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Daulat Radhu Bhatija v. State And Another..

Delhi High Court
Apr 22, 1994
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — S.C. Jain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The complaint in this matter was filed by Sh. Sunil Bagga, acting as attorney for S.A.S. Exports, against Sh. Daulat Radhu Bhatija (the petitioner). The complaint sought a direction to the S.H.O., Police Station Kotla Mubarak Pur, New Delhi to register a case and investigate offences alleged to fall under Sections 420, 506, 379 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and to file a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.

The complaint was presented before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (M.M.) Sh. Sukhdev Singh. By order dated 19.7.1993 the M.M. directed the S.H.O. to get a case registered and investigate the matter under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and to submit his report on 10.8.1993.

The petitioner challenged the M.M.'s order by way of this writ petition, seeking quashing of the M.M.'s order (challenging the direction to police to register and investigate under Section 156(3)) and also sought quashing of the ensuing investigation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate validly directed the police to register a case and investigate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. without first taking cognizance and recording the complainant's statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
  2. Whether a Magistrate, when exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., may direct registration of the case by the police or is limited to directing investigation only.
  3. Whether the investigation and proceedings initiated pursuant to the M.M.'s order are liable to be quashed on the ground that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner under the cited penal provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • On presentation of a complaint the M.M. must examine the complainant and the witnesses on oath (under Section 200 Cr.P.C.), and the Magistrate would not refrain from such examination except as provided by proviso (a) of Section 200 Cr.P.C.
  • The M.M. illegally directed the police to register the case and investigate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. without taking cognizance of the matter.
  • While the Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., this power can be exercised only to find out truth or falsehood of complaint allegations; the scope of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is limited and the Magistrate should not use Section 156(3) to bypass the Chapter XV procedure.
  • The Magistrate can send the complaint to the police for investigation but, according to the petitioner, cannot direct registration of the case as part of that order; the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is therefore illegal and unsustainable.
  • On the merits, no case is made out against the petitioner under Sections 420 or 506 IPC or other provisions even on a prima facie basis and having regard to the police report submitted pursuant to the M.M.'s order, the proceedings and investigation should be quashed.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976 S.C.C. (Crl) 380) Distinction between power under Section 156(3) (pre-cognizance) and Section 202(1) (post-cognizance); Section 156(3) can be invoked before taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) but not after Magistrate embarks on Chapter XV procedure. Used to establish that ordering police investigation under Section 156(3) is valid only at the pre-cognizance stage; court relied on this to assess whether the M.M.'s order was pre-cognizance.
Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sah (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1541) When a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Chapter XV (i.e., Sections such as 200/202), he is taken to have taken cognizance; but applying mind for ordering investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to taking cognizance. Cited (with Tula Ram) to support conclusion that an order for investigation under Section 156(3) does not necessarily imply that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence.
Tula Ram and Others v. Kishore Singh (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2401) Same principle as Jamuna Singh regarding distinction between applying mind for Chapter XV proceedings and applying mind for ordering investigation under Section 156(3). Followed alongside Jamuna Singh to conclude the M.M. in the instant case acted at the pre-cognizance stage when directing investigation under Section 156(3).
Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1990 Vol. 1 Crimes 600) Held that ordering registration of the case while exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is illegal (in the facts of that case, where the Magistrate had already taken cognizance). Relied upon by the petitioner; the court distinguished that case on its facts because in Raghbir Singh the Magistrate had already taken cognizance and recorded evidence, whereas in the present case the order was at the pre-cognizance stage.
Rattan Amol Singh and Another v. State of Punjab and Another (1988 Vol. 2 RCR 600) Authority where Magistrate had already taken cognizance under Section 190(1)(a)(i) and recorded some evidence; illustrates limits on invoking Section 156(3) after cognizance. Distinguished on facts — used to show that cases where Magistrate had already taken cognizance are different from the instant facts where the order was pre-cognizance.
India Carats Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Another (1989 [1] R.C.R. 395) Decision referred to but noted as not directly addressing whether a Magistrate acting under Section 156(3) can order registration of the case. Court observed it does not directly deal with the specific question raised in the petition and therefore is not directly determinative here.
Jagdish Rai and Others v. State of Punjab and Another (1988 [1] R.C.R. 202) Single Bench view that even if Magistrate's direction to register a case is irregular, registration of FIR and subsequent investigation are not illegal because the police could in any case register/investigate and submit a report under Section 173. Cited to support the proposition that an order which may be somewhat irregular does not automatically render the registration/investigation illegal; court relied on this reasoning.
Baru Ram and Others v. The State of Haryana and Another (1990 CC Cases 118 HC) Approved the reasoning in Jagdish Rai regarding irregular but not illegal registration and investigation. Cited as supportive authority; the court noted Jagdish Rai was cited with approval in Baru Ram.
State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others (AIR 1992 S.C. 604) Laid down seven categories where High Court may interfere under Article 226 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings; emphasised such power must be exercised sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases. Applied to the petitioner's plea for quashing: court found no grounds under the Bhajan Lal categories to quash investigation at this stage and cautioned against liberal use of quashing powers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by outlining the several courses available to a Magistrate on receipt of a complaint (paragraph 6): taking cognizance and recording statements under Section 200; dismissing under Section 203 if insufficient ground; issuing process under Section 204 if sufficient ground; postponing issue of process and inquiring himself or directing investigation by police (or another person); or, alternatively, ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) without following the Chapter XV procedure.

