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Nirmal Singh And Anr. v. C.M Jaya & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (C.M. Nayar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's award dated 7 May 1981. The appeal was brought by the owner and driver of the offending truck (appellants) and the insurer New India Assurance Co. Ltd. was impleaded as a co-respondent; the claimants (respondents) filed cross-objections. The claim petition had been instituted by the widow and two minor children as legal heirs of the deceased, Shri V. Vasudevan, under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking Rs. 6,00,000 in compensation for fatal injuries sustained on 22 February 1975.
Material factual allegations (as pleaded by the claimants) were that the deceased was pillion rider on a scooter returning from duty; the scooter was struck from behind by truck No. DLL-9885 driven by appellant No. 2. The deceased died on the spot. The claimants asserted negligence on the part of the truck driver; the appellants disputed this and contended that the scooter driver attempted an improper overtaking manoeuvre and lost control after the truck turned to give way to a DTC bus. The Tribunal framed seven issues, made findings on negligence and quantum, assessed compensation, and limited the insurer's liability to Rs. 50,000. The present appellate court considered both the appeal and the cross-objections.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the deceased sustained fatal injuries in an accident due to rash and negligent driving of truck No. DLL-9885 by respondent No. 1 (appellant No. 2)?
- Whether the accident took place solely on account of negligence on the part of Shri Jagdish Chandra (the scooter rider)? If so, to what effect?
- To what amount of compensation, if any, are the petitioners entitled and from whom?
- Whether the claimants are the legal representatives of the deceased?
- Whether the respondents (defendants) are not liable for reasons stated in the preliminary objections of the written statement?
- Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
- Relief.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents-Claimants (petitioners)
- The deceased (35 years) was a pillion rider on a scooter driven by his employee Jagdish Chandra and was returning from duty when the scooter was struck from behind by the truck.
- The truck driver was rash and negligent, driving at high speed and without sounding a horn; the deceased died on the spot as a result.
- The claimants sought full compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and, on cross-objections, sought enhancement and that liability be fixed on the insurer insofar as the Tribunal had limited it to Rs. 50,000.
Appellants (owner and driver) and Insurer (New India Assurance Co. Ltd.)
- Denied rash/negligent driving by the truck driver; asserted the truck was driven slowly. Their pleaded version was that a DTC bus was approaching and the truck driver turned left to give way; while so turning the scooter attempted to overtake from the left without warning and lost balance, causing the collision.
- Contended that cross-objections by claimants seeking enhancement against the insurer were not maintainable because the claimants had only filed cross-objections and had not filed an appeal to impugn the award; relied on authorities holding a respondent ordinarily cannot prefer objections against a co-respondent.
- The insurer contended limited liability (confined to Rs. 50,000) based on the policy as placed before the Tribunal; also argued procedural objections to cross-objections against co-respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Vaijanti, 1995 ACJ 560 (M.P) | Support for drawing adverse inference where a party (driver) is not produced as witness in support of defence. | The Tribunal's adverse inference against the driver for non-production was held to be validly drawn and the Tribunal's finding of negligence by the truck driver was affirmed on that basis. |
| Prem Devi Pandey v. Dayal Singh, 1976 ACJ 407 | Principles distinguishing distinct pecuniary gains (e.g., life insurance proceeds) from acceleration of pecuniary gain (e.g., bank savings). | The Tribunal had relied on this distinction to deduct Rs. 30,000 as life insurance and to treat bank savings as an acceleration of pecuniary gain subject to a 10% deduction; the appellate court criticized the Tribunal's conjectural application. |
| Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, 1992 ACJ 300 | Holds that deduction of 1/3rd out of assessed compensation on account of lump sum payment is not justified; discusses effects of delay and inflation. | The court relied on this authority to reject the Tribunal's lump-sum deduction and to hold that such deduction was not justified in assessing compensation. |
| Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, 1981 ACJ 507 (SC) | Observations on delay in final disposal devaluing compensation due to inflation; used in reasoning against lump-sum deductions. | Cited (via Hardeo Kaur) to support the view that deductions for lump-sum payment are unjustified given delay and inflationary loss of value. |
| Manjushri Radha v. B.L. Gupta, 1977 ACJ 134 (SC) | Illustrates awarding compensation by multiplying life expectancy without making deductions. | Used to support the proposition that courts need not make deductions when applying multiplier methods for future loss of dependency. |
| General Manager, Kerala Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 | Permits courts to consider future prospects/advancement and to augment multiplicand accordingly; court accepted doubling income in that case. | Cited as authority supporting consideration of future prospects; the appellate court reasoned that doubling or increasing dependency to reflect career progression is permissible when appropriate. |
| Urmilla Pandey v. Khalil Ahmad, 1994 ACJ 805 (II (1994) ACC 431) | Reiterated that life expectancy could not be less than 65 years and that deduction of 33% for lump-sum payment was unjustified. | Cited in support of using a higher multiplier and rejecting lump-sum deductions. |
| Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516 | Holds that ordinarily a respondent cannot prefer cross-objections against a co-respondent under Order 41 Rule 22; only in exceptional cases may relief against co-respondent be entertained; discusses interpretation of "cross-objection". | Primary authority for the court's analysis on maintainability of cross-objections against co-respondents; the court applied its principles to hold cross-objections maintainable in the exceptional circumstances of this case (and further relied on Order 41 Rule 33). |
| New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Smt. Hemlata Biswas, AIR 1983 Allahabad 115 | Division Bench view that cross-objection by claimants for enhancement was not maintainable against insurer who had not filed appeal. | Cited as supporting authority for the general rule that cross-objections are not maintainable against co-respondents, as part of the court's discussion before distinguishing the present facts. |
