Mrs. Santosh Duggal, J.:— This sales tax reference has been made by the Appellate Tribunal, Sales Tax, Delhi, at the instance of the assessee, M/s. Televista Electronics (P) Ltd., Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi. The questions that have been referred for the opinion of this Court pertain to the assessment year 1974-75, and are as follows:

1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that television sets were covered by entry No. 4 of the First Schedule appended to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to Delhi?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that T.V cabinets, decorative panel, turn knobs, printed circuit boards and boards were component parts and accessories of “wireless reception instruments and apparatus” within the meaning of these terms in entry No. 4 of the First Schedule appended to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to Delhi?

2. The dispute primarily is as to the rate of sales tax, chargeable in respect to one category of finished goods marketed by the assessee, namely, television sets, the assessee being engaged in the manufacture of T.V sets, tape-recorders, calculators and transistors, etc. The statement of facts further reveals that the assessee being a registered dealer, purchased certain parts required for the manufacture of T.V sets against the registration certificates without payment of requisite sales tax. The liability to pay sales tax on these items arose because of the provisions of second proviso to section 5(2)(ii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to Delhi (for short “the Act”), for the reason that the parts which the assessee purchased on the strength of the registration certificates could earn exemption from sales tax only if they were intended for resale in the Union Territory of Delhi or had been purchased for use as raw material in manufacture of goods, in the Union Territory of Delhi. It appears that a certain number of T.V sets, for the manufacture whereof parts as enumerated in question No. 2 had been used, were sent for sale outside the Union Territory of Delhi and for this reason the department raised the demand by invoking the provisions of the second proviso to section 5(2) of the Act, which lays down that in case the goods are not utilised by the registered dealer for the purpose declared while making tax-free purchases, these shall form part of taxable turnover of the purchasing dealer. This is how the liability to pay sales tax has fallen on the assessee, in respect to television cabinets, decorative panels, turn knobs, printed circuit boards and boards, etc.

3. In so far as the first question is concerned, the assessee has contested the rate of sales tax as applied by the department. The contention is that T.V sets manufactured by them do not fall in any of the entries of the First Schedule to the Act, as applicable at the relevant time, and as such the lower rate of sales tax as envisaged by section 5(1)(c) would be payable. The implication is that by virtue of the provisions of section 5(1)(a), the rate of sales tax for goods specified in the First Schedule is 10 per cent of the taxable turnover, whereas goods which are neither specified in the First nor in the Third Schedule, the rate of sales tax is 5 per cent under sub-section (1)(c) of section 5.

4. For proper appreciation of the contentions canvassed on behalf of the assessee, it will be expedient to extract the relevant entries of the First Schedule at different points of time so as to put the controversy in proper perspective. The first period is from 1st December, 1956, to 30th September, 1959. The relevant entry, reads as under:

“3. (a) Wireless reception instruments and apparatus and component parts thereof including all electrical valves, accumulators, amplifiers and loudspeakers which are not specially designed for purposes other than wireless reception.”

5. By virtue of the amendment effective from 1st October, 1959, the entry was changed to No. 4, and read as under:

“4. Wireless reception instruments and apparatus, radios and radio gramophones, electrical valves, accumulators, amplifiers and loudspeakers and spare parts and accessories thereof.”

6. It is this entry which falls for interpretation for the purpose of present reference, for the reason that till the enactment of Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, it was this entry that remained in operation, and which is being invoked by the department to bring television sets within the net of 10 per cent rate of sales tax. In fact, the dispute relates to the assessment year immediately preceding the enforcement of the aforesaid Act, wherein the relevant entry, being entry No. 4 of the First Schedule appended to the 1975 Act, reads as under:

“4. Wireless reception instruments and apparatus, radios and radio-gramophones, television sets, accumulators, amplifiers and loudspeakers and spare parts, component parts and accessories thereof, and electrical valves.”

7. A comparative study of these entries, as they existed for time to time, reveals that up to 1975 the relevant entry contained the generic expression as “wireless reception instruments and apparatus”. This expression is common to all the three entries which were operative during different periods. The only difference is that from time to time certain other items like radios and radio-gramophones, etc., were specified. The T.V sets, as specified item, appeared in this entry for the first time in the First Schedule to the 1975 Act.

