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D.T.T.D.C. v. D.R Mehra & Sons.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (a Corporation) was the plaintiff in Suit No. 1693/95 and appeals against the order in IA 7540/1995 and IA 7930/1995 dated 8.11.1995 which vacated a temporary injunction earlier granted on 24.7.1995.
On 16.4.82 the appellant invited tenders for entering into a "licence" agreement to run a liquor shop; the respondent-owners' offer was accepted on 3.5.82 and a licence deed executed on 5.5.82. The licence was initially to run until 31.3.83, continued to 31.3.84, and various correspondence between the parties followed (1984–1992) about commission/compensation. On 13.2.92 the appellant agreed to vacate by 31.3.92. Despite repeated notices in 1992 the appellant continued to occupy the premises; disputes followed in 1993–1995 (including service disconnections). The appellant filed the present suit in 1995 and obtained a temporary injunction on 24.7.95 restraining the respondent from evicting it; that injunction was subsequently vacated by the impugned order dated 8.11.95. The trial Judge accepted the defendant's case that the plaintiff was a licensee whose licence stood revoked and therefore in the position of a trespasser, and vacated the injunction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person who voluntarily asked the owner to enter into a "licence" and who entered into such a licence, can — after expiry of the licence and after the owner has expressly requested vacation — obtain temporary injunctive relief from the Court to prevent the owner from evicting him.
- Whether a licensee (or other occupant) who is in "settled" possession but whose licence/tenancy has expired can claim a temporary injunction to prevent dispossession until the owner resorts to due process of law (i.e., whether settled possession entitles the occupant to interim relief against the true owner).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contended that it was a tenant and not a licensee, and that nomenclature alone in the agreement is not decisive.
- Relying on the Supreme Court decision in East India Hotel Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank (1992 Supp. (2) SCC 29), learned counsel for the appellant argued that, when a party is in "settled" possession, it is entitled to a temporary injunction. Refusal of interim relief would allow forcible removal and violate rule of law; even a trespasser could not be thrown out without due process of law.
Respondent / Trial Court's Position
- The learned trial Judge accepted that the plaintiff was only a licensee and that the licence had been revoked; it was not a licence coupled with interest. The trial Judge emphasised that the appellant itself had invited tenders for a "licence".
- The trial Judge found the appellant's allegation of threats of forcible eviction implausible because the respondent had assisted by locating alternative premises and providing contacts, and thereby there was no real attempt to forcibly dispossess the appellant.
- On the basis of precedent (D.H. Manian & Ors. v. Woman Laxman Kudar), the trial Judge treated the appellant as a trespasser after revocation of licence and held it was not a fit case for exercise of discretion to grant an injunction; thus there was no prima facie case and balance of convenience favoured the respondent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| D.H. Manian & Ors. v. Woman Laxman Kudar (1977 (1) SCR 403) | Authority for the proposition that where a licence is revoked the licensee is in the position of a trespasser. | The trial Judge relied on this to treat the appellant as a trespasser after licence revocation; the present Court referred to it as part of the authorities holding that a revoked licence leads to trespasser status. |
| Yashwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (AIR 1968 SC 620) | Holds that a person without title but in "settled" possession (as opposed to fugitive possession) can recover possession if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law (Section 6, Specific Relief Act). | Used to illustrate the principle that settled possession may attract protection under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act; distinguished from the separate question of seeking injunction against the true owner. |
| Krishna Ram Mohale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkata Rao (1989 (4) SCC 131) | Supports the proposition that a person in settled possession can seek recovery if dispossessed other than by due process of law. | Listed among decisions recognizing protection for settled possessors under Section 6; cited as part of background on settled-possession principle. |
| Ram Rattan v. State of UP (1977 (1) SCC 188) | Another authority on the settled-possession principle enabling recovery under Section 6 when dispossessed not in due course of law. | Referred to as supporting authority for settled-possession remedy (Section 6) distinct from the injunction question. |
| State of U.P v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh (1989 (2) SCC 505) | Supports the settled-possession principle cited above. | Referred to as part of the line of cases recognizing the Section 6 protection for settled possessors. |
| K.K. Verma v. Union of India (AIR 1954 Bombay 358) | Bombay High Court decision on rights of tenants/possessors; cited as a leading decision on recovery of possession and distinctions between tenants and trespassers. | Described as the leading decision quoted in subsequent Supreme Court rulings; used historically to explain the law on recovery of possession and limitations for trespassers. |
| East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank (1992 Supp. (2) SCC 29) | Considered the conflict of opinion whether a bank in occupation (by licence) was entitled to relief under Section 6; one Judge treated licensee as trespasser, another as entitled to Section 6 relief; referred to the conflict and the need for further consideration. | The Court discussed the split in East India Hotels as illustrating the competing approaches (trespasser vs. settled possession) and noted that the matter was referred to a third Judge; the opinion uses it to frame the debate on settled possession vs. trespass. |
