Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Lt. General J.K Arora v. Union Of India &Ors

Delhi High Court
Aug 12, 1991
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

By a petition filed under Article 266 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner (at the time Additional Director General, Armed Forces Medical Services) sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to appoint him to the post of Director General Medical Services (Army) (DGMS (Army)). The petitioner had been commissioned as a Medical Officer on 10 July 1955, promoted to the rank of Lt. General on 14 June 1990 with seniority from 1 April 1990, and was due to superannuate on 31 October 1991. The Armed Forces Medical Services comprises integrated medical services for Army, Navy and Air Force and is structured in three tiers: DGAFMS (senior-most), the three DGMS posts (Army, Air Force, Navy) (second tier), and three third-tier posts (including Additional DGAFMS). There are seven officers in the cadre at the rank of Lt. General who fill the various posts.

The post of DGMS (Army) fell vacant on 1 July 1991. The petitioner contended he was the senior-most Lt. General available (except one officer already holding DGMS (Air Force)) and thus entitled to the DGMS (Army) post. The respondents refused to appoint him on the ground that he had less than one year of service remaining before superannuation. The petitioner challenged that refusal in the present writ petition. The respondents filed a counter-affidavit defending the decision; at hearing the court summoned and reviewed the service record and correspondence before delivering its decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, being the senior-most officer of the rank of Lt. General in the relevant cadre, was entitled to appointment as DGMS (Army) despite having less than one year of service left before superannuation.
  2. Whether the post of DGMS (Army) is of higher status and responsibility (and therefore distinct) as compared to the petitioner's then-post (Additional DGAFMS), such that appointment to DGMS (Army) should follow seniority practice rather than be treated as a mere incidence of posting.
  3. Whether denial of appointment on the ground of short remaining tenure contravenes principles of equality and fairness under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (as invoked by the petitioner).
  4. Whether the respondents' claim that appointment to DGMS (Army) is by selection (and not by seniority) is sustainable in light of past practice and the record, and whether any claimed policy of refusing appointment to officers with less than one year's service exists and was applied consistently.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (Lt. General J.K. Arora) asserted entitlement to appointment as DGMS (Army) by virtue of being the senior-most officer at the rank of Lt. General (save for one officer already holding DGMS (Air Force)).
  • There was no departmental rule or requirement that a minimum period of one year's remaining service is necessary for appointment to DGMS (Army); the one-year minimum in the departmental note applied only to DGAFMS (the senior-most post), not to second-tier DGMS posts.
  • Appointments in the past had been made to DGMS posts even where incumbents had less than one year's remaining service; thus, denying appointment now on that ground was arbitrary and not based on consistent policy.
  • The post of DGMS (Army) commands higher status and responsibility than the petitioner's post (Additional DGAFMS); distinctive features of DGMS (Army) were identified (membership of selection boards, membership of apex advisory committees, precedence in seating plans, etc.), supporting the claim that DGMS (Army) should be offered by seniority practice.
  • Denial of the post was challenged as unfair, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution; counsel relied on Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 1413) to assert that armed forces personnel retain constitutional protections.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents' counter-affidavit stated that appointment to DGMS (Army) is not made on seniority but by selection, and that the petitioner had not been selected for the DGMS (Army) post.
  • They argued appointment of the petitioner for a short period before retirement would not be in the service interest; his short tenure justified not appointing him.
