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V.K Jain v. Richa Laboratories (P) Ltd. .
Case Summary — Opinion by Mr. J.K. Mehra, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a petition for winding up of the respondent company alleging that the respondent owed Rs. 3,15,165 to the petitioner and failed to pay despite a demand notice dated 25 March 1988 served under Section 434 of the Companies Act. The petitioner further alleged that the company repeatedly shifted its registered office without filing returns with the Registrar of Companies and that a statutory notice was served on 21 May 1988; the respondent neither paid the dues nor sought to compound them.
The respondent contested the petition and, in its pleadings and at different points, asserted (a) a bona fide dispute as to the claim and denial of delivery/liability, (b) that the respondent had obtained a manufacturing licence only on 13 May 1986 while the invoices pre-dated May 1986, (c) that certain documents including a balance-confirmation letter and sales tax declarations were fabricated or pertained to a sole proprietorship rather than the company, and (d) that the petitioner had already instituted a civil suit for recovery of the same amount. At the hearing, the respondent abandoned the contention that no statutory notice had been served after being confronted with an A.D. card.
The petitioner produced several documents in rejoinder: sales tax declarations bearing the signature of A.K. Racharya (admittedly the Managing Director), an agreement dated 30 April 1985 by which assets and liabilities of M/s Richa Laboratories (a partnership) were to be transferred to M/s Richa Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., a letter from Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited certifying that payments were received for supplies made through the petitioner to M/s Richa Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., the petitioner's account showing debits and a balance sheet reflecting a debit balance of Rs. 3,15,165, and other corroborating materials. The respondent did not produce a sales tax registration certificate or documents showing a separate sole-proprietorship concern under the same name, nor did it produce a certificate from Ranbaxy to support its claim that goods were not delivered to the respondent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the materials and statutory notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, a presumption arises that the respondent company is unable to pay its debts and whether the petition for winding up should be admitted.
- Whether the institution of a civil suit by the petitioner for recovery of the same claim operates to non-suit or invalidate the winding up petition.
- Whether a bona fide dispute exists such that the winding up petition should be dismissed.
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the outstanding balance claimed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The respondent owes Rs. 3,15,165 and failed to pay despite service of a statutory notice dated 25 March 1988 under Section 434 of the Companies Act; further statutory formalities (service on 21 May 1988) were complied with.
- The respondent repeatedly shifted its registered office without filing returns and has been lying closed since 11 July 1986, supporting the inference of inability to pay.
- Documentary evidence — including sales tax declarations bearing A.K. Racharya's signature and a Ranbaxy letter listing invoices supplied through the petitioner to M/s Richa Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. — supports the petitioner’s claim that the respondent was liable and had received supplies through the petitioner.
- The suit filed by the petitioner was instituted as a precaution ("by way of abundant caution") to avoid the claim being barred by limitation and does not bar winding up proceedings.
Respondent's Arguments
- There exists a bona fide dispute as to the claim; the respondent denied liability and denial of delivery of goods the price of which is claimed.
- The respondent received a licence to manufacture pharmaceuticals only on 13 May 1986, whereas the invoices relied upon relate to a period prior to May 1986, which, the respondent contended, undermines the claim.
- Certain documents (including a balance-confirmation letter and sales tax declarations) were alleged to be fabricated or to belong to a sole proprietorship concern of A.K. Racharya rather than to the respondent company; it was suggested dates and stamps had been interpolated.