The court then analysed the distinction between pre-cognizance and post-cognizance powers, relying on Devarapalli and other authorities: Section 156(3) is a pre-cognizance power while Section 202(1) operates at the post-cognizance stage (paragraph 7). If a Magistrate has once taken cognizance and embarked upon Chapter XV procedure, he cannot revert to the pre-cognizance position to invoke Section 156(3).

Applying these principles to the facts, the court examined whether the M.M.'s order of 19.7.1993 was passed before taking cognizance. The court found that the Magistrate did not apply his mind to decide whether there was sufficient ground to proceed under Chapter XV; rather he considered the matter for the limited purpose of ordering an investigation under Section 156(3). Consequently the order was held to be at the pre-cognizance stage (paragraphs 9–10).

The court addressed the petitioner's submission that the Magistrate cannot direct registration under Section 156(3). The decision in Raghbir Singh (and others where the Magistrate had already taken cognizance) was noted, but those cases were distinguished on their facts because in them the Magistrate had already taken cognizance and recorded evidence (paragraph 11). The court observed that although directing registration while ordering investigation may appear irregular, authorities such as Jagdish Rai and Baru Ram support the proposition that such irregularity does not necessarily render the registration or the ensuing investigation illegal (paragraphs 12–13).

On the question of quashing the proceedings, the court applied the principles in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others. The court noted the limited and sparing jurisdiction to quash and held that, since the Magistrate had not taken cognizance and a police report had been submitted to be dealt with under Section 173(2), there was no ground at this stage to quash the investigation or proceedings (paragraphs 14–16).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ Petition dismissed. (Final order: the petition seeking quashing of the M.M.'s order and the investigation is dismissed — paragraph 17.)

Implications:

  • The court concluded that the Magistrate validly exercised power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. at the pre-cognizance stage; the order directing police investigation (and calling for a report under Section 173) is legally sustainable even if the direction to register the case may be somewhat irregular.
  • The investigation and the police report are not quashed at this stage; the Magistrate is to consider the police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. and may drop the proceedings if he concludes there is no case for taking cognizance.
  • No order was made altering the substantive criminal process beyond refusing to quash; the decision applies the established distinction between pre- and post-cognizance powers and follows existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities. The opinion resolves the petition on the facts before the court and does not purport to lay down any new departure from cited precedents.
Show all summary ...

S.C Jain, J.— The facts giving rise to this writ petition, in brief are that Sh. Sunil Bagga (hereinafter referred to as Respondent No. 2) as attorney of S.A.S Exports, A-30 Bapu Park, Kotla Mubarak Pur, New Delhi filed a complaint before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. New DELHI purporting to be under Section 156 Cr.P.C against Sh. Daulat Radhu Bhatija (hereinafter referred to as the Petitioner) seeking a direction to the S.H.O Police Station Kotla Mubarak Pur, New Delhi to register a case for offences under Sections 420/506/379/323 I.P.C and investigate the same and file a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C

2. Sh. Sukhdev Singh, M.M, to whom this case was assigned, by his Order dated 19.7.1993 directed the S.H.O Police Station Kotla Mubarak Pur to get a case registered and investigate the same under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C and to submit his report on 10.8.1993

3. It is this order of the M.M which has been challenged in this writ petition. Investigation being made by the police pursuant to the order dated 19.7.1993 has also been sought to be quashed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the order passed by the learned M.M argued that on presentation of the complaint, the M.M has to examine the complainant on oath and all his witnesses present. The Magistrate would not examine the complainant only if the case is covered by proviso (a) of Section 200 Cr.P.C According to the learned Counsel the M.M without taking cognizance of the matter illegally directed the police to register the case and to investigate under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C and to submit the report. According to the learned counsel the M.M in an appropriate case can order investigation or further investigation by police under Section 156 (3) Cr. P.C, but only to find out the truth or falsehood of the contents of a complaint as a scope of enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C is limited to find out the truth or otherwise of the complaint in order to determine whether process be issued or not. Learned counsel submitted that the Magistrate in terms of Section 156(3) Cr. P.C, can send the complaint to police for investigation and not for registration of the case. According to the learned counsel the procedure adopted by the Magistrate is illegal and the impugned order is not sustainable.

