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Ex. Hav. Mahipal Singh v. Union Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, who was enrolled on February 28, 1976 and promoted to Havildar effective January 1, 1984, was posted to Zonal Recruiting Office (Z.R.O.), Jabalpur on September 9, 1984 and served there until August 5, 1987, after which he was posted to No. 27 Air Defence Regiment. He was subsequently attached back to HQ Recruiting Zone, Jabalpur and was served with an initial "Tentative Charge Sheet" dated September 22, 1986 alleging multiple counts of forgery and accepting gratification relating to recruitment (charges framed under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 465 IPC). That tentative charge sheet was abandoned; subsequent tentative and formal charge sheets dated June 1, 1988, September 8, 1988 and November 16, 1988 replaced the offences under Section 69 with Section 63 of the Army Act and eventually proceeded to trial by Summary Court-martial (SCM).
The petitioner was tried by the Commanding Officer (CO) of ZRO (to which he had been attached), acquitted of one charge but convicted of others and sentenced to six months R.I., reduction in rank and dismissal from service by order dated November 24, 1988. The confirming authority removed one conviction but otherwise endorsed the SCM findings. The Central Government, by order dated April 5, 1990, upheld the findings and sentence. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the SCM proceedings and the November 24, 1988 order, and restoration to service.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Summary Court-martial had jurisdiction to try the petitioner when the officer holding the trial was not the Commanding Officer of the petitioner’s unit (contravening Section 116 and Note 5 to Section 120 of the Army Act)?
- Whether a non-commissioned officer or sepoy (such as the petitioner) may be attached to another unit for the purpose of trial by Summary Court-martial, given Note 5 to Section 120 and applicable Army Regulations (para 381)?
- Whether substituting or amending initial charges under Section 69 (a provision excluded from SCM jurisdiction under Section 120(2) absent grave reason) to charges under Section 63 so as to bring the matter within SCM jurisdiction was permissible in law?
- Whether Rule 113 of the Army Rules, 1954 permitted the type of amendment that converted offences originally charged under Section 69 into offences under Section 63 for the purpose of proceeding by Summary Court-martial?
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner challenged the validity of the SCM proceedings and the resulting punishment, asserting that all charges related to a period before he took duties as a clerk in the Recruiting Office and that he was made a scapegoat while senior officers were blamed but not tried.
- The petitioner contended that the SCM lacked jurisdiction because: (a) the officer holding the trial was not his Commanding Officer and belonged to a different unit; (b) a NCO/sepoy cannot be attached to another unit for the purpose of SCM except as allowed by Army Regulations para 381; and (c) there was no valid attachment order authorizing trial by that outside unit.
- The petitioner argued that the initial charge-sheet under Section 69 (an offence which Section 120(2) restrains SCM from trying absent grave reason) was impermissibly abandoned and replaced with charges under Section 63 to vest jurisdiction in a Summary Court-martial.
- The petitioner did not press factual disputes before the court but focused on the legality and jurisdictional validity of the SCM proceedings and the legal interpretation of relevant statutory provisions.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondents contended that the petitioner was properly attached to Headquarters Recruiting Zone, Jabalpur and therefore the ZRO CO validly tried him by SCM.
- They relied on an executive office order dated May 22, 1985 (signed by Brig. R.N. Batra) which they argued justified the practice of trying personnel by officers of different units in certain circumstances; this was advanced to meet the objection under Section 116 and the Notes.
- The respondents further relied on Rule 113 of the Army Rules, 1954 as permitting amendment of the charge-sheet in the interests of justice, which they contended authorised the change from offences under Section 69 to those under Section 63.