- The respondent pointed out that the petitioner had already filed a civil suit for recovery and argued that this should preclude the winding up petition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 62 (1987) CC 239 | Held that winding up proceedings will not be invalidated merely because a suit has been filed by the petitioning creditor as a precaution to save the claim from being barred by limitation. | The court applied this principle to conclude that the petitioner's institution of a suit "by way of abundant caution" did not non-suit or invalidate the present winding up petition. |
| 1990 (1) Company Law Journal 289 | Held that winding up proceedings are not a substitute for recovery proceedings and, where a company raises a substantial defence, a company petition may be dismissed while leaving the creditor free to pursue a civil suit. | The court considered the respondent's reliance on this decision but found the present case distinguishable: the court concluded that no bona fide dispute had been demonstrated on the facts before it, and therefore the cited decision did not require dismissal of the petition here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the pleadings and documentary evidence and proceeded through the following analytical steps:
- Notice and Non-Payment: The petitioner had served a statutory demand under Section 434 of the Companies Act and, despite service, the respondent did not pay the indebtedness nor applied to compound the dues. This factual matrix supports a prima facie inference of inability to pay.
- Documentary Evidence: The petitioner produced multiple documents that were probative of the respondent's liability — sales tax declarations bearing A.K. Racharya's signatures and rubber stamps, a Ranbaxy letter certifying payments for supplies made through the petitioner to M/s Richa Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., the petitioner's ledger showing debits and a balance sheet reflecting a debit of Rs. 3,15,165. The respondent failed to produce sales tax registration or proprietorship records to substantiate its claim that the documents related to a separate sole proprietorship.
- Allegations of Fabrication: The respondent alleged fabrication and interpolation of dates and use of the company's rubber stamp on documents. At hearing, the respondent abandoned the contention that the statutory notice was not served. The court observed that carbon copies of documents were in the respondent's custody and that no satisfactory explanation was provided for the presence of A.K. Racharya's signatures on the sales tax declarations, undermining the fabrication allegation.
- Transfer of Partnership Assets: The court relied on an agreement of 30 April 1985 among directors/promoters whereby assets and liabilities of M/s Richa Laboratories (a partnership of A.K. and Salil Racharya) were to be transferred to the respondent company. No evidence was placed before the court to show a distinct proprietary concern separate from the partnership and the respondent company.
- Effect of Pending Suit: The court considered the respondent's contention that the petition should fail because the petitioner had filed a civil suit. Applying the principle in 62 (1987) CC 239, the court held that filing a suit does not invalidate winding up proceedings where the suit is instituted to protect limitation rights; thus the petition was not barred for that reason.
- Bona Fide Dispute and Precedent: The respondent relied on 1990 (1) CLJ 289 where a petition was dismissed because of a substantial defence. The court distinguished that case from the present facts, stating that it was not satisfied that any bona fide dispute had been established on the record before it.
- Interest Claim: The petitioner sought interest at 18% p.a. The court noted absence of any agreement or evidence to justify that rate of interest and therefore declined to conclude entitlement to interest at that rate on the materials before it.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Petition admitted; petition allowed.
Concretely, the court admitted the winding up petition and directed publication of one citation each in The Statesman, Nav Bharat Times and the Delhi Gazette for 27 September 1993. The court provided the respondent an opportunity to avoid publication by paying the principal amount due (i.e., the amount claimed) less the interest claimed by the petitioner within two months from the date of judgment. If the principal amount due is paid within the stipulated time, the petition shall be dismissed, subject to liberty to the petitioner to continue to pursue his remedy in the civil suit with respect to interest.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the winding up petition was admitted and publication of citations was ordered, but publication can be avoided if the respondent pays the principal sum within two months (the court declined to grant the 18% interest due to lack of evidence).
- The court did not state that it was establishing any novel legal precedent; it applied existing authorities (as cited) to the facts and distinguished contrary authority relied upon by the respondent. The decision's broader application is limited to the factual findings (non-payment after statutory notice, documentary evidence linking the respondent to the claimed liability, and absence of a bona fide dispute on the record).
Petition allowed.
Mr. J.K Mehra, J.— This is a petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent company alleging that the respondent eompany is indebted to the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 3,15,165/—which the respondent company failed to pay despite a notice of demand dated 25th March 1988 under Section 434 of the Companies Act having been served on the company. It is further pointed out that the company kept on shifting its Registered Office without filing any return with the Registrar of Companies and that a notice was ultimately served on 21st May, 1988. Despite such service the respondent company did not pay the dues of the petitioner nor took any steps to compound the dues.
