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Naresh Kumar v. State .

Delhi High Court
Jan 4, 1995
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated March 31, 1990, of an Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, convicting the appellant for offences under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 (with one year further rigorous imprisonment in default) on the murder count, and two years rigorous imprisonment on the arms count, the substantive sentences to run concurrently.

The prosecution case was that on May 13, 1988, at about 3:30 P.M., the appellant stabbed Tek Chand (deceased) in Tek Chand's electric shop (No. WZ-297.C, J.J. Colony, Madipur, Delhi). Tek Chand later succumbed to injuries. An earlier incident was noted in which Tek Chand had allegedly stabbed the appellant's brother Jai Bhagwan, and a case under Section 307 IPC had been registered against Tek Chand on June 13, 1987.

Following the incident the police received a message and a Daily Diary entry was made; statements were recorded from several witnesses including Rajesh Kumar (PW5) and Prabhu Dayal (PW3). The post-mortem disclosed multiple incised wounds and medical opinion that one wound was sufficient to cause death; the injuries were consistent with a knife. The appellant was arrested on May 15, 1988. He is said to have made a disclosure statement in the presence of PW1 (Mahesh Kumar) and PW2 (Khazan Singh — brother of the deceased) and led police to recover a blood-stained knife from a drain; clothing and recovered items were sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), which reported human blood of group 'O' on the knife and on the deceased's clothes, while blood on the appellant's shirt was group 'B'.

On appeal the Additional Sessions Judge's conviction was challenged on grounds including alleged lapses in recording and forwarding the F.I.R./Daily Diary and on credibility of witnesses; the State defended the reliability of eye-witness testimony and the corroboration provided by recovery and forensic reports.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction of the appellant for murder (Section 302 IPC) and an offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act was sustainable having regard to the evidence on record.
  2. Whether lapses in police procedure — specifically alleged non-compliance with requirements to record the substance of the F.I.R. in the Daily Diary and to send a special report to higher authorities/Metropolitan Magistrate — vitiate the prosecution’s case or demonstrate that the F.I.R. was ante-timed.
  3. Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses (notably PW3 Prabhu Dayal and PW5 Rajesh Kumar) was credible and sufficient, alone or with corroboration, to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt.
  4. Whether the recovery of the knife at the appellant's instance and the forensic blood-group findings furnished adequate corroboration of the prosecution case, notwithstanding certain apparent discrepancies in witness statements.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The prosecution did not prove the case beyond reasonable doubt because key eyewitness Prabhu Dayal was not named in the F.I.R., and other witnesses (notably Anil Kumar and Rajesh Kumar) turned hostile or contradicted earlier statements.
  • Lapses by the investigating police — failure to prove the Daily Diary entry containing the substance of the F.I.R. and failure to show that a special report was sent promptly to higher authorities including the Metropolitan Magistrate — support an inference that the F.I.R. was ante-timed and the appellant was falsely implicated, possibly due to enmity.
  • The inconsistencies and omissions in witness statements and procedural irregularities undermine the credibility of the prosecution case.