  • Respondents disclosed that Major General U.S. Bhargava had been proposed for appointment as DGMS (Army) and had been approved for the rank of Lt. General on 7 May 1991.
  • At hearing, respondents' counsel alternatively argued that all seven Lt. General posts are of equal status and that posting as DGMS (Army) is a mere incidence of posting rather than an elevation based on distinct responsibility.
  • The respondents maintained that appointments are to be made by selection, emphasizing service interest and continuity over strict seniority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narain, Mithila University v. Dayanand Jha (1986) (All India Service Law Journal reference in the opinion) The equivalence of pay scale alone does not determine whether two posts are equivalent; the correct criterion is whether the posts are of equal status and responsibility. The court relied on this principle to determine that DGMS (Army) and the petitioner's post were not equivalent despite identical pay/ rank; status and responsibility mattered and supported the petitioner's claim.
Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 1413 (referred to in the opinion) Personnel subject to the Army Act do not cease to be citizens and remain entitled to constitutional protections, including under Articles 14 and 16. The court applied this authority to affirm that the petitioner, as an army officer, was entitled to protection under Articles 14 and 16 and that executive actions concerning his posting were subject to judicial scrutiny for fairness and legality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the record and correspondence after noting inconsistencies between the respondents' counter-affidavit (which described appointment as by selection) and oral submissions (which characterized the DGMS (Army) posting as a mere incidence of posting and as of equal status to the petitioner's present post). The court observed the following analytical steps and findings, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The court found that the record and correspondence demonstrated that the post of DGMS (Army) does possess higher status and authority than the post occupied by the petitioner. This conclusion was supported by documentary material in the file (including seating precedence and functional responsibilities), and the respondents did not deny the distinctive features identified by the petitioner.
  2. Notwithstanding identical rank and emoluments, the court accepted that internal seniority and reporting relationships within the cadre show a hierarchy: some officers in the same rank report to others, indicating differentiated status among posts of the same pay/rank.
  3. The court treated the respondents' shifting positions (selection versus mere posting; equality of posts versus higher status of DGMS) as inconsistent and found the counter-affidavit's assertion of selection was at variance with the record and past practice.
  4. The court noted that historically officers with less than one year's remaining service had been appointed to DGMS (Army) and related posts. Therefore, denying the petitioner on the sole ground of short tenure would be unsustainable unless the respondents could show a clear, uniformly applied policy that no officer with less than one year's service would be appointed in future.
  5. The respondents were asked to produce an affidavit stating any such policy; they were unable to furnish a categorical policy statement and ultimately expressed an inability to do so on instructions. The absence of a clear, consistently applied policy rendered the denial on tenure grounds unjustified.
  6. The court invoked the principle from Prithi Pal Singh that members of the armed forces retain constitutional rights, reinforcing the view that administrative decisions affecting appointments must meet standards of fairness and legality under Articles 14 and 16.
  7. Considering the petitioner's unblemished service record and the lack of any other reason for non-selection, the court concluded that the petitioner should not be deprived of the higher-status posting at the late stage of his career without a valid, demonstrable policy reason.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to appoint the petitioner to the post of Director General Medical Services (Army) (DGMS (Army)) and to grant him consequential benefits in respect of that appointment.

