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Ravi Kumar v. Misha Vadhera & Ors

Delhi High Court
Nov 16, 1994
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an order dated 8.9.1994 of a learned Single Judge (IA No. 7909 of 1994 in Suit No. 2828/93) appointing the plaintiff as Receiver and directing dispossession of the 1st defendant without service of the Receiver application on him.

The basic contractual facts, as set out in the opinion, are:

  • The 1st defendant/appellant, Mr. Ravi Kumar, is the admitted owner of a first-floor flat with commercial space (1106 sq. ft.) in the Hansalaya building, New Delhi. He is an NRI and purchased the property using foreign exchange with RBI permission.
  • The plaintiff-1st respondent, Misha Vadhera, is said to be the builder and sought specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 28.10.1993 for Rs. 90 lakhs. The payment schedule required Rs. 1 lakh on 28.10.1993, Rs. 8 lakhs within 7 days of signing, and Rs. 81 lakhs after clearance under Chapter XX-C of the Income-Tax Act.
  • The appellant admits receiving Rs. 1 lakh on 28.10.1993 but contends the plaintiff failed to pay Rs. 8 lakhs within seven days, constituting breach. The appellant says he revoked the contract by FAX on 6.11.1993 and by registered letter on 7.11.1993, returned the Rs. 1 lakh by demand draft on 16.12.1993, and issued public and legal notices thereafter; no reply was received.
  • The plaintiff filed Suit No. 2828/93 for specific performance and IA No. 10881/93 under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC for temporary injunction restraining the defendant from alienation/transfer. Notice was ordered on 20.12.1993. An FAO (OS) 4/94 was filed against the notice order; a Division Bench on 6.1.1994 granted temporary injunction subject to depositing Rs. 89 lakhs (later modified to furnishing bank guarantee). Those Division Bench orders were passed without service on the present appellant/1st defendant.
  • When the appeal returned to the Division Bench on 4.5.1994, the Bench treated the injunction as an ad interim order of the trial Court and permitted the 1st defendant to move to vacate it. The 1st defendant filed IA 8424/94 under Order 39 Rule 4 to vacate the injunction (posted to 23.9.1994).
  • Before the 1st defendant's application to vacate was heard, the plaintiff filed IA 7909/94 on 31.8.1994 seeking appointment of a Receiver. The learned Single Judge ordered notice for 5.10.1994 but on 8.9.1994 appointed the plaintiff as Receiver, directed him to take possession and "use and enjoy the flat" until disposal of the suit or variation of the order, prohibited parting with possession, and appointed an Advocate as Commissioner to take possession if necessary with police aid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff could be permitted to summarily dispossess the vendor (1st defendant) by appointing the plaintiff as Receiver and ordering dispossession before notice of the Receiver application was served on the defendant or before he was set ex parte.
  2. Whether the learned Single Judge's appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver without giving reasons or hearing the defendant conformed with the established principles for appointment of receivers.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (1st defendant, Mr. Ravi Kumar)

  • The appellant asserts he is the owner of the flat and an NRI who purchased the property legitimately.
  • The appellant contends the plaintiff breached the agreement by failing to pay Rs. 8 lakhs within seven days; the appellant revoked the contract by FAX (6.11.1993) and registered letter (7.11.1993) and returned the Rs. 1 lakh by demand draft dated 16.12.1993. Annexures supporting these communications were filed.
  • The appellant says notices were not properly served on him, that he lived outside India, and that the plaintiff deliberately sent notices to wrong addresses; therefore the plaintiff should not have been permitted to dispossess him before service or ex parte proceedings.
  • The appellant argued that the learned Single Judge's order appointing the plaintiff as Receiver contained no reasons and was made before the defendant was set ex parte or served in the IA for appointment of Receiver.