| Smt. Shazadi Begum v. Vinod Kumar, AIR 1978 (M.P.) 20 | Reiterates restrictive construction of Order 41 Rule 22 (respondent's objection should generally be directed only against appellant). | Cited to show consistent high court precedent supporting restrictive right to cross-objections; court used it in contextual analysis. |
| Hindustan General Insurance Society Ltd. now National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Nilima Mahanta, II (1989) ACC 341 | Single Bench view that law does not permit a respondent to agitate cross-objections against a co-respondent except in exceptional cases. | Cited to support the general rule on cross-objections; court considered this authority in its maintainability analysis. |
| Timmayya v. Lakshmana, ILR 7 Mad. 215 | Madras High Court earlier view that Order 41 Rule 22 permitted respondents to seek relief even against other respondents (a differing historical view). | Cited as part of historical survey; court notes this view was later overruled by Madras Full Bench. |
| Venkateshwarlu v. Ramamma, ILR (1950) Mad. 874 : AIR 1950 Mad 379 (Full Bench) | Madras Full Bench overruling earlier decisions and holding that Order 41 Rule 22 gives only a restricted right to a respondent to object primarily against the appellant. | Referred to in the historical exposition of the law governing cross-objections and relied upon in the court's reasoning on the scope of Order 41 Rule 22. |
| Burroda Soonduree Dossee v. Nobo Gopal Mullick; Maharaja Tarucknath Roy v. Tuboornnissa Chowdhrain; Ganesh Pandurang v. Gangadhar Ramkrishna; Anwar Jan Bibi v. Azmut Ali | Older decisions cited for historical position that ordinarily a respondent could not seek relief against a co-respondent. | Referred to in the historical survey and to show the long-standing judicial approach prior to codified rules discussed. |
| Jan Mohamed v. P.M. Razdon, AIR 1944 Lah 433 | Lahore High Court adopted the restrictive view later adopted generally by other High Courts. | Part of historical exposition supporting restriction on cross-objections. |
| Chandi Prasad v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1948 Nag. 377 | Nagpur High Court adopting restrictive approach to cross-objections. | Referred to in historical survey on Order 41 Rule 22 interpretation. |
| Kesho Prasad Singh v. Narayan Doyal, 1925 Patna 285 | Early authority indicating appellate court's power to affect rights of non-appealing parties to give effect to its decision. | Invoked to support the proposition that an appellate court may interfere with or adjust rights of parties not appealing in order to do complete justice. |
| Mt. Chanda Bibi v. Mohanram Sahu, AIR 1934 Patna 134 | Authority cited in support of exceptional entertainability of cross-objections under the wider power in Order 41 Rule 33. | Used to support the proposition that Rule 33 empowers appellate courts to make orders necessary to do complete justice between parties. |
| Balkrishna Chatrabhuj Thacker v. Devabai, AIR 1985 Gujarat 133 | Authority relied upon to show exceptional circumstances where cross-objections or relief between respondents may be entertained. | Cited in the context of when Rule 33 may be invoked to grant relief against co-respondents. |
| Bhagwan Das v. National Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1991 (M.P.) 235 | Explains import of Order 41 Rule 22 and distinguishes insurer's role and the position of owner/driver; supports principle that insurer's indemnity role is distinct. | Quoted and relied upon to explain how cross-objections by claimants should be directed against owner/driver and how insurer's liability and representation affects the appellate approach. |
| National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 | Law that to cover unlimited liability under a comprehensive policy additional premium must be shown to have been paid. | Applied to require production of original policy or payment proof; absence of proper documentation led court to draw adverse inference and hold insurer liable without the Rs. 50,000 cap. |
| New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Bai (Smt.), (1995) 2 SCC 539 | Authority on premium/endorsement proof necessary to show unlimited liability under a comprehensive policy. | Relied upon to support the court's conclusion that insurer failed to show that additional premium had been paid; endorsements and missing originals justified drawing adverse inference and holding insurer liable beyond Rs. 50,000. |
| New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Saloni Dargan, 1990 ACJ 127 | Authority cited for drawing adverse inference against insurer where policy documentation is not properly produced. | Applied by the court to justify drawing an adverse inference against the insurer and in finding the insurer's liability to be unlimited in the facts of this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in structured stages:
- Liability for negligence: The appellate court reviewed the Tribunal's appreciation of ocular evidence (PW1, PW2 and police/Investigating Officer PW5). The Tribunal accepted eye-witness testimony that the truck struck the scooter from behind, that the truck driver attempted to flee and ran over the deceased. The truck driver was not produced in the witness box for the defence, and the court accepted the Tribunal's adverse inference (citing Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Vaijanti). On that basis the Tribunal's finding that the accident resulted from the truck driver's rash and negligent driving and that the scooter rider Jagdish Chandra was not negligent were affirmed.
- Quantum of compensation — criticism of Tribunal methodology: The Tribunal accepted an income figure (Rs. 2,400 + Rs. 450 allowance). However, the Tribunal then made significant deductions based on assumed Provident Fund contribution, assumed life insurance premium payments, and assumed bank savings; these were not supported by evidence. The appellate court characterized those deductions as conjectural and based on non-evidence (and the Tribunal had drawn adverse inferences from failure to produce tax returns or employment certificates). The appellate court set aside those conjectural findings and held they could not stand.
- Appropriate multiplicand and multiplier: The appellate court accepted the proven salary of Rs. 2,400 per month (it did not accept ignoring allowances entirely but noted the Tribunal did not take the Rs. 450 allowance into account). The court fixed the annual dependency (carry-to-family) at Rs. 14,400 (effectively reflecting that the deceased was spending Rs. 1,200 per month on the family after accounting for personal deductions and statutory contributions). For a 35-year-old deceased the court considered a multiplier of 25 appropriate (explaining this choice with reference to precedents that consider life expectancy and prospects; the court expressly cited General Manager, Kerala RTC v. Susamma Thomas and Hardeo Kaur as relevant authorities). Using Rs. 14,400 x 25 the court arrived at Rs. 3,60,000 as compensation.