State's Arguments

  • The prosecution case is supported by credible and truthful eyewitness testimony (particularly PW3 Prabhu Dayal and PW5 Rajesh Kumar) and corroborated by recovery of the weapon at the appellant's instance and forensic findings.
  • Mere lapses by investigating police in complying with procedural provisions (Daily Diary entries, special report transmission) do not, by themselves, justify discarding the prosecution case when core eyewitness evidence is reliable and corroborated.
  • The apparent contradictions in witnesses' statements — for example relating to details of the recovery — are minor/innocuous and do not go to the root of the matter; the knife bore blood matching the deceased and was opined to be capable of producing the cuts found on the dead body.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Punjab v. Tarlok Singh, (1972) 3 SCC 869 : AIR 1971 SC 1221 Delay in sending a special report cast doubt on the prosecution version; such delay may suggest the F.I.R. was not lodged promptly and could be ante-timed. Court reviewed the authority and noted that in that case witnesses were not truthful and delay contributed to acquittal; used as an example of circumstances where delay undermined prosecution.
Balaka Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 511 : AIR 1975 SC 1962 Omission to report names of some accused in inquest report and circumstances may raise doubt as to complicity; possible late recording of F.I.R. after inquest. Referred to illustrate situations where omissions in official records led courts to doubt prosecution chronology and reliability.
Ishwar Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1976) 4 SCC 355 : AIR 1976 SC 2423 Extraordinary delay in sending F.I.R. or special report is a circumstance to suspect ante-timing and fabricated improvements in prosecution story. Referred to show that excessive delay may legitimately cast suspicion on timing and truth of the F.I.R., depending on facts.
Vijinder Singh v. The State, 1984 (1) Crimes 237 Delays in sending F.I.R. under Section 157 CrPC and material improvements by witnesses can point to false implication. Used as an example where delay and witness improvements led to finding of false implication in that case.
Lala Ram v. State, 36 (1988) DLT 8 Necessity of complying with Section 154 CrPC read with Rule 24.1 Punjab Police Rules for recording substance of F.I.R in Daily Diary and prompt sending of special report in murder cases. Referred to emphasize statutory safeguards designed to ensure prompt and fair investigation and recording of complaints.
Jagjit Singh v. State, 1990 (2) Delhi Lawyer 135 (DB) Similar principles regarding prompt recording and transmission of F.I.R./special report. Cited to show that this Court has reiterated the same principles on prompt reporting and procedural safeguards.
Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar, JT 1994 (2) SC 627 When prosecution evidence is shaky and inconclusive, coupled with delay in sending special report, these facts can be fatal to prosecution. Referred to illustrate that infirmities in evidence plus delay can justify acquittal; court contrasted that position with the facts of the present case.
State v. Dharampal (Murder Reference No. 8 of 1976), Division Bench (May 6, 1977) Absence of the accused's name in Daily Diary does not automatically mean F.I.R. was ante-timed if witnesses are found truthful. Invoked to show that lapses in official recording do not always invalidate truthful eyewitness testimony; applied analogously in present case.
State of U.P v. Gokaran, 1984 Supp SCC 482 : AIR 1985 SC 131 Not every delay in sending a special report under Section 157 CrPC necessarily implies that the F.I.R. was not lodged at stated time or that investigation was unfair. Cited by State and accepted by court to support the proposition that delays alone are not determinative and depend on facts.
Vahula Bhushan Alias Vahuna Krishnan v. State Of Tamil Nadu, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 232 : AIR 1989 SC 236 The testimony of a single truthful and credible eye witness can be sufficient to convict. Cited to support the proposition that even a solitary truthful eyewitness (here, PW3) can secure conviction if reliable and corroborated.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step analysis, addressing the core factual findings and the procedural objections raised by the appellant:

  1. On the absence of Prabhu Dayal's (PW3) name in the F.I.R.: the court held that it is not an absolute requirement for names of all eye-witnesses to appear in the F.I.R. The court examined the circumstances and found it plausible that PW3 was not available to be named when the F.I.R. was recorded and that the Investigating Officer had not been shown to have erred in that respect. The court emphasized that the question is one of credibility and facts in each case.
  2. Assessment of PW3's credibility: the court described Prabhu Dayal as a "straight forward and truthful witness." It accepted his testimony that he saw the appellant coming out of the shop and pursued him and that he had seen the appellant stab Tek Chand. The court rejected the argument that PW3's not raising hue and cry made his testimony unnatural, observing that a pursuer may not always raise an alarm and that no evidence was adduced of public presence at the bus stand at that time.
  3. Consideration of hostile witnesses and alleged contradictions: the court examined the conduct and testimony of Anil Kumar (PW4) and Rajesh Kumar (PW5). Although Anil turned hostile and admitted matters favorable to the accused, the court treated his testimony with caution, noting that his hostile stance and additional assertions (e.g., presence of 'chics') were unsupported by other evidence or the sketch prepared at the spot. Rajesh Kumar, author of the F.I.R., supported the part of the prosecution story that he saw the appellant running away; this part was not challenged in cross-examination.
  4. On procedural lapses (Daily Diary, special report): the court reviewed authority showing that delay or omission may, in some cases, cast suspicion on the prosecution (citing multiple precedents). However, the court held that such lapses do not automatically invalidate a prosecution case. It emphasized that each case depends on its facts and that truthful and corroborated eyewitness testimony can outweigh procedural lapses.
  5. Corroboration by recovery and forensic evidence: the court accepted that the appellant made a disclosure in the presence of PW1 and PW2, leading to recovery of a blood-stained knife from a drain. CFSL reports showed human blood of group 'O' on the knife and on the deceased's clothes; the deceased's blood group was 'O'. The shirt of the appellant had 'B' group blood and was therefore not linked to commission of the crime. The court found discrepancies in witness descriptions of the drain's distance and whether it had a grill, but treated these as minor and explicable; they did not undermine the core fact of a disclosure and recovery corroborated by police witnesses (PW10 and PW16).
  6. Synthesis and conclusion: weighing the credible testimony of PW3 (corroborated by PW5) and the corroborative recovery/forensic findings, and treating the procedural lapses and peripheral inconsistencies as insufficient to overturn the core prosecution case, the court concluded that the convictions were properly based on evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the conviction and sentences imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge on March 31, 1990, are maintained.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is to affirm the appellant's life imprisonment and associated sentences/fines as ordered by the trial court.
  • The court emphasized that procedural lapses by the investigating agency (such as delays in Daily Diary entries or sending special reports) do not automatically invalidate prosecution evidence; the weight to be given to such lapses depends on the facts of the case.
  • The opinion reiterates that the presence of corroboration (recovery at the accused's instance, forensic linkage) and truthful eyewitness testimony can sustain a conviction even where certain procedural or minor testimonial discrepancies exist.
  • No broader or novel precedent is declared by the court beyond application of established principles to the facts; the decision applies established case law to uphold the conviction on the facts presented.
Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

Mr. P.K Bahri, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated March 31, 1990, of an Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, by which the appellant has been convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act and has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year on the first count and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years on the second count with the direction that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently.

2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant's brother Jai Bhagwan had been stabbed by Tek Chand-deceased and a case was registered against Tek Chand for an offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code on June 13, 1987, vide copy of the F.I.R Ex.PW9.A. Tek Chand was having an electric shop bearing No. WZ-297.C, J.J Colony, Madipur, Delhi. On May 13, 1988, it is alleged that while Tek Chand was present in the shop at about 3.30 P.M that the appellant came to that shop and had stabbed Tek Chand with a knife and Tek Chand had succumbed to his injuries as a result of the said assault.

3. The police came to the spot on the basis of a report No. 18 recorded at Police Post Madipur, Delhi, copy of which is Ex.PW19.A wherein it is recorded that at 4 p.m a message was received from the Police Officer Incharge of a police van that Police Van-9 had removed the injured from Madipur Bus Stand to some unknown hospital. A copy of this report was handed over to ASI Om Parkash PW15 who accompanied by Constable Mahabir Singh had reached the said place and he met Rajesh Kumar PW5 and recorded his statement Ex.PW5.A in which Rajesh Kumar disclosed that he was a resident of house No. E-370, J.J Colony, Madipur and he is also having a shop bearing No. WZ-297.C at that place and at about 3.30 P.M he was proceeding to his house from the shop that he saw Naresh i.e appellant coming out of the shop of Tek Chand and running away and he went to the shop of Tek Chand and found Tek Chand lying in a pool of blood and he with the help of Anil Kumar had put Tek Chand in a police jeep and Anil Kumar told him at that time that. Naresh Kumar s/o Nawal Kishore of Village Madipur had stabbed Tek Chand and thereafter Anil Kumar had gone with the injured in the police jeep and got him admitted in Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. There is also a mention that a criminal case of stabbing Jai Bhagwan, brother of the appellant, is pending against Tek Chand in the court and he had assaulted Tek Chand to take revenge.