Plaintiff's Assertions (1st respondent, Misha Vadhera)

  • In IA 7909/94 the plaintiff asserted that the 1st defendant was deliberately avoiding service of notice.
  • The plaintiff stated that the defendant had received Rs. 1 lakh and was holding a cheque for Rs. 8 lakhs.
  • The plaintiff had furnished a bank guarantee for Rs. 89 lakhs (as required in earlier proceedings) and claimed entitlement to use and occupation of the property and to derive benefits therefrom.
  • The plaintiff contended that the defendant had no authority or right to be in possession and that the defendant being in possession would be “wholly illegal having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.”

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Leney & Sons Ltd. v. Callingham & Thompson, 1908 (1) K.B. 79 Describes the Chancery principle that a receiver should preserve property pending litigation and warns that taking possession may cause irreparable wrong to a defendant; possession should not be taken lightly as interim interference can cause mischief if plaintiff ultimately fails. The Court relied on this passage to underscore that defendants' possession must not be lightly disturbed at a preliminary stage and to support the proposition that appointment of a receiver is an exercise of discretion requiring caution and reasons.
Benoy Krishna v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1928 P.C. 49 Affirms that discretion to appoint a receiver must be exercised cautiously, judicially and according to legal principles after considering all circumstances; a receiver should not be appointed merely because it is convenient for one party. The Court invoked this authority to state that a plaintiff must ordinarily show a prima facie case, special equity, or danger of waste/dissipation before a receiver may be appointed; it reinforced that the Single Judge should have applied these principles and given reasons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court limited its consideration to the narrow question whether the plaintiff could be allowed to summarily dispossess the vendor by appointing the plaintiff as Receiver before notice in the Receiver application was served or before the defendant was set ex parte. The Court expressly did not decide whether the plaintiff would be entitled to appointment of a receiver after full hearing.

Chronology and procedural posture formed the factual basis for the analysis: the suit for specific performance was filed, an injunction application and appellate proceedings produced an ad interim injunction (initially granted without service on the appellant), the appellant filed a later IA to vacate the injunction, and before that IA was heard the plaintiff filed the Receiver application which resulted in the impugned appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver on 8.9.1994.

The Court highlighted two procedural defects in the Single Judge's action:

  • The impugned order contained no reasons explaining why appointment of a receiver and dispossession was "just and convenient" in the circumstances.
  • The appointment and dispossession were ordered before notice of the receiver application was served on the appellant and before he could be set ex parte, denying him an opportunity of being heard on a drastic interim relief.

The Court reviewed the legal principles governing appointment of receivers (drawing from English equity and Indian authority):

  • Possession of defendants should not be lightly disturbed by the court at a preliminary stage.
  • Even after service and hearing, a plaintiff normally must establish a prima facie case and show special circumstances (e.g., danger of dissipation, waste or other irreparable mischief) to justify immediate dispossession by a receiver.
  • The discretion to appoint a receiver is not arbitrary; it must be exercised judicially and with reasons, taking account of the whole circumstances.

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court observed:

  • The Single Judge gave no reasons beyond a bare statement that appointment was "just and convenient."
  • There was no finding that the appellant was evading service, or that he was in knowledge of proceedings and changing addresses; indeed the appellant had returned the Rs. 1 lakh and asserted breach by the plaintiff.
  • There was already an ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from alienating or parting with possession, and the appellant had not been set ex parte when the Receiver order was made.
  • Given the absence of reasons and the lack of the special circumstances required to justify dispossession before hearing, the Court concluded the Single Judge was wrong to appoint the plaintiff as Receiver and to order dispossession at that stage.