- Rejection of lump-sum deduction: The court reiterated established authorities that deduction for lump-sum payment (i.e., deduction of 1/3rd or similar for payment in one instalment) is not justified because long delays and inflation diminish the real value; it relied on Hardeo Kaur and other Supreme Court authorities to reject the Tribunal's further arbitrary deductions.
- Maintainability of cross-objections against insurer: The court undertook a detailed survey of law on cross-objections under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the power under Rule 33. It acknowledged the general rule (Panna Lal and subsequent authorities) that a respondent's cross-objection is ordinarily directed at the appellant and not against co-respondents, but explained that in exceptional cases and where necessary to do complete justice the appellate court may entertain relief against co-respondents by invoking Order 41 Rule 33. Considering that the owner, driver and insurer had all been parties to the original proceedings, had filed written statements and been represented (in fact by the same counsel in the Tribunal), the court found it appropriate to entertain the cross-objections and to grant relief against the insurer.
- Insurance liability (limited vs. unlimited): The court examined the insurance policy record. The Tribunal had limited the insurer's liability to Rs. 50,000 but had not considered the absence of original documents, the late-dated endorsements attached to the policy, or the requirement (as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore and New India Assurance v. Shanti Bai) that additional premium must be proved to establish unlimited liability. The appellate court concluded that the owner and insurer had not discharged the burden to show a valid limitation: the original or carbon copy policy was not produced and endorsements bore later dates. The court drew an adverse inference against the insurer and held that the insurer's liability was unlimited (i.e., could not be confined to Rs. 50,000).
- Conclusion of relief: On the basis of the above, the court dismissed the appeal, allowed the claimants' cross-objections in part by enhancing the award to Rs. 3,60,000, directed interest at 15% per annum from date of application until realization, awarded costs of Rs. 5,000, and held the insurer fully liable (subject to the award and directions).
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): Appeal dismissed; cross-objections allowed; award enhanced to Rs. 3,60,000 with interest and costs; insurer held liable beyond Rs. 50,000 (unlimited liability).
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The respondents-claimants are entitled to Rs. 3,60,000 compensation (computed as Rs. 14,400 annual dependency x multiplier 25).
- Interest of 15% per annum is awarded from the date of application until realization on the enhanced award.
- Costs quantified at Rs. 5,000 are awarded to the claimants.
- The insurer (New India Assurance Co. Ltd.) cannot limit its liability to Rs. 50,000 on the record produced; the insurer's liability was held unlimited in the circumstances because it failed to prove a limitation (original policy/proof of additional premium), and adverse inferences were drawn from the inconsistent policy endorsements and absence of originals.
Broader legal implications addressed by the court (as explained in the opinion):
- The opinion reinforces that appellate courts may, in exceptional circumstances and under Order 41 Rule 33, grant relief against co-respondents even where cross-objections are not ordinarily maintainable under Order 41 Rule 22 — particularly where doing so is necessary to give effect to the appellate decision and where co-respondents were parties and represented in the original proceedings.
- The decision reiterates that conjectural deductions (e.g., assumed provident contributions, insurance premiums, bank savings) unsupported by evidence cannot be made to reduce compensation.
- The judgment emphasizes the insurer's burden to prove any limitation of liability (e.g., by producing original policy documents or proof of additional premium) and that failure to produce such proof may attract adverse inference and exposure to full liability under a comprehensive policy.
Appeal dismissed.
C.M Nayar, J.— The present appeal is directed against the award dated May 7, 1981 passed by Shri S.P Saberwal, Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi. The respondents-claimants have also filed cross-objections (C.M No. 854/83). The appeal has been filed by the owner and driver of the offending vehicle and the insurer, New India Assurance Company Ltd. is impleaded as a co-respondent along with the claimants.
2. The claim petition was filed by the widow and two minor children as legal heirs of the deceased Shri V. Vasudevan, under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation amounting to Rs. six lakhs. The deceased sustained fatal injuries in an accident that took place on February 22, 1975 at about 5.15 p.m at G.T Road crossing near Narrow-Gauge railway line, Shahdara. The deceased was sitting on the pillion seat of two wheeler scooter No. DLW-3606 and was coming from his duty in M/s. Air Reduction Company Ltd., Plot No. 56, Site No. 4, Sahibabad, Ghaziabad for going to Kashmere Gate Bus stand in order to get a bus for his house situated at Gurgaon. The said scooter was being driven by one of his employees, namely, Jagdish Chandra and it was pleaded that the scooter was being driven with due care and caution and on correct side of the road at a normal speed when truck bearing No. DLL-9885, which was being driven by appellant No. 2, rashly and negligently struck against the said scooter from behind. It was further alleged that the driver did not blow any horn and the truck was being driven at a very high speed when it hit the scooter from behind. As a result of the injuries sustained in the accident, Shri Vasudevan died on the spot. The deceased was 35 years of age and was stated to be earning Rs. 2400/- plus Rs. 450/- as allowances per month and was Chief Engineer in the employment of M/s Air Reduction Company Ltd. The offending truck was insured with New India Assurance Co. Ltd, respondent No. 4 in this appeal.
3. The claim petition was resisted by the appellants and respondent No. 4. The appellants filed joint written statement whereas separate written statement was filed by the insurer, respondent No. 4 though they were all represented in the Tribunal by the same Counsel. It was denied that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of appellant No. 2. The said appellant was driving the vehicle at a slow speed and was coming from Ghaziabad Border to Delhi and when he crossed the railway crossing, Jagdish Chandra came from behind the truck and without blowing any horn or giving signal tried to over-take the truck from its wrong side i.e left side when a DTC bus came from the opposite side and appellant No. 2 in order to give way to the said bus turned his truck to left and at that time the scooter driver who was overtaking the truck from the left lost his balance and control and the scooter struck with the left middle of the truck and it fell down with both its riders. The scooter driver, namely, Jagdish Chandra fell down on his left side but the deceased, who was a pillion rider, fell on the right side and he was crushed under the wheels of the truck.
4. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:
1. Whether the deceased sustained fatal injuries in an accident due to rash and negligent driving of truck No. DLL-9885 on the part of respondent No. 1?
2. Whether the accident took place sheerly on account of negligence on the part of Shri Jagdish Chandra? If so, to what effect?
3. To what amount of compensation, if any, are the petitioners entitled and from whom?
4. Whether the claimants are the legal representatives of the deceased?
5. Whether the respondents are not liable for reasons stated in the preliminary objections of the written statement?
6. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
7. Relief.
5. The respondents-claimants are the widow and minor children of the deceased and were, therefore, held as legal representatives and competent to file the claim petition. The question of negligence was next considered. The eye witnesses to the occurrence were examined. PW1 Latoor Das has deposed that on February 22, 1975 at about 5.15 p.m he saw the accident between the scooter and the truck. The accident took place before the railway crossing of the narrow gauge line while coming from Ghaziabad towards Shahdara at about 8/10 yards from the railway crossing. He deposed that two-wheeler scooter was coming from the side of Ghaziabad towards Shahdara on his correct side at a slow speed when the truck in question was coming at a very fast speed and while trying to overtake the scooter, struck with its front portion at the back of two-wheeler scooter. As a result of the impact Shri Jagdish Chandra, who was driving the scooter and the deceased Shri V. Vasudaven fell on the ground in between the front two wheels of the truck on the right hand side. He further deposed that rear wheel of the truck came on the half body of the deceased and people at the spot shouted at the truck driver to stop the truck. Meanwhile Jagdish Chandra came out from beneath the truck of the left rear wheel and along with other persons at the spot shouted at the driver and asked him to reverse the truck so that the deceased, who was alive at that time, could be taken out. The truck moved ahead in order to run away and ran over the body of the deceased which got entangled on the left rear wheel and the truck dragged the same to a distance of about 72 to 75 yards ahead. Meanwhile the deceased had died on the spot. PW2 Sangram Singh corroborated the averments made by PW1. He reiterated that the truck driver in order to run away drove the truck ahead at a fast speed and ran over the body of the deceased with left rear wheel which/resulted in the death of the deceased. The police came on the spot within 15-20 minutes and took the vehicle into possession, prepared the site plan and photographs were taken at the scene of accident. PW5 is the Sub Inspector Bachan Singh who was the Investigating Officer. He deposed that he inspected the spot and prepared the site plan with its correct marginal notes. Copy of the same is Ex.PW5.A. He prepared the inquest report and sent the body of the deceased for post-mortem. The plea of the appellant-driver that DTC bus was coming from opposite direction and the truck driver in order to give way to the said bus turned his truck to the left side when the scooter driver, who was in the process of overtaking the truck from the left side, lost balance which resulted in the accident, was not accepted by the Tribunal. The driver was not produced in the witness box in support of the defence. There was valid ground for drawing adverse inference against the driver who was not examined in support of the defence. (Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Vaijanti, 1995 ACJ 560 (M.P). The Tribunal, on appreciation and appraisal of evidence of the eye witnesses, came to the finding that the accident which resulted in the death of Shri V. Vasudevan took place due to rash and negligent driving of truck No. DLL-9885 on the part of appellant No. 2, Santokh Singh. It was further held that there was absolutely no negligence on the part of Jagdish Chandra, who was driving the scooter. I have perused the evidence on record. The findings of the Tribunal are based on correct appreciation and cogent grounds. There is no infirmity in the same which are, accordingly, affirmed.
6. The assessment of compensation was dealt with in issue No. 3. The deceased was held to be about 35 years of age on the date of accident which took place on February 22, 1975. The learned Judge further considered the history of longevity in the family and taking that into account and the health of the deceased, it was held that the deceased would have lived at least up to the age of 65 years, if not more, if he had not died in the aforesaid accident.
7. The contribution of the deceased to his family was next considered. It was brought in evidence that prior to his employment with Air Reduction Company Ltd., the deceased was employed as Chief Engineer in Industrial Gases Limited, Ranchi on a salary of Rs. 2500/- per month. He was in service for 12 years and worked in various places i.e Bhopal, Ranchi, Modi Nagar prior to joining M/s Air Reduction Company Ltd. where he was getting Rs. 2400/- per month plus Rs. 450/- as allowance in the scale of Rs. 2400-15-3000-ER 200-4000. The widow of the deceased was examined as PW6 and she gave details of his income, as referred to above. PW7 R.P Singh, Assistant Manager in Air Reduction Company Ltd. deposed that the deceased was working as Chief Engineer in the Company in the year 1975. He further stated that he had worked in the Company only for 3 days. The deceased possessed Diploma in Chemical Engineering and had completed the prescribed course of instructors in that field and was awarded the title of ‘Licentiate in Chemical Engineering’ by Technological Diploma Examination Board. In the facts of the case and on the basis of evidence on record, it was held by the Tribunal that the income of the deceased on the date of accident, while working as Chief Engineer in M/s. Air Reduction Pvt. Ltd, was Rs. 2400/- per month. The payment of Rs. 450/- as allowance was also not disbelieved but it was pointed out that the deceased might have been required to spend such amount for official work.