4. On the basis of this statement, a case was registered under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code vide F.I.R No. 166/88 at about 4.45 p.m at Police Station Punjabi Bagh as per copy of the F.I.R Ex.PW12.B. At this stage we may point out that in the paper book the office had put a translation of the F.I.R in English which contains certain cuttings regarding the date and the time but we have seen the original F.I.R which is in Hindi and find that there is no cutting either in the date or in the time. The learned Counsel for the appellant in all fairness did not pursue any further contention on the basis of such cutting appearing in the translated copy of the F.I.R prepared by our Registry.

5. Coming back to the case, PW16 SI Harpal Singh had also on receiving information reached the place of occurrence and on being informed that the injured Tek Chand had been removed to the hospital, he reached there and obtained the Medico Legal Certificate of Tek Chand which disclosed that he had been shown as brought dead. He took into possession the two sealed parcels containing a shirt and a vest of the deceased vide memo Ex.PW11.A. He recorded the statements of Prabhu Dayal and Anil Kumar in the hospital. PW9 Inspector Sumer Singh, SHO of the Police Station concerned, had conducted the inquest proceedings and prepared the necessary papers which are Ex.PW8.A and had sent the dead body of Tek Chand for post-mortem vide application Ex.PW8.B alongwith brief facts Ex.PW8.C. The post-mortem on the dead body of Tek Chand was performed by Dr. L.K Baruah. He found in all six injuries out of them five were incised wounds and he opined that injury No. 5 was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and he also gave the opinion that injuries were possible with the knife, which was later on allegedly recovered at the instance of the appellant on the basis of his disclosure statement, which was also sent to the doctor for his opinion.

6. The appellant was arrested on May 15, 1988 and was interrogated in presence of PW1 Mahesh Kumar and PW2 Khazan Singh, brother of the deceased and is stated to have made a disclosure statement Ex.PW2.A and got recovered the knife from a drain nearby the place of occurrence of which sketch was prepared and the same was also converted into sealed parcel. The appellant's shirt, which was having some blood stains and appeared to have been washed, was also taken into possession. The case property was sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory. The reports of the CFSL Exs.PW16.C1 to C4 disclose that there was human blood present on the knife which was of ‘O’ group and the said ‘O’ group human blood was also found on the clothes of the deceased and so also his sample blood. However, the blood stains found on the shirt of the appellant were found to be of ‘B’ group, hence that shirt is not connected with the commission of the crime.

7. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has believed the testimony of PW3 Prabhu Dayal and had sought corroboration to certain material facts from the testimony of PW4 & PW5 and had also believed the recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant which was blood stained and the blood stains were found to be same group ‘O’ which was the blood group of the deceased and thus brought home the offences to the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt.

8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has in his usual vehemence contended that the prosecution case is not made out beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as Prabhu Dayal has not been named as an eye witness in the F.I.R whereas Anil Kumar, who is alleged to have disclosed the name of the appellant to Rajesh Kumar (PW5), has turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case on this point and even Rajesh Kumar had turned hostile by deposing that he has not been disclosed the name of the appellant by Anil Kumar and thus, there was no credible witnesses examined by the prosecution which could have supported the prosecution version. He has also urged that although Tek Chand's death had come to the notice of the police soon after the information was sent by the Duty Constable to the Police Post which was recorded at 4.45 p.m in Daily Diary No. 22, copy of which is Ex.PW19B, but no special report is proved to have been sent to the higher authorities including the Metropolitan Magistrate of the area concerned. So, it is urged that in the present case in the absence of these safe-guards and also absence of any proof of any corresponding copy of the Daily Diary which is required to be recorded as soon as the F.I.R is recorded containing the substance of the FIR, it must be inferred that F.I.R in the present case must have been ante-timed and the name of the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case perhaps due to the enmity which the appellant had with the deceased.