- Respondents did not dispute that no one else besides the petitioner had been arraigned in court-martial proceedings for the same incidents, and that senior officers were only administratively blamed or not proceeded against for various reasons (e.g., retirement).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H.C. Sarin v. Union of India, (1976) 4 SCC 765; AIR 1976 SC 1686 | To illustrate how notes appended to statutory rules may be treated — either as part of the rule or as executive instructions — and the legal effect of such notes in departmental procedure. | The court relied on the Sarin passage to reject the respondents' contention that an office circular (executive order) could override or nullify statutory provisions and authoritative notes (Manual/Regulations) governing SCM jurisdiction. The opinion observed that executive circulars cannot eliminate statutory provisions contained in the Act and Manual of Military Law. |
| Ex-Havildar Ratan Singh v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 716; AIR 1992 SC 415 | Interpretation of Section 120(2) of the Army Act limiting the jurisdiction of a Summary Court-martial in respect of specified offences (including Section 69) absent grave reason for immediate action. | The court applied the legal principle from Ratan Singh to hold that offences covered by Section 69 are of a serious nature and should not be tried by SCM when there is no grave reason for immediate action. The opinion used this authority to support the conclusion that replacing Section 69 by Section 63 so as to enable SCM was impermissible and that the petitioner should have been tried by a regular court-martial. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the case by reference to the statutory provisions and accompanying notes in the Army Act and the Army Regulations, and by examining the sequence of charge-sheets and the circumstances of the petitioner's attachment and trial:
- The court examined Section 116 of the Army Act which authorises a Summary Court-martial to be held by the commanding officer of any corps, department or detachment and noted the appended Note 5 (from the Manual of Military Law) and the Army Regulations para 381 which restrict when a CO of a different unit may conduct an SCM. The court emphasised that a NCO or sepoy cannot be attached to another unit for SCM except as provided in para 381.
- Applying those provisions to the facts, the court found that the petitioner was tried by the CO of an outside unit (ZRO) to which he had been placed on temporary duty/attached, and that there was no evidence of a valid attachment order or of the exceptional circumstances contemplated by para 381. On this basis the court held that the SCM lacked jurisdiction.
- The court then considered the change in the substance of the charges: the initial tentative charge-sheet invoked Section 69 (and IPC forgery provisions) but later charge-sheets recast allegations under Section 63, thereby enabling SCM jurisdiction. The court observed that Section 120(2) expressly prohibits an SCM from trying offences punishable under Section 69 absent grave reason for immediate action.
- The court evaluated the respondents' reliance on an administrative circular dated May 22, 1985 and on Rule 113 of the Army Rules (which permits certain amendments to charge-sheets). It concluded that the administrative circular could not override statutory prescriptions and the Manual of Military Law; and that Rule 113 permits correction of mistakes in name/description or amendments in the course of trial in narrow circumstances, but did not authorise the substitution of a Section 69 charge by a Section 63 charge to manufacture SCM jurisdiction.
- The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Ex-Havildar Ratan Singh to reinforce that Section 120(2) restricts SCM jurisdiction for serious offences and that where no grave reason for immediate action exists, a regular court-martial is the appropriate forum affording fuller defence rights. The court observed the record showed senior officers were implicated administratively, yet only the petitioner was tried by SCM, which militated in favour of a regular court-martial.
- On these bases — lack of jurisdiction due to improper trial by an outside CO and impermissible conversion of charges to fit SCM jurisdiction — the court concluded the impugned SCM trial and its resulting punishment were vitiated and without jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The court held that the Summary Court-martial that tried the petitioner lacked jurisdiction and the impugned order of punishment dated November 24, 1988 was set aside. The Rule was made absolute and there was no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the petitioner's conviction and sentence delivered by the Summary Court-martial were quashed and the punitive order of November 24, 1988 was set aside.
- The court concluded that the respondents could not rely on administrative/circular instructions to override statutory provisions and authoritative notes in the Manual of Military Law governing SCM jurisdiction.
- No broader or new precedent is stated to have been laid down by this opinion beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and the precedents it cited (notably Ex-Havildar Ratan Singh and H.C. Sarin) to invalidate an SCM held without jurisdiction. The opinion confines its effect to vindicating the petitioner's right to a trial by an appropriate forum and quashing the SCM proceedings against him.
Appeal allowed.
Mr. C.M Nayar, J.— The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus and Certiorari for directing the respondents to take back the petitioner in service by declaring the Summary Court-martial proceedings and the resultant impugned order dated November 24, 1988, by which the petitioner was sentenced to be reduced in the ranks, to be dismissed from service and to suffer R.I for six months as invalid and for quashing the same.