2. The petition was resisted on various ground which have been refuted by the petitioner in the rejoinder. The respondent has alleged that there exists a bonafide dispute about the claim of the petitioner. The respondent while disputing the liability and delivery of goods the price whereof is claimed by the petitioner has taken the plea that the respondent received licence to manufacture pharmaceuticals by the Drug Control and Licencing Authority, Delhi only on 13.5.1986 whereas all the bills on the basis whereof the present action has been initiated relate to period prior to May 1986. The respondent has denied having been supplied any basic drugs by the Manufacturer through the petitioner. This plea, as would appear from what is noticed hereinafter is without any merit. The respondent has also raised a plea that the notice was fabricated and no statutory notice had been served. However, this plea at the time of arguments was given up by the Counsel for the respondent on being confronted with the A.D card. In any event. I must notice that this plea on the face of the record is malafide and false. Another objection raised by the respondent is that the letter of balance confirmation signed by Mr. A.K Racharya is fabricated inasmuch as the said letter was given on 26th October, 1985 by Mr. A.K Racharaya in his capacity as sole propreitor of Richa Laboratories which is alleged to be his sole propreitorship concern. It is alleged that the date on this letter has been changed from 26.10.85 to 26.12.85 only to bring the petitioner's claim within the period of limitation, with regard to the stamp of the respondent company, Counsel stated that the petitioner Mr. Vijay Kumar Jain, Proprietor v. Parkash and Company was also one of the Directors of the respondent and in that capacity he had in his possession a rubber stamp of the company and such stamp was affixed by Mr. Jain himself after interpolating the date thereon. I may note that although this letter is being attributed to the sole proprietorship concern which is alleged to be different from the Respondent Company, yet the carbon copy of the original was produced by the respondent's Counsel from the respondents custody. Furthermore, no explanation is forthcoming as to how the respondent was in possession of the carbon copy of the letter dated 26.12.85 when according to them this letter did not pertain to the company and had been forged and fabricated by the petitioner by altering the date and also by affixing the rubber stamp of the company. It was further stated that the proprietory concern was changed to a partnership and the assets and liabilities of the partnership were taken over by the respondent Company. The petitioner has also refuted the plea of interpolating the letter confirming the balance. It was pointed out that if the letter had been signed in October 1985 the balance amount would have been only Rs. 1.75,165/—which was the debit balance upto 26th October, 1985. The amount of Rs. 3,50,000/- was the debit balance on 26.12.85 only, in the light of this I feel that the correction of date, if any, must have been carried out by Mr. Racharya himself.
3. Next it was contended that the petitioner has already instituted a suit for the recovery of the amount referred to in the present petition and as such that matter will be done into on its own merits after recording evidence. For that reason also, this Hon'ble Court should not proceed with this petition.
4. The petitioner has filed with the rejoinder photocopies of a number of documents including the sales tax declarations, all signed by Mr. A.K Racharya who is admittedly the Managing Director of the respondent Company. These sales tax declarations also bear the rubber stamp of the respondent. The plea raised by respondent was that all these were signed by Mr. Racharya in the name of his own proprietorship concern and not on behalf of the respondent Company and rubber stamps were affixed, by the petitioner since Mr. Jain happened to be in possession thereof. The respondent has alleged that those declarations were also fabricated, but no explanation is forthcoming about the reasons for Mr. A.K Racharya's signatures, which are not disputed, on those declaration slips. The respondent has not produced in the Court their sales tax Registration Certificate nor have they got produced the record of the sole proprietorship to sustain their allegations that the sales tax declarations related to the poprietorship concern. Production of the record of the alleged proprietorship would have been no problem since the alleged proprietor and Managing Director of respondent are the same person. In para 8 of the reply the respondent has stated that it has been lying closed since 11.7.86 which clearly indicates that the Company had not been carrying on any business since that date.