| R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P (1995 (5) SCC 698) | Discussed whether "lawful possession" is necessary for grant/renewal of certain licences; held that possession of a tenant whose tenancy expired was tenant at sufferance and not "lawful". | Referred to for the proposition that "lawful possession" is required in certain contexts and that expired-tenancy possessors are not in lawful possession for licensing purposes. |
| M.C. Chokkalingam v. V. Manichavasagar (AIR 1974 SC 104) | Authority referenced in discussion of "lawful possession" for licensing purposes. | Referred to in support of Ramaswamy J.'s views on lawful possession and licensing contexts. |
| Krishna Kishore Firm v. Government of A.P (1991 (1) SCC 184) | Authority considered in the context of lawful possession and licence/renewal issues. | Referred to as part of the jurisprudence on possession and licensing. |
| Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995 (3) SCC 33) | Holds that a trespasser in possession could not seek injunction against the true owner; emphasises the discretionary nature of injunctions and the need for clean hands. | Treated as a leading recent Supreme Court decision firmly establishing that a trespasser cannot obtain an injunction against the owner; the Court applied this principle to deny interim relief to the appellant. |
| Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD (1993 (3) SCC 161) | States that injunction is discretionary and judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or perpetuate a wrong by a party approaching the Court. | Quoted to support the discretionary nature of injunctions and the principle that a wrongdoer cannot seek equitable relief; used to underpin the decision that trespassers should not obtain injunctions. |
| Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992 (1) SCC 719) | Discussed in relation to the meaning of "prima facie case" and "balance of convenience". | Referred to by the Court (via Mahadeo Shelke) to inform the assessment of prima facie case and balance of convenience and to support denial of injunction to trespassers. |
| Hoshiar Singh Etc. v. Gaon Sabha, Daryapur Kalan & Ors. (36) 1988 DLT 428 | One of several High Court decisions holding that an injunction cannot be granted in favour of a trespasser against the true owner. | Listed among High Court authorities consistent with the Supreme Court view that trespassers cannot obtain injunctions. |
| K.V. Narayan v. S. Sharana Gowda (AIR 1986 Karn. 77) | High Court authority cited as consistent with the view that trespassers cannot obtain injunctions against the owner. | Included as supporting authority for the established rule against granting injunctions to trespassers. |
| Alamelu Achi v. Ponnaiah (AIR 1962 Madras 149) | High Court authority cited on the same point (injunctions and trespassers). | Listed among authorities supporting the rule that trespassers cannot seek injunctions against owners. |
| Biswabam Pvt. Ltd. v. Santosh (AIR 1964 Cal. 235) | High Court authority on injunctions and trespassers. | Listed as consistent authority supporting the prohibition on injunctions for trespassers. |
| Bishni v. Bahadur Singh (AIR 1980 All. 209) | High Court authority on the same issue. | Included among cases aligning with the Supreme Court's approach that trespassers cannot obtain injunctions. |
| Padmanabha v. Thkomas (AIR 1989 Kerala 188) | High Court authority to the same effect. | Listed in support of the settled rule on injunctions and trespassers. |
| Bhawani Investments Ltd. v. Shree Properties (32 (1987) DLT 397) | High Court decision taking the contrary view that till evicted by due process a trespasser may be entitled to injunction against the true owner. | The Court identified this and similar authorities as taking an opposite approach and explicitly stated that such decisions run contrary to the Supreme Court's rulings (e.g., Mahadeo Shelke, Shiv Kumar Chadha) and should be deemed wrongly decided. |
| Moyilivarapu Annapurnaih v. Melampati Narsimha Rao (AIR 1982 AP 253) | Another High Court decision adopting the contrary view that a trespasser may obtain injunction until evicted by due process. | Noted as part of the group of decisions the Court regarded as contrary to the Supreme Court's recent authoritative pronouncements. |
| Patel Exhibitors (Pvt) Ltd. v. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore (AIR 1986 Karnataka 194) | High Court decision reflecting the contrary approach on interim injunctions for occupants whose title had ceased. | Identified by the Court as part of a group of conflicting High Court rulings considered inconsistent with Supreme Court precedents. |
| Bhola Nath & others v. Maharao Raj Saheb Bundi State (AIR 1984 All. 60) | High Court authority taking a view contrary to the Supreme Court pronouncements regarding injunctions for trespassers. | Included in the list of conflicting authorities which the Court said must be deemed wrongly decided vis-à-vis Supreme Court decisions. |
| Geeta & another v. Ashok Kumar (1982 84 Pun. L.R. 291) | High Court authority on the contrary side. | Noted among decisions taking an approach contrary to the Supreme Court's rulings on the matter. |
| Sai Balaji Trading Co. v. Veeraswamy (1980 (1) AIR 28) | High Court ruling adopting the contrary view that a trespasser may obtain injunction until evicted by due process. | Listed among cases the Court regarded as inconsistent with Supreme Court law on injunctions for trespassers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court separated the analysis into two distinct aspects and applied authority and equitable principles rather than inventing new law.
