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Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Quadricon Pvt. Ltd.

Delhi High Court
Sep 8, 1994
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — I.A. 4412/94 & I.A. 5240/94

Factual and Procedural Background

The order disposes I.A. 4412/94 and I.A. 5240/94. The proceedings arise from a petition under Section 41 read with the Second Schedule of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The petitioner is a public sector undertaking and the respondent is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Under an agreement, the respondent had taken advances from the petitioner for tests and procurement related to portable steel bridge superstructures using the petitioner's patented Qadricon system in execution of a Government of Bangladesh tender. Disputes between the parties are the subject matter of arbitration pending before an arbitrator.

The respondent separately contracted with the Chief Engineer (Purchases), Northern Railway for the Akhnoor Bridge Project and was due to receive about Rs. 30 lakhs from that project. The petitioner filed I.A. 4412/94 under Order 39 Rules 1-2 read with the Second Schedule and Section 41 of the Arbitration Act seeking an order restraining the respondent from receiving amounts payable by the Northern Railway in respect of the Akhnoor Bridge Project. The petitioner also sent a letter to the General Manager, Northern Railway requesting non-release of funds.

In response, the respondent filed I.A. 5240/94 under Section 41 read with the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act and Section 151 CPC seeking a restraint on the petitioner from interfering with the respondent's business and with the receipt of the amounts from Northern Railway, and sought a direction to the petitioner to inform the Chief Engineer that payments could not be withheld at the petitioner's instance.

The Chief Engineer/General Manager, Northern Railway, who would be the paying authority, is not a party to these proceedings. Both interlocutory applications were contested and the central dispute addressed by the Court related to the scope of the Court's powers under Section 41 and the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act and whether interim relief could be granted in the circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court, under Section 41 read with the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act, has power to grant injunctions or other interim reliefs that restrain a third party (here, the Northern Railway) from paying sums to a party to an arbitration when those sums are not the subject matter of the arbitration.
  2. Whether the reliefs sought by the petitioner (attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC or injunction under Order 39 Rules 1-2 CPC read with Section 41 and the Second Schedule) qualify as being “for the purpose of, and in relation to” the arbitration proceedings so as to permit Court intervention.
  3. Whether an order of attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC could be granted on the facts of this case to prevent the respondent from receiving amounts from the Northern Railway.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner sought interim relief by invoking Section 41 and the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act, together with Order 39 Rules 1-2 CPC, to prevent the respondent from receiving payments from Northern Railway which, the petitioner contended, might prejudice recovery that could be effected under an eventual arbitral award.
  • When the Court's power under Section 41/Second Schedule and Order 39 was found inadequate or in dispute, the petitioner attempted to rely on Order 38 Rule 5 CPC (attachment before judgment) as an alternative basis for an order to secure the amounts payable by Northern Railway to the respondent.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent applied under Section 41 read with the Second Schedule and Section 151 CPC to restrain the petitioner from interfering with its business or with its right to receive approximately Rs. 30 lakhs from Northern Railway, and sought a direction that the petitioner could not induce Northern Railway to withhold payment.
  • Substantively, the respondent argued that it was unreasonable and illegal for the General Manager/Chief Engineer of Northern Railway to withhold payment on the basis of a letter from the petitioner and that the petitioner had no lawful basis to ask the paying authority to withhold amounts legitimately due to the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
HMK Ansari & Co v. Union of India, AIR 1984 S.C. 29 Clause (a) of Section 41 makes procedural provisions of CPC applicable but does not by itself authorise injunctions; injunction power stems from clause (b) via items in the Second Schedule. The Court cannot use clause (a) to sidestep clause (b). The Court relied on this Supreme Court ruling as controlling law to hold that injunctions or freezing of payments not “for the purpose of, and in relation to” arbitration proceedings cannot be ordered under Section 41; applied to reject both interlocutory applications that sought to affect third‑party payments unrelated to the arbitration.
Manohar Singh v. Hind Kumar Kohli, AIR 1991 MP 373 Held (by single bench) that Order 38 Rule 5 CPC's source of power for attachment could be traced to clause (a) of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act. The Court noted this decision but rejected its reasoning as contrary to the Supreme Court in HMK Ansari; held Manohar Singh's view is not good law and that clause (a) cannot be used to justify non‑procedural orders like attachment before judgment.
C. Raghava Reddy v. Superintending Engineer Irrigation Circle Nizamabad, AIR 1988 AP 53 Held that Court had no power under the Arbitration Act to grant injunction restraining a Government authority from withholding amounts due to a party under other contracts because such an injunction is not for the purpose of, and in relation to, the arbitration proceedings. The Court followed this High Court decision as consistent with HMK Ansari to reinforce that withholding of payments by a third party (not party to arbitration) cannot be restrained under Section 41 where those sums are unrelated to the arbitration.
Sardar Govind Rao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai and ors, AIR 1982 SC 989 Sets out that an order for attachment before judgment requires specific ingredients and is not to be made merely because the plaintiff has a strong case; outlines caution in exercising O.38 R.5 power. Invoked to emphasize caution and the strict requirements for attachment before judgment; used to assess the petitioner's reliance on Order 38 Rule 5 and to find the petitioner had not established the necessary ingredients.
Nand Lal v. Keshri Mal, AIR 1950 MB 70 High Court note of caution that attachment of property is a serious remedy and courts should avoid being instruments of oppression. Used to underline the need for circumspection before ordering attachment before judgment; supported rejection of the petitioner's O.38 R.5 plea on the record.
Bharat Tobacco Co. v. Maula Saheb A. Zamadar, AIR 1980 Guj 202 Explained that to invoke Order 38 Rule 5 a party must establish facts showing the opposite party intends to dispose of property to obstruct or delay execution of a decree; attachment before judgment is drastic and requires utmost caution. Quoted for the strict evidentiary and factual threshold required for attachment before judgment; applied to find the petitioner had not met that threshold.
Prem Raj Mundra v. Md. Maneck Gazi and Ors, AIR 1951 Calcutta 256 Formulated guiding principles (eleven) for courts considering O.38 R.5-6 CPC applications, including that existence of circumstances is a question of fact, and that courts should not act merely because no apparent harm would be done. The Court reproduced and applied selected principles (such as proof of circumstances and heightened caution in business cases) in evaluating whether the petitioner satisfied O.38 R.5 requirements; concluded the petitioner failed to demonstrate the required facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps rooted in statutory construction and precedent:

  1. Statutory scope: The Court examined Section 41 of the Arbitration Act and the Second Schedule. It emphasized the distinction between clause (a) (makes procedural provisions of the CPC applicable) and clause (b) (expressly confers power to make orders enumerated in the Second Schedule). The Court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in HMK Ansari to conclude that injunctional powers are not to be derived from clause (a) alone.
  2. Applicability of interim relief to the facts: Applying the above principle, the Court asked whether the payments due to the respondent from Northern Railway were “for the purpose of, and in relation to” the arbitration. It concluded they were not: the amounts payable in respect of the Akhnoor Bridge Project are neither the subject matter of the arbitration nor connected to it. Hence, relief under Section 41/Second Schedule (including injunctions) was not available.
  3. Third party status of the paying authority: The Court noted that the Chief Engineer/General Manager, Northern Railway—the entity asked to withhold payment—is not a party to the arbitration or to these proceedings. The Court found it could not make orders that would bind or affect non-parties “behind their back.”
  4. Consideration of respondent’s complaint about the petitioner's letter: The respondent argued that it was unlawful for Northern Railway to withhold payment on the basis of the petitioner's letter. The Court recognized the force of that contention but observed that any complaint about Northern Railway's conduct was a matter the respondent could raise directly with the railway authorities; the Court held it had no jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief sought against the railway because of the legal limits established by precedent.
  5. Attachment before judgment (Order 38 Rule 5 CPC): Addressing the petitioner's fallback reliance on Order 38 Rule 5, the Court reviewed the strict requirements and guiding principles established by higher courts and precedent. The Court found that the petitioner had not pleaded or proved facts satisfying the ingredient of intent to dispose or remove property with a view to defeat a decree. On the contrary, available material suggested the respondent was a well‑established company and there was no prima facie material to infer an intention to defeat or delay the petitioner's claim.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Because the reliefs sought were not “for the purpose of, and in relation to” the arbitration, because the amounts at issue were not the subject matter of the arbitration, and because the paying authority was not a party to the proceedings, both interlocutory applications could not be granted. Separately, the petitioner failed to establish the stringent factual basis required for attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both interlocutory applications I.A. 4412/94 and I.A. 5240/94 are rejected.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: No interlocutory restraint was granted. The respondent is not restrained by this Court from receiving the amounts due to it from the Northern Railway, and the petitioner is not permitted by this order to secure the respondent's receipts from the railway through an injunction or attachment in these proceedings.
  • Effect on third party (Northern Railway): The Court declined to make any order binding the General Manager/Chief Engineer, Northern Railway, because that authority is not a party to the arbitration or the present proceedings.
  • Precedential effect: The decision applies and reiterates existing Supreme Court and High Court authority about the limited scope of Section 41 and the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act and about the stringent requirements for attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. The opinion does not purport to lay down new law; it follows and applies established doctrine (notably HMK Ansari).