8. The Tribunal then considered the deductions from the salary of the deceased towards General Provident Fund and premium towards Life Insurance Policy, Income Tax etc. The exact amount of payments, as mentioned above, were not ascertained as the learned Judge noted that the widow of the deceased had deposed that the deceased did not have any bank account. The testimony of the widow to this effect was treated as completely false. It was inferred that payment of salary to the Executives of the Company are made by cheques. The non-production of Income-tax Returns and the certificates of employment of previous employers was treated as an adverse inference against the claimants. In view of the fact that the deceased must have contributed towards Provident Fund, premium towards Life Insurance Policy etc., the Tribunal assessed these figures on imaginary and conjectural basis and proceeded to deduct the amounts from the salary of the deceased under those heads. It may be interesting to reproduce the following findings of the Tribunal:
“Keeping in view the income of the deceased and the fact that the petitioner deliberately withheld information by not filing the Income Tax Return/Assessment Order, it is reasonable to expect that the deceased must have contributed 1/5th of the salary towards Provident Fund. As such, the contribution of the deceased towards Provident Fund in the circumstances, should be held to be Rs. 480/- per month.
Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that the deceased who was a top executive in Air Reduction Company Limited must have been insured at least to the extent of Rs. 30,000/- and if not more, he must have paid Rs. 200/- per month as premium. It is also reasonable to expect that the deceased would have made contribution of at least Rs. 300/- per month in his Bank Account in order to save amount for rainy days and for incurring the expenditure on the marriage of two minor children, namely, Shri J.D Navin and Miss. J.D Navin. It is reasonable to expect that he must have saved at least Rs. 300/- per month particularly when his salary was Rs. 2,500/- per month. The petitioner deposed that the deceased used to get Rs. 2,500/- per month in Industrial Gases Limited, Ranchi, and Rs. 2,000/- in Bombay firm and Rs. 1,500/- per month in Modi Pur and Rs. 700/- per month in Bhopal. The petitioner deposed that the deceased had worked for 12 years. Even if the saving in the Bank are taken on average of Rs. 150/- per month, it is reasonable to expect that he must have saved at least Rs. 20,000/-.
In case, the deceased had deducted 1/5th of the salary towards Provident Fund and paid Rs. 200/- towards premium of Life Insurance Policy, the tax including surcharge on the salary of Rs. 2,400/- per month, must have been not less than Rs. 220/- per month. If the deduction of Rs. 480/- towards Provident Fund (1/5th of the total salary of Rs. 2,400/- per month), Rs. 200/- towards Life Insurance Policy premium Rs. 220/- towards I.T and S.T and Rs. 300/- towards bank savings are taken, the amount towards deductions would come to Rs. 1,200/-. As such, the carry-home salary of the deceased on the relevant date was not more than Rs. 1,200/- per month.”
9. The carry-home salary of the deceased on the above basis was held to be Rs. 1200/- per month from which an amount of 1/3rd of the salary was deducted for personal expenses and the dependency was fixed at Rs. 800/- per month i.e Rs. 9600/- per annum. The multiplier of 16 years was adopted as appropriate to the age of the deceased giving an award of Rs. 1,53,600/-. The Tribunal proceeded to commit another error and again used an arbitrary and conjectural basis to make further deductions, thus reducing the award of compensation. The following paragraph in the award reads as follows:
“As regards deduction, it may be pointed out that in my aforesaid findings, it has been held that the deceased must have been at least insured for Rs. 30,000/- and he must have saved Rs. 20,000/- in the bank. It may be pointed out that in case 1976 A.C.J 407 Prem Devi Pandey v. Dayal Singh, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dalip Kapur has held that money in the Bank can be considered to be an acceleration of pecuniary gain. As far as the life insurance policy is concerned, this is an amount which would have been received by the deceased, only if he had paid to remaining instalments on the policy. It was, therefore, held that amount towards Life Insurance Policy could be considered a distinct pecuniary gain. In view of the above, a sum of Rs. 30,000/- should be deducted from the aforesaid amount of Rs. 1,53,600/-. The balance amount therefore, comes to Rs. 1,23,600/-. As regards bank saving amounting to Rs. 20,000/- a deduction of 10 per cent is reasonable as the aforesaid amount is not a distinct pecuniary gain but it is an acceleration of pecuniary gain. As such, after deducting Rs. 2,000/- from the aforesaid amount of Rs. 1,23,600/-, the balance comes to Rs. 1,21,600/-.”
10. The learned Judge did not stop at the above figure and made last deduction at the rate of 15 per cent for lump sum payment to the claimants. The ultimate award was assessed in the sum of Rs. 1,03,360/-. The question of liability of the Insurance Company, respondent No. 4 herein, was disposed of in the following manner:
“The Insurance Policy has been produced and proved on record as Ex. R1/1. The liability of the Insurance Company is limited to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-. As regards the amount of Rs. 53,360/- the liability of respondents 1 and 2 is joint and several.”
11. The Tribunal has proceeded on an erroneous basis in the assessment of compensation in the present case. There seems to be total non-application of mind in fixing the amount as contribution for dependency towards respondents-claimants. The deceased was a qualified Engineer and was 35 years of age. He was holding a high position of Chief Engineer in a reputed Company and it is accepted by the Tribunal that he was earning Rs. 2400/- per month besides an allowance of Rs. 450/-. The relevant parts of the judgment have already been reproduced earlier wherein it is indicated that the learned Judge has accepted that the deceased would be insured for Rs. 30,000/- contributing to Provident Fund and would have saved at least Rs. 20,000/- in his bank account. These findings are based on no evidence on record. They are merely originating from a mere guess work. Therefore, no logic will sustain them and they have to be set aside. The adverse conclusions cannot be drawn against the party and at best the income of the deceased can be accepted which has been indicated on the basis of evidence on record i.e Rs. 2400/-. the only deductions, which can be made from this amount, is the usual 1/3rd for personal expenses and minimum amounts towards taxation and Provident Fund as required by statutory provisions. The further deduction from the awarded amount for lump sum payment is no longer sustainable in law. The following paragraph as the judgment of Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, 1992 ACJ 300 is of great relevance and reads as under:
“7. We are of the view that deduction of 1/3rd out of the assessed compensation on account of lump sum payment is not justified. The accident took place in July, 1977 and the litigation has come to an end, hopefully, today, 15 years thereafter. This Court in Motor Owners' Insurance Co. ltd. v. J.K Modi, 1981 ACJ 507 (SC), held that the delay in the final disposal of motor accident compensation cases, as in all other classes of litigation, takes a sting out of the laws of compensation and added to that the monstrous inflation and the consequent fall in the value of rupee makes the compensation demanded years ago less than quarter of its value when it is received after such a long time. In Manjushri Radha v. B.L Gupta, 1977 ACJ 134 (SC) this Court awarded compensation by multiplying the life expectancy without making any deductions. With the value of rupee dwindling due to high rate of inflation, there is no justification for making deduction due to lump sum payment. We, therefore, hold that the Courts below were not justified in making lump sum deduction in this case.”