-
First aspect — settled possession and Section 6 (Specific Relief Act):
The Court acknowledged the settled principle (citing Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) that a person in settled possession (not mere fugitive possession) may, if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law, sue to recover possession notwithstanding defects in title. The Court listed several Supreme Court authorities (e.g., Yashwant Singh, Krishna Ram Mohale, Ram Rattan, State of U.P) and the Bombay High Court decision in K.K. Verma as supporting this proposition. The Court recognized that this line of authority allows persons in settled possession to seek restoration when dispossessed unlawfully.
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Second aspect — whether a trespasser (or expired-licence occupant) can seek an injunction against the true owner:
The Court held that this question does not rest solely on Section 6 but "mainly depends upon certain general principles applicable to the law of injunctions" and the scope of judicial discretion in granting injunctions. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's clear statement in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation that a trespasser in possession cannot seek injunction against the true owner. The Court quoted the principle from Shiv Kumar Chadha that "judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court."
The Court analyzed East India Hotels v. Syndicate Bank to show there was a conflict of opinion at the Supreme Court level on a closely related factual situation; one Judge treated the licence as terminated (trespasser position), another treated possession as "settled" and eligible for Section 6 relief. The present Court used later Supreme Court decisions (including Mahadeo Shelke) to conclude that the correct approach is to treat injunction relief as discretionary and to deny injunctions to trespassers.
The Court emphasized equitable maxims: injunction is an equitable remedy and a person seeking equity must do equity and come to Court with clean hands. A party who has asked to be allowed only a short period in 1992 to remain, who received many notices to vacate and who was offered alternative premises, cannot ask the Court to assist to protect unlawful possession.
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Responses to counter-arguments:
The Court rejected the appellant's contention that refusing injunctive relief would permit forceful eviction in violation of rule of law by stressing that the two principles (owner's duty to use due process and occupier's duty to vacate when required) are distinct and complementary; a person seeking the owner's compliance with the law must himself abide by the law. The Court also rejected multiplicity-of-proceedings arguments as inadequate to override the equitable considerations that weigh against a trespasser seeking injunction.
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Application to facts:
Applying the principles to the present case, the Court found that the appellant had its licence expired, had itself asked (in 1992) for a short period to vacate, had received numerous notices thereafter, and had been offered alternative premises. Given those facts and the settled law that an injunction will not be granted in favour of a trespasser, the Court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to the Court's "helping hand" in the form of a temporary injunction.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed in limine.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the appellant's challenge to the order vacating the temporary injunction (dated 8.11.1995) fails and the appellant will not obtain interim injunctive protection to continue occupying the premises.
- The Court reaffirmed the principle—following recent Supreme Court authority—that a person in unlawful possession (a trespasser after revocation or expiry of licence) cannot obtain an injunction against the true owner; equitable considerations (clean hands, discretionary nature of injunction) govern this refusal.
- The opinion identifies a set of High Court decisions that had taken a contrary approach (permitting injunction until formal eviction) and states that those decisions run contrary to the Supreme Court rulings (such as Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke and Shiv Kumar Chadha) and "must be deemed to be wrongly decided." The Court therefore adopts the Supreme Court's view over those contrary High Court rulings.