Consequently, the Court set aside the Single Judge's order of 8.9.1994 and directed immediate procedural and remedial steps to restore the status quo pending adjudication:

  • The plaintiff was directed to put the appellant back in possession forthwith.
  • The Commissioner appointed earlier was directed to restore possession to the appellant, if necessary with police aid, take photographs of the property at the time of handing over and file a report in the IA so that the property's condition at restoration is on record.
  • The Commissioner was to be paid Rs. 5,000 by the appellant for carrying out the restoration.
  • Unless the appellant is put back in physical possession, the IA for appointment of a receiver should not be taken up for further orders or hearing.
  • The IA 7909/94 was remitted to the learned trial Judge for disposal according to law after hearing both sides; the Division Bench expressly refrained from expressing any view on the merits of that IA.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; THE ORDER APPOINTING THE PLAINTIFF AS RECEIVER AND DIRECTING DISPOSSESSION (ORDER DATED 8.9.1994) IS SET ASIDE.

Direct consequences and procedural implications stated by the Court:

  • The plaintiff must restore the appellant to possession immediately; the Commissioner will assist and will document the condition of the property by photographs and report.
  • The appellant must pay Rs. 5,000 to the Commissioner for effecting restoration.
  • The Receiver application (IA 7909/94) is remitted to the learned trial Judge for hearing and disposal in accordance with law after giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard; no further action on that IA is to be taken until the appellant is physically restored to possession.
  • The Division Bench did not decide the merits of the Receiver application; it confined itself to correcting the interlocutory procedural error of appointing a receiver and dispossessing the defendant before service and without reasons.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was laid down beyond application and restatement of existing principles requiring caution, reasons, and a prima facie or special case for dispossessing a defendant by appointment of a receiver at a preliminary stage.

Note: This summary is confined to the facts, reasoning and holdings contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J— Admitted.

2. This is an appeal by the 1st defendant against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8.9.94 in IA No. 7909 of 1994 in Suit No. 2828/93 appointing a Receiver in an application filed by the plaintiff-1st respondent, without service of the notice in the IA on the appellant.

3. The appellant - 1st defendant Mr. Ravi Kumar is admittedly the owner of a flat with commercial space measuring 1106 sq. ft. on the first floor of a multi-storied building, namely, ‘Hansalaya’, 15, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi. The appellant states that he is a non-resident Indian (NRI) and he had earlier purchased this property by paying sale consideration in foreign exchange after taking the required permission from the Reserve Bank of India. The plaintiff-1st respondent Misha Vadhera is said to be a builder of the multi-storied building ‘Hansalaya’ and according to the appellant, the plaintiff is carrying on business in real-estate through respondent 3, a real-estate agent (M/s Satish Pandit & Associates). It is said that the appellant is carrying on business in names of respondent 2 (Hotel Hans Pvt. Ltd.) and respondent 4 (M/s Hansalaya Properties). Appellant admits that he entered into an agreement of sale with respondents 1,2 for a consideration of Rs. 90 lacs in respect of the above property, and the terms are that Rs. 1 lakh be paid on 28.10.1993, Rs. 8 lakhs within 7 days of signing the agreement and balance of Rs. 81 lakhs in 60 days of obtaining of the permission by the appellant from the competent authority under Chapter XX-C of the Income-Tax Act. The appellant was to apply for the clearance from the I.T authorities within 10 days after the signing of the agreement i.e after receipt of Rs. 8 lakhs. It is also admitted that appellant received Rs. 1 lakh on 28.10.93 But, it is the case of the appellant that the plaintiff failed to pay Rs. 8 lakhs within 7 days of the signing of the agreement on 28.10.93 and therefore the plaintiff committed breach of contract. The appellant says he, therefore, revoked the contract by a FAX message on 6.11.1993 sent to the plaintiff (FAX No. 3314830) and he also sent a registered letter in that behalf on 7.11.1993 He also says that he returned the amount of Rs. 1 lakh by a registered letter dated 16.12.93 in the form of a Bank Demand Draft No. 110013014 on 16.12.1993 drawn on Bank of India. These letters are filed as Annexures I and II. Appellant says he also took out a public notice and sent a legal notice dated 31.1.1994 to the respondents by regd. post as per Annexures III and IV. According to him, no reply was received.

