statutory formalities weighed against the plaintiffs' claim for interim protection.
Balancing these considerations, the judge concluded that on the present material the plaintiffs had not shown entitlement to an injunction. The judge nevertheless sought to protect the plaintiffs' interest in another manner: should the defendant intend to create third party interests, she must inform the intending purchaser/transferee in writing about the pendency of the suit, and the plaintiffs' interest would remain protected by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Holding and Implications
APPLICATION FOR AN AD‑INTERIM INJUNCTION DISPOSED OF (REFUSED).
Direct consequences and practical implications:
- The plaintiff's application for an interim injunction restraining the defendant from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third party rights in the property is refused; the defendant is entitled to enjoy and deal with the property pending the suit.
- However, if the defendant intends to transfer, sell, alienate or create a third party interest in the property she must inform the prospective transferee/purchaser in writing about the pendency of this suit.
- The plaintiffs' substantive interest remains protected by the doctrine of lis pendens as provided in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- The application is disposed of with the parties ordered to bear their own costs and the court's observations in this order are stated not to affect the merits of the pending suit.
- No new legal precedent is indicated to have been laid down by the order; the decision addresses the interlocutory question of injunctive relief on the specific facts before the court.
S.K Mahajan, J.— This order will dispose of the application of the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 for the grant of an ad-interim order of injunction restraining the defendant from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third party rights in property being House No. N-1, Green Park Extension, New Delhi. Facts, in short, giving rise to the present suit are that:—
2. By an agreement alleged to have been entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendants on 15th September, 1994, the defendant had agreed to sell the terrace rights of the property bearing No. N-1, Green Park Extension, New Delhi to the plaintiffs for a total consideration of Rs. 48 lakhs. The agreement is in the form of a receipt-cum-agreement on a paper of an exercise book. The defendant has signed on the back side of the said paper on the revenue receipt and the same has been witnessed by the son of the defendant. Certain other documents, namely, affidavit/undertaking, affidavit for submission of building plans, indemnity bond, letter of authority for architect and certain forms for submission to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Ministry of Urban Development, were also signed by the defendant. All these documents are typed. While the agreement is on a paper of an exercise book, affidavits, undertaking and the indemnity bond are on the stamp papers and have been duly attested by a notary. All these documents bear date of 20th September, 1994. A sum of Rs. 21,000/- was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant at the time of signing of the agreement. The son of the defendant expired on October 5, 1994. On the defendant not taking steps for execution of the sale deed in respect of the terrace rights of the property, the plaintiff filed this suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 15th September, 1994. Alongwith the suit, an application for injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating or creating any third party rights in the property in suit was also filed.
3. Defendant has filed the written statement and reply to the application. The case of the defendant is that she is an illiterate widow and has no male member to look after her. It is stated that after the death of her husband and elder son, her younger son Vinod Babuta fell into bad company and taking advantage of the bad habits of her son and by offering him liquor and other luxuries of life, the plaintiffs allured him to get the signatures of her mother on some documents and provided them photocopies of the documents of the property. Vinod Babuta had been pestering the defendant for money all the lime. He, therefore, allegedly pressurised the defendant to enter into a collaboration agreement with a firm of the plaintiffs known as Posh Wears Private Limited, E-29, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi. It was under threat of her son that the defendant agreed to enter into a collaboration agreement and a sum of Rs. 21,000/- was paid to her by Shri Vinod Babuta on behalf of the said M/s. Posh Wears Private Limited of which plaintiff No. 1 is one of the Directors. It is stated that she was made to sign certain papers on the clear understanding that the said papers were required for collaboration agreement which the parties had agreed to enter. She was also made to sign a blank paper on which the plaintiffs had now prepared the agreement to sell. After about 15 days of the said agreement, her son died and, therefore, the deal of collaboration could not be finalised. It is stated that the plaintiffs are trying to take advantage of the pathetic condition of the defendant.
4. With a view to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it will be useful to note the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell, as under: -
“Today 15/9/94, (Smt. Sita Rani W/o. Lale Shri Krishan Chand, aged 60 years, resident of N-1, Green Park Ext., New Delhi - 110 016, hereby who is the absolute owner of the above house, has agreed to sell the terrace rights of First, Second floor and above of N-1, Green Park Ext., New Delhi to Shri Vinod Saluja and Smt. Archana Saluja resident of H-33, Green Park Ext., New Delhi for a considerable amount of Rs. Forty Eight Lacs only. Smt. Sita Rani will also agreed to provide parking space for two cars at the back portion of the above house and also agreed to provide space for booster, electric and water meters to Mr. Vinod Saluja and Mrs. Archana Saluja.
A sum of Rs. Twenty One thousand today has been paid as a token money by Shri Vinod Saluja & Smt. Archana Saluja to Smt. Sita Rani in cash. The balance of Rs. Forty Seven Lacs and Seventy Nine thousand will be paid within ninety days from the date of agreement to sell. All the expenses in this regard whatsoever will be borne by Sh. Vinod Saluja and Mrs. Archana Saluja. No other expenses will be incurred by Mrs. Sita Rani in this regard.”