8. Mr. Sangal, arguing on behalf of the assessee, contended that the terms and expressions used in taxing statutes should be interpreted in the manner, as understood by the business community, and not by reference to technical meanings or scientific derivations. The contention, in short, is that the court should adopt the trade parlance test. He argued that in common practice no one describes a T.V set as wireless instruments or apparatus and that the view taken by the departmental authorities up to the Tribunal is erroneous, when they held that a television because of its functional operation of receiving sound and images by wireless, answers to the generic description of “wireless reception instruments and apparatus”. He further contended that where the specified goods, working on wireless reception system, were meant, such as radios and radio-gramophones, they have been expressly included in the entry.

9. The learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case reported as State of A.P v. V.V Rama Rao and Company [1989] 74 STC 190, where an entry more or less similar to entry No. 4 in the present case, fell for interpretation vis-a-vis television sets and the court held that although it may be possible by an involved process of reasoning to include television sets within the meaning of wireless reception instruments and apparatus, but the learned Judges by applying the common or commercial parlance test, came to the conclusion that television sets cannot be so categorised.

10. We cannot bring ourselves to accept the view as propounded by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid case. It is true that ordinarily the trade parlance test may be relevant, while deciding the classification in respect to commercial goods but it cannot be a determining factor. When terms of science or technology are used, then the scientific and technical meaning has to take precedence over the common parlance test.

11. It is only when trade names or common nomenclatures are employed, that this could be pressed into aid for interpretation of an entry. We find support for this proposition from a judgment of the Chancery Court reported in Holt & Co. v. Collyer [1881] 16 Ch D 718, where it was held that if there is a word which is of a technical and scientific character, then it must be construed according to that which is its primary meaning, namely, its technical and scientific meaning.

12. The Supreme Court also endorsed this view in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarin Textile Mills [1975] 35 STC 634 : (1975) 4 SCC 308 : AIR 1975 SC 1262, where an entry in the notification issued under the U.P Sales Tax Act was interpreted by reference to the dictionary meaning by taking note of dictionaries such as Oxford Dictionary, and Webster's New World Dictionary.

13. It thus follows that common parlance test is not the uniform rule. It depends upon the expression used by the Legislature or the intention gathered from other items enumerated in the relevant entry by adopting what is known as the ejusdem generis test or noscitur a sociis test and also by taking a cumulative view of the entries as they stood from time to time.

14. There are cases where the entries were of such description that certain goods, which ordinarily would not, by adopting the common parlance test or that of a layman's understanding, be considered to be belonging to that particular category, but by virtue of the generic description of the tariff entry, it was held to include items which ordinarily could not, by the commercial parlance test, be so counted. For instance, in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Slate of Rajasthan [1980] 46 STC 256 : (1980) ELT 383 (SC), the Supreme Court held that the relevant entry in the Central excise tariff was of such wide magnitude, namely, “all varieties of fabrics” that it would include tyre cord fabric. This conclusion was reached with the aid of Dictionary of Textile Terms and Manmade Textile Encyclopaedia. This was so even when the Revenue Board had issued a clarificatory circular that this item, namely, tyre cord fabric cannot be described as a “fabric”. The court held that:

“To our mind, the view taken by the Revenue Board cannot be regarded as resolving the question before us. Whether Parliament understood the word ‘fabric’ to include tyre cord fabric must be gathered from all the relevant material and with reference to tests and criteria accepted in law rather on the basis of a single notification.”

15. The rule of literal interpretation is another test recognised by courts. For instance, in the case of Polestar Electronic (Put.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax [1978] 41 STC 409, the Supreme Court laid down that when the court is construing a statutory enactment, the intention of the Legislature should be gathered from the language used by it and it is not permissible to the court to speculate about the legislative intent. If the language of a statute is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it, for in such a case the words best declare the intention of the law giver. It was also held that in construing a taxing statute, one must have regard to the strict letter of the law, and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law.

16. In case where a comprehensive expression with scientific and technological connotation has been used, then the courts have to take recourse to the dictionary meaning as the Supreme Court did in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. [1980] 46 STC 256 : (1980) ELT 383 (SC). The rule of noscitur a sociis, endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rainbow Steels Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1981] 47 STC 298, can also be a guiding factor, as also the rule of ejusdem generis.