4. The Suit No. 2828/93 was filed for specific performance by the 1st respondent and IA No. 10881/93 was filed under order 39 rules 1 & 2 cpc to restrain the appellant from alienating the property to others, etc. A learned Single Judge ordered notice on 20.12.93 for 1.2.94 The plaintiff filed FAO (OS) 4/94 against the order ‘notice’ issued by the learned Judge. In that appeal, a Division Bench of this Court passed an order on 6.1.94 permitting the appellant-therein (i.e plaintiff) to deposit Rs. 89 lakhs and said that if the amount is deposited, there shall be temporary injunction as prayed against the 1st defendant(appellant in the present appeal). Later the said order was modified on 25.1.94 into an order to furnish bank-guarantee and the interim injunction was continued. These orders were passed without the present appellant who was respondent in FAO(OS) 4/94 being served in the appeal. The said appeal FAO (OS) 4/94 came up before a Division Bench later, on 4.5.94 and even by that time the 1st. defendant(1st respondent therein) was not served in that appeal or suit. Inasmuch as earlier an order was passed by the Bench on 6.1.94 granting injunction without the 1st defendant(1st respondent therein) being served, the Bench, when the matter came before it on 4.5.94, was not in a position to either consider continuance/vacation of the order of injunction passed earlier on 6.1.94 and with a view to give the necessary opportunity to the 1st defendant, the Bench passed an order permitting the 1st defendant(vendor), to file an applilcation before the learned Single Judge, treating the order of the Bench dated 6.1.94 as an ad interim order passed by the trial Court. The 1st defendant-vendor filed IA 8424/90 before the learned Single Judge under Order 39 Rule 4 for vacating the injunction and the same was posted to 23.9.94

5. But, in the meantime, the plaintiff (respondent in the appeal) filed IA No. 7909/94 on 31.8.94 seeking the appointment of a Receiver to take possession of the said property.

6. In the above IA, the plaintiff stated that the 1st defendant was avoiding to receive notice deliberately, that he had received Rs. 1 lakh, and was also holding a cheque for Rs. 8 lakhs, that the plaintiff had given bank guarantee for Rs. 89 lakhs, that the plaintiff is incurring serious financial loss and stated:

“It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs are entitled to use and occupation of the property and derive benefit thereunder,”

and again that

“The said defendant has no authority or right to be in possession of the suit property and/or to being put in his use and occupation which would be wholly illegal having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case”.

7. In this IA 7909/94 for appointment of a Receiver the learned Single Judge ordered on 8.9.94 ‘notice’ for 5.10.94 and then appointed the plaintiff as Receiver ‘to take possession of the flat’ and ‘use and enjoy the flat till disposal of the suit or till this order is varied.’ Plaintiff is not to part with possession of the property in any manner whatsoever. An Advocate was appointed as Commissioner to take over possession of the property, if need be, with police aid.

8. In other words, pending the suit for specific performance of contract dated 28.10.93 to sell the flat for Rs. 90 lakhs, upon the plaintiff paying Rs. 1 lakh to the vendor (which was sent back by the vendor with a letter of revocation of contract) and upon furnishing bank guarantee for Rs. 89 lakhs, and when the 1st defendant was already restrained by injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 from transferring the property or possession, and when 1st defendant was not served nor was declared ex parte, the plaintiff filed the Receiver application and while ordering notice in the Receiver application, the learned Single Judge appointed the plaintiff as Receiver to take possession of the flat and appointed a Commissioner to give possession to the plaintiff by police aid. We may also refer to the order of the learned Single Judge, which according to the appellant's counsel, does not contain any reasons as to why a Receiver is appointed. It reads:

“In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears just and convenient to appoint plaintiff as a Receiver to take possession of the flat as claimed in this present application at this stage. He will use and enjoy the flat till disposal of the suit or till this order is varied. He will not part with possession of the property in any manner whatsoever till further orders. Notice be also issued to the defendants for 5th October, 994. Mr. J.P Verma, Advocate, who is present in Court is appointed as a Commissioner right in directing dispossession of the vendor(1st defendant-appellant) before 1st defendant was set ex parte and at a stage when there was already a temporary injunction against the vendor in an earlier I.A?