12. The learned Counsel for the respondents-claimants has vehemently contended that, there was no basis or justification before the Tribunal to have reached the conclusion that the deceased was contributing particular amounts for Provident Fund, payment of premium of Insurance Policy as well as for savings in the Bank. There is considerable force in the said arguments. There is no doubt that some basic amount has to be contributed towards Provident Fund. It was, however, not necessary that the deceased would be paying premium for Life Insurance Policy, firstly, he may not have taken any policy and secondly this cannot be treated as a deduction from the amount fixed for dependency. The Tribunal has based its reasoning on conjectural basis merely on the ground that respondents-claimants have not given any positive proof or have not produced Income Tax Returns or filed the certificates of employment of previous employers. There was no reason to draw adverse inference on these grounds. The findings in this regard are, accordingly, set aside.
13. The income of the deceased has been assessed at Rs. 2400/- per month besides allowances of Rs. 450/- per month. The deceased would be spending some amount on his personal expenses. The allowance of Rs. 450/- has not been taken into account by the Tribunal on the ground that the deceased might have been required to spend such amount for official work. Therefore, the total income of the deceased has been allowed at Rs. 2400/- per month. The deceased was Chief Engineer and was duly qualified to hold that assignment. It is also not in dispute any longer that the Courts can consider the future prospect or advancement in life and career in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. In General Manager, Kerala Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 the Supreme Court accepted this proposition and doubled the income of the deceased who was 39 years of age at the time of his death. The multiplier of 12 was considered appropriate to the age of the deceased. The Supreme Court in Hardeo Kaur (supra) which was an earlier judgment than the one cited above, adopted slightly different method to work out the dependency and multiplier. In that case the deceased was 36 years of age and was a Major in the Army. The income was assessed at Rs. 2200/- per month and after allowing usual deduction for personal expenses the dependency was fixed at Rs. 1400/- per month i.e Rs. 16,800/- per year. The multiplier of 24 was used, as considered appropriate to the age of the deceased and the ultimate award was made on that basis. This judgment did not take into account the future prospects of advancement in career but compensated the claimants by using a higher multiplier of 24 on the ground that the normal span of the deceased could not be less than 60 years. Similar view was expressed in Urmilla Pandey v. Khalil Ahmad, 1994 ACJ 805 : II (1994) ACC 431 where the Supreme Court again reiterated that the life expectancy could not be less than 65 years and the deduction of 33 per cent on account of lump sum payment was not justified.
14. The Tribunal in the present case has accepted the income of the deceased as Rs. 2400/- plus Rs. 450/- as allowance per month. The deduction of 1/3rd for personal expenses is again widely accepted as a valid deduction. Taking an overall view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can safely be held that the deceased was spending a sum of Rs. 1200/- per month for his family which will take into account the compulsory deductions, such as, Income Tax, Provident Fund etc. which will come to Rs. 14,400/- in the year. The dependency i.e the annual amount which the deceased was spending for his family can be assessed at Rs. 14,400/- in the facts and circumstances of the case. The multiplier of 25 on the basis of the age of the deceased, who was 35 years of age on the date of his death, would be appropriate in the present case to meet the ends of justice. Thus, the amount of compensation is assessed at Rs. 3,60,000/- (Rs. 14,400/- x25). The award will be only marginally different if the assessment is based by using a lower multiplier on the basis of the judgment of Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (supra). The amount fixed for dependency has to be doubled on the basis of time bound consideration for promotion and revisions in the salary of the deceased in the years to come.
15. The respondents-claimants have asked for enhancement of compensation as well as for fixing the entire liability on the Insurance Company, respondent No. 4 herein on the plea that the Tribunal has gravely erred in fixing the liability at Rs. 50,000/-. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has contended that no relief can be granted to the respondents-claimants as they have only filed the Cross-Objections and no appeal has been filed to impugn the Award. The Cross-Objections are not maintainable against a co-respondent. Strong reliance is placed on the judgments as Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1516; News India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Smt. Hemlata Biswas, AIR 1983 Allahabad 115; Smt. Shazadi Begum v. Vinod Kumar, AIR 1978 Madhya Pradesh 20 and Hindustan General Insurance Society Ltd. now National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Nilima Mahanta, II (1989) ACC 341
16. In the case of Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (supra) the Supreme Court was of the opinion that ordinarily respondent cannot prefer objections against the co-respondent. The following passages from this judgment will be of relevance and read as follows:
16. The question whether a respondent could by way of cross-objection seek relief against another respondent under these provisions was first raised before the Court almost a century ago. Both the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts held in a number of cases that ordinarily it was not open to a respondent to seek relief as against a co-respondent by way of objection, though in exceptional cases this could be done. (Vide Burroda Soonduree Dossee v. Nobo Gopal Mullick, 1864 Sum WR 294; Maharaja Tarucknath Roy v. Tuboornnissa Chowdhrain, 7 Suth WR 39(1); Ganesh Pandurang v. Gangadhar Ramkrishna, 6 Bom HCAC 244 and Anwar Jan Bibi v. Azmut Ali, 15 Suth WR 26. These decisions, it is proper to mention, were given under the Code of 1859 where Sec. 348 provided that “Upon hearing of the appeal, the respondent may take any objection to the decision of the lower Court which he might have taken if he had preferred a separate appeal from such decision.” After this section was replaced by Sec. 561 in the Code of 1877 and the Code of 1882 the question whether a respondent can file an objection against another respondent came up before the Courts several times and the decision remained the same.