- No new, novel precedent was created; the Court applied and reaffirmed existing Supreme Court authority and equitable principles to the facts of this case, resulting in dismissal of the appeal.
M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J— The plaintiff is the appellant in Suit No. 1693/95. This appeal is preferred against the order in IA 7540 of 1995 and IA 7930 of 1995 dated 8.11.1995 vacating the temporary injunction granted earlier on 24.7.95
2. The facts of the case are as follows:
3. The appellant Corporation wanted to run a liquor shop and gave an advertisement on 16.4.82 inviting tenders from owners of shops for entering into a ‘licence’ agreement. The respondent-owners submitted their offers and the said offer was accepted by the appellant on 3.5.82 Thereafter a licence deed was executed on 5.5.1982 whereby the appellant agreed to pay certain percentage as compensation with a minimum guarantee of Rs. 6,000/- p.m The licence was to be upto 31.3.83 It was continued upto 31.3.84 On 1.6.84, appelllant wrote to the owners inquiring if the respondent would allow appellant to continue till 31.3.85 By letter dated 22.11.84, the appellant wrote to respondent that it would increase the commission at 10% of gross profit with a minimum of Rs. 4,000/- p.m w.e.f 1.4.1984 On 13.6.86, appellant wrote to respondent agreeing to pay a percentage of its gross profits for the year 1986-1987. On 18.8.87, appellant wrote to respondent that w.e.f 1.4.87, it would pay compensation at 12.5% subject to a minimum of Rs. 6000/- p.m On 19.9.91 appellant wrote to respondent that its sales have come down and that respondent should accept whatever appellant could pay. On 13.1.92, appellant wrote to respondent declining to enhance compensation from 12.5% to 15% with a minimum of Rs. 16,000/-. Appellant was prepared to pay only 12.5%.
4. On 14.1.92, respondent wrote to appellant that in view of the delay from August 1991 to January 1992 in responding to the request of the respondents for enhancing the compensation, the appellant is directed to vacate by 15.2.92 Appellant wrote on 13.2.92 requesting to be “allowed to operate its L-2 ven till 31st March, 1992” as the licence from Excise Department is current upto 31.3.92 In other words, the appellant agreed to vacate by 31.3.92
5. On 14.2.92, 16.3.92, 24.5.92, 18.5.92, 9.6.92, and 21.7.92, the defendant-respondent asked the appellant to vacate and clear its stocks, as agreed in the appellant's letter dated 13.2.92
6. Instead of vacating the premises on 31.3.92 as agreed above, the appellant continued to occupy the premises without acceding to the repeated reminders by the respondent. Thereafter, there were disputes during 1993 because of disconnection of water-supply and electricity. These continued during 1994-1995. Then the appellant filed the present suit in 1995 and obtained temporary injunction on 24.7.95 restraining the respondent from evicting the appellant. Under the impuned order, the injunction has been vacated.
7. In the suit, the appellant has contended that it is a tenant and not a licensee and that the nomenclature employed in the agreement is not decisive. It may here be noted that the appellant corporation itself invited tenders from owner for a licence and not for a lease.
8. The learned trial Judge said that he was inclined to accept the case of the defendant that plaintiff was only a licensee and that the license stood revoked. It was not a case of a licence coupled with interest. The learned Judge stressed on the fact that while inviting tenders, the appellant corporation had itself desired to enter into a ‘licence’. On the question of alleged-threats of forcible eviction, the learned Judge said that this was not plausible because on 5.4.95, the respondent wrote to the appellant that the appellant had requsted the respondent to find out an alternative shop and that, in fact, respondent had located one at No. 72, Mehar Chand Market, Lodhi Colony, with area of 450 sq. ft. and therefore there was no attempt on the part of the respondent to forcibly disposses the appellant. On 9.6.95, the respondent gave address of another shop-owner who was willing to give his shop to the appellant. It was clear that the allegation of alleged force was a false allegation. In view of D.H Manian & Ors. v. Woman Laxman Kudar 1977 (1) SCR 403, the appellant whose licence was revoked, was in the position of a tresspasser and it was not a fit case for exercise of ‘discretion’ to grant injunction in favour of appellant. Appellant had not made out a prima facie case. Balance of convenience was not in favour of continuing appellant because respondent is deprived of the commercial value of the user of the shop. For these reasons, the temporary injunction was vacated on 8.11.95
9. In this appeal learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned single Judge could not ignore the judgment of Supreme Court in East India Hotel Ltd v. Syndicate Bank 1992 Supp1. (2) SCC 29 and when appellant was having ‘settled’ possession, appellant was entitled to temporary injunction. Refusal to grant temporary injunction would amount to giving permission to remove the appellant by force and to violate the rule of law. Even a tresspasser cannot be thrown out without resorting to due process of law.