17. Viewed in this light, we have no doubt in our mind that the term “wireless reception instrument and apparatus” is a technical term of comprehensive nature and shall encompass in its ambit all goods which answer to the functional test of wireless reception. The inclusion, in this entry, of goods such as radios, radio-gramophones is only illustrative. We would go further to say that television is in a way an extension of the principle of radio transmission because the only difference is that in radio the reproduction is only of sound whereas in television it is both audio as well as visual, but both operate on the principle of wireless reception. In Words and Phrases Legally Defined, volume 5, second edition, television set has been defined to mean:

“any wireless telegraphy apparatus designed primarily for the purpose of receiving and exhibiting television programmes broadcast for general reception.” (page 172)

18. In the same dictionary, the term “wireless telegraphy” has been defined at page 344 to mean the emission or reception of electromagnetic energy which serves, inter alia, for the conveying of messages, sound or visual images. On this definition of wireless telegraphy, a television is for all purposes a wireless reception instrument and apparatus.

19. In Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Fourth Edition, television has been defined to mean:

“Process of transmitting and reproducing on a screen events, scenes, plays, etc., in pictures and sound, using radio signals, programmes broadcast in this way “(page 1321)

20. A television has also been defined, in this dictionary, to be an apparatus with a screen and loudspeaker for receiving broadcast, and wireless to mean radio communications as also broadcast by wireless.

21. As per Concise Oxford Dictionary, Eighth Edition, television set means a system for reproducing on a screen visual images transmitted with sound by radio signals, a device with a screen for receiving these signals. (page 1255).

22. In the same dictionary, wireless is defined to mean the transmission and reception of radio signals.

23. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition, at page 852 defines “radio” inter alia, to mean transmission and reception of messages, etc., by electromagnetic waves of radio-frequency, without connecting wire, and television has been defined at page 1099 to mean a system for reproducing actual or recorded scene at a distance on a screen, etc., by radio transmission.

24. In the Chambers Technical Dictionary, Revised Edition, term “radio” has been defined to mean a generic term applied to methods of signalling through space, without the use of connecting wires by means of electromagnetic waves generated by high-frequency alternating currents (page 698). Television has been defined in this dictionary as an electrical transmission of visual scenes and images by wire or radio in such rapid succession (page 837). Wireless, according to this dictionary, is an alternative name for radio (page 911).

25. Similar is the meaning given to the expression “wireless” in The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of English Language, Encyclopaedic Edition, page 1128, namely, as a method of communication by electromagnetic waves and also radio telegraphy whereas television has been defined at page 1017 to mean the transmission of visual images by means of electromagnetic waves.

26. It would also be of interest to note the definition of wireless communication as contained in (The Indian) Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, whereby according to section 2, “wireless communication” has been defined to mean:

“2. (1) ‘wireless communication’ means any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by means of electricity, magnetism, or radio waves of hertzian waves, without the use of wires or other continuous electrical conductors between the transmitting and the receiving apparatus.”

27. There is thus no manner of doubt that a television operates on principle of wireless telegraphy or radio transmission. By virtue of the definition in the Wireless Telegraphy Act also, any apparatus which is a means of wireless communication by transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds by electricity, magnetism or radio waves shall take within its ambit television set also.

28. In the judgment in the case of Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer [1961] 12 STC 286, while considering as to whether “betel leaves” shall be included in the expression “vegetables” as used in the C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, it was no doubt held by the Supreme Court that words of common day use should not be construed in technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. But the judgment is primarily based on the fact that originally the term “vegetables” was included in item No. 6 of the Schedule to that Act whereas “betel leaves” were covered by item 36. This was the Schedule where all articles mentioned therein were exempt from sales tax. By subsequent amendment item 36 pertaining to betel leaves was altogether omitted. It was in that context that the Supreme Court held that the intention of the Legislature was very clear that the term “vegetables” did not include betel leaves as indicated by two separate entries and that since one of the entries had been taken out of the Schedule, then the necessary corollary would be that that item ceased to enjoy exemption and it cannot be argued that it should be taken to include in the more general term. This case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable, and can be of no assistance to the petitioner.