2. The facts, briefly stated, are that the petitioner was enrolled on February 28, 1976 and was promoted to the rank of Havildar with effect from January 1, 1984. He was posted on transfer to the Zonal Recruiting Office (for short Z.R.O) Jabalpur on September 9, 1984 and continued to serve there till August 5, 1987. He was thereafter posted to No. 27 Air Defence Regiment (for short 27 A.D Regiment). The petitioner was called from 27 AD Regiment on alleged attachment to HQ., Recruiting Zone, Jabalpur where he continued till the date he was removed from the Army by order dated November 24, 1988, as a result of conviction by the Summary Court-martial. On reaching Jabalpur he came to know that there were some allegations against him and impugned disciplinary proceedings were contemplated to be initiated at Head Quarter Recruiting Zone. The petitioner was served with the “Tentative Charge Sheet” dated September 22, 1986, and the same reads as follows:
Tentative Charge Sheet
The accused No. 12688139W Hav/Clk Mahipal Singh of Headquarters Recruiting Zone Jabalpur is charged with:—
First charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE. THAT IS TO SAY, FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
in that he
at Jabalpur, on or around 16 December 85, fraudulently made an application for outsider sanction for recruitment in respect of Shri Nar Singh (now No. 15351916 H recruit) Nar Singh of 1MTR, 1STC, Jabalpur) furnishing false and fictitious details there in, with intention to obtain sanction for recruitment of said Shri Nar Singh into the Army.
Second Charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.
in that he,
at Jabalpur, on 16 December 85, fraudulently made a false letter, bearing No. 70908.Gen dated 16 December 85 purported to be originated and signed by an officer of the rank of Captain/Major of 506 Army Base Workshop, Jabalpur.
Third Charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
in that he,
at Jabalpur on 14 October 85, fraudulently made an application for outsider sanction for recruitment in respect of Shri Prem Kumar (now No. 1535058 recruit Prem Kumar of 4 TTRm 1STC Jabalpur) furnishing false and fictitious details therein with intention to obtain sanction for recruitment of said Shri Prem Kumar into the Army.
Fourth Charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
in that he,
at Jabalpur on or around 22 December 85, fraudulently made an application for outsider sanction for recruitment in respect of Shri Ram Kishan (now No. 6924478X recruit Ram Kishan of AOC Centre Secunderabad) furnishing false and fictitious details therein, with intention to obtain recruitment of said Shri Ram Kishan into the Army.
Fifth Charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
in that he,
at Jabalpur on 22 December, 85, fraudulently made a false letter, bearing No. 70478.Inst dated 22 December 85, purported to be originated and signed by a fictitious person named Captain HN Singh of 506 Army Base Workshop Jabalpur.
Sixth Charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
in that he,
at Jabalpur on or around 31 December 85, fraudulently made an application for outsider sanction for recruitment in respect of Shri Raj Kumar son of Shri Jagmal Singh of Village Barsana, Mohindergarh (Haryana) furnishing false and fictitious details therein, with intention to obtain sanction for recruitment of said Shri Raj Kumar into the Army.
Seventh Charge: (AA Sec 69) COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, FORGERY, CONTRARY TO SECTION 465 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
in that he,
at Jabalpur, on 31 December 85, fraudulently made a false letter bearing No. 1043.Gen/TS/dated 31 December 85 purported to be originated and signed by an officer of the rank of Lt. Col of the Grenediers Regimental Centre, Jabalpur.
Eighth Charge: (AA Sec 64(e)) ACCEPTING FOR HIMSELF A GRATIFICATION AS A MOTIVE FOR PROCURING SANCTION FOR ENROLLMENT OF A PERSON
in that he,
at Jabalpur on or around 13 Jan 86, while working as a clerk in the Zonal Recruiting Office accepted a sum of Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred only) from Shri Nar Singh (now No. 15351916H recruit Nar Singh of 1MTR, 1STC, Jabalpur), a gratification as a motive for procuring the enrollment of said Shri Nar Singh.
Ninth Charge: (AA Sec 64(e)) ACCEPTING FOR HIMSELF A GRATIFICATION AS A MOTIVE FOR PROCURING SANCTION FOR ENROLLMENT OF A PERSON
in that he,
at Jabalpur on or around in Nov-Dec 85 accepted free services of ploughing and sowing 6 acres of land belonging to his father Shri Banwari Lal from Shri Ram Kishan (Now No. 6924478X recruit Ram Kishan AOC Centre Secunderabad), a gratification as a motive for procuring the enrollment of said Shri Ram
Kishan.