10. The point that arises in this appeal is whether a person who himself asks the owner to enter into a ‘licence’ and enters into such an agreement can, after expiry thereof and express request of the owners to vacate, seek the helping hand of the Court for a temporary injunction against the owner and whether the appellant can contend that till he is dispossessed by due process of law, he is entitled for an injunction?
11. In our opinion, there are two different sets of principles which have to be borne in mind. Taking up the first aspect, it is true that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain in property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner except by recourse to law. This principle is laid down in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1103 (Sic 1963). That Section says that if any person is dispossessed without his consent from immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. That a person without title but in “settled” possession - as against mere fugitive possession - can get back possession if forcibly dispossed or rather, if dispossed otherwise than by due process of law, has been laid down in several cases. It was so held by the Supreme Court in Yashwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh AIR 1968, SC 620; Krishna Ram Mohale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkata Rao 1989 (4) SCC 131 (136), Ram Rattan v. State of UP. 1977 (1) SCC 188 and State of U.P v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh 1989 (2) SCC 505 (516-517). The leading decision quoted in these rulings is the decision of the Bombay High Court in K.K Verma v. Union of India AIR 1954 Bombay 358).
12. Before going to the other aspect, we shall refer to one of the cases cited for the appellant. In East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank. (1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 29, there was a conflict of opinion between two learned Judges of the Supreme Court not in regard to the above principle but in regard to the question whether the appellant (owner) of the premises was bound to give back possession to the Bank (plaintiff therein) in the latter's suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Kasliwal J. held that the licence in favour of the Bank stood terminated, and the Bank was in the position of a trespasser in view of D.H Manian v. Woman Laxman Kudav (1970) (4) SCC 118. If dispossessed, a trespasser could not resort to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The learned Judge observed that in K.K Verma's case (AIR 1954 Bom 358) Chagla, C.J pointed out that a tenant whose tenancy had ceased could get back possession under the summary procedure in the Specific Relief Act but that a tresspasser who had been thrown out of pos session could not go to Court under Section 9 and claim possession as against the true owner'. Kasliwal J. pointed out that the Bombay case was approved by the Supreme Court in Lalla Yeshwar Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh (1968 SC 620). His Lordship would allow the appeal of the owners and dismiss the suit. However Ramaswamy J. differed holding that the possession of the Bank was “settled” possession and even if the Bank was a trespasser, it could resort to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law. He would therefore dismiss the appeal of the owner and confirm the decree for possession. The matter was referred to a third Judge.
13. Ramaswamy, J. had occasion recently to refer to his views in East India Hotel's case while dealing with question whether a person whose tenancy had expired could be said to be in ‘lawful possession’ for purposes of grant of licence under Cinematograph Act in R.V Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P 1995 (5) SCC 698. His Lordship held that ‘lawful possesion’ was necessary at the time of grant of licence by the licensing authority in view of the language in the rule. For renewal of licence also, lawful possession was necessary even though the word ‘lawful’ was not used in the rules relating to renewal. His Lordship referred to M.C Chokkalingam v. V. Manichavasagar AIR 1974 SC 104 and to Krishna Kishore Firm v. Government of A.P 1991 (1) SCC 184. The possession of a tenant whose tenancy expired was a tenant at sufferance and his possession was not ‘lawful’ and he was not entitled to renewal. No writ could be issued to the licensing authority. We have referred to this case because it refers to the views expressed by Ramaswamy, J. in East India Hotels case. This is so far as the first aspect referred to by us earlier, is concerned.