5. Regarding quashing of the proceedings the learned counsel submitted that no case either under Section 420 I.P.C or under Section 506 I.P.C or under any other provision of law is made out against the petitioner even on prima facie ground and also on the basis of the report submitted by the police as per the order of the M.M and as such these proceedings and investigation are also liable to be quashed.

6. On receipt of a complaint a Magistrate has several courses open to him. The Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence at once and proceed to record statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. After recording those statement, if in the opinion of the Magistrate there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. On the other hand, if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may issue process under Section 204. If, however, the Magistrate thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by the police officer or such other person as he things fit, for the purpose or deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Another course open to the Magistrate is that instead of taking cognizance of the offence and following the procedure laid down under Section 200 or Section 202, he may order an investigation to be made by the police under Section 156 (3). When such an order is made, the police will have to investigate the matter and submit a report under Section 173(2). On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) and issue process straightaway to the accused.

7. It has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy and Others (1976 S.C.C (Crl) 380) that “The power to order police investigation under Section 156 (3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the magistrate is in seisin of the case. Therefore, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable of fence, the power under Section 156 (3) can be invoked by the magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under section 190 (1) (a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156 (3).

8. It is well settled that the order directing the police to investigate the case under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C can be validly made but it should be at the precognizance stage. When a magistrate receives complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence himself.

9. It is to be seen whether the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C is before taking cognizance by the Magistrate or not. It is well settled as has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sah (A.I.R 1964 S.C 1541) and followed in Tula Ram and Others v. Kishore Singh (A.I.R 1977 S.C 2401) that “when on a petition of complaint being filed before him a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under the various provisions of Chapter XVI of Cr.P.C he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offence mentioned in the complaint. When however he applies his mind not for such purpose but for proposes of ordering investigation under Section 156 (3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence.”

10. On facts, in the instant case the magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, but only for ordering an investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C Instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he has in the exercise of his discretion sent the complaint for investigation by police under Section 156 Cr.P.C From the facts of this case, it is apparent that the order passed by the Magistrate is at the precognizance stage.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana (1990 Vol. 1 Crimes 600) for the proposition that the order of the Magistrate directing registration of the case while exercising power under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C is illegal. The facts of the cited decision show that the Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C inasmuch as the trial Magistrate in the said case had already recorded some evidence and, therefore, the Magistrate could not legally invoke his power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C Likewise in the case of Rattan Amol Singh and Another v. State of Punjab and Another (1988 Vol. 2 RCR 600), the Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence under section 190 (a) (i) and had already recorded some evidence. The decision of the Supreme Court in India Carats Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Another (1989 [1] R.C.R 395) does not directly deal with the question whether the Magistrate while acting under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C is legally empowered to order registration of the case of not.

12. The Single Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court took the view in jagdish Rai and Others v. State of Punjab and Another (1988 [1] R.C.R 202) that “Even if direction of the Magistrate, with the order for registering a case on the complaint, is some what irregular, the registration of the FIR and the investigation following it cannot be said to be illegal as even otherwise, the Police Officer could register a case and investigate and then submit a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

13. The aforesaid decision in the case of Jagdish Rai was cited with approval by another learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Baru Ram and Others v. The State of Haryana and Another (1990 CC Cases 118 HC).

14. In the present case the Magistrate has exercised power under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C at the pre-cognizance stage. In the facts and circumstances of this case the order of the Magistrate directing the police to register a case under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C may be somewhat irregular but that is of no consequence and it cannot be held to be illegal and the order in so for as it directs the investigation and calls for a report at this pre-cognizance stage is perfectly legal and cannot be said to be either irregular or illegal. The arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, are not legally sustainable.

15. Regarding the quashing of the investigation and the proceedings, the law is well settled, as has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others (AIR 1992 S.C 604). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down seven categories wherein the High Court may in exercise of powers under Articles 226 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C may interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secute the ends of justice. However, as a word of caution, it has been observed that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

16. In this case, the Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence, though a report has been submitted which shall be treated by him under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C He might drop the proceedings, if he comes to the conclusion that there is no case for taking cognizance in the matter and at this stage, we do not find any ground for quashing the investigation and the proceedings.

17. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.