9. The learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, has contended that mere lapses of the investigating police in not complying with the various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which require that the substance of the F.I.R must be recorded in the Daily Diary and as soon as heinous crimes like murder is shown to be committed, a special report may be immediately sent to the higher authorities including Metropolitan Magistrate, are not sufficient to throw away the prosecution case which is clearly made out on the basis of credible and truthful statements of the eye witnesses which find due corroboration from the recovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the appellant. He has urged that the various apparent contradictions pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant with regard to the statements of the witnesses particularly of the witnesses to the recovery of knife are innocuous and do not go to the root of the matter and the case of the prosecution is well made out particularly when the blood stains found on the knife were found to tally with the bood of the deceased and that knife was also opined to have been used for stabbing Tek Chand. The cut marks found on the shirt of the deceased were opined to have been possible with the aforesaid knife.

10. It is true that name of Prabhu Dayal PW3 does not find mention in the F.I.R or in the sketch prepared by the Investigating Officer at the place of occurrence. If we keep the testimony of Prabhu Dayal in view it is evident that he on seeing the appellant running away from the shop of Tek Chand had pursued him to some distance and thereafter he had gone to the hospital learning that the injured had been removed to the hospital and it is in the hospital that he met the Investigating Officer and had disclosed that he was the eye witness and he gave the statement. It is quite clear as far as law is concerned that it is not absolutely necessary that names of all the eye witnesses must figure in the F.I.R It depends upon the facts of each case to see whether a particular eye witness is a truthful witness or not and also to examine the reason as to why his name could not come in the F.I.R If the Court is satisfied that there was no lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer in recording the F.I.R and the eye witness was not available at the time the F.I.R was recorded, it cannot be said that eye witness was later on put up just to support the prosecution case.

11. Prabhu Dayal PW3 is totally independent witness. He has no links either with the appellant or with the deceased or with the other eye witnesses. It is evident that when he saw the ocurrence his attention was directed towards the appellant running away from the shop of Tek Chand and he thought it fit to pursue him. It is possible that Rajesh Kumar or even Anil the other witnesses produced by the prosecution might not have noticed Prabhu Dayal so that his name could be also disclosed in the F.I.R

12. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the testimony of Prabhu Dayal is not natural inasmuch as he had not raised any hue and cry while pursuing the appellant in order to attract the passers by or persons who might be present on the very busy Bus Stand located just near the shop of Tek Chand. It is true that Prabhu Dayal has stated that he has not raised any hue and cry while he was pursuing the appellant, but it has not come in evidence that there was any public person present at the Bus Stand at that time whose attention could have been attracted by raising hue and cry. When a person is following another person it is not always necessary that it would come to his mind to raise alarm because that person himself is not affected by the crime committed by the other person. We have gone through the testimony of Prabhu Dayal closely and we find that he is straight forward and truthful witness. He had seen the appellant coming out of the shop of Tek Chand and he just followed him. He had also seen Tek Chand being stabbed by the appellant. The learned Counsel for the appellant has pointed out to the testimony of Anil PW4 where, while being hostile to the prosecution, he has stated that there were chics both on the front side of the shop as well as on the rear side. The contention raised is that any person walking in front of the shop of Tek Chand would not have been in a position to witness the occurrence which took place inside the shop. Anil Kumar is hostile witness and he has not supported the prosecution version with regard to his having witnessed the stabbing and he was duly confronted with his police statement where he had given the eye witness account. It is clear from the testimony of the Investigating Officer who had prepared the sketch that no question had been put to him that there were any chics found at the shop of Tek Chand and no such chics have been shown in the sketch prepared at the spot. Mere fact that hostile witness Anil Kumar had thought it fit to show favour to accused in his cross-examination by admitting that there were chics present at the shop of Tek Chand at the time of the occurrence does not mean that whatever he is telling the court is true. ‘We should not forget that he has already turned hostile to the prosecution and in his anxiety to support the appellant, he has come out with the fact which is not alluded to by any of the other witnesses. The defence has not cross-examined other witnesses or the Investigating Officer to elicit this fact whether there existed any chics or not at the shop of Tek Chand. The sketch of the premises prepared soon after the occurrence does not show the presence of any such chics. So, on this score it cannot be said that Prabhu Dayal could not have seen the occurrence taking place in the shop of Tek Chand when he had come there for unloading certain goods from his hand-driven cart. There is not even a suggestion to Prabhu Dayal that he has any reason to falsely implicate the appellant for this crime.