29. The principle has always been recognised that where technical term or terms of science or art are involved, then although common parlance test has also to be kept in view, but reference to dictionary and technical words always facilitates interpretation. For instance, the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jaswant Singh Charon Singh [1967] 19 STC 469, took note of a number of dictionary meanings, such as Blackies' Concise Dictionary, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, and Webster's New International Dictionary, as an aid to interpretation as to whether the term “charcoal,” would be included in the term “coal”. The final analysis, as outlined in this case, was that the construction of the word has to be adopted to the fitness of the matter and the statute.

30. A resume of all these authorities shows that the common parlance test, though accepted to be a reliable test ordinarily, it is not the exclusive test. In case ordinary trade names are used, then the theory of commercial parlance test is more readily available, as against cases where generic expression of scientific or technological meaning have been used, and then the technical meaning would be more relevant.

31. There are also cases where functional test has been held to be the key factor. For instance, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. The Siemens India Limited [1986] 61 STC 194 went by the functional test. The court in that case was dealing with two entries in the Schedule with reference to an article known as monobloc pump sets. While accepting the fact that these pump sets were included in the definition of “electric motors” and worked on electric principle, but going by the functional use to which these monobloc pump sets are put, and recognising the fact that one of the uses is by agriculturists, it was held that these goods will not fall in the entry relating to “electrical goods” (entry 15), but rather in entry No. 17 which reads as under:

“17. Agricultural implements including chaff-cutters and Persian wheels or parts thereof and electric motors including monobloc pump sets of 3 to 7.5 horse-power.”

32. To the same effect is the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Karnal Machinery Store v. Assessing Authority, Karnal [1973] 31 STC 3, wherein it was held that monobloc pump sets, purpose of which is to pump water cannot be classed as electric goods simply because these worked by electric energy.

33. In the present case also, going by functional test, a television set certainly operates as a wireless reception apparatus to receive sounds and images by radio waves. Merely because entry 4 has some items included by specific reference, namely, such as radio or radio telegraphy and does not include television sets, does not mean that the intention was to exclude television sets. It is pertinent to note that in the Schedule to the 1975 Act, the television as an article has been specifically included in entry No. 4, which otherwise remains more or less identically worded.

34. Mr. Sangal further argued that this entry contains even goods which do not work on wireless principle such as electric valves, amplifiers and radio speakers. Nothing turns on this plea because it is an established proposition that it would make no difference once certain goods are enumerated in a specified tariff entry by specific inclusion even though they generally may not be belonging to the class of goods in the leading expression, because as held in the case of Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241 : AIR 1977 SC 597 that once an article is classified and put under a distinct entry, the basis of classification is not open to question.

35. Such a contention is, in fact, begging the question in issue because in case the expression “television” by specific reference is included, then all this controversy would not have arisen. The question to be seen is only as to whether the generic expression “wireless reception apparatus” would take within its ambit “television sets” or not. Inclusion or exclusion, at a particular point of time, by itself would not be of any significance, as held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of A.P v. V.V Rama Rao & Co. [1989] 74 STC 190, on which Mr. Sangal placed reliance, that: “Simply because some particular goods are included in a particular entry by way of amendment” does not mean that those goods become taxable under that entry for the first time. In such cases the amendments are clarificatory or explanatory in nature in order to eliminate any room for controversy or dispute. We fully subscribe to this view and hold that the assessee's contention cannot be sustained to the effect that simply because “television sets” were not specifically included in entry No. 4, at the relevant time, the term “wireless reception apparatus” cannot be understood to take them in its fold.

36. We feel fortified in the view we have taken by judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, In re [1932] AC 304, where the contention that since broadcasting was not known as means of communication at the time when Constitution Act of Canada was passed, and as such the term “broadcasting” was not covered by the expression “telegraph and other works and undertakings” in section 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act of 1867, was negatived. An identical view was taken in an earlier case by the Queen's Bench in Attorney-General v. Edison Telephone Company of London (1880) LR 6 QBD 244, where the question arose whether the Edison Telephone Company, London, infringed by installation of telephones, the exclusive privilege of transmitting telegrams which was conferred upon the Postmaster-General under an Act of 1869, because the company had contended that since telephones were unknown at the time when those Acts were passed, the definition of telegraphy could not comprehend telephone. This contention was rejected by the court.