Note: This summary is strictly confined to and derived from the content of the provided judicial opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text of the opinion were introduced.

Show all summary ...

R.C Lahoti, J.— This order disposes of I.A 4412/94 and I.A No. 5240/94.

2. These proceedings have arisen out of a petition under Section 41 read with Schedule II of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.

3. The petitioner is a public sector undertaking. The respondent is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. They are parties to an agreement under which the respondent has availed advances for making tests on portable steel bridges superstructures using patented Qadricon system for procurement of plant, machinery, equipment as also raw material for execution of tendered work of Govt of Bangladesh awarded to the respondent. Between the parties there have arisen disputes which form subject matter of arbitration which is pending. The respondent has entered into yet another contract with the Chief Engineer (Purchases) of the Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi. The work under that contract is known a Akhnoor Bridge Project. According to the petitioner, the respondent in executing such other works, is taking aid of test certificates achieved by using the petitioner's advances and by using petitioner's plant, machinery, equipment, left over raw materials/steel sections, etc. The respondent having already received substantial amounts in execution of such other work, is due to receive more than Rs. 30 lakhs from the abovesaid Akhnoor Bridge Project. I.A 4412/94 has been filed by the petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1-2 read with Schedule II and Section 41 of the Arbitration Act seeking a restraint order against the respondent from receiving any amount receivable by it from Chief Engineer Purchases of Northern Railway on account of Akhnoor Bridge Project.

4. Though order was yet to be passed on I.A 4412/94, it appears that the petitioner as on 20.5.94, addressed a letter to the General manager Northern Railway Headquarters requesting the latter not to release any amount to the respondent because the release of amount may prejudice adversely the recovery which the petitioner is likely to make from the respondent hopefully under the award which is yet to be given by the Arbitrator.

4.1 On 31.5.94, the respondent has filed I.A No. 5240/94 styled as an application under Section 41 read with Schedule II of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Section 151 CPC whereby it has sought for a restraint order against the petitioner from interfering (i) in the business activities of the respondent and (ii) in receiving the amount of Rs. 30 lakhs approximately from the office of the Chief Engineer Northern Railway, Baroda House New Delhi relating to the work executed at Jammu in respect of Akhnoor Bridge Project. The respondent also seeks a direction to the petitioner to inform the Chief Engineer Northern Railway that the amount payable by the latter to the respondent cannot be withheld at the instance of the petitioner.

4.2 Thus, in short, the two applications seek reliefs diametrically opposed to each other.

5. Let it be noted at the very outset that the Chief Engineer Northern Railway is not a party to these proceedings. He is also not a party to the contract entered into between the parties and the disputes forming subject matter of arbitration before the Arbitrator. So also, the petitioner herein is neither a party nor has anything to do with the contract entered into by the respondent with the Chief Engineer Northern Railway relating to Akhnoor Bridge Project.

6. Both the applications have been seriously contested by the two non-applicants of the two applications. Though the learned counsel for the parties have made their exhaustive submissions on the meritworthiness of the two applications, the major part of their arguments centers around the provisions contained in Section 41 and Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act. The scope and extent of power exercisable by the Court and the nature of interim relief which can be allowed by the Court during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings before the Arbitrator need to be examined and determined.

7. Section 41 of the Act and Second Schedule are extracted and reproduced hereunder for the sake of ready reference:—

Section 41. Procedure and powers of Court.-

Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made there-under-

(a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals, under this Act, and

(b) the Court shall have, for the purpose of, and in relation to, arbitration proceedings, the same power of making orders in respect of any of the matter set but in the Second Schedule as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before the Court:

THE SECOND SCHEDULE POWERS OF COURT

1. The preservation interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the reference.

2. Securing the amount in difference in the reference.

3. The detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject of the reference or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any persons to enter upon or into any land or building in the possession of any party to the reference, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence.

4. Interim injunctions or the appointment of a receiver.

5. The appointment of a guardian for a minor person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitration proceedings.