Consequences and implications:

  • The immediate, concrete effect of the decision is that the respondents must appoint the petitioner as DGMS (Army) and provide the consequential benefits arising from that appointment.
  • The court recorded that the petitioner had a distinguished service record and found no other justified reason in the record for denying the posting.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.
  • The court applied settled principles (as reflected in the cited precedents) about assessing equivalence of posts by status and responsibility, and about the applicability of Articles 14 and 16 to members of the armed forces. The judgment addresses the fairness of the administrative decision-making in the particular factual matrix rather than announcing a new, broad legal principle; the direct effect is limited to the parties and the appointment ordered.
Show all summary ...

Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare, J.:— By this petition under Article 266 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner who is at present Additional Director General, Armed Forces Medical Services prays that a writ of mandamus to issued directing the respondents to appoint him on the post of Director General Medical Services (Army) DGMS Army). The brief facts are as follows;

2. The petitioner was commissioned as a Medical Officer in the Indian Army on 10th July, 1955 and on 14th June, 1990, he was promoted to the rank of Lt. General with national seniority w.e.f 1st April, 1990 The petitioner is due for retirement on his superannuation on 31st October, 1991. The medical services of the Armed Forces is an integrated service comprising of the medical services of the three wings of the Armed Forces, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force. It is headed by Director General Armed Forces Medical Services (DGAFMS,) The services of Medical Officers are inter-changable as per the requirements. The medical service of the respective wing of the Armed Forces is under a Director General. According to the petitioner, there are three tiers in the services. The first tier is of DGAFMS, the second tier consists of DGMS (Army), DGMS (Air Force) and DGMS (Navy). The third tier consists of Commandant AMC Centre and School (b) Commandant Armed Forces Medical College and (c) Additional Director General Armed Forces Medical Services. The post of DGAFMS is the senior most. The posts of DGMS (Army), DGMS (Air Force) and DGMS (Navy) are at par and second in seniority and junior to DGAFMS. The three posts in the third tier are at par and are junior most and lower in seniority to posts in the second tier. There are in all seven officers in the cadre of the rank of Lt. General in the Aimed Forces Medical Services. These seven Lt. Generals in the Medical Service fill up the post according to their seniority in the first tier second tier or third tier. The Government of India, Ministry of Defence issued a departmental note that with effect from 1.4.1988 only those Lt. Generals (and equivalent) who have at least one year of service before the attainment of 60 years of age i.e the age of superannuation will be eligible for the appointment as DGAFMS. Thus, if none of the officers in the second tier has more than one year service left an officer from the third tier having minimum one year service could be appointed as DGAFMS. It is the case of the petitioner that no such condition of minimum service is prescribed for appointment to the post of DGMS (Army), or DGMS (Air Force) or DGMS (Navy) i.e the post in the second tier. The post of DGMS (Army) fell vacant on 1st July, 1991. The petitioner claims that since he is the senior most officer of the rank of the Lt. General in the entire Armed Forces Medical Service, except one officer who is already holding the appointment of DGMS (Air Force) in the second tier, he is entitled to be appointed as DGMS (Army). According to the petitioner, since minimum service is not prescribed for appointment to the post, the respondents can not deny him the said post on the ground that he has less than one year service left and he is to retire on his superannuation on 31.10.1991 The petitioner is aggrieved by this decision of the respondents refusing to appoint him as DGMS (Army) on the ground that he has less than one year service left and hence this present writ petition.

3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though all the seven posts in the cadre are of the rank of Lt. General the appointments from the third tier to the second tier is made on the basis of seniority and the senior most person in the third tier is entitled to appointment when there is a vacancy in the second tier. He further submitted that respondents can not promote a Major General directly as a DGMS in the second tier overlooking the seniority of officers working in the third tier either as Commandent in AMC School. Commandant Armed Force Medical College or Additional DGAFMS. Learned, counsel submitted that respondents now propose to promote Major General, U.S Bhargava as DGMS (Army) superseding the petitioner who is senior to Major General Bhargava. Learned counsel further submitted that n the past appointment to the post of DGMS (Army) was made even though the incumbents had less than year's service and, therefore, the reason givene for not appointing the petitioner as DGMS (Army) is unjustified and not basd on any policy. Though all the seven posts are of the rank of Lt. General the posts of DGMS (Army) is considered higher because it carries higher status and the DGMS (Army) has to perform important and responsible functions. Learned counsel pointed out following distinctive features which would show that post of DGMS (Army) and the post of Additional Director Genera1 Medical Service are not equal:

(i) DGMS (Army) is the head of Medical Services of the Army, while the Additional DGAFMS is merely a ministerial department post as number two. This fact is admitted in para S of the counter affidavit by the respondents.

(ii) DGMS (Army) is the Member of Selection Board held for selection for promotion of Medical Officers from the rank of Col. to Brigadier and Brigadier to Major General, whereas Additional DGAFMS is not.

(iii) DGMS (Army) is the member of Medical Services Advisory Committee (an apex body for policy formulation), while Additional DGAFMS is not.