5. The contention of the plaintiffs is that in view of the defendant having entered into an agreement to sell and having received a sum of Rs. 21,000/- as advance, there was no reason as to why the plaintiff should not be granted the specific performance of the said agreement to sell and till such time the final decision is taken in the suit, the defendant should be restrained by an order not to sell, transfer, alienate or create any third party interest in the property as in that case not only that the plaintiffs will suffer an irreparable injury but it will also lead to multiplicity of proceedings.
6. The thrust of the argument of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant, is that there is no case for specific performance of the agreement to sell as no agreement was ever entered into between the parties. It is stated that admittedly no form has been signed by the parties for permission under Section 269 UC of Income Tax Act and the papers which the defendant had signed were in respect of a collaboration agreement of building on the plot of land. The plaintiffs have used the blank paper signed by her for preparing an agreement to sell to which she had never agreed. Further contention is that while the affidavits and the indemnity bond are on the stamp paper, there was no reason as to why the alleged agreement should not have been written on a stamp paper and according to him no reliance can be placed on this agreement prepared on a paper of an exercise book. It is also the contention of the defendant that the fact that the parties had agreed to enter into a collaboration agreement is clear from the affidavits and the indemnity bond which had been signed by her on September 20, 1994. In the first affidavit, the defendant has given an undertaking that the structure of the building shown for demolition shall be demolished first before starting the construction at site. In the undertaking as well as in second affidavit, defendant has stated that the aforesaid plot of land was the only plot of land held by her and that extent of plot is within the ceiling limit on vacant land imposed by the Act. In view of these paragraphs appearing in the affidavits and undertaking, the contention of the defendant is that had this been an agreement to sell, there was no need of either demolition of the property nor was it required to state in the affidavits and the undertaking that it was a vacant plot of land. These averments have been made, according to the defendant, on account of the fact that a building was to be constructed in collaboration with the plaintiffs after demolition of the structure existing on the plot.
7. A contract of sale does not create any right in the property and cannot bind the estate as is the position in the case of a mortgage or lease. Of course, personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement to sell. It is no doubt true that in case the proposed vendor is not restrained from transferring or alienating the property till the decision of the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell, the plaintiff in case of success may have to resort to proceedings against the person who with notice of the suit has purchased the property. However, can this be a ground for the grant of an injunction in all cases, is a question to which I have given my thoughtful consideration.
8. Admittedly, the value of the property is not less than Rs. 48 lakhs. Can the defendant be restrained from dealing with the property in any manner she likes merely because a sum of Rs. 21,000/- has been received by her even assuming that the agreement was an agreement to sell? Even this amount of Rs. 21,000/- has not been mentioned as advance or earnest money but has been described as “Token Money”. Position might have been different, if it was an admitted case of the parties that they had entered into an agreement to sell, however, in the present case, execution of the agreement to sell is denied by the defendant. Without any evidence on record it is very difficult, at this stage, to say as to whether the defendant had signed the blank paper which has now been used for preparing the agreement to sell and whether the defendant had agreed to enter into a collaboration agreement and not the agreement to sell. I feel that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff is not entitled to get an order of injunction. In my opinion, defendant is entitled to the enjoyment of the property till such time the rights of the parties are decided in suit. In certain circumstances, where substantial amount of consideration has been paid to the vendor or the vendee has been put in possession of the property or some act has been done by the parties in furtherance of the agreement, it may be that the interest of the proposed vendee has to be protected. However, in this case where a paltry sum of Rs. 21,000/- has been paid for a property of the value of more than Rs. 48 lakhs, in my opinion, it will not be in the interest of justice to restrain the defendant from enjoying the property in any manner she likes. Moreover, admittedly no application has been filed before the appropriate authority under the Income-Tax Act for permission under Section 269 UC of the Act. It is not the case of the plaintiff that they had signed requisite forms/application under the Act for obtaining such permission. All that has been stated in the plaint is that defendant did not take steps for the grant of approval in writing and/or for permission and/or for taking Income-Tax clearance certificate. For permission under Section 269 UC of the Income-Tax Act both the parties are required to sign the requisite papers/forms. In their notice dated 12.12.1994, the plaintiffs have written that they were prepared to sign form 37 (i) required to be submitted to the Department. It clearly shows that prior to that they had neither signed such form nor had approached the defendant for the same.
9. For all these reasons, I am not inclined to pass any order of injunction against the defendant. However, in case the defendant intends to transfer, sell, alienate or create third party interest in the property, she shall inform the intending purchaser/transferee in writing about the pendency of this suit. The interest of the plaintiff in any case will be protected by the doctrine of lis pendens as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
10. With the above observations, the application is disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Any observation made in this order will not affect the merits of the case.
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