13. At any rate the testimony of Rajesh Kumar PW5, who is author of the F.I.R, also shows that he had also seen the appellant running away from the shop of Tek Chand. This part of his statement was not challenged in cross-examination. It is true that on certain facts, which he had given to the police in the F.I.R, he had been confronted with as he had not given those facts in his statement in court as he deposed that Anil Kumar had not told him that the appellant had stabbed Tek Chand which fact stands mentioned in the F.I.R given by this witness. At any rate Rajesh Kumar is also an independent witness. He is a neighbour shopkeeper and has no axe of his own to grind by falsely implicating the appellant in this crime. The statement that he had seen the appellant coming out of the shop of Tek Chand after the commission of the crime and running away from the spot is quite credible and in our view has been rightly believed by the Lower Court.

14. The learned Counsel for the appellant has cited various judgments in support of his contention that as there has taken place lapses on the part of the investigating agency in not proving the Dairy Diary report containing the substance of the F.I.R and not showing that any special report was sent to the Metropolitan Magistrate, thus it should be held that the F.I.R in this case was not recorded at the time purported to have been mentioned in the F.I.R He has made reference to The State Of Punjab v. Tarlok Singh., (1972) 3 SCC 869 : AIR 1971 SC 1221. In the said case it was found that F.I.R purported to have been lodged at 3.45 p.m but the special report had not reached the Magistrate till 8 a.m on the following day even though it was shown to have been sent through a special messenger. The High Court had come to the conclusion that such delay had cast doubt on the prosecution version that the report was lodged without lapse of unnecessary time. We have gone through the judgment and we find that witnesses who were examined were not truthful. So, keeping in view all these facts, the High Court had acquitted the accused in that case which acquittal was upheld by the Supreme Court.

15. He has also referred to Balaka Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 511 : AIR 1975 SC 1962. In the said case, there was omission to report the names of some of the accused in the inquest report and keeping in the various facts appearing in that case the Supreme Court held that such omission led to some doubt of complicity of the four accused who were not mentioned in the inquest report. It was also found as a fact that in all probability the F.I.R was recorded after the inquest report was prepared.

16. Reference is then made to Ishwar Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1976) 4 SCC 355 : AIR 1976 SC 2423, wherein the extraordinary delay took place in sending the F.I.R in a case pertaining to serious offences, it was held that extraordinary delay in sending the F.I.R is a circumstance which provides a legitimate basis for suspecting that the First Information Report was recorded much later than the stated date and hour affording sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments and set up a distorted version of the occurrence. He has also cited Vijinder Singh v. The State, 1984 (1) Crimes 237, where the eye witnesses made many improvements of grave magnitude in the statements in court and there were deeply interestd witnesses, a Bench of this Court in that case had found that there delay in sending the F.I.R to the Magistrate as required under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thus, held that this delay has resulted in false implication of the accused in that case.

17. He has also cited the case Lala Ram v. State, 36 (1988) DLT 8, in which also it has been highlighted the necessity of complying with the requirement of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Rule 24.1 of the Punjab Police Rules for recording the substance of the F.I.R in the Daily Diary and for sending the special report to the Ilaqa Magistrate in a case of murder promptly.

18. It is true that these safe-guards have been provided by the statute to ensure not only the fair investigation being done by the prosecution but also that there is prompt recording of the F.I.R which sometimes lead the court to believe the prosecution version as it has come out without any delay.