(K.S Bhandari)
Colonel OC Troops
JabalpurDeputy Zonal Recruiting Officer
22 Sep 86“
3. This charge sheet was abandoned by the respondents and no proceedings took place in respect of the same. The second charge sheet, which substituted the offences from Section 69 to Section 63 of the Army Act, was issued vide order dated June 1, 1988, which also was a Tentative Charge Sheet and is reproduced as below:
“TENTATIVE CHARGE SHEET
The accused No. 126813N Havildar Clerk Mahipal Singh of 27 Ad Regt (Amritsar) att to HQ Rtg Zone Jabalpur vide HQ 769 (I) AD Bde Sig No. A4656 dated 02 Feb 86, is charged with:—
Jabalpur AA Sec 63 Charge I 13 Jan 86 An act prejudicial to Good order and Military discipline in that, he at Jabalpur, while working as a clerk in the office of RO (HQ) Jabalpur prepared a RIC in respect of Shri Raj Kumar without ascertaining the fact that a RIC has earlier been prepared for the said candidate after which he had been declared medically unfit. Jabalpur 10 Sep 85 to AA Sec 63 Charge II 28 Dec 85 An act prejudicial to good order and discipline, in that, he at Jabalpur, while working as a clerk in the office of HQ Rtg Zone, Jabalpur helped in following pers in obtaining Fraudulent outsider sponsorship sanction between the period from 10 Sep 85 to 28 Dec 85:—
(a) Rect Prem Kumar
(b) Rect. Nar Singh
(c) Rect. Ram Kishan
(d) Rect. Bhoop Singh”
4. There was no progress in respect of this charge sheet as well when third charge sheet took its place. The same is dated September 8, 1988 and is filed as Annexure P. 3 to the petition. This charge sheet was also not proceeded with and a communication was sent to the petitioner on November 16, 1988, which reads as follows:—
“TRIAL BY SCM”
You will be tried by SCM on November 21, 1988. A copy of the charge sheet and S of E recorded in your case is enclosed along with a copy of the part I order constituting the SCM. Please forward the receipt as appended below.”
5. The charge sheet enclosed with this communication is Annexure P. 5 to the writ petition and the same reads as follows:
CHARGE SHEET
The accused, No. 1268139W Havildar Clerk Mahipal Singh of 27 ADRect. (Amritsar) att to HO Rtg Zone, Jabalpur vide No. 769 (I) AD Bde Sig No. A-4656 dated 02 Feb 88, is charged with:
AA Sec 63 Charge I Jabalpur 11 Dec 85 An ACT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE in that he at Jabalpur while working as a clerk in the office of HQ Recruiting Zone, Jabalpur helped No. 15350588N Sig/M Prem Kumar, 4 TTR, I STC Jabalpur of village Gomali Ki Dhani, District Mahendragarh (Haryana) in getting fraudulently enrolled at RO (HQ) Jabalpur on 11 Dec 85 by calling him from his village and keeping him at his (accused) Government Quarter for the purpose of getting enrolled in the Army at Jabalpur. AA Sec63 Charge II Jabalpur 21 Dec 85 AN ACT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE in that he at Jabalpur while working as a clerk in the office of HQ Recruiting Zone, Jabalpur helped No. 15351916 H Rect Nar Singh of I TTR, I STC. Jabalpur in getting a fraudulent outsider sponsorship Sanction on 21 Dec 85 for enrolment by RO (HQ) Jabalpur. AA Sec 63 Charge III Jabalpur 28 Dec 85 AN ACT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE in that he at Jabalpur while working as a clerk in the office of HQ Recruiting Zone, Jabalpur helped No. 6924478X Sep Ram Kishan of 57 Mtn Div Ord Unit in getting a fraudulent outsider sponsorship sanction on 28 Dec for enrolment by RO (HQ) Jabalpur. AASec 57(e) Charge IV Jabalpur 21 Feb 86 OBTAINING FOR A PERSON AN ADVANTAGE BY MAKING A FALSE ENTRY IN A RECORD in that he at Jabalpur while working as a clerk to assist in preparation of Recruit's inspection Cards (RICs) at RO (HQ) Jabalpur, prepared a RIC No. 11428 in respect of Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Jagmal Singh on 21 Feb 86 in his own hand writing and made a false entry for the date on the said RIC as 13 Jan 86, for obtaining an ad vantage for consideration for recruitment as a fresh candidate for Shri Raj Kumar, who had earlier been rejected on medical grounds on a RIC prepared with the same number 11428 on 13 Jan 86.”