8. Straightaway, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in HMK Ansari & Co v. Union of India AIR 1984 S.C 29, may be noticed. Vide para 18 their Lordships have held:

“Clause (a) of Section 41 makes only the procedural rules of the Civil P.C applicable to the proceedings in Court under the Arbitration Act. This clause does not authorise the Court to pass an order of injunction. The power is conferred by clause (b) of Section 41. The source of power, therefore, cannot be traced to clause (a)”

It was contended before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that clause (a) of Section 41 makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to all proceedings before the court and “to all appeals under the Act and, therefore, Order 39 of the Code could be invoked to get an injunction order even if the conditions of clause (b) of Section 41 were not satisfied. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled the contention and observed:—

“….. If the contention of Shri Kacker is accepted the appeals would lie under Sections 96, 100 or 104 of the CPC but the Arbitration Act itself provides for appeal under Section 39. Besides, if Clause (a) of Section 41 gave wide powers to pass an order of injunction, Clause (b) of Section 41 would become otiose.

9. A single bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Manohar Singh v. Hind Kumar Kohli AIR 1991 MP 373, was referred to at the Bar. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh faced with an application under Order 38 rule 5 CPC traced the source of power for passing an order thereunder to clause (a) of Section 41 and held:—

“It is true that in any of the items Of the second schedule there is not specific power given for passing an order under order 38 rule 5 but clause (a) of s. 41 makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals, except where such application is expressly excluded by the Act or by any enactment or rule.”

With greatest respect to the learned Judge deciding Manohar Singh' case it has to be said that the view of the law taken therein runs counter to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and, therefore, cannot be said to be good law. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is that Section 41 (a) makes only the procedural rules of CPC applicable to the proceedings in Court under the Arbitration Act. An order of attachment before judgment under Order 38 rule 5 CPC is not a matter of mere procedure. It appears that the law laid down by the Supreme Court though available was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge deciding Manohar Singh's case.

10. HMK Ansari's case (supra) was a case where the contractor had entered into more contracts than one with the Union of India. The Union of India threatened to withdraw an amount from the payment due under the pending bills of other contracts of the contractor. The contractor sought for an injunction under Section 41 read with Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act and Order 39 Rules 1-2 read with Section 151 CPC restraining the Union of India from appropriating or withholding or recovering the amount claimed from its other bills in any manner whatsoever. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held:—

“The court has got the power to pass an order of injunction only ‘for the purpose of and in relation to arbitration proceedings’ before the Court.”

(para 15)

“It was not open to the Court to pass the interim injunction restraining the respondent from withholding the amount due to the appellant under pending bills in respect of other contract”.

(para 19)

11. Following the abovesaid law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held in C. Raghava Reddy v. Superintending Engineer Irrigation Circle Nizamabad (AIR 1988 AP 53):—

“The Court has no power, under the Arbitration Act, to grant an injunction restraining the Government from withholding the amounts due to the appellant herein in respect of other contracts for the reason that such an injunction cannot be said to be for the purpose of, and in relation to the proceedings before the Court.”

12. In view of the abovesaid legal position, well settled as it is, both the applications-one filed by the petitioner and the other filed by the respondent-are liable to be rejected. The amount which is claimed by the respondent from the General Manager, Northern Railway in connection with Akhnoor Bridge Corporation is neither a subject matter of the proceedings before the Arbitrator, nor has anything to do therewith. The relief sought by either party cannot be said to be for the purpose of and in relation to arbitration proceedings.

13. It was forcefully contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that it was not only unreasonable but also illegal on the part of the General manager or the Chief Engineer of the Northern Railway to have withheld the payment due to the respondent on account of Akhnoor Bridge Project contract on a letter written by the petitioner IRCON, and it was equally illegal and improper on the part of the petitioner to have asked the General Manager/Chief Engineer Northern Railway to withhold the payment to the respondent. There is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent inasmuch as the claim pending before the Arbitrator to which the present proceedings relate is yet to be adjudicated upon and in hopeful anticipation of an award by the Arbitrator, a party cannot of its own ask a third party to withhold a payment which is otherwise legitimately due and payable. However, that is the position of law which the respondent is at liberty to bring to the notice of the General Manager/Chief Engineer, Northern Railway. In so far as, this Court is concerned, in view of the law which has already been stated hereinabove, no order either way can be made.