37. This view, as propounded in the aforesaid two cases was endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vishnu Agencies (Put.) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1978] 42 STC 31 holding that:

“These decisions proceed on the principle that if after the enactment of a legislation, new facts and situations arise which could not have been in the contemplation of the Legislature, statutory provisions can justifiably be applied to those facts and situations so long as the words of the statute are in a broad sense capable of containing them.”

(emphasis* supplied)

38. It is a different matter that on the facts of the given case, the ratio of the said judgments was hot held applicable.

39. Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, at page 155, has referred to another judgment of the King's Bench holding that:

“It is stringent rule of construction that in construing an Act of Parliament or a deed containing technical words, those words must be given their technical meaning.”

40. In this view of the matter, and particularly taking note cumulatively of the definitions as contained in the dictionaries, referred to above, where “television” has been invariably defined to mean an apparatus receiving images as well as sounds by radio transmission, i.e, on wireless, we have no hesitation in holding that the assessee has no case in insisting that the term “television set” cannot be deemed to be covered by entry No. 4, as it existed at the relevant time.

41. There is also an indication from a reading of the entry in the Customs Tariff Act, as is apparent from entry 85.15 as published in 1981, that a television transmission and reception apparatus is treated to be in the same category as radio. This is for the obvious reason, as already noted, the only difference is that whereas radio receives and transmits only sounds, a television performs the additional function of receiving and transmitting image, but both function on wireless technology.

42. The evidence of commercial parlance is also available from entries in the Central Excise Tariff because tariff entry 33A of the Central Excise Tariff includes television receiver sets in the general entry “wireless receiving-sets”.

43. There can be no better criteria for determining the trade understanding than taking note of the entries in the Central Excise and Customs Tariff Act because the manufacturers, as well as importers of goods, who are representatives of trade, industry and business, directly deal with them.

44. Accordingly even on the contention that common parlance test is the guiding factor, the petitioner has no case. Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that the assessee collected 10 per cent sales tax, during the assessment year under reference, on the television sets manufactured and marketed by them. What better evidence of trade understanding is required than assessee's own interpretation? It is only after collecting 10 per cent sales tax that the assessee has raised this dispute, and claimed refund by contending that the sales tax chargeable was??? cent under section 5(1)(c) of the Act, and that the “television sets” cannot be deemed to be covered by entry No. 4 or any other entry of the First Schedule, so as to make them exigible to the 10 per cent rate of sales tax.

45. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer question No. 1 in favour of the department and against the assessee.

46. In so far as question No. 2 is concerned, it requires modification to the extent that the opinion of the court is required as to whether T.V cabinets, decorative panels, turn knobs, printed circuit boards and boards were spare parts and accessories of “wireless reception instruments and apparatus” within the meaning of entry No. 4 of the First Schedule. It seems to be by mistake that the question refers to them as “component parts” because entry No. 4 contains the expression “spare parts” and not “component parts”. In fact, it is assessee's contention that the entry at the relevant time pertained only to “spare parts”, and these items were not so, and thus could not be subjected to sales tax at the rate of 10 per cent but at the general rate of 5 per cent under section 5(1)(c) of the Act.

47. Mr. Chawla appearing for the respondent contended that there was, in fact, no distinction between the term “spare parts” and “component parts”, and that the two are interchangeable, and that nothing turns on the fact as to whether these items were component parts or spare parts, and so long as they are parts of television, which they admittedly are, they shall be subjected to 10 per cent sales tax vide entry No. 4 of the First Schedule.

48. We have to decide first on principles as to whether the expressions “spare parts” and “component parts” are interchangeable terms or whether they carry different connotations? There can be no gainsaying the fact that whereas a “spare part” will always be a “component part” of an instrument or apparatus or machinery, but in our opinion the converse cannot invariably be true.

49. The distinction between as to what constitutes “spare parts” as against the term “component parts” has been very lucidly brought out by a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court reported as Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Amar Radio Cabinet Works [1968] 22 STC 63, where the contention of the taxing authorities that the radio cabinets fell within the definition of “spare parts” of wireless reception instruments and apparatus was rejected by holding that:

“As a matter of plain language, the expression ‘spare parts’ connotes a part which requires replacement in the ordinary course on account of wear and tear, and as an extra item for use in an emergency.”