6. The reading of the charge-sheets as referred above, would indicate that the first charge sheet was issued to the petitioner under the provisions of Section 69 of the Army Act, 1950, (hereinafter called “the Act”), which was subsequently amended to Section 63 in the second, third and fourth charge sheets. In the last charge sheet of November 16, 1988, the word “Tentative” was removed and it was only termed as charge sheet. The proceedings took place in respect thereof. The petitioner was held not guilty of the third charge but was held guilty of the first, second and fourth Charges and was sentenced to six months R.I, reduction to ranks and dismissal from service. The Confirming Authority by order dated December 27, 1988, further set aside the findings of the Summary Court-martial with regard to the second charge as well, and endorsed the findings in respect of other two charges. The Central Government vide order dated April 5, 1990, upheld the findings and sentence of Summary Court-martial (SCM) and rejected the plea of the petitioner.
7. The petitioner has reiterated that the entire proceedings against him are vitiated as all the charges against him pertain to the period prior to his taking over the duties of clerk in Recruiting office. The Court of Inquiry blamed the ZRO and Dy ZRO (Brig, Col/Lt. Col) for granting outsider sanction to 189 candidates as against permissible number of 103 and also blamed them for frequently attempting to recruit 22 candidates, who had been earlier rejected. No action was taken against any of these officers and the petitioner was made a scape-goat on trumped up charges. The Counsel for the respondent has not denied that no one else, apart from the petitioner has been arraigned in any Court-martial proceedings in respect of the alleged incident.
8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has, however, only questioned the validity of proceedings of the Summary Court-martial and the ultimate punishment on interpretation of law and has not made any submission on the questions of fact, which arise in the case. The first contention, which has been raised before me is with regard to the lack of jurisdiction of the Summary Court-martial, inter-alia, for the following reasons:
(a) The officer holding the trial was not the Commanding Officer (CO) of the petitioner as he belonged to a different Unit. Section 116 and Note 5 appended to the Section is of relevance in this regard.
(b) NCO or a Sepoy cannot be attached to another Unit for SCM. This is forbidden by Note 5 to Section 120 of the Act.
(c) There was no valid attachment order by which the petitioner was alleged to be attached to another Unit for the purposes of Summary Court-martial.
9. The second contention, which has been made, is that the petitioner was issued “Tentative Charge Sheet” in the first instance for offences under Section 69 of the Army Act and Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code/which was subsequently changed to Section 63 to vest jurisdiction in Summary Court-martial to proceed against the petitioner, which is not permissible in law.
10. Section 116 of the Act deals with Summary Court-martial and the same is reproduced as follows:
“16. Summary Court-martial—(1) A Summary Court-martial may be held by the commanding officer of any corps, department or detachment of the regular Army, and he shall alone constitute the Court.
(2) The proceedings shall be attended throughout by two other persons who shall be officers or junior commissioned officers or one of either, and who shall not as such be sworn or affirmed.”
11. Note 5, which is appended to the Section in the publication, ‘Manual of Military Law’, issued by Government of India, Ministry of Defence, reads as follows:
“5. See Regulations Army para 381 for the circumstances under which a CO of a different unit may hold the trial by SCM of a person subject to AA.”
12. It is, accordingly, contended that the petitioner was transferred to another Unit for the purpose of trial by SCM, which was neither permissible under Section 116 nor by Note 5, as referred above. The only exception, which is made by Note 5, is with regard to trial of Deserters, as stated in paragraph 381 of the Army Regulations. It is admitted that the petitioner was tried by the Commanding Officer of ZRO with whom he was placed on temporary duty. Section 120(3) of the Act also provides that ‘a Summary Court-martial may try any person subject to this Act and under the command of the officer holding the Court, except an officer, junior commissioned officer or warrant officer’. The explanation to this sub-clause is given in Note 5 appended to the Section, which reads as follows:
“5. A NCO or a sepoy cannot be attached to another unit for the purpose of trial by SCM except as provided in Regulations Army para 381.”