(iv) All Director General (DGs) in all Government Departments are senior posts than the Additional Director Generals (Addl. DGs) in such Government Departments.

(v) In seating plans for official meetings DGMS (Army) has the precedence over the third tier officers as per para 1(a)(ii) of DGAFMS letter No. 15965.seating plan of the DGAFMS/DG-3 (b) dated 2.5.1990 which reads as under;

“DGMS as the Head of Services will have precedence over the Commandent AFMC and Additional DGAFMS irrespective of their individual service seniority The precedence amongst the DGMS will be based on their individual service seniority (date of seniority)”.

4. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narain, Mithila University, 1986 (Vol. 2) All India Service Saw Journal page 142 in support of his contention that although the rank os DGMS (Army) and Additional DGAFMS is that of Lt. General the posts are not at par and equal because of the higher status and authority which DGMS commands. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that he being the senior most officer of the rank of the Lt. General in the cadre he is entitled to the appointment as DGMS (Army).

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that officers working in the Armed Forces are as much entitled to the protection of their fundamental rights under the Constitution as any other citizen and the petitioner can not be denied his legal and constitutional rights or appointment as DGMS (Army). He has challenged the decision as unfair, unjust, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution Reference is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 1413 in support of his contention and it is submitted that even Army Officers are entitled to the benefits of the liberal spirit of the Constitution and are entitled to the protection of their fundamental rights.

6. The respondents have filed counter affidavit and have taken the stand that the appointment to the post of DGMS (Army) is not made on seniority basis and is made purely by selection Lt. General J.K Arora, petitioner herein has not been selected for appointment of DGMS (Navy) nor was he selected to the post of DGMS (Army). It is further stated in the affidavit that appointment of the petitioner as DGMS (Army) for a short period is not in the service interest. It is, however, not disputed by the respondents that Major General Bhargava is proposed to be appointed as DGMS (Army) directly and hps been approved for rank of Lt. General on 7th May, 1991. However, at the hearing of the case, the learned counsel for the respondents took a different stand and contended that all the posts of seven officers of the rank of Lt General are equal in rank and status and the appointment of DGMS (Army) it a mere incident of posting. They have further reiterated that the petitioner was not selected for the post of DGMS (Army) in view of his short tenure as the petitioner was due to superannuate on 31.10.1991 The post of DGMS (Army) can not be claimed on the ground of seniority as Lt.’ General and appointment is to be made by selection based on service interest and continuity so that, the officer is capable of making fruitful contribution. It was thus submitted that nobody can claim appointment as his or her right when appointment is to be made by selection. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the petitioner does not stand to loose in any manner since the rank and emoluments are the same for both posts. Since, the petitioner continues as Lt. General, it can not be said that denial of the posts of DGMS (Army) amounts to any disadvantage in benefits and status.

7. Since the stand taken by the learned counsel at the hearing and the stand in counter affidavit was at variance, we summoned the record relating to the matter and perused the same very carefully. We do not propose to discuss details in this regard in view of the nature of the matter, however, we find that the record clearly indicates that the posts of DGMS (Army) does possess a higher status and authority. This fact is clearly borne out from the correspondence which forms part of the record. It is clear that the petitioner is denied the position, particularly, on the ground that he has a short tenure and thus may not be able to do justice to the assignment in the short tenure. It is, however, apparent from the record that in the past officers with short tenure were appointed to the post but now a deviation is made on the ground that it is the prerogative of the authorities to post the petitioner in any position it is deemed fit and proper.

8. On consideration of the rival contentions we find it difficult to accept the contention of the respondents that appointment to the post of DGMS (Army) is not of higher status and responsibility and is a matter of mere incidence of posting Although the post is held by an officer of the some rank as Lt. General yet the past it was always offered to the senior most officer in the rank of Lt. General. The contention of the respondents is not supported by the record of the case. We find that the stand taken by the learned counsel for the respondents at the hearing is rather contradictory. Whereas it is categorically averred in the counter affidavit that it is a selection post and the petitioner was not selected for appointment to the said post, at the hearing it was contended that the post is of equal status to the one already held by the petitioner and he is not posted as DGMS (Army) in view of his short tenure.