5. My attention has been drawn to an agreement between all the Directors including Mr. A.K Racharya and Promotors of the respondent company dated 30th April, 1985. Clause 3 thereof provides that all the assets and liabilities of M/s. Richa Laboratories, partnership concern of which the first i.e (Mr. A.K Racharya) and second party (i.e Mr. Salil Racharya) are the partners shall be transferred to the said company M/s. Richa Laboratories Pvt Ltd. In fact from the said agreement it appears that M/s Richa Laboratories was a partnership firm of which A.K Racharya and Salil Racharya were” the partners. There is no evidence placed on record by the respondent to show that apart from the partnership firm and the respondent there existed another business concern by the same name i.e, Richa Laboratories of which A.K Racharya was the sole proprietor. Even a copy of the Sales Tax Registration Certificate has not been produced to support the story of Mr. A.K Racharya being the sole proprietor of Richa Laboratories whose assets and liabilities had not been taken over by the respondent Company. The petitioner in his rejoinder has mentioned that the respondent Company had earlier a licence to manufacture pharmaceuticals from the Drug Controller. Delhi for its premises which was at that time located at E-249/10 Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-II, New Delhi. No further effort was made or documents produced to show that the drug licence for the said premises related only to a proprietorship and not the respondent Company as referred to in para 2 of the rejoinder. The petitioner has further filed a letter from the manufacturer i.e Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited wherein they have listed all the bills which are the subject-matter of the claim of the petitioner against the respondent stating therein, inter-alia, as under:—
“this is to certify that we have received payment from you against our various invoices as per the details given for supplies made through you to M/s. Richa Laboratories Pvt. Ltd…”.
6. The petitioner has also filed a copy of its own statement of account showing the debits relating to the aforesaid bills to the manufacturers and debits have been raised after payment against the respondent after payment to the manufacturer. They have also filed a copy of the relevant account showing the balance as on 1.4.87 in the account books and the balance sheet of the petitioner relating to the respondent Company showing a debit balance of Rs. 3,15,165/-. The arguments were postponed to enable the respondent to obtain from M/s Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited a Certificate showing as to where the goods were actually delivered to sustain their allegation that they never received any goods from Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. but no such certificate was produced.
7. In the light of this discussion and also keeping in view the fact that the respondent has been lying closed since 11.7.86 and the did not respond to the notice of demand under Section 434 of the Companies Act there does arise a presumption in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent that the respondent is unable to pay its debts. Only question that remains to be seen is, if filing of the suit by the petitioner would non-suit him in the present case. I cannot agree with this contention of the Respondent. This question was duly considered in a case 62 (1987) CC 239 wherein it was held that the proceedings for winding up will not be invalidated if a suit is filed by the petitioner by way of abundant caution to save the claim getting barred by limitation, in the present case also the suit appears to have been filed by way of abundant caution to save the limitation from running out.
8. The respondent placed reliance on the judgment of this Court 1990 (1) Company Law Journal 289 wherein it was held that winding up proceedings are no substitute for proceedings for recovery. In that case it was in the light of a substantial defence raised by the Company that the Court was pleased to dismiss the Company petition. While taking the above view they left the petitioning creditor free to seek his remedy by way of a Civil Suit. In the present case I am not in a position to agree with the respondent that there exists a bona fide dispute. The petitioner has however not produced any agreement between the petitioner and the respondent to pay interest on the outstanding balance nor has any evidence been produced wherefrom such a liability could be inferred. In the circumstances, in the absence of evidence it cannot be concluded that the petitioner was entitled to charge interest at the rate of 18% p.a as alleged.
9. In the light of the above discussion. I admit this petition and direct that one citation each be published in “Statesman”. “Nav Bharat Times” and Delhi Gazette for 27th September 1993, with a further direction that in case the respondent pays the amount due minus the interest claimed within 2 months from the date of this judgment, the citations shall not be published. In case the principal amount due is paid, this petition shall stand dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his remedy with regard to interest in the suit instituted by him.
Petition allowed.
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