13. The petitioner ought to have been tried by the CO. of his own Unit No. 27AD Regiment, as required by law and the Summary Court-martial of the petitioner for the alleged offences is, therefore, without jurisdiction.
14. The learned Counsel for the respondents has contended that the petitioner was properly attached to Head Quarters Recruitment Zone Jabalpur and it is denied that the petitioner was only sent on temporary duty from 27 AR Defence Regiment to which the petitioner belonged. Faced with the argument that the petitioner could not have been tried by CO. of another unit, as the same will be violative of Section 116 of the Act supplemented by Note 5, the Counsel has argued that subsequently executive instructions were issued vide order dated May 22, 1985 and reference is made to paragraph 2 of the said office order, which has been signed by one Brig. R.N Batra, Officiating Additional DG D&V for Adjutant General. This plea was taken belatedly and it has not been explained as to whether there has been amendment to the provisions of law, referred to above, and as incorporated in the ‘Manual of Military Law’. It seems that this circular was issued to tide over a particular situation arisen out of a particular incident and cannot eliminate the statutory provisions, as contained in Section 116 and Note 5. The validity of the notes appended to the statutory Rules has been explained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in H.C Sarin v. Union of India, (1976) 4 SCC 765 : AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1686. Reference may be made to paragraph 21 at page 1694, which reads as follows:
“The enquiry was being conducted in accordance with Rule 1730 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I. In the main body of the rule where a procedure for holding a departmental enquiry has been provided for, there is nothing said in relation to the engagement of a lawyer. Certain notes are appended to the rule. They seem to have been appended not on the basis of the executive instructions but as parts of the rule itself. One such note was appended as note 4, which subsequently became note 3, on September 25, 1956 by the President of India who had framed Rule 1730. This note reads as follows:
“In a departmental enquiry, the accused railway officer may, if he so desires, be accompanied by another railway officer provided that the officer so nominated as the defence Counsel is approved by the competent authority to act as such, and provided also that the person so nominated shall not be a professional lawyer. The term ‘professional lawyer’ includes those persons who are competent to practice in a Court of law”.
In face of the above note, treating it as a part of the rule, the appellant was not entitled to the services of a professional lawyer. Gottwald, as it appears, was a lawyer in name but actively in business. The services of a professional lawyer were not necessary to cross-examine him. The fact was a simple one as to whether he had paid money to the tune of about 24,000 D.M to the appellant from time to time. Even if we treat the note aforesaid as one based merely on the executive instructions and not a part of the rule itself, we see no reason to say that/he authority was obliged not to follow the note but to go against it. At the most it had a discretion in the matter. The question is whether the discretion was rightly exercised or was it exercised so arbitrarily as to lead to the conclusion that principles of natural justice were violated when the services of a professional lawyer were not made available to the appellant. We give the answers against the appellant.”
15. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Summary Court-martial as conducted by CO of an outside Unit to which the petitioner did not Belong and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and the trial is, accordingly, vitiated. Note 5 as appended to Section 120 further reiterates that a NCO or a Sepoy cannot be attached to another unit for the purpose of trial by SCM except as provided in Army Regulations, para 381.
16. The next contention which has been raised is that the initial charge-sheet specified the charges under Section 69 of the Act read with Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and this was subsequently abandoned and the charge-sheet was issued under Section 63 of the Act to bring the petitioner within the purview of Summary Court-martial. This was not permissible in law. Section 120 of the Act is cited in this regard:
“120. Powers of summary Court-martial—Subject to the provisions of Subsection (2), a summary Court-martial may try any offence punishable under this Act.
(2) When there is no grave reason for immediate action and reference can without detriment to discipline be made to the officer empowered to convene a district Court-martial or on active service a summary general Court-martial for the trial of the alleged offender an officer holding a summary Court-martial shall not try without such reference any offence punishable under any of the sections 34, 37 and 69, or any offence against the officer holding the Court.
(3) ……. ……..