17. The Patna and the Allahabad High Courts also took the view that as a general rule the right of a respondent to urge cross objections should be limited to asking relief against the appellant only and it is only where the appeal opens up questions which cannot be disposed of properly except by opening up matters as between co-respondents that relief against respondents can also be sought by way of objections. The Madras High Court took a different view in Timmayya v. Lakshmana, ILR 7 Mad. 215 and held that the words of the section were wide enough to cover all objections to any part of the decree and it was open to a respondent to seek relief under this section even against another respondent, and this view was reiterated by that Court even after the Code of 1908 made an important change in the provision by using the word “cross-objection” in place of “objection”. Ultimately however in 1950 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkateshwarlu v. Ramamma, ILR (1950) Mad. 874: (AIR 1950 Mad. 379) considered the question again and decided over-ruling all previous decisions that on a proper construction of the language, Order 41 Rule 22 confers only a restricted right on the respondent to prefer objection to the decree without filing a separate appeal; that such objection should, as a general rule, be primarily against the appellant, though in exceptional cases it may incidentally be also directed against the other respondents. The Lahore High Court which had earlier followed the former view of the Madras High Court also decided in Jan Mohamed v. PM. Razdon, AIR 1944 Lah 433 to adopt the other view held by the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, Calcutta and Patna. The Nagpur High Court has also adopted the same view. (Vide Chandi Prasad v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1948 Nag. 377.)
18. In our opinion, the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that Order 41 Rule 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct. Whatever may have been the position under the old Sec. 561, the use of the word “cross-objection” in Order 41 Rule 22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the Legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. As Rajamannar, C.J said in ILR 1950 Mad 874: (AIR 1950 Mad 379) (FB):
“The Legislature by describing the objection which could be taken by the respondent as a “cross-objection” must have deliberately adopted the view of the other High Courts. One cannot treat an objection by a respondent in which the appellant has no interest as a cross-objection. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent. The cross-objection must be an objection by a respondent against the appellant.”
We think, with respect, that these observations put the matter clearly and correctly. That the Legislature also wanted to give effect to the views held by the different High Courts that in exceptional cases as mentioned above an objection can be preferred by a respondent against a co-respondent is indicated by the substitution of the word “appellant” in the third paragraph by the words “the party who may be affected by such objection.”
17. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Smt. Hemlata Biswas (supra) has reiterated that cross-objection of claimants for enhancement was not maintainable against Insurance Company who had not filed appeal.
18. In Smt. Shazadi Begum v. Vinod Kumar (Supra) the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (supra) and reiterated that “Order 41 Rule 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as, where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents that an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents.
19. The Single Bench of Gauhati High Court in Hindustan General Insurance Society Ltd. now National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Nilima Mahanta (supra) has also held that the law does not permit a respondent to agitate his cross-objections against the co-respondent. Reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal (supra) was made and it was noticed that “only in exceptional cases, where the interests of co-respondent are so linked or intricately mixed with that of the appellant, that the interest of a co-respondent getting affected cannot be helped or avoided, that a respondent may state that a finding against him should have gone in his favour.”
20. The learned Counsel for the respondents-claimants has argued that the law laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal's case does not bar relief to be granted against the co-respondent, in case the facts and circumstances demand. He has further argued that in any case, this Court is empowered to give relief to the claimants by exercise of powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance is placed on the judgments as Mt. Chanda Bibi v. Mohanram Sahu, A.I.R 1934 Patna 134; Balkrishna Chatrabhuj Thacker v. Devabai, AIR 1985 Gujarat 133 and Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Vaijanti, 1995 ACJ 560. The law is already settled in the case of Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, (supra) that the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that the provisions of “Order 41 Rule 22 permit, as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is inter-mixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct.” The above said view is reiterated in the judgment as reported Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Vaijanti (supra).
21. The next question which arises is, whether the Appellate Court may exercise the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure in case, no relief could be granted under Order 41 Rule 22. The position of law is clear that the respondent is not entitled as of right to urge cross-objection against co-respondent. However, it is also not in dispute that such objection may be entertained under Rule 33 in exceptional cases. This view finds support in the judgments in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (supra), Balakrishna Chatrabhuj Thacker v. Devabai (supra) and Mt. Chanda Bibi v. Mohanram Sahu (supra). The Supreme Court in Panna Lal has reiterated that “even a bare reading of Order 41 Rule 33 is sufficient to convince any one that the wide wording was intended to empower the Appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the Appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as the case may require’.” Therefore, it cannot be said that if a party who could have filed cross-objections under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not done so, the Appellate Court can, under no circumstance, give him relief under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code and such objection not coming under Order. 41 Rule 22 may be entertained under Order 41 Rule 33 in cases of exceptional kind. In Bhagwan Das v. National Insurance Company Ltd., Gwalior, AIR 1991 Madhya Pradesh 235; R.C Lahoti, J. has explained the import of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 and has also made reference to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Panna Lal v. State of Bombay (supra). Paragraphs 41 and 43 may be reproduced as under:
41. Order 41, Rule 22 permits a respondent to raise all pleas by way of cross-objection to the decree appealed against which he could have taken by way of appeal. The primary responsibility of satisfying an award is that of the driver and the owner, both being the tort-feasor and the person vicariously liable. The insurer has to indemnify the owner. The insurer does not have any say in the matter of quantum of compensation by virtue of Sub-sections (2) and (6) of Sec. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is for the driver and the owner to contest the quantum and it is for the insurer to indemnify against the liability incurred by the owner. The cross objection by a claimant/respondent has, therefore, to be directed against the driver and the owner. There lies the distinction between the approach to be adopted in the matter of cross-objection when the appeal has been filed by the driver and/or owner impleading the insurer as respondent, as against an appeal preferred by an insurer alone impleading the owner and driver as respondents.