9. Assuming that respondents have mentioned selection in a loose sense other than normally understood in service terminology, and what is meant is selection for posting, the important question for consideration is whether all the seven posts in the cadre are equal status posts. Undoubtedly even when posting of officers is to be done there is some kind of selection inasmuch as an officer who is most fit for the job has to be posted to do a particular job. Such posting permit shuffling of officers from one post to another because all the posts are of same status and an officer in one post does not have to report to his equal in the other post. In the present case, however, we find that though DGAFMS, who is of the rank of Lt. Colonel does not report to DGMS (Army) the officer in the post of Commandant Armed Service Medical College who is also of the rank of Lt. Colonel in third tier reports to DGMS (Army). This clearly shows that all the seven Lt. Colonels though are of the same rank there is an internal seniority maintained in the cadre. Because naturally a senior man in the same rank cannot be required to report to a man junior in service. The respondents have not denied the various distinctive features Of the post of DGMS (Army)’ Thus, though the emoluments are the same, there can be no doubt that status and responsibility of DGMS (Army) is higher. In fact, that is one of the reasons why the respondents do not want to appoint an officer with short tenure to this post. We, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is not a matter of mere posting. In Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narain Mithila University v. Dayanand Jha (Supra) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the equivalence of the pay scale is not the only factor in judging whether the post of Principal and that of Reader are equivalent posts. The real criteria to adopt is whether they should be regarded of equal status and responsibility. In the present case, the respondents have neither denied in their counter-affidavit nor the record indicates otherwise that the post of DGMS (Army) carriers higher status and responsibility than the post the petitioner is occupying presently.

10. Further more since it is not disputed before us that in the post other officers with less than one year's tenure had held the post of GDMS (Army) DGMS (Air Force) and DGMS (Navy), denial of the post to the petitioner on that ground can not be sustained unless the respondents have as a matter of policy decided that in future also no officer with less than one year's service will be selected for the post of DGMS (Army). We suggested to the learned counsel for the respondents that in case such a policy decision is taken a categorical statement in that regard be made by way of an affidavit. He sought time to seek instructions in this regard, however, later, on instructions he expressed his inability to do so. Rather he submitted that it can be stated on oath that in future no person with less than one year's service will not be appointed.

11. We felt that it may not be necessary for us to interfere as there is a clear cut policy framed by the Authorities and the Government, however since no such categorical statement is forthcoming, the denial of the said post to the petitioner, on that ground, to our mind is unjustified. Certainly they can not be a policy only for one individual. The petitioner can not be deprived of the posting which admittedly is higher in status and responsibility at the concluding stage of his career unless a policy decision is taken. The respondents have no denied that the petitioner is a first class officer and always had an immaculate record of service and have not put forward any other reason for not selecting him to the post of DGMS (Army) We may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India (Supra) wherein the apex Court held that the persons subject to Army Act do not cease to be citizens and are equally entitled to the protection of their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court observed that:

‘Reluctance of the apex Court more Concerned with civil law to interfere with the internal affairs of the army is likely to create a distorted picture in the minds of the military personnel that persons subject to Atmy Act are not citizens of India. It is one of the cardinal features of our Constitution that a person by enlisting in or entering armed forces does not cease to be a citizen so as to wholly deprive him of his rights under the Constitution…”

12. The petitioner has a distinguished long career in the Army and there is no complaint about his ability and efficiency. It will be wrong to deny him a position of higher status and responsibility as there are the just expectition of an officer who is ripe for superannuation.

13. In view of the above, this petition deserves to be allowed. We direct the respondents to appoint the petitioner on the post of DGMS (Army) and grant him consequential benefits in this regard. There shall be no order in to costs.