11. We may make it clear that we are not here deciding whether the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to an order of appointment of the plaintiff as Receiver after both sides are heard. We are only deciding the limited question whether the plaintiff could have been allowed to summarily dispossess the vendor-1st defendant(appellant) even before service of notice or even before the Court could think of setting him ex parte.

12. We have already pointed out that the learned Judge did not choose to give any reasons except to say that that was ‘just and convenient’ and in the circumstances of the case. What the circumstances were, have not been set out. As already stated, the respondent-plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance on 6.12.93 and sought for temporary injunction in IA 10881/93 restraining the 1st defendant from alienating or transferring possession to others. Notice was ordered on 20.12.93 and against that order respondent filed FAO (OS) 4/94 and a Division Bench granted temporary injunction on 6.1.94 without notice to appellant, subject to the plaintiff depositing Rs. 89 lakhs and later modified it on 15.1.94 into one for furnishing Bank guarantee. Later, when the appeal came before the Bench on 4.5.94 it found that in view of the injunction already granted without notice, it could direct the same to be treated as an interim order by the Single Judge and the defendant be permitted to move for vacating it. Thereafter the 1st defendant in fact filed IA 8424/94 on 23.9.94 but even before that, the plaintiff filed the present IA 7909/94 on 31.8.94 for appointing a Receiver and the Court appointed the plaintiff as Receiver on 8.9.94 and ordered notice to the defendant.

13. In our view, the case was not a fit one to dispossess the 1st defendant, even before he was served with notice or was set ex parte and that too without any reasons. Except to say that, in the circumstances, it was ‘just and convenient’ to appoint a Receiver at that stage, no reasons whatsoever are given in the impugned order.

14. It is well-settled that the posssession of the defendants cannot be lightly disturbed by the Court and that too at a preliminary stage even before notice of suit or notice in the Receiver application is served. Lord Cranworth L.C stated in Leney & Sons Ltd. v. Callinghan & Thompson (1908 (1) K.B 79) as follows:

“The receiver, if appointed in this case, must be appointed on the principle which the court of Chancery acts, of preserving proper for furnishing Bank guarantee. Later, when the appeal came before the Bench on 4.5.94 it found that in view of the injunction already granted without notice, it could direct the same to be treated as an interim order by the Single Judge and the defendant be permitted to move for vacating it. Thereafter the 1st defendant in fact filed IA 8424/94 on 23.9.94 but even before that, the plaintiff filed the present IA 7909/94 on 31.8.94 for appointing a Receiver and the Court appointed the plaintiff as Receiver on 8.9.94 and ordered notice to the defendant.

13. In our view, the case was not a fit one to dispossess the 1st defendant, even before he was served with notice or was set ex parte and that too without any reasons. Except to say that, in the circumstances, it was ‘just and convenient’ to appoint a Receiver at that stage, no reasons whatsoever are given in the impugned order.

14. It is well-settled that the posssession of the defendants cannot be lightly disturbed by the Court and that too at a preliminary stage even before notice of suit or notice in the Receiver application is served. Lord Cranworth L.C stated in Leney & Sons Ltd. v. Callinghan & Thompson (1908 (1) K.B 79) as follows:

“The receiver, if appointed in this case, must be appointed on the principle which the court of Chancery acts, of preserving property pending litigation which is to decide the right of the parties. In such cases the court must, of necessity, exercise a discretion as to whether it will or will not take possession of the property by its officer……..where, indeed, the property is as it was, in medio, in the enjoyment of no one, the Court shoud prevent a scramble……But where the object of the plaintiff is to assert a right to property, of which the defendant is in the enjoyment, the case is necessarily involved in further questions. The Court by taking possession at the instance of the plaintiff may be doing a wrong for the defendant, in some cases, an irreparable wrong. If the plaintiff should eventually fail in establishing his right against the defendant, the Court may, by its interim interference, have cause mischief to the defendant, for which the subsequent restoration of the property may afford no adequate compensation.”