50. The court further held that:

“It is inconceivable that anybody would keep a radio cabinet as an extra for use in an emergency, or that it could be said to be a part which would require replacement in the ordinary course on account of wear and tear.”

51. This view was reiterated in a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported as Rose Mary Carpentry Works v. Stale of Madras [1964] 15 STC 924. In that case even though the Board of Revenue had suo motu issued a memorandum clarifying that radio cabinet was only an accessory, the court held, taking note of the definition of the term “component” in the Chamber's Dictionary that a radio cabinet was a component part of a radio and could not be treated as an accessory even though the highest taxing body, namely, the Board of Revenue had characterised it so.

52. This view found favour with a single Judge of this Court also in the case of Sujan Singh v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax [1969] 24 STC 504, wherein the ratio of the decision in Amar Radio Cabinet Works [1968] 22 STC 63 (Bom) was followed. This judgment also took note of the meaning of “spare parts” as defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, as under:

“An extra part of a vehicle or machine kept for use in emergency or replacement.”

53. The court in that case was dealing with the body of a motor vehicle and held that it cannot fall within the expression “spare parts”. On the same parity of reasoning a television cabinet can also not fall within the category of “spare parts”, because as held in that case, the expression “spare parts” cannot be equated with “parts” with reference to the colour that is lent by the word “spare”.

54. The case relied upon by Mr. Chawla and reported as State of Gujarat v. B.G Batwara & Co. [1968] 22 STC 202 (Guj), related to tyres and there can be no disputing the proposition that tyres can always be used as “spare parts” as it is a matter of common knowledge that they are kept for replacement and can be used in emergency.

55. The fact that at different points of time the relevant entries, some time contained the expression “component parts” and some time “spare parts”, and in the 1975 Act entry No. 4 contains both, namely, “spare parts” as also “component parts” leads to the inevitable inference that these terms are not treated as interchangeable. Following the ratio of the judgments of the Bombay and Madras High Courts, as well as the High Court of Delhi extracted above, we are of the view that television cabinets cannot be deemed to be “spare parts” but are “component parts”.

56. Mr. Chawla placed reliance on a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Star Paper Mills Limited. v. Collector Of Central Excise, Meerut. [1990] 76 STC 312. This case is of no assistance to the Revenue because it only elucidates the term “component parts”, as parts going into the making or manufacture of an article, namely, which is a constituent part. As already noted, the question was misdirected and, in fact, what is required to be decided is whether these items fell in entry No. 4, and that entry at the time contained the expression “spare parts” only and not “component parts”.

57. Mr. Chawla could not refer us to any decided case or other tariff entry or dictionary meaning in support of his contention that the “component parts” and “spare parts” were interchangeable terms.

58. This Court has also kept a distinction between the terms “spare parts” and “component parts” in the case reported as Ghaziabad Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1991] 80 STC 243, though in a different context.

59. The same reasoning will apply to the items known as printed circuit boards and boards because these also are constituent parts of a television set and go into its making, and cannot be treated as spare parts. As a result, these three items, i.e, television cabinets, printed circuit boards and boards would constitute as component parts and would not fall in entry No. 4 as it existed at the relevant time and thus not liable to higher rate of sales tax which was applicable to items enumerated in the First Schedule, but would attract sales tax at the rate of 5 per cent as per provisions of section 5(1)(c) of the Act.

60. In so far as the other item, namely, decorative panel is concerned, this in our opinion has not been shown on record to be constituent part of a television set, nor is it a spare part. This item should aptly fall in the category of accessories, as these are not essential for the functioning of a television set. As the entry at the relevant time included the term “accessories” this item known as decorative panel would be covered by the said entry. Similarly, “turn knobs” would also be covered by this entry because these apparently answer to the description of “spare parts” as these can be kept and used in emergency and are meant for replacement without any overhauling of the main instrument. This would be thus also falling under entry No. 4. Question No. 2 is accordingly answered partly in favour of the Revenue and partly in favour of the assessee, in terms of the foregoing discussion.

61. There will be no order as to costs.

62. Reference answered accordingly.