43. A Court may pass a decree against several defendants. One of them alone may choose to prefer an appeal. He shall have to implead non-appealing defendants as respondents, they being necessary parties for adjudications of the appeal. If non-appealing defendants permit one to prefer an appeal, because they stand to gain in the event of the appeal being allowed, they by their conduct have allowed the appealing one to represent their common interest. They must accept his representative character in the result of the appeal. Unless this approach is to be adopted, the co-defendants having suffered common decree would be able to set at naught statutory right of the respondents to file cross-objection by permitting one of them to file an appeal and then contending that the effect of allowing cross-objection would result in adversely affecting the liability of non-appealing defendant/respondents. Such an argument cannot be accepted”.
22. The question now arises as to whether the respondents-claimants could seek relief against respondent No. 4 by way of cross-objections. Ordinarily, there is no dispute about the proposition that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 permits a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant. But in exceptional cases relief can be granted against the co-respondent as well where the objection is intermixed with the relief granted in the matter and to do complete justice between the parties. The law is clearly stated in the cases cited above wherein it has been held that the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 only confers restrictive rights on the respondent to prefer objections to the decree without filing a separate appeal and such objections should, as a general rule, be primarily against the appellant but in exceptional cases it may incidentally be also directed against the other respondents. Furthermore, the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 will come to the rescue of the cross-objectors and they can be granted relief as the object of Rule 33 is manifestly to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties to the appeal.
23. In the present case, the claim petition was filed against the driver, the owner as well as the insurer of the offending vehicle. The award was made against the said parties but confined the limit of liability to a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as far as respondent No. 4 was concerned. It may be noticed that the owner, the driver as well as the Insurance Company who was the insurer of the vehicle filed the respective written statements and were represented by the same Counsel before the Tribunal. The Appellate Court, as in the present case, is fully empowered to interfere with, modify or extend the decision of the Tribunal to give effect to that decision by interfering, if necessary, even with the rights and liabilities of those who were not in fact appealing from that decision of the Tribunal. The power under Order 41 Rule -33 of the Code can also be exercised to give effect to the Appellate Court's decision by interfering in some way or the other with the rights of those parties which are not even the subject of appeal before the Appellate Court. This view was stated as early as in the year 1925 in the judgment Kesho Prasad Singh v. Narayan Doyal, 1925 Patna 285. There is another aspect which will justify to grant relief to the respondent-claimants against a co-respondent, who is insurer in this case because no manifest injustice will be caused to the respondent 4 in the facts of the present case. The Insurance Company has been impleaded in the present appeal as a respondent. The Counsel has appeared and has made his submissions. The objection that the respondents-claimants be non-suited in respect of their rights which arise against the insurer merely on the ground that no relief can be granted against the co-respondent under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be sustained. There is no specific bar in the provisions of the said Rule that no relief can be granted against the co-respondent as the insurer who is impleaded as respondent as owner of the vehicle, has been duly served and represented. The objection, accordingly, will be only academic and it will be necessary to grant relief to the respondents-claimants to do complete justice between the parties. The plea of the Insurance Company, respondent No. 4 in this appeal, is accordingly, rejected and it is held that the cross-objections are maintainable.
24. The plea of limited liability may now be examined. The alleged true copy of the policy along with various annexures are on record as Ex.R1/1. The same is effective from 2nd September, 1974 to Ist September, 1975. It is not denied that it is a comprehensive policy and is not an “Act only” policy. The original nor the carbon copy has been produced and placed on record by the owner or by the insurer though the same Counsel appeared for both the parties in the Tribunal. The endorsements are attached to the policy which will indicate that the proformas were printed on February, 1976, April, 1976 and June, 1976 respectively, whereas the policy was issued on September 2, 1974. There is no doubt that to cover unlimited liability the additional premium must be shown to have been paid. This is so required under the law laid down by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Bai (Smt.), (1995) 2 SCC 539. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 has contended that the policy has been admitted by Counsel for the respondents-claimants before the Tribunal. It is true that the word “Admitted” has been written above the signatures of one of the Counsel appearing in the Tribunal but much credence cannot be given to the same as neither the owner nor the insurer have been forthright and honest in production of the original or carbon copy. The mere alleged admission cannot be used against the respondents-claimants, particularly, in view of the fact that the vehicle was comprehensively insured and it was not an “Act only” policy. The Tribunal has not dealt with any of the above aspects and has limited the liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- without application of mind and without carefully going through the record. There is also force in the contention that adverse inference has to be drawn against the insurer when the endorsement attached to the policy are for a much later date than the actual date of the issuance of the policy itself. The reliance on the judgment of this Court as New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Saloni Dargan, 1990 ACJ 127 is correctly placed. The responsibility was on the owner and the insurer, respondent No. 4 herein and the said burden has not been discharged.
25. For the aforesaid reasons, it is held that the liability of the Insurance Company, respondent No. 4 is unlimited and cannot be confined to Rs. 50,000/-. The finding in this regard is reversed.
26. The appeal, as a consequence, is dismissed. The cross-objections are allowed and the respondents-claimants are held entitled to compensation of Rs. 3,60,000/- with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of application till realisation. They shall also be entitled to costs, which are quantified at Rs. 5000/-.
Appeal dismissed.
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