15. It is clear, therefore, possession of the defendant is not to be lightly interfered with and at any rate even before notice is served on the defendant or he is set ex parte. Even thereafter, normally a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case and also a further case that if the defendant is not disturbed from possession and the Court is not to take over possession the property is likely to be damaged or wasted. The principles laid down by the English Courts of Equity have been followed by our courts consistently. The words ‘just or convenient’ used in Section 25 of the Judicature Act 1873 (now Section 45 of the Judicature Act, 1925) were interpreted to mean ‘just and convenient’. The same view is followed in India. The discretion to appoint a receiver is not arbitrary or unregulated but is to be exercised cautiously, judicially and according to legal principles (Benoy Krishna v. Satish Chandra AIR 1928 P.C 49) after consideration of the whole of the circumstances of the case. A receiver cannot be appointed merely because it is expedient or convenient to one of the parties to do so or because it will do no harm to do so. A bona fide possessor of property should not be dispossessed pending suit unless there is some substantial reason, such as, well-founded fear that the property in question being dissipated or that some other irreparable mischief may occur unless the court gives its protection. The application for appointment of receiver should not be disposed of summarily. The matter should be considered judicially in all its aspects. The plaintiff must show prima facie that he has a strong case i.e either a good title to the property or a special equity in his favour requiring immediate dispossession of the defendant or that the property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wasted.

16. If these are the general and well settled principles applicable for appointment of a receiver even after the defendant is served and after hearing him, we fail to see how the respondent can take over possession as a Receiver, pending disposal of the Receiver application and before notice therein is served. In this case the 1st defendnt had returned even the Rs. 1 lakh received by him alleging that plaintiff had committed breach of contract. It is true that the plaintiff has a case that the appellant was evading notice in the suit and was watching the progress of the case. But even, on this aspect, there is no finding of evasion or that the appellant was in know of things and was watching and was giving different addresses. Nor was the appellant set ex parte. After all, there is already ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the appellant from alienating or parting with possession. Counsel for the appellant contends that it is the case of the appellant that he is an NRI and was living outside India, that this fact is known to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was deliberately sending notices to wrong addresses. It is also argued that the appellant filed an IA for vacating the temporary injunction but before that date the plaintiff took over as receiver even before notice in the receiver application was served.

17. We may state that ordinarily, even if the plaintiff stated in his plaint that he was ready and willing to complete the contract and even if he had deposited the consideration into court, he cannot normally be put in possession straightaway except where, on the principles stated above, the Court thinks of taking over possession through a receiver because of the serious likelihood of waste or damage to property or the existence of other situations mentioned above.

18. In the result, we set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8.9.94 and direct the plaintiff to put back the appellant in possession forthwith. The Commissioner appointed by the court earlier is hereby directed to put back the appellant in possession, if need be, with police aid. The Commissioner will be paid Rs. 5000/- for the same by the appellant. The Commissioner will also take photographs of the property handing over possession to the appellant and submit a report in the IA so that the condition of the property at the time of handing over possession to the appellant will be a matter of record. Unless the appellant is put in physical possession, the IA for appointment of receiver should not be taken up for further orders or hearing.

19. The appeal is allowed and the IA 7909/94 is remitted to the learned trial Judge, for disposal according to law. We may make it clear again that we are not to be understood as having said anything on the merits of the IA. All that we have done is to set down the general principles and also to say that the learned Single Judge was wrong in appointing the plaintiff as Receiver even before notice in suit or the IA was served and without any reasons. After hearing both sides now, the learned Single Judge can deal with the application in accordance with law.