19. He has also referred to Jagjit Singh v. State, 1990 (2) Delhi Lawyer 135 (DB), where again same principles have been laid down by this Court. Lastly he has referred to Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar, JT 1994 (2) SC 627. In the said case the evidence was found to be shaky and inconclusive. There were infirmities in the prosecution evidence coupled with that there was delay in sending special report to the Magistrate and thus, the court held that all these facts are fatal to the prosecution case.

20. It depends on the facts of a particular case to see as to whether such lapse of the prosecution should lead the court to disbelieve eye witness or not. Reference may be made to Murder Reference No. 8 of 1976, State v. Dharampal, decided by a Division Bench of this Court on May 6, 1977. It was found that there was no name of the accused mentioned in the substance of the F.I.R recorded in the Daily Diary, still keeping in view the facts of that case as the witnesses were truthful the court held that this lapse on the part of the investigating agency would not go to show that F.I.R was ante-timed to falsely implicate the particular accused.

21. The learned Counsel for the State has cited State of U.P v. Gokaran, 1984 Supp SCC 482 : AIR 1985 SC 131, where it was laid down by the Supreme Court that it is not that as if every delay in sending a delayed special report to the District Magistrate under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would necessarily lead to the inference that the F.I.R has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-timed or ante-dated or that the investigation is not fair and forth-right.

22. It is an absurd proposition of law that if there takes place lapse at the level of the police investigating the crime, this lapse should result in every case in drawing an inference against the prosecution that the witnesses put forward by the prosecution as eye witnesses are not truthful witnesses or have been just put up to support the prosecution version at a belated stage. It is also settled law that even if there is one solitary eye witness whose evidence is truthful and credible such an eye witness's testimony alone can be sufficient to bring home the offence to a particular accused. Reference may be made to Vahula Bhushan Alias Vahuna Krishnan v. State Of Tamil Nadu, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 232 : AIR 1989 SC 236, in this connection.

23. In the present case, we find that the Additional Sessions Judge has rightly placed implicit reliance on the straight-forward and truthful evidence of Prabhu Dayal PW3 which finds due corroboration also from the testimony of author of the F.I.R PW5 Rajesh Kumar.

24. However, in the present case we also find that there is recovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the appellant on the basis of the disclosure statement made by him. It is true that PW2 Khazan Singh is the brother of the deceased and PW1 Mahesh is his friend and they would be, of course, anxious to see that the culprit in the case is apprehended and for that purpose they had come to the police to find out whether the culprit has been arrested or not. It is in their presence that the police had interrogated the appellant on May 15, 1988, which led to the recovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the appellant. Of course there are certain discrepancies appearing in their statements with regard to the drain from which the knife was allegedly recovered. PW1 has stated that the drain was located at a distance of 10-15 paces from the place of occurrence whereas PW2 had stated that it was at a distance of 400-500 yards. Some persons have little sense of distance. So, such a discrepancy would not go to show that the statements of the witnesses are not credit-worthy with regard to the core of the matter regarding the disclosure statement having been made which led to the recovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the appellant. It has been then pointed out that PW1 has stated that there was some grill covering the drain from where the knife was got recovered whereas PW2 has stated that it was uncovered drain. It has not been pin-pointed from the statements of the witnesses in cross-examination as to whether the whole of the drain was uncovered or a particular portion of the drain was uncovered or a particular spot of the drain was covered. It is possible that particular spot of the drain might have the grill over it while the other portion might not have any such grill. So, it cannot be said that there has occurred any such serious discrepancy in the statements of these witnesses which could lead this court to draw an inference that this knife has been just planted on the appellant. Presence of the blood of the same group as that of the deceased on the knife ensures that this knife was the weapon of offence and these witnesses are also supported by the police officials, namely, PW10 Constable Harpal Singh and PW16 SI Harpal Singh that the appellant had made a disclosure statement and had got recovered the said knife from the said drain. Hence, we hold that the recovery of knife also gives due corroboration to the prosecution case.

25. So, in view of the above discussion, we hold that the conviction of the appellant is well based and we, thus, dismiss the appeal and maintain the conviction and sentences of the appellant.

Appeal dismissed.