17. A bare perusal of Sub-section (2) of Section 120 would clearly indicate that when there is no grave reason for immediate action and reference can without detriment to discipline be made to the officer empowered to convene a district Court-martial or on active service a summary general Court-martial for the trial of the alleged offender an officer holding a summary Court-martial shall not try without such reference any offence punishable under any of the sections 34, 37 and 69 or any offence against the officer holding the Court. It is indicative that in the present case, the charge under Section 69 was replaced by charge under Section 63 primarily with a view to vest powers in the Authorities to proceed against the petitioner by means of Summary Court-martial.
18. Mr. V.K Shali appearing for the respondents, however, has contended that the amendment to the charge is permissible under Rule 113 of the Army Rules, 1954. This Rule reads as follows:
“113. Amendment of charge—(1) At any time during the trial if it appears to the Court that there is any mistake in the name or description of the accused in the charge-sheet, it may amend the charge-sheet SJ as to correct that mistake.
(2) If on the trial of any charge it appears to the Court at any time before it has begun to examine the witnesses, that in the interests of justice any addition to, omission from, or alteration in, the charge is required, it may amend such charge and may, after due notice to the accused, and with the sanction of the officer empowered to convene a district Court-martial or on active service a Summary General Court-martial for the trial of the accused if the amended charge requires such sanction, proceed with the trial on such amended charge.”
19. On a closer look to the provisions of this rule, it would indicate that the amendment can only be made when there is any mistake in the name or description of the accused in the charge-sheet or during the course of the trial and covers no other situation. The Counsel has not stressed this point any further.
20. Reference may be made now to the judgment of the Supreme Court Ex-Havildar Ratan Singh v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 716 : AIR 1992 S.C 415. Basing his argument on the law settled by the Supreme Court in this case, the Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner would have been entitled to a qualitative better right of defence before a Court-martial other than Summary Court-martial which was denied to him on a wrong assumption that the case was covered by Section 63 and not by Section 69. Similar submission was made before the Supreme Court in the case of Ex-Havildar Ratan Singh (supra) where the Court interpreted the provisions of Section 120 of the Act. Paragraph 4 of the judgment reads as follows:
“The charge-sheet states that when fired upon by a group of terrorist-militants during an armed operation against them, the appellant quitted his place without orders from his superior officer. Section 120 of the Act states that subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of the Section a Summary Court-martial may try any offence punishable under the Act, Sub-section (2) reads as follows:—
“(2) When there is no grave reason for immediate action and reference can without detriment to discipline be made to the officer empowered to convene a district Court-martial or on active service a summary general Court-martial for the trial of the alleged offender, an officer holding a summary Court-martial shall not try without such reference any offence punishable under any of the sections 34, 37 and 69, or any offence against the officer holding the Court.”
The position, thus, is that if the offence is covered by Section 34 and immediate action for the specified reasons is not warranted, the Summary Court-martial: shall not have jurisdiction to hold the trial.”
21. Similarly, in the present case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is governed by the provisions of the Act. Section 69 of the Act is of wider import whereas the scope of Section 63 is limited. The allegations against the petitioner are of a serious nature relating to recruitment and grant of outsider's sanction against the permissible limits. The record has been produced before me and I have carefully gone through the same. The record indicates that large number of officers, including senior personnel of the ranks of Brigadier and Colonel were also held responsible for administrative lapses with regard to irregular outsider's sponsorship sanctions. It is conceded by learned Counsel for the respondent that no Court-martial took place in respect of these officers on the ground that some of them had already retired and an administrative action was taken against others. The petitioner was alone tried by Summary Court-martial for similar offences. In this view of the matter, it would have been more appropriate if the petitioner was proceeded against by a regular Court-martial so that he was afforded a better right of defence. There was no warrant and legal justification for the respondents to frame successive charge-sheets and from changing the application of Section 69 to the one under Section 63 of the Act, which only indicates that the petitioner was sought to be tried by Summary Court-martial, although no such immediate action was warranted.
22. It is not necessary to deal with any other contention of the petitioner. The impugned trial of the petitioner by Summary Court-martial and the decision, therefore, is without jurisdiction and has to be quashed.
23. The writ petition, as a consequence, is allowed. The Rule is made absolute. The impugned order of punishment dated November 24, 1988, is set aside.
24. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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