14. For three reasons the two applications filed by the petitioner and respondent herein must fail. Firstly, the parties are asking for a relief which is neither ‘for the purpose of nor ‘in relation to’ the arbitration proceedings. Secondly, the amount payable in respect of Akhnoor Bridge Project contract is not a subject matter of this suit. Thirdly, the General and/or Manager or the Chief Engineer, Northern Railway are not parties in these proceedings and no order can be made effecting or binding them behind their back.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner still tried to salvage the prayer contained in the petitioner's application by resorting to Order 38 rule 5 CPC and submitting that even if Order 39 Rules 1-2 CPC read with Section 41 and Second Schedule of Arbitration Act was held to be inapplicable, the facts and circumstances of the case eminently justify relief being allowed to the petitioner by way of attachment before judgment of the amount payable by the Northern Railway to the respondent.

16. Order 38 rule 5(1) CPC provides as under:—

“R.5 Where defendant may be called upon to furnish security for production of property:

(1) Where at any stage of a suit, the Court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him—

(a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or

(b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court, the court may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required the said property or the value of the same or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security.”

17. It is well settled that an order for attachment before judgment is not to be made merely because the court is convinced of the plaintiff having a strong case on merits or merely because the court feels that it would not cause any harm to the opposite party. The ingredients must exist without which a Court will not have jurisdiction to make the order. (See Sardar Govind Rao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai and ors AIR 1982 SC 989, PARA 57,58). High Court of Madhya Bharat in Nand lal v. Keshri Mal, AIR 1950 MB 70 sounded a note of caution - “attachment of property is a serious proceeding and courts ought to be careful not to lend themselves as tools of oppression. The High Court of Gujrat in Bharat Tobacco Co v. Maula Saheb A. Zamadar, Air 1980 Guj 202 has stated the law in the following terms:—

“In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Order 38 rule 5, it is not sufficient to reproduce the language of that rule but the party seeking the order must establish by affidavit or otherwise facts which would satisfy the Court that the opposite party is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property with a view to obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree that may be passed in the suit. An order of attachment before judgment is a drastic order and ordinarily the court would be slow in exercising the power conferred upon it under Order 38 rule 5 for the simple reason that if the power is not exercised with utmost care and caution, it may ruin the reputation and business of the party against whom the power is exercised. The Court must act with utmost circumspection before issuing an order of attachment so that the power vested in the court is not abused by an unscrupulous litigant as a weapon of oppression against the opposite party. It is the duty of the Court to take care to see that it is not used as an instrument to coerce the opposite party to settle the matter with the party armed with an order of attachment before judgment on the latter's terms.”

18. The High Court of Calcutta in an illuminating judgment on the provisions of O. 38 R 5-6 CPC, in Prem Raj Mundra v. Md. Maneck Gazi and Ors (AIR 1951 Calcultta 256) laid down 11 guiding principles to be kept in view by the Courts faced with a prayer for attachment before judgment. These principles have been formulated from a perusal of several authorities on the point and referred to in the judgment. The following principles are relevant for the case at hand which are extracted and reproduced:

(1) That an order under O.38 rules 5 and 6 can only be issued, if circumstances exist as are stated therein.

(2) Whether such circumstances exist is a question of fact that must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

(3) That the Court would not be justified in issuing an order for attachment before judgment, or for security, merely because it thinks that no harm would be done thereby or that the defendants would not be prejudiced.

(8) That the mere fact of transferts not enough since nobody can be prevented from dealing with his properties simply because a suit has been filed: There must be additional circumstances to show that the transfer is with an intention to delay or defeat the plaintiff's claim. It is open to the Court to look to the conduct of the parties immediately before suit, and to examine the surrounding circumstances and to draw an inference as to whether the defendant is about to dispose of the property and if so, with what intention. The court is entitled to consider the nature of the claim and the defence put forward.

(10) That in case of running, business, the strictest caution is necessary and the mere fact that a business has been closed, or that its turnover has diminished, is not enough.”

19. This Court has carefully perused the contents of I.A 4412/94. The contents of the application and the affidavit in support thereof do not satisfy the requirements of O.38 Rule 5-6 CPC. Withholding of payment is sought for solely on the ground that it was necessary for meeting the ends of justice. Without entering upon the discussion suffice it to say that the application does not set out any facts attracting the applicability of any of the ingredients of Order 38 rule 5 CPC so as to persuade this court to grant the relief by way of attachment before judgment to the petitioner. On the contrary, having perused the facts and circumstances of the case and such material as is available on record, prima facie this Court finds the respondent to be a well established company of long standing having a widespread field of its activities. There is no material avilable in record to justify drawing an inference that the respondent was securing release of Rs. 30 lakhs approximately from the Northern Railway with the intention of defeating or delaying the petitioner's claim.

20. As an upshot of the above discussion, both the I.As 4412/94 & 5240/94 are rejected.