14. We shall now refer to the other aspect of the matter. Assuming a trespasser ousted can seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, can the trespasser seek injunction against the true owner? In our view this question does not entirely depend upon Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act but mainly depends upon certain general principles applicable to the law of injunctions and as to the scope of the exercise of discretion while granting injunctions? Recently, the law in this behalf has been clarified by the Supreme Court in clear terms in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation 1995 (3) SCC 33 = JT 1995 (2) SC 504. It was there held by Ramaswasmy J., after referring to Woodroffe on ‘Law relating to injunction; L.C Goyle ‘Law of injunctions; David Bean ‘Injunction’ Joyce on Injunctions and other leading Articles on the subject that the appellant who was a tresspasser in possession could not seek injunction against the true owner. In that context the Supreme Court quoted Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD (1993) (3) SCC 161 wherein it was observed that injunction is discretionary and that
“Judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court”
15. His Lordship Ramaswamy, J. also referred to Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992)(1) SCC 719 in regard to the meaning of the words ‘prima facie case’ and ‘balance of convenience’ and observed in Mahadevo Savlaram Shelke (supra) at p.39:
“It is settled law that no injunction could be granted against the owner at the instance of a person in unlawful possession”.
16. Therefore as pointed by the above decision of the Supreme Court it is settled law that a trespasser cannot seek injunction against the true owner. It has been so held also by several High Courts stating that an injunction cannot be granted in favour of a person who is a trespaser against the true owner (Hoshiar Singh Etc.… v. Gaon Sabha, Daryapur Kalan & Ors.… (36) 1988 DLT 428). In K.V Narayan v. S. Sharana Gowda AIR 1986 Karn. 77, Alamelu Achi v. Ponnaiah AIR 1962 Madras 149. Biswabam Pvt Ltd. v. Santosh(AIR 1964 Cal. 235), Bishni v. Bahadur Singh, AIR 1980 All. 209; Padmanabha v. Thkomas AIR 1989 Kerala 188. The above decisions accord with the view taken by the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha's case and in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke's case.
17. It is true that in some other cases Bhawani Investments Ltd. v. Shree Properties 32 (1987) DLT 397, Moyilivarapu Annapurnaih v. Melampati Narsimha Rao (AIR 1982 AP. 253); Patel Exhibitors(Pvt) Ltd. v. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore AIR 1986 Karnataka 194; Bhola Nath & others v. Maharao Raj Saheb Bundi State AIR 1984 All. 60; Geeta and another v. Ashok Kumar (1982) 84 Pun. L.R.291 and in Sai Balaji Trading Co. v. Veeraswamy (1980 (1) AIR 28, a contrary view has been taken that till evicted by due process of law, a trespasser is entitled to injunction against the true owner. These jugments in our opinion run quite contrary to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mahadeva Savalram's case 1995 (3) SCC 33 and to the two earlier rulings of the Supreme Court quoted therein namely Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD 1993 (3) SCC 161; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahalad Singh 1992 (1) SCC 719 and in our view, must be deemed to be wrongly decided. The approach in the latter group of cases to the question of grant of injunction was from the angle of Section 6 of Specific Relief Act and Lala Yeshwant Singh case (AIR 1968 SC 620) and K.K Verma's case (AIR 1954 Bombay 358) and not from the angle of the Court's discretionary power to grant injunction.
18. In our view injunction is an equitable relief and the Court must see whether a person who is a trespasser can seek the helping hand of the Court for protecting his unlawful possession as against the owner. A person who seeks equity must do equity. He must also come to Court with clean hands. When he does these things there will be no occasion for him to seek an injunction in as much as the trespass would have automatically stood vacated. If he does not do these things, he cannot at the same time ask for the helping hand of the Court to protect his illegal possession.
19. It is argued for the appellant that this may be anamolous. It is said that the trespasser has a “right” to an injunction against the true owner, and this is complementary to the duty of the owner not to evict the trespasser outside the judicial process. In our view, there is no anomaly. Each of these is based on a different legal principle. If the plaintiff wants the defendant to act in accordance with law he must first abide by the law himself and vacate the property as one would expect a law abiding citizen to behave.
20. It is then argued that this may lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Should the plaintiff be allowed to be forcibly evicted so as to compel him again to seek restoration of possession under Section 6 Specific Relief Act, or otherwise? The danger could be prevented? This argument based on multiplicity of proceedings, in fact, goes against the trespasser in possession. The plaintiff can, - on the same parity of reasoning - behave in such a manner as to make it unnecessary for the owner to sue for possession separately. The duty to be a lawful citizen is not one - sided. It does not apply only to the owner but applies to the trespasser as well.
21. For the above reasons, we are of the clear view that the appellant plaintiff - whose licence has expired and which had itself pleaded in 1992 for a short period to vacate from the shop and which had been given a large number of notices to vacate and where the owners have even shown alternative premises which appellant could have, occupied - cannot be granted the helping hand of the Court for temporary injunction. The appeal is therefore